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ABSTRACT

Basic facts are given about the social, economic, political, and military institutions of China. The handbook, which is one of a continuing series designed for those interested in foreign affairs, is a revision of one published in 1972. The 1981 edition focuses on historical antecedents and China's new modernization strategies. Arranged into 14 major topics, the handbook describes the general character of the society with information on its history, physical environment and population, social system, education and culture, economic structure, agriculture, industry, trade and transportation, science and technology, government, political processes, foreign policy, internal security, and national defense. Integrated within the text are artistic renditions of ancient artifacts, numerous photographs, 15 illustrative maps, economic and military graphs, and organizational charts depicting the structure of the Chinese Communist Party and other governmental systems. A glossary of terms and an extensive bibliography follow three appendices, which provide: (1) tables of metric conversion units, Pinyin equivalencies of Wade-Giles forms, a chronological listing of dynasties, major minority nationalities, and production and population tables; (2) excerpts of the 1972 Shanghai Communique and the 1979 Joint Communique; and (3) basic facts and figures concerning the People's Liberation Army of China. (LH)

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China
a country study

Area Handbook Series

Foreign Area Studies
The American University
Edited by
Frederica M. Bunge
and Rinn-Sup Shinn
Research Completed
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

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On the cover: Ink and sponge drawing of a pacing horse, in bronze, dating from the Eastern Han Dynasty (25–220 A.D.). Other representations of the arts of China over the centuries to be seen on the chapter title pages that follow.

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Foreword

This volume is one of a continuing series of books written by Foreign Area Studies, The American University, under the Area Handbook Program. Its title, format, and substance reflect modifications introduced into the series in 1978. The last page of this book provides a listing of other country studies published. Each book in the series deals with a particular foreign country, describing and analyzing its economic, national security, political, and social systems and institutions and examining the interrelationships of those systems and institutions and the ways that they are shaped by cultural factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic insight and understanding of the society under observation, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal of it. The study focuses on historical antecedents and on the cultural, political, and socioeconomic characteristics that contribute to cohesion and cleavage within the society. Particular attention is given to the origins and traditions of the people who make up the society, their dominant beliefs and values, their community of interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their involvement with the national institutions, and their attitudes toward each other and toward the social system and political order within which they live.

The contents of the book represent the views, opinions, and findings of Foreign Area Studies and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other official documentation. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Such corrections, additions, and suggestions for factual or other changes that readers may have will be welcomed for use in future revisions.

William Evans-Smith
Director, Foreign Area Studies
The American University
Washington, D.C. 20016

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The authors also wish to express their gratitude to members of the Foreign Area Studies staff who contributed directly to the preparation of the manuscript. These persons include Karen R. Sagstetter, Kathryn R. Stafford, Andrea T. Merrill, and Ann Paduda, who edited the manuscript with assistance from Janet B. Connors; Harriett R. Blood, who prepared the graphics; Rachel M. Johnson, indexer and Eloise W. Brandt and John Nuzzi, who typed the manuscript. The team appreciates as well the assistance provided by Gilda V. Nimer, librarian, and by Ernest Will, publications manager, who gave this book thoughtful attention through a series of production stages.

Grateful acknowledgment is given to Marty Ittner, who designed the cover as well as the illustrations of the title page of each chapter. Michael T. Graham of The American University Department of Art provided guidance on some of the pieces. The inclusion of photographs in this study was made possible by the generosity of various individuals and public and private agencies. We acknowledge our indebtedness especially to those persons who contributed original work not previously published.

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Preface

China: A Country Study supersedes the 1972 *Area Handbook for the People's Republic of China*. Because of the sweeping changes in the form and substance of many economic, social, and political institutions in the past decade, little material from the original volume has been incorporated in the present study. Sources of information used in the new edition have included scholarly journals and monographs, official reports of governments and international organizations, foreign and domestic newspapers, numerous periodicals, and interviews with individuals having special competence in Asian affairs. Chapter bibliographies calling attention to valuable sources of further reading appear at the end of each chapter.

The aim of the authors was to enhance in some small measure the reader's understanding of the nature of contemporary Chinese culture and society against a backdrop of the past. In view of the limited access of Western scholars to the country since 1949 and the paucity of information from Chinese sources until very recently, however, statistical reporting and descriptive material in this text contain obvious lacunae, and the interpretations and conclusions of the authors must necessarily be regarded as highly tentative. Many questions remain for further exploration by interested observers of Chinese affairs.

With certain important exceptions, Chinese personal and place names in this study are represented according to Pinyin rather than the Wade-Giles system of romanization, commonly used in Western-language publications on Chinese subjects. The decision to use Pinyin reflects its adoption by the government of the People's Republic of China as the exclusive system of transliteration of Chinese words and names in Western languages effective January 1, 1979. Pinyin is based on standard Beijing pronunciation. Place names in the text are taken from the Pinyin listings in the *Gazetteer of the People's Republic of China, July 1979*, compiled by the United States Board on Geographic Names (BGN). Some romanizations are identical in the two systems (see table 2, Appendix A).

The switchover to Pinyin poses a particular difficulty with respect to textual treatment of historical places and persons familiar to Western readers in their Wade-Giles spellings. As an accommodation, this study sometimes adds the Wade-Giles spelling in parenthesis. Wade-Giles spellings are used on the historical map (fig. 2) accompanying chapter one (apart from conventional names used in minority areas) and for Taiwanese place names.

Most libraries in the United States in the early 1980s were still entering and alphabetizing according to Wade-Giles, and the reader will find that author entries in the bibliographies in this study are predominantly given in Wade-Giles, in accordance with their spelling in the original publication. Recent works are of course in Pinyin.

Another circumstance taken into account in the editing of this study was the existence of conventional names for certain Chinese

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places and geographic features that are more familiar to Western readers than their Chinese equivalents. Sometimes the text notes the better known term of reference in passing, for example by referring to "Beijing University, formerly known as Peking University." The text employs some of these conventional names, and where space permitted, the conventional names have been given parenthetically on figures otherwise in Pinyin. For the reader's assistance, a listing of some conventional terms of reference and the Pinyin equivalents is provided (see table 3, Appendix A).

It should be noted too that in the text some generic parts of Chinese geographic names have been dropped in preference to their English equivalents. Thus *jiang* and *he* (river), *hai* (bay), *shan* and *ling* (mountain) have been used; but island, plateau, basin, plain, and desert, municipality, province, and autonomous region replace, respectively, *dao*, *gaoyuan*, *pendi*, *pingyuan*, and *shamo*, *shi*, *sheng*, and *zizhiqu*.

Measurements are given in the metric system; a conversion table is provided to assist those readers who are unfamiliar with metric measurements (see table 1, Appendix A). A Glossary is also included.

Country Profile



Country

Formal Name: People's Republic of China.

Short Form: China.

Term for Nationals: Chinese.

Capital: Beijing.

Geography

Size: Area about 9.6 million square kilometers; east to west distance about 5,000 kilometers; north to south distance some 5,500 kilometers.

Topography: Main topographic features include Tibet Plateau 4,000 meters above sea level and Kunlun, Qin Ling, and Greater

Khingan ranges. The Yangtze River and the Huang He are longest of country's numerous rivers extending for some 6,300 and 5,400 kilometers respectively.

Society

Population: Officially estimated at 971 million at end of 1979; annual rate of increase estimated officially at 1.17 percent in early 1979. Government figures established urban population of 110 million end of 1978, or 12–13 percent of total; other estimates suggested urban percentage possibly as great as 20 percent.

Education: Late 1970s about 95 percent of primary school age children attended school as compared with about 20 percent in 1949. About 146 million students were enrolled in nearly 950,000 primary schools. Secondary-level middle schools were divided into junior and senior stages, with majority at the lower level. About 65.5 million students attended secondary-level institutions. Intense competition for admission to the more than 600 colleges and universities. About 1 million students were enrolled in these various institutions—Beijing and Qinghua universities and some eighty other key universities were most prestigious. Technical education emphasized.

Ethnic Minorities: In 1978 China recognized fifty-five minority nationalities, numbering about 56 million persons, concentrated in the Northwest and Southwest. Not the largest, but most important politically were the Tibetans and the various Turkic groups who constituted a majority in Xizang (Tibet) and Xinjiang-Uygur autonomous regions respectively.

Health: Level of health and medical care improving. Network of provincial and county-level hospitals and local clinics in the countryside operated by collective agricultural units. Traditional and Western medicine both practiced. Average life expectancy of 68.2 years in 1979. Many epidemic diseases once widespread have been eradicated.

Economy

Salient Features: Centrally planned socialist economy; substantial portion of planning and control exercised at province or local level. Industry dominated by large state-owned enterprises; significant proportion of industrial labor force employed in smaller collectively owned enterprises. Agriculture predominately collectively owned in three-tier commune system. Agricultural units relatively autonomous, responsible for own profits, losses, investment, income distribution. Growth interrupted repeatedly by political upheavals and major changes in economic policy. Death of Mao Zedong in 1976 brought pragmatic leadership to power, shift from autarkic, ideologically oriented system to growing foreign trade, use of material incentives. In 1980 extensive decentralization of decisionmaking in progress, increased role of market forces, further growth in foreign trade.

Industry: Employed 10 percent of labor force but produced over 50 percent of gross national product (GNP). Fastest growing sector; average annual growth of 11 percent from 1952 to 1978. Wide range of technological levels; many small handicraft units; many enterprises used machinery installed or designed twenty and thirty years earlier; significant number of big, up-to-date plants, including textile mills, steel mills, chemical fertilizer plants, petrochemical facilities. Produced most types of products made by developed industrial nations but limited quantities of high technology items. Technology transfer by importing whole plants, equipment, and designs an important means of progress. Major industrial centers were Liaoning Province, the Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan region, Shanghai, and Wuhan. Mineral resources included huge reserves of iron ore; adequate to abundant supplies of nearly all other industrial minerals. Mining and ore processing technologically outdated but improving.

Agriculture: Employed 75 percent of labor force; proportion of GNP had declined to less than 30 percent in 1979. Low worker productivity due to scanty supplies of agricultural machinery and other modern inputs. Most agricultural processes still performed by hand. Arable land area very small in relation to size of country and population; only 11 percent of total area, as compared to 22 percent in United States. Intensive use of land; all fields produce at least one crop a year; wherever conditions permit, two or even three crops grown annually, especially in the south. Grain is most important product, including rice, wheat, corn, sorghum, barley, millet. Vegetables second in importance, many grown on private plots cultivated by individual peasant families. Wide variety of fruit grown. Poultry and pigs also grown on private plots; eggs a major product; pork supplies have increased steadily. Other livestock relatively limited in numbers, except for sheep and goats, which are grazed in large herds on grasslands of Nei Monggol Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolia) and Northwest. Substantial marine and freshwater fishery. Timber resources mainly located in Northeast and Southwest; most of country deforested centuries ago.

Energy Sources: Self-sufficient in all energy forms, exporting coal and petroleum in 1980. Coal reserves among world's largest; mining technology inadequately developed, but major investment and upgrading under way in 1980. Petroleum deposits only superficially tapped; known reserves very large. Suspected deposits in Northwest and offshore tracts believed to be among world's largest; exploration and extraction limited by scarcity of equipment and trained personnel; contracts for joint offshore exploration and production by Japanese and Western oil companies signed in 1979. Hydroelectric potential greatest in world, a fraction in use; very large hydroelectric projects under construction, even larger ones in planning stage. Hydroelectric potential constrained as of 1980 by limited capabilities of power transmission grids and generator manufacturers. Energy policy set out in 1980 called for primary reliance on coal for immediate and long-term power needs; increased construction of pit-mouth thermal electric generation plants. Hydroelectric power to become a major source by late 1980s; longer lead time for construction than thermal units. Petroleum production growth to continue in order to meet needs of nationwide mechanization and provide important foreign exchange, but domestic use to be restricted as much as possible.

Foreign Trade: Small by international standards and only 6 percent of GNP in 1979 but growing rapidly in size and importance. Trade controlled by Ministry of Foreign Trade and subordinate units, and by Bank of China, the foreign exchange arm of the central bank. Substantial decentralization and increased flexibility in foreign trade operations in late 1970s. The leading export category was textiles. Other important exports included foodstuffs and petroleum. Leading imports were industrial producer goods, particularly iron and steel, and advanced machinery, textile fibers, and foodstuffs. Japan dominant trading partner, accounting for almost 30 percent of imports to China and 20 percent of exports in 1979. Hong Kong leading market for exports but supplied only 7 percent of imports. In 1979 United States became second largest importer to China and third largest overall trade partner. Western Europe, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), also major trading partner. Tourism encouraged and growing.

Transport and Communications

Railroads: Basis of transportation system. Track in operation—51,300 kilometers. Some important lines were not double tracked and lacked modern equipment. Locomotives were 90 percent steam engines in 1979, but numbers of diesel and electric models rapidly growing. Freight cars numbered 251,000 in 1976. Railroads efficient within limits of track system. Expansion and improvement in progress in 1980.

Roads: 890,000 kilometers in 1979. Majority dirt or gravel surface; few paved, high-speed highways. Little interregional transportation by truck. Local roads intensively used by wide range of vehicles, from bicycles and animal carts through trucks and buses. Buses important form of passenger transportation.

Inland Waterways: 136,000 kilometers of navigable rivers, streams, lakes, canals carried 43.8 percent of freight traffic in 1979, only slightly less than railways. Rapid growth. Principal system is the Yangtze and its tributaries in Central and East China; major freight artery. Second is Zhu Jiang system in South.

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Maritime Shipping: Rapidly growing merchant fleet; 400 vessels of various types in 1979, total cargo capacity over 7 million tons. Major ports include Shanghai, Qingdao, Lüda (Dalian), Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, and Huangpu. Port facilities fairly modern and in process of substantial improvement.

Civil Aviation: 168,000 kilometers of domestic routes; 67,800 kilometers of international routes in 1979. State airline is General Administration of Civil Aviation of China known as CAAC. Tiny share of total freight and passenger traffic but important link to remote areas and foreign countries. In 1980 fleet included Soviet and British aircraft and recently acquired Boeing 707 and 747 jetliners. Modern new airport completed at Beijing in 1980.

Telecommunications: Telephone service to all parts of country. Telephones limited in number, but at least one locally available; local switching systems of poor quality, but international and long distance links by cable and satellite of high quality. Telegraph, facsimile, and telex all in use. Over 150 radio stations by mid-1970; transistorized radio receivers common in 1980, especially in cities. Vast wired broadcasting system including over 140 million loudspeakers carried radio transmissions into all rural units and many urban ones. Television system grew rapidly in late 1970s and 1980. Many urban families and growing numbers of rural units owned black and white or color sets in 1980.

Government and Politics

Party and Government: A unitary and "socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat" based on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong-Thought led by Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Political processes guided by Party Constitution of 1977 and State Constitution of 1978; constitutions stress the principle of "democratic centralism" under which representative organs of both party and state are elected by lower bodies and they in turn elect their administrative arms at corresponding levels. Within representative and executive bodies, minority must abide by the decisions of the majority; lower bodies obey the orders of the higher level organs. In theory the National Party Congress is highest organ of power of the party side but real center of power is Political Bureau (Politburo) of CCP Central Committee and still more select Standing Committee of this bureau. On government side National People's Congress (NPC) highest organ of state power but in reality merely rubber-stamps CCP policies and programs, despite efforts in 1980 to make NPC a serious forum for review and deliberations concerning government programs. State Council serves as equivalent of cabinet; key members also hold positions in important party organs.

Administrative Divisions: Divided into three tiers—twenty-one provinces, three centrally governed municipalities, and five autonomous regions; the middle tier consisting of autonomous prefectures, counties, autonomous counties, cities, and municipal districts; and the basic level comprising people's communes and towns.

Justice: Four-level court system. The Supreme People's Court in Beijing; higher people's courts in provinces, centrally governed municipalities, and autonomous regions; intermediate people's courts at prefectural level and also in parts of centrally governed municipalities, provinces, and autonomous regions; basic people's courts in the counties, towns, and municipal districts. Special courts handle matters affecting the military, railway transport, water transport, and forestry. The court system paralleled by a hierarchy of prosecuting organs called people's procuratorates; at apex stands the Supreme People's Procuratorate.

Foreign Affairs: Friendly and cooperative relations with many countries including the United States, Japan, and most industrially advanced Western nations. China regards itself as member of less developed bloc of countries known as the Third World. It has not joined any military alliance. Strains evident in Chinese relations with the Soviet Union, considered in Beijing as the main source of tensions and war, and Vietnam, regarded by Chinese as "the Cuba of Asia" and "regional hegemonist."

National Security

Armed Forces: Combined strength of combat and combat support units of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in 1980 was 4.3 million. Ground forces—3.6 million, the world's largest standing army. Navy—350,000 including those assigned to naval air forces. Air Force—estimated 400,000. Missile forces—no separate estimate available. Nonuniformed administrative and service support units—3–4 million.

Combat Units and Major Equipment: In September 1980 ground forces consisted of forty main-force armies including 120 infantry divisions; eleven armored and forty artillery and antiaircraft divisions; eighty-five regional-force border defense, garrison, and internal security divisions; nearly 300 main- and regional-force independent combat and combat support regiments. Navy—two nuclear-powered attack submarines (one nuclear-powered SSBN submarine under development), 100 diesel attack submarines, thirty major surface combatants (destroyers and frigates), seventy lesser combatants, 500 patrol boats (about half armed with Styx missiles). Air forces (including naval air)—thirty-eight air defense and fighter bomber divisions, fifteen bomber divisions, two–four reconnaissance regiments; total of over 6,000 combat aircraft. Missile Forces—thirty–forty MRBMs (range: 600–700 nautical miles), fifty–seventy IRBMs (1,500–1,700 nautical miles), two limited-range ICBMs (3,000–5,000 nautical miles), a full-range ICBM under development.

Military Budget: Officially estimated for 1980 at Y19.7 billion (for value of the yuan–Y–see Glossary). Western analysts estimated defense spending to be about 8 percent of GNP in 1980.

Police Agencies and Paramilitary: Police organized under national Ministry of Public Security. No estimate of police strength available. Supported by committees of grass-roots "mass organizations." Armed militia—about 7 million.


Xinjiang
Yining (Gulja)
Ürümqi
Gansu
Yumen (Laojunmiao)
Nei Monggol (Inner Mongolia)
Hailar
Heilongjiang
Qiqihar
Harbin
Changchun
Jilin
Vladivostok
Shenyang
Liaoning
Sea of Japan
Beijing
Hebei
Tianjin
Hohhot
Bo Hai
Lüda (Dalian)
Yinchuan
Taiyuan
Shijiazhuang
Ningxia
Indian claim
Xining
Qinghai
Lanzhou
Jinan
Shandong
Qingdao
Yellow Sea
Shanxi
Huang He
Xi'an
Shaanxi
Zhengzhou
Henan
Jiangsu
Anhui
Nanjing
Shanghai
Hangzhou
Hefei
Xizang (Tibet)
Hubei
Wuhan
Chang Jiang (Yangtze River)
Zhejiang
East China Sea
JAPAN
Lhasa
Chongqing
Chengdu
Sichuan
Nanchang
Changsha
Jiangxi
Hunan
Fuzhou
Fujian
Taipei
Guizhou
Guiyang
Xiamen
TAIWAN
Kunming
Yunnan
Guangxi
Guangdong
Guangzhou
Nanning
HONG KONG (U.K.)
MACAO (Port.)
Gulf of Tonkin
Bay of Bengal
South China Sea
Philippine Sea
PHILIPPINES
SOVIET UNION
International boundary
International boundary in dispute
Other line of separation
National capital
Provincial-level boundary
Provincial-level capital
City over 1,000,000 population
0 100 200 300 400 Miles
0 100 200 300 400 Kilometers

Figure 1. China

Map of India has been split up into two pages by ERIC.

Figure 1a

Introduction

AS THE 1980s BEGAN, all China was caught up in the modernization process. The leaders who had secured control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the government since the death of Party Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976 were setting the nation of nearly 1 billion persons on a new course. Focusing their vision on the year 2000, they had established a broad goal of "four modernizations," intended to bring China into the community of advanced industrial nations by the start of the next century.

The promotion of economic progress, with a strategy stressing pragmatism and reformism, had replaced ideological orthodoxy as the dominant theme of national life. The new party leaders strongly disagreed with the emphasis the Maoist approach had given to ideology—framed in terms of mass struggle and permanent revolution—and the concomitant subordination of economic policy to it and, accordingly, had made drastic changes in national priorities. Their policy of economic modernization rested on two major and, for China, innovative concepts: the use of market and profit incentives to promote production and the devolution of greater decision-making authority to managers at the local level. The implications of these concepts were revealed in the concerns of party planners in late 1980, who at that time began to speak of initiative, risk taking, and accountability, and those of workers and peasants, who now competed for profit incentives and bonuses.

The contrast between the pragmatic ethos of the "four modernizations" movement and the radical, egalitarian, isolationist mood of the late 1960s and mid-1970s was the latest manifestation of tension over development concepts within the Chinese leadership that had existed since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. At the conclusion of the Chinese Revolution in that year, Mao, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and his band of peasant supporters had envisioned a strong and prosperous China, all of whose people would eventually enjoy modest comfort and be free from the social inequalities and cruel deprivations of the past. Such a future necessitated economic growth and modernization, but measures that most effectively promoted this aspect of the nation's development often worked against socialist goals of equality in incomes, status, and opportunity. As the predominant concerns of Chinese leaders shifted between economic modernization and social equalization, corresponding swings in official policy often left foreign observers baffled.

From 1949 to the late 1950s the task of building the new China had been pursued in accordance with the Marxist ideological basis of the Chinese Revolution and with extensive scientific and technical assistance from the Soviet Union. Debate over policy lines produced no major fractures in party unity. By 1957, however, Mao had concluded that the Soviet approach to industrialization was

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inappropriate for the unique needs of China, and in 1958 he launched the abortive attempt to dramatically accelerate economic growth known as the Great Leap Forward (1958–60). This political and economic upheaval reflected Mao's belief that a population imbued with revolutionary zeal and wedded to the concept of self-reliance would bring added momentum to national development. Relying largely on human effort to achieve economic objectives set at unrealistically high levels, the Great Leap drained the population and caused serious damage to the economy. In its aftermath China's political pendulum swung to the right, and under party moderates, economic policy was less subordinated to ideological concerns.

By the mid-1960s, however, the issue of political and ideological correctness by Maoist criteria was once again in the fore. Mao had become increasingly concerned about what he saw as "capitalist tendencies" among senior party stalwarts and by growing evidence of the emergence of a new bureaucratic elite. Determined to arrest this tendency, he took steps to restore ideological purity, reinfuse the party and government bureaucracies with revolutionary fervor, and intensify class struggle. In 1966, aided by the more radical party and PLA elements later denounced as the Lin Biao and Gang of Four groups, he launched the Cultural Revolution with the deliberate intent of shaking up the party apparatus and government security organs.

The consequences for the country were catastrophic. Educated youth and other radicalized elements of society, whipped to a frenzy of ideological fervor by leaders of the Mao-Lin Biao faction, yielded to vicious excesses. Senior and middle-aged cadres were denounced, humiliated, and forcibly removed from their positions by Red Guards given license to act without reference to party discipline or judicial safeguards. Hundreds of thousands of persons, possibly a million, were purged and sent to the countryside. Many were killed or took their own lives. Schools and universities were closed, some for three years, many for nearly a decade. Widespread destruction and massive civil disorder ensued, the country eventually brought to the brink of anarchy.

By 1968 the momentum of the campaign subsided as events in the outside world focused the attention of the country's leaders on dangers from abroad. The conflict, and the subsequent shock of an attempted military coup in 1971 led by Lin Biao, left the country wracked by political dissension and factionalism, its economy disorganized, its people frightened and unsure. Slowly, moderate and pragmatic party elements were politically rehabilitated and regained a foothold in the power structure. Until Mao's death in 1976, however, they were locked in a power struggle with the party chairman and the ultraleftist Gang of Four, led by Mao's wife, Jiang Qing. After Mao's death, party leaders moved quickly against the Gang of Four, and the political pendulum swung once again to the right. Ranking party leaders expressed open, profound relief that the eleven-year period encompassing the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath was over. In late 1980 they espoused the view that much had been learned from the vicissitudes of that experience and that it had provided the impetus to make reforms.

Support for reform was not without opposition. Even at the highest levels there were people who owed a great deal to the late party chairman. With the Gang of Four imprisoned, however, the moderate leadership gradually strengthened its grip on power—first under the leadership of Party Vice Chairman Hua Guofeng and later under the leadership of Party Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping. Deng and his supporters recognized that in this era of reconstruction and rebuilding, continued popular legitimacy would depend substantially on their ability to maintain a peaceful and stable social order and on their expressed interest in promoting responsive government. In the long run the basic issue to be resolved was how to maintain control yet guard against abuses of power and the stifling of initiative.

Given China's experience in the past century the odds were not in favor of continued political stability projected over more than two decades. Change in China in modern times has been recurrent and enormously complex. The closing centuries of the imperial era had been punctuated by crisis, reform, and rebellion, the succeeding decades shattered by warlordism, Japanese aggression, and civil war. In the three decades of socialist rule, the pattern had not changed. Quite the contrary, as the political pendulum shifted from left to right and back again, the society was shaken by major upheavals and dramatic reversals in rapid succession. As the Chinese people considered their future in the light of these past upheavals and discontinuities, some were guardedly optimistic, others determined to make current CCP policies work, still others cynical and disillusioned.

In bringing about the dramatic, complex, and at times contradictory changes in Chinese society since 1949, Mao, a revolutionary romanticist of complexity and contradiction, stood paramount. During his time, despite the many costly mistakes, much had been accomplished. Especially during the first decade of the People's Republic, Mao's hope for and vision of a strong and prosperous socialist society seemed to be bearing fruit. Party planners, concerned about building political solidarity, devoted immense effort to improving the lot of the tradition-bound peasantry, who made up 80 percent of the population, and closing the chasm between them and the better fed, housed, and educated, urban segment. Famine, which once haunted the land, was curbed except for an interlude in the early 1960s, and hundreds of millions of peasants came to know what it was to eat regularly. Education and health care spread to the countryside. During the period of transition to socialism in the mid-1950s, the Party organized a land reform movement, strengthened its control over the society, and consolidated the rural population in a new system of economic and political organization based on the commune.

For the 1980s leadership, modifying Mao's priorities was one thing, but dealing with his place in history was quite another. The legacy of the Cultural Revolution and Mao's later years of rule was of hate and injustice, political infighting, economic imbalance, and popular frustration. Nevertheless, the late party chairman was also remembered as the father of the Chinese Revolution, the preeminent leader of the CCP for more than forty years; in short, the man without whom the People's Republic would never have come into being. A repudiation of Mao would strike at the very foundations of Party and government. Beyond this, many of the senior leaders were longtime Mao associates, some still aligned with his policies. The leadership seemed to resolve the matter by compromise. "Chairman Mao committed mistakes," Deng told an Italian journalist in late summer 1980, but "the contributions he gave the Chinese revolution cannot be obliterated and the Chinese people will always cherish his memory." Mao's relation to the Gang of Four, however, was a troubling issue which, in September 1980 on the eve of their trial, refused to go away.

While delicately reducing Mao's godlike image, China's leaders were spearheading the drive for economic modernization, based on pragmatic and flexible lines. In the China of the early 1980s there was great diversity in income levels among regions, provinces, counties, communes, brigades, and individual families. Many people were poor, but none starved and none were excessively wealthy. Given the fact that the country contained almost one-quarter of the world's population, this was an impressive accomplishment.

Nonetheless serious economic imbalances and deficiencies existed, by no means attributable solely to the recent political chaos. Transportation networks were inadequate, power shortages frequently occurred, factory equipment was outdated, and labor productivity low. Pollution and environmental degradation gave cause for deep concern.

Identifying bureaucratic inertia as a central political issue, high-level party officials called for the retirement of senior cadres and elderly officials and their replacement with younger, and presumably more efficient, energetic, and resourceful, managers. Insufficient flexibility to the planning process was a further weakness, so policy was modified to put more initiative at the lower levels. Additionally, greater reliance was placed on profit incentives, bonuses, and private production of small crops among the peasants. Unemployed urban workers were encouraged to become private entrepreneurs in sidewalk enterprises. Mao had stressed revolutionary zeal in the national development process; technical competence was secondary at best. Deng took a different view:

> Being expert certainly does not mean being red. However to be red, it is also necessary to be expert. No matter what you trade, if you are not expert, if

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> you do not understand things, and if you give blind orders which damage the people's interest and delay the development of production and construction, it is out of the question to say you are red.

Another widely quoted assertion by Deng made the point more succinctly. "It does not matter if the cat is black or white; as long as it catches mice, it is a good cat."

Along with the de-emphasis of ideology, CCP policies of pragmatism and reformism reached into every corner of society. Nowhere did the impact strike more deeply than with respect to the family and the problem of population growth. China's burgeoning population was a major impediment to the modernization effort and the goal of raising the standard of living of the people, and in late 1980 the Party was trying hard to limit population growth. Couples were encouraged by economic incentives to have only one child and were punished for having more than two. Government and party cadres were assigned a central role in a newly created nationwide family planning network and were encouraged personally to make themselves models of successful family planning.

The implications of realistic approaches to promote economic progress were visible in other areas as well. Direct elections at the county level were introduced in 1980. Legal reforms followed a review of the entire legal structure, the intent of which was to prevent any return to the abuse or misuse of power by single individuals such as had occurred during and after the Cultural Revolution. In another realm, the emphasis on mass education was shifted toward elitist training of scientific and technical experts, and political content in the curriculum was reduced. Scientists and other intellectuals were rehabilitated, accorded respected positions, given a positive research environment, and encouraged to exchange ideas with Western scholars. Science and technology were seen as the key to modernization of agriculture, industry, and national defense.

The issue of military modernization had been much debated in China since the Korean War, which had revealed deficiencies in the equipment and tactics of the PLA. Advocates of modernization pressed their case with varying degrees of success over the years, especially invoking the Soviet threat after that country's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and clashes on the Sino-Soviet border in 1969. The Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 may have strengthened their plea for updated equipment. In the late 1970s Chinese delegations visited Western Europe and the United States, viewing arms and equipment; in 1980 after further exchanges of visits, the United States agreed to sell China some dual-use technology. Only minimal funding for such purchases was available, and in late 1980 senior military officers grudgingly postponed increases in defense spending and conceded that overall economic modernization in science, technology, and manufacturing was a prerequisite for defense modernization.

As China entered the decade of the 1980s, its status as a major world power appeared likely to increase especially if it succeeded in its current drive toward the "four modernizations." The management of external affairs had assumed critical importance, and the pragmatic and flexible thrust of China's new foreign policy positively emphasized the country's access to foreign technology, capital, and essential goods. In principle the leadership continued to stress self-reliance, but its healthy respect for, and appreciation of, a Western-oriented foreign policy—as distinguished from the pro-Soviet and isolationist foreign policy stances of earlier years—was manifest beyond any shred of doubt. There were few inhibitions in Chinese efforts to reach out to every corner of the world for friendship, goodwill, and reciprocity—efforts dictated by the compelling need for a stable regional environment and internal peace within which to pursue the goals of modernization. Equally compelling was the need to mobilize world opinion against the perceived threat of the Soviet Union against China.

The nation's forward-looking posture as it entered the new decade complemented an abiding interest in the past shared by many Chinese. With the world's longest continuous history, most Chinese were acutely aware of themselves in the perspective of human time. They shared a strong sense of the ancient traditions of their civilization and were imbued with a belief in the superiority of Chinese achievements in art, intellect, and social institutions over those of other peoples of the world.

Contemporary historians on mainland China have rewritten the past according to classic Marxist tenets, and the contributions of Confucius and other historic personages of the precommunist era to Chinese culture have at times been downplayed or denigrated. Nevertheless, aspects of traditional life and thought by no means disappeared from the scene. Artistic and literary achievements of the past were in general highly valued, and some of the many classic tales and romantic legends had clearly influenced the approach of contemporary leaders to modern problems.

Thus the China of 1980 was a complex amalgam of old and new. The communist victory in 1949 had swept away much of the form and substance of institutions of the past. But other elements of the traditional order persisted, either because they had been selectively built up and reinforced by CCP leaders for their own purposes or because these institutions and modes of thought and behavior—deeply rooted in the society and imbued with great meaning for many people—persisted despite communist objection.

The foreign observer interested in understanding the changes of recent decades has been faced with a difficult and frustrating task, since meaningful information was deliberately withheld from the outside world before Mao's death. The past few years have brought a major reversal of this policy, however, and a dramatic new openness to foreign contact. The new openness has witnessed the welcoming of great numbers of foreign tourists, scholars, and businesspeople to

China; the expansion of foreign trade and the establishment of a few joint ventures; and the exchange of state visits with Western countries and East European communist countries.

In late 1980 China's leaders stressed the grave danger to world peace from Soviet efforts to dominate other countries, but they also faced sobering realities on the domestic front. The country had to support nearly one-quarter of the human race. Its vast population made governing a cumbersome, difficult task. Eighty percent of its people were in rural areas, including minority nationalities near the borders whose cultures and languages differed from those of the Han majority. The gap between China's peasantry and its urban population had widened recently, despite the best efforts of its socialist planners.

Of all the strains associated with the modernization process, however, among the most critical and certainly disturbing to the authorities was growing alienation, disillusionment, and deviant behavior among Chinese youth. Young Chinese born since 1949 lacked the revolutionary inspiration that had sustained Mao's generation, and in the wake of the catastrophic events of the recent past many were less than sanguine about prospects for the future. Dissatisfaction and personal frustration were particularly acute among that component of the under-thirty-five age group that had been forcibly resettled in the countryside to defuse competition for scarce urban jobs, particularly among those who had thrown in their lot with Mao during the Cultural Revolution. In 1980 millions of young Chinese were living in rural areas under these circumstances, angry and frustrated at not being allowed to return to the cities. Adding to their bitterness and despair was the feeling they had been passed by as a "lost generation" and that other, younger persons were being given educational and other opportunities that promised a better future than the one seemingly in store for them. The situation of educated youth was of deep concern to China's leaders, hard pressed to find a solution in view of the critical unemployment problem in the cities.

The view of millions of China's youth notwithstanding, the mood of the country in late 1980 was hopeful and determined. Optimism about the future was tempered with a strong degree of realism about existing impediments. The sophisticated senior leadership was well aware of the opportunities and dangers that lay ahead and was carefully nurturing a promising new generation of leaders to assume the challenging responsibilities of the coming years.

September 30, 1980

* * *

As the manuscript for this book was being completed in the late summer of 1980, China's economic situation worsened. In September the Party further renounced the ten-year plan for 1976–85, the schedule of which had been abandoned in October 1976; it blamed leftist sabotage for the drafting of a program in which targets were too high and scale of capital construction too great. Continued unemployment in urban areas, declining spending power brought on by inflation, and deficits in the state budget confirmed in early 1981 that the "readjustment" measures instituted two years earlier were not sufficiently stringent. These circumstances provided a strong rationale for slackening the pace of modernization, and by early 1981 a full-blown retrenchment program had been launched. Goals for long-range plans were scaled down and were accompanied by drastic budgetary reductions, sharp cutbacks on capital construction, and cancellation of large orders for foreign equipment. Among projects suspended or postponed were the huge petrochemical complex in Nanjing and the second phase of the Baoshan steel mill. At the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, meeting in Beijing in June 1981, the Party asserted that the root of the economic problem lay in "leftist" mistakes of the past, in "trying to exceed our actual capabilities and ignoring the returns," and it promised a new era of slow but steady economic development in orderly stages.

Retrenchment, as the Party was only too aware, would add to stresses already present in the society. The ripple effect of decreased spending power and widespread unemployment was reflected in pockets of labor unrest and increased criminal activity. Discontent had surfaced within the rank and file of the PLA over farm policy, even as food shortages spread through the country in the wake of the worst drought to hit northern China in thirty-eight years and violent floods along the Yangtze that left millions homeless or living on government-issued rations.

Notwithstanding these concerns, Deng could take satisfaction in political developments over the same period, from the conviction of the Gang of Four on charges of counterrevolution in January, to the dramatic events at the party plenum in June, which saw his position further consolidated. The tumultuous trial in Beijing, spanning several months, had ended with a guilty verdict for all the accused. Mao's widow, Jiang Qing, had been given a death sentence with a two-year reprieve. At the party plenum, which coincided with the sixtieth anniversary party celebrations, a major breakthrough was revealed in the consensus, after more than a year's debate, over the touchy question of Mao's place in history. In a lengthy party communiqué, Mao was sharply criticized for great mistakes during the Cultural Revolution but lauded as a great proletarian revolutionary whose merits were primary and errors secondary. In the meantime the ouster of Mao's handpicked successor, Hua Guofeng, from the chairmanship proved more difficult than anticipated but was finally accomplished. Deng's protégé, Hu Yaobang, was elevated to the post from which Hua Guofeng had resigned. Hua, given a face-saving position on the Standing Committee of the Politburo, also resigned as chairman of the party's Military Commission in favor of Deng. An easing of tensions in party-army relations was evident in party pronouncements at the meeting.

July 24, 1981 Frederica M. Bunge

Chapter 1. Historical Setting

Some of the earliest archaeological evidence dates from the Shang Dynasty (ca. sixteenth century–eleventh century B.C.), including this bronze mask discovered in a ruler's tomb at Anyang.

ALTHOUGH EARLIER CIVILIZATIONS elsewhere have flourished and become extinct, China has the world's oldest continuous history and culture. Samples of archaic Chinese writing, out of which the modern written language evolved, have been found dating back to the second millennium B.C. At that time Chinese civilization, sprouting along the Huang He valley of North China had already acquired some of its distinctive and enduring characteristics.

The Chinese have developed a strong sense of history and have kept voluminous records since very early times. It is largely as a result of these records that information concerning the ancient past, not only of China but also of surrounding Asia, has survived.

Chinese history, until the twentieth century, was written mostly by members of the ruling scholar-officials class and was meant to provide the ruler with established precedents to guide or justify his policies. The historians confined their accounts almost exclusively to events pertaining to the king or emperor and to the relatively small circle of people with whom the ruler dealt. Their writings told of a succession of dynasties, each one following a cyclical pattern of rising, flourishing, decaying, and falling.

Of various recurrent patterns identified by independent historians, a salient one has been the capacity of the Chinese to absorb the people of contiguous areas into their own civilization because of the superiority of their ideographic written language, their technology, and their political institutions; the refinement of their artistic and intellectual creativity; and the weight of their sheer numbers. The process of assimilation continued over the centuries through conquest and colonization until what is now known as China Proper (see Glossary) was completely brought under an effective rule. It spread gradually to outlying regions, and the Chinese also left an enduring mark on the people beyond their borders, especially the Koreans, Japanese, and Vietnamese.

Another recurrent historical theme has been the unceasing struggle of the sedentary Chinese against the continual threat posed to their safety and their way of life by non-Chinese peoples on the margins of their territory in the north, northeast, and northwest. At first the chief threat came from the steppes of northern and northwestern Asia. The Mongols became the first alien people to conquer all China in the thirteenth century but, not as culturally developed as the Chinese, they left only a minimal imprint on Chinese civilization. China came under alien rule for the second time in the mid-seventeenth century; the conquerors—the Manchus—came again from the north and northeast.

For centuries virtually all the foreigners that Chinese rulers saw came from the less developed societies along their land borders, and this conditioned the Chinese view of the outside world. The Chinese

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saw their domain as the self-sufficient center of the universe and hence the traditional Chinese name for their country—Zhongguo, literally Middle Kingdom or Central Nation. China was seen surrounded on all sides by so-called barbarian peoples whose cultures were demonstrably inferior by Chinese standards.

The China-centered view of the world remained undisturbed at the time of the first serious confrontation with men from the western world in the nineteenth century. China had taken it for granted that its relations with Europeans would be conducted according to patterns of patronage and tribute payment that had evolved over the centuries between the emperor and representatives of the lesser states on China's borders. But once humiliated militarily by the superior technology and weaponry of the West and faced with imminent territorial dismemberment, China began to reassess its position with respect to western civilization and to determine what aspects could be usefully adapted to serve its own needs. The millennia-old dynastic system of imperial government was brought down in 1911 by its inability to make this reassessment and readjustment successfully.

Given the length and complexity of China's past, the history of the Middle Kingdom lends itself to varied interpretations. There are many different versions, depending on a scholar's interests and training. Since the communist takeover in 1949, historians on mainland China have added their own interpretation of the past—a history of China framed according to a Marxist pattern of progression from primitive communism to slavery to feudalism to capitalism to socialism. History has come to be presented essentially as a function of the class struggle. Historiography in China became subordinated to the higher demand of proletarian politics fashioned and directed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). By the 1960s independent historical research and writing in China had become virtually extinct through a series of thought reform and antirightist campaigns directed against the intellectuals in the arts, sciences, and academic community (see ch. 9, Science and Technology).

In the years after 1978, however, there was a surging interest within the CCP and outside it as well in restoring the integrity of historical inquiry. This was consistent with the party's commitment to what might be called a "Speak the Truth" campaign. As a result, historians and social scientists raised probing questions concerning the state of historiography in China. An academic symposium held in Beijing in October 1979, for example, was focused on what *Guangming Ribao* (October 27, 1979) called "the major experiences and lessons in the science of historical research during the last 30 years." This source stated that at the symposium, "everyone emancipated his mind, eliminated lingering fear, expressed his own views, and broke down forbidden zones" in the true spirit of "academic democracy."

The range of topics debated at the symposium appeared to underscore the scholarly concern of the participants—whether history should continue to serve proletarian politics or whether historical research should be guided by the principle of "let a hundred schools of thought contend" in a freer and more "democratic" academic environment. Other topics focused on whether peasant uprisings were "revolutions" or "peasant movements"; whether the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966–68 (see Glossary) should or should not be interpreted as "a rebellion against the proletariat"; and whether the "phenomenon of criticizing the bourgeoisie on sight and praising the peasants on sight" might not result in the enlargement of class content in the writing of history. Despite these hard and searching questions, there was as yet no indication in late 1980 whether historiography in mainland China would undergo any substantive change away from the conventional Marxist approach. In any case, the fact that critical questions were being posed obviously with the blessings of the CCP represented a potentially significant development.

The Ancient Dynasties

The origins of Chinese civilization are still shrouded in mythology that begins with Pangu (P'an-ku), the creator of the universe, followed by a succession of legendary sovereigns or culture heroes who taught the ancient Chinese the essential skills. The first prehistoric dynasty is said to be Xia, from about 2200 to 1500 B.C. (see table 4, Appendix A). No archaeological evidence of this dynasty has yet been unearthed.

The Dawn of History

Dozens of archaeological findings in the Huang He valley—the apparent cradle of Chinese civilization—lend credence, though far from definitive, to the existence of a Shang dynasty, roughly from 1766 to 1027 B.C. The Shang (also called Yin) Dynasty is believed to have been founded by a rebel leader who overthrew the last Xia ruler. Its civilization was based on agriculture, augmented by hunting and animal husbandry. Two important events of the period were the development of a writing system as revealed in the specimens of archaic Chinese writing found on the oracle bones and the use of bronze metallurgy. A number of ceremonial bronze vessels with inscriptions on them are believed to date from the Shang period; the workmanship on the bronzes attests to a high level of civilization.

A line of hereditary Shang kings ruled over much of North China, and Shang troops fought frequent wars with neighboring settlements and nomadic herdsmen from the steppes. The capitals, one of which was at Anyang (An-yang), known locally as Zhangde, were centers of glittering court life. Court rituals to propitiate spirits and to honor sacred ancestors were highly developed. In addition to his secular position the king was the head of the ancestor and spirit worship cult. Evidence from the royal tombs indicates that royal personages were buried with articles of value, presumably for use in the afterlife. Perhaps for the same reason, hundreds of commoners, who may have been slaves, were buried alive with the royal corpse.

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The Zhou Period

The last Shang ruler, a despot, was overthrown by a chieftain of a frontier tribe called Zhou, which was settled along the banks of the Wei He valley in modern Shanxi Province. The Zhou Dynasty had its capital at Hao, near the modern city of Xi'an (Hsi-an, or Sian). Sharing the language and culture of the Shang, the early Zhou rulers through conquest and colonization gradually sinicized (meaning, at the time, the extension of Shang culture) much of China Proper north of the Yangtze River. The Zhou Dynasty lasted longer than any other—from 1122 to 249 B.C. Official historians of the dynasty first enunciated the doctrine of the "Mandate of Heaven," the notion that the ruler (the "Son of Heaven") governed by right of the power divinely invested in him and that, if he were dethroned, his fallen fate was proof of having lost the mandate. The doctrine permitted them to explain and justify the demise of the two earlier dynasties and at the same time provided the legitimacy for the authority of rulers that would be invoked by royal apologists from then on.

Accurate or not, many students of Chinese history label the Zhou period as "feudal" because some of its features are believed to be similar if not identical to those of medieval Europe. Zhou kings, for example, parceled out their kingdom to hereditary regional vassals or lords, who ruled autonomously through a hereditary warrior aristocracy. The Zhou political order was essentially anchored on personal bonds between the king and his regional lords. The stability of this relationship was at first ensured by the formidable power of the royal court, the familial ties of the ruling elite between the center and the regional states, and the common danger stemming from so-called barbarians—the non-Chinese tribes of the interior and the warlike nomads of the inhospitable steppes and deserts of the north and western frontiers.

In 771 B.C. the Zhou court was sacked and its king killed by invading barbarians who were allied with rebel lords. Its capital was moved eastward to Luoyang in the present-day province of Henan. Because of this shift historians divide the Zhou era into Western Zhou (1122–771 B.C.) and Eastern Zhou (771–256 B.C., or 771–249 B.C.). With its royal line broken, the relocated Zhou court was gradually reduced to a fraction of its earlier power; the fragmentation of the kingdom accelerated. Eastern Zhou actually divides into two subperiods. The first half from 722 to 481 B.C. is called the Spring and Autumn Period after a famous historical chronicle of the time; the second half is the era of the Warring States (402–221 B.C.). (Overlapping or discrepancy in dating occurs from the Chinese practice of counting time not by centuries as in the West but, as Edwin Reischauer and John Fairbank noted, by using "the dynasty as the major unit of historical time, and within that unit various subdivisions.")

The Hundred Schools of Thought

The era of the Warring States, though marked by civil strife, witnessed a ferment and flowering of Chinese thought and culture.

Griffin-like, winged mythical animal, inlaid with silver; warring states period (402–221 B.C.). Courtesy China Pictorial

Bronze square Zun (tsun), a ritual wine vessel with animal face design, Shang Dynasty (sixteenth century B.C.–1066 B.C.). Courtesy China Pictorial

Partially excavated warriors, sculpted in clay, unearthed at the recently discovered burial site of the first emperor, near Xi'an. Chinese archaeologists are excavating this army of more than 7,500 figures buried over 2,000 years ago. Courtesy China Pictorial

The atmosphere of reform and of new thought is attributed to the struggle for survival among warring regional lords who competed in building strong and loyal armies and in increasing economic production to ensure a broader base for collection of taxes. For this they needed ever-increasing numbers of skilled, literate professionals. The requirements for economic growth and loyal armies led to new recruitment procedures based on merit and upward mobility for a small number of commoners, as well as stimulation of commerce through the introduction of coinage and technological improvements. Iron came into general use, making possible not only the forging of weapons of war but also the manufacture of plows and tools. Public works on a grand scale—such as flood control, irrigation projects, and canal digging—were executed. Enormous walls were built around cities and along the broad stretches of the northern frontier.

So many different ideas blossomed that the Chinese accounts refer, figuratively, to a "hundred schools" of thought. Many of the thinkers were itinerant intellectuals who, besides teaching their disciples, were employed as advisers to one or another of the various state rulers on the methods of government, war, and diplomacy.

The school of thought that had the most enduring effect on subsequent Chinese life was the one founded by Kongfuzi (K'ung-fu-tzu), or Master Kung (551–479 B.C.), known to the West as Confucius. For an ideal social and political order Confucius looked to the early days of Zhou rule but believed that the only way such a system could be made to work properly was for each person to perform his or her assigned role. "Let the ruler be a ruler and the subject a subject," he said, but added that to rule properly a king must be virtuous. To Confucius, the functions of government and social stratification were facts of life to be sustained by morals, not force. He stressed remolding people's minds through education and the observance of rules of etiquette and decorum.

Mencius, or Mengzi (Meng-tzu; 372–289 B.C.), a Confucian follower, developed the humanism of Confucian thought further, declaring that man is by nature good. He also introduced the idea that a ruler cannot govern without the people's tacit consent and that the penalty for unpopular, despotic rule was the loss of the Mandate of Heaven.

Diametrically opposed to Mencius was the interpretation of Xunzi (Hsun-tzu; ca. 300–237 B.C.), another brilliant Confucian follower. He preached that man was innately selfish and evil and that self-cultivation for goodness was possible only through education and proper conduct according to status. Xunzi also argued that the best government was one based on authoritarian control, not ethical or moral persuasion.

Xunzi's unsentimental and authoritarian inclinations were developed into a doctrine of what came to be called legalism. The doctrine was formulated by Hanfeizi (Han-fei-tzu; d. 233 B.C.) and Li Si (Li Ssu; d. 208 B.C.), who maintained that man's nature is incorrigibly

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selfish and therefore the only way to preserve the social order is to impose discipline from above and to enforce laws strictly. The legalists exalted the state and sought its prosperity and martial prowess above the welfare of the common people. Legalism became the philosophic basis for the imperial form of government.

Taoism, the second most important stream of Chinese thought, also developed during the Zhou period. Its formulation is attributed to a legendary sage, Laozi (Lao-tzu—Old Master), said to predate Confucius, and to Chuan Chou (369–286 B.C.). The focus of Taoism is man in nature rather than man in society. It holds that the goal of life for each individual is to find his own personal adjustment to the rhythm and patterns of the natural (and supernatural) world, to follow the Way (tao) of the universe. In many ways the opposite of the rigidity of Confucian moralism, Taoism proved to many of its adherents to be complementary. A scholar on duty as an official would usually follow Confucian teachings but on holiday or in retirement might well seek the harmony with nature of a Taoist recluse.

Another strain of thought that can be traced back to philosophies current in the Eastern Zhou period is the belief that all nature or cosmic forces are composed of mutually complementary opposites: yang, which is sun, light, hot, male, and positive; and yin, which is moon, dark, cold, female, and negative. One school of thought that originated in the fifth century B.C. but disappeared two centuries later was Mohism, founded by Mozi (Mo-tzu), who was active sometime between 479 and 381 B.C. Mozi preached universal love, which implied the rejection of Confucian filial piety, and frugal living and ran counter to the Confucian stress on music and elaborate ceremonies. Pacifism was also emphasized, warfare being regarded as wasteful and not enriching the life of the people. Mohism failed to survive the Western Zhou era apparently because of its conflicting values with the more moderate and practical teachings of Confucianism.

The Imperial Era

The First Imperial Period

Much of what came to constitute China Proper was unified for the first time in 221 B.C. In that year the western frontier state of Qin (Ch'in, from which is derived the outsiders' designation of China)—one of the several, and perhaps the most aggressive, of the warring states—subjugated other rival powers. The king of Qin took for himself the grandiloquent title of First Emperor Qin Shi Huangdi (Shih Huang-ti) and proceeded to apply Qin's centralized, nonhereditary bureaucratic system to the empire. In abolishing the feudal order throughout the empire, the Qin kings relied heavily on legalist scholar-advisers. The process of centralization, accompanied by ruthless methods, centered on the standardization of legal codes and bureaucratic procedures, the forms of writing, coinage, and the pattern of thought and scholarship. To silence criticism of imperial rule, many dissenting Confucian scholars were banished or put to death and their books confiscated and burned. Qin's aggrandizement was aided by frequent military expeditions, pushing forward frontiers in the north and the south as well. To fend off barbarian intrusion, the various fortification walls previously built by the warring states were connected to make a 3,300-kilometer-long Great Wall. A number of public works projects were also undertaken to consolidate and strengthen the imperial rule. These activities required enormous levies of manpower and resources, not to mention repressive measures. Revolts broke out as soon as the First Emperor died in 210 B.C., and the dynasty was extinguished less than twenty years after its triumph. The imperial system Qin initiated, however, set a pattern that was developed over the next 2,000 years.

After a short civil war a new dynasty called Han (206 B.C.–A.D. 220) emerged with its capital at what was then called Chang'an, later known as Xi'an. The new empire retained much of Qin's administrative structure but instituted a semifeudal pattern in some areas for the sake of political convenience. The Han rulers, of course, modified some of the harsher aspects of the previous dynasty. Confucian ideals of government, out of favor during the Qin period, were adopted as the creed of the Han empire, and Confucian scholars gained prominent status as the core of the civil service. A rudimentary system of civil service examination was also initiated. Intellectual, literary, and artistic endeavors revived and flourished. The Han period produced China's most famous historian, Sima Qian (Ssu-ma Ch'ien; 145–87 B.C.?), whose work *Shiji (Shih-chi)*, or *Historical Records*, provides a detailed chronicle from the time of a legendary Xia emperor to that of Han's emperor Wu Ti (141–87 B.C.). Technological advances also marked this period. Two of the great Chinese inventions, paper and porcelain, date from Han times.

The Han Dynasty, after which the members of the ethnic majority in China are named as the "people of Han," was notable also for its military prowess. The empire was expanded westward as far as the rim of the Tarim Basin, making possible relatively secure caravan traffic across Central Asia to Antioch, Baghdad, and Alexandria. The paths of the caravan traffic are often called "the silk route" because the Romans used the route to import Chinese silk. Chinese armies also invaded and annexed parts of northern Vietnam and northern Korea toward the end of the second century B.C. Han's control of peripheral regions was generally insecure, however. To ensure peace with distant non-Chinese local powers, the Han court developed a mutually beneficial relationship that came to be known as a tributary system. Non-Chinese states were allowed to remain autonomous in exchange for symbolic acceptance of Han overlordship, and tributary ties were confirmed and strengthened through intermarriage at the ruling level and periodic exchange of gifts and goods as well.

The Han rule, though interrupted briefly, was later restored and enjoyed another two centuries of power. In A.D. 220, however, a combination of palace intrigues, popular unrest, and external pressures from the northern steppes brought the dynasty to an end. The demise is also attributed to the weakening of the intellectual and religious consensus at home resulting from the introduction of Buddhism from India in the late Han era.

Era of Disunity

The collapse of Han was followed by nearly four centuries of rule by warlords. The age of civil wars and disunity began with the era of the "Three Kingdoms" (A.D. 221–80). In later times fiction and drama would greatly romanticize the reputed chivalry of this period. Unity was restored briefly in the early years of the Jin Dynasty (265–420), but Jin could not for long contain the invasions of the nomadic peoples. In 317 the Jin court was forced to flee and reestablished itself at Nanjing (Nan-ching, or Nanking) to the south. This transfer of capital in effect meant China's political division into a succession of dynasties that was to last from A.D. 317 to 589. During this period the process of sinicization accelerated in both parts, among the non-Chinese arrivals in the north and among the aboriginal tribesmen in the southern areas. This process was also accompanied by a progressive popularity of Buddhism in both North and South China. Despite the political disunity of the times, there were notable technological advances. The inventions of gunpowder (at that time for use in fireworks only) and the wheelbarrow are believed to date from the sixth or seventh centuries. Advances in medicine, astronomy, and cartography are also noted by historians.

Restoration of Empire

China was reunified in A.D. 589 by the short-lived Sui Dynasty. Its early demise is attributed to the government's tyrannical demands on the people who bore the crushing burden of taxes and compulsory labor. These resources were overstrained in the completion of the Grand Canal—a monumental engineering feat—and in the undertaking of other construction projects, including the repair and rebuilding of the Great Wall. Weakened by the costly and disastrous military campaigns against Korea in the early seventh century, the dynasty was overthrown by a combination of popular revolts, famine, and floods.

The Tang Dynasty (A.D. 618–907), with its capital at Xi'an is regarded by historians as a high point in Chinese civilization—equal, or even superior, to the Han period. Its territorial extent was greater than that of the Han, made possible by the military exploits of its early rulers. Stimulated by contact with India and the Middle East, the empire saw a flowering of creativity in many fields. Block printing was invented, making the written word available to vastly greater audiences. The Tang period was the golden age of literature and art. A government system based on a large class of literates selected through civil service examinations was perfected by Tang rulers. This competitive procedure was designed to draw the best talents into government; but perhaps an even greater consideration was to create a body of career officials having no autonomous territorial or functional power base—aware that royal dependence on powerful aristocratic families and warlords would have destabilizing consequences. As it turned out, these scholar-officials, having status in their local communities, family ties, and shared values connecting them to the royal court, often functioned as intermediaries between the government and the grass roots from Tang times until the closing days of the Manchu empire in 1911.

Tang power had ebbed by the mid-eighth century A.D. Military defeats at the hands of the Tai in modern Yunnan province and the loss of Turkestan to the surging might of Arabs impaired the effectiveness of the court. Misrule, court intrigues, economic exploitation, and popular rebellions weakened the empire, making it possible for northern invaders to terminate the dynasty in 906.

The next half-century was an age of fragmentation into five northern dynasties and ten southern kingdoms. But in 960 a new power, Song (960–1279), reunified most of China Proper. The Song period divides into the two phases: Northern Song (960–1127) and Southern Song (1127–1279). The division was caused by the forced abandonment of North China in 1127 by the Song court, which could not push back the nomadic invaders.

The founders of Song built an effective centralized bureaucracy staffed with civilian scholar-officials. Regional military governors and their supporters were replaced by the centrally appointed officials. This system of civilian rule led to a greater concentration of power in the emperor and his congeries of palace officials than ever was possible in the previous dynasties.

The Song is notable for the development of cities not only for administrative purposes but as centers for trade, industry, and maritime commerce. The landed scholar-officials, sometimes collectively referred to as the gentry, lived in the provincial centers alongside the shopkeepers, artisans, and merchants. The spread of printing and education and the growth of private trade and a market economy linking the coastal provinces and the interior gave rise to a new group of wealthy commoners, or the mercantile class. Landholding and government employment were no longer the only means of gaining wealth and prestige.

Culturally the Song refined many of the developments in the previous centuries. Included in these refinements were not only the Tang ideal of the universal man who combined the qualities of scholar, poet, painter, and statesman but also historical writings, painting, calligraphy, and hard-glazed porcelain. At the same time there was a progressive revival of interest in the Confucian ideals and society of ancient times, coinciding with the decline of Buddhism, which the Chinese regarded as foreign and offering few

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

Tiananmen Square, Beijing. In the background stands the Forbidden City, built in the early fifteenth century and containing the imperial palace. (Photo of Mao was removed in March 1980).
Courtesy William H. Young, Jr.

Pair of lions guarding the entrance to one of the halls within the Forbidden City.
Courtesy William H. Young, Jr.

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practical guidelines for the solution of political and other mundane problems. The main interest of Song intellectuals was to seek answers to all philosophical and political questions in the Confucian classics.

Among the Song Neo-Confucian philosophers who wrote commentaries on the classics, the most famous and influential was Zhu Xi (Chu Hsi; 1130–1200), whose synthesis of Confucian thought and Buddhist, Taoist, and other ideas became the official imperial ideology from late Song times to late in the nineteenth century. As incorporated into the examination system, Zhu Xi's philosophy evolved into an unyielding orthodox official creed, which stressed the one-sided obligations of obedience and compliance by subject-to-ruler, child-to-father, and wife-to-husband. The effect was to stifle philosophical and intellectual development and to reinforce the rigidity of Chinese society. Neo-Confucian doctrines came to play the dominant role in the intellectual life also of Korea, Vietnam, and Japan.

Mongolian Interregnum

The Mongols already had subjugated North China, Korea, and the Muslim kingdoms of Central Asia and had twice penetrated Europe. With the resources of his vast empire, Kublai Khan (1214–94), a grandson of Genghis Khan who was the supreme leader of all Mongol tribes, began his drive against Southern Song and, even before the latter's extinction, had established the first alien dynasty to rule all China—the Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368).

The Mongol rule was resented by the Han Chinese. The natives were discriminated against socially and politically. All important central and regional posts were monopolized by Mongols, who also preferred employing non-Chinese from other parts of the Mongol domain—Central Asia, the Middle East, and even Europe—in those positions for which no Mongol could be found. Chinese were more often employed in non-Chinese regions of the empire.

Culturally the Yuan period was barren with the possible exception of drama. Economically the Mongols undertook public works such as the development of the inland river and canal routes, encouraged overland as well as maritime commerce with the rest of Asia, and made possible the first direct Chinese contact with Europe. Related to this time are the first records of travel by westerners. The most famous traveler of the period was the Venetian Marco Polo, whose account of his trip to China and life there astounded the people of Europe. The effect of Europeans upon China, however, was negligible compared to that of the peoples and cultures of the western half of the Mongol empire. From this period dates the conversion to Islam, by Muslims of Central Asia, of growing numbers of Chinese in the northwest and southwest.

The Chinese Regain Power

Rivalry among the Mongol imperial heirs, natural disasters, and numerous peasant uprisings led to the collapse of the Yuan Dynasty. The Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) was founded by a Han Chinese peasant, former Buddhist monk, and a rebel army leader. Having its capital first at Nanjing and later at Beijing (Peking), Ming reached the zenith of power during the first quarter of the fifteenth century. The Chinese armies reconquered Annam in Southeast Asia and kept back the Mongols, while the Chinese fleet ranged the China seas and the Indian Ocean, cruising as far as the east coast of Africa. The maritime Asian nations sent envoys to perform the kowtow (formal prostration) in homage to the Chinese emperor.

After 1433, however, imperial interest in maritime affairs declined partly because of the need to concentrate on preventing another barbarian land invasion and partly by the development of a conservative climate at court. The latter was brought about by pressure from the powerful Neo-Confucian bureaucracy, which led to the revival of the traditional denigration of trade and commerce. The stability of the two and one-half centuries of the Ming Dynasty, which were without major disruptions of the economy, arts, society, or politics, promoted a belief among Chinese that they had achieved the most satisfactory civilization on earth and that nothing foreign was needed or welcome.

Long wars with the Mongols, incursions by the Japanese into Korea, and harassment of Chinese coastal cities by the Japanese in the sixteenth century weakened the Ming Dynasty, which became, like earlier Chinese dynasties, ripe for an alien takeover. In 1644 the Manchus took Beijing and became masters of North China, establishing the last dynasty of imperial China, the Qing (1644–1911).

Although the Manchus were not Han Chinese and were strongly resisted, especially in the south, they had in contrast to the Mongols been sinicized to a great degree before coming to power. Realizing the importance of doing things the Chinese way if they were to dominate the empire, they retained many institutions of Ming and earlier Chinese derivation. They continued the Confucian cult rituals, over which the emperors had traditionally presided.

The Manchus continued the Confucian civil service system. Although Chinese were barred from the highest offices, outside the capital Chinese officials predominated over Manchu officeholders, except in military positions. The Neo-Confucian philosophy, emphasizing obedience by the subject to the ruler, was patronized and was enforced as the state creed. The Manchu emperors also supported Chinese literary and historical projects of enormous scope; the survival of much of China's ancient literature is attributed to these projects.

Ever suspicious of Han Chinese, the Qing rulers put into effect measures aimed at preventing the absorption of the Manchus into the dominant Han Chinese population. Han Chinese were prohibited from migrating into Manchuria. No agriculture was permitted in northern Manchuria, and Manchus were forbidden to engage in trade or manual labor. Intermarriage between the two groups was forbidden. In many government positions a system of dual appointments was used—the Chinese appointee was required to do the substantive work and the Manchu to supervise and prevent treachery.

The Qing regime was determined to protect itself not only from internal rebellion but also against invasion from without. After all of China Proper had been subdued, the Manchus conquered Outer Mongolia (now the Mongolian People's Republic) in the late seventeenth century, and in the eighteenth century the Manchus gained control of Central Asia as far as the Pamirs and established a protectorate over Tibet (see fig. 2). The Qing thus became the first dynasty to eliminate successfully all danger to China Proper from across its land borders, and during its regime the empire grew to include a larger area than ever before or since; Taiwan was also incorporated into China for the first time under the Qing. In addition, its emperors received tribute from the various border states.

The chief threat to China's integrity did not come overland, as it had so often in the past, but instead came by sea, reaching the southern coastal area first. Western traders and missionaries and soldiers of fortune began to arrive in large numbers. The dynasty's inability to evaluate correctly the nature of the new challenge or to respond flexibly to it resulted in the demise of the Qing and the collapse of the entire millennia-old framework of dynastic rule.

Emergence of Modern China

The success of the Qing Dynasty in maintaining stability proved a liability when the empire was confronted by the seafaring western powers. The centuries of peace and self-satisfaction dating back to Ming times had brought about little change in the inward orientation of the ruling elite. The imperial Neo-Confucian scholars accepted as axiomatic the cultural superiority of Chinese civilization and the position of the empire at the hub of their perceived world. To question this assumption, to suggest innovation, or to promote the adoption of foreign ideas would have been tantamount to heresy. Imperial scholastic purges dealt ruthlessly with those who deviated from orthodoxy.

By the nineteenth century, however, China had to reckon with growing internal pressures of economic origin. By the start of the century there were over 300 million Chinese, but there had developed no industry or trade of sufficient scope to absorb the surplus labor. Moreover the scarcity of arable land led to widespread rural discontent and a breakdown in law and order, aided by the weakening of the Manchu bureaucratic and military systems through corruption and mounting urban pauperism. Localized revolts erupted in various parts of the empire in the early nineteenth century. Secret societies, such as the White Lotus sect in the north and the Hung society in the south, gained ground, combining anti-Manchu subversion with banditry.

The Western Powers Arrive

Beginning in the sixteenth century westerners came in sufficient


Regional boundary
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CHINA PROPER
(The Middle Kingdom)
CHIHLI
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ANHWEI
HUPEH
SZECHWAN
CHEKIANG
KIANGSI
HUNAN
FUKIEN
KWEICHOW
YÜNNAN
KWANGSI CHUANG
KWANGTUNG

Figure 2. China Proper and Outer China (Around 1800)

numbers or with sufficient resources to make a lasting and revolutionary impact. As elsewhere in Asia the Portuguese were the pioneers, establishing a foothold at Macao, from where they monopolized the foreign trade at the Chinese port of Guangzhou (Kuang-chou, or Canton). Soon the Spaniards arrived, followed by the British and the French.

Trade between China and the West was carried on in the guise of the tribute. The foreigners were obliged to follow the elaborate centuries-old ritual imposed on envoys from China's tributary states if they wanted to trade with China. There was no conception at the imperial court that the westerners would expect or deserve to be treated as cultural or political equals. The sole exception was in the case of Russia.

The Manchus were sensitive to the need for security along the northern land frontier and therefore were prepared to be flexible in dealing with Russia, the most powerful inland neighbor. The Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) with the Russians, drafted to bring to an end a series of border incidents and to establish a border between Siberia and Manchuria along the Amur River, was China's first agreement with a western power and was in terms of equality between the emperor and the czar. In 1727 a second treaty delimited the remainder of the Sino-Russian border.

Western diplomatic efforts to expand the trade and on equal terms were rebuffed, the Chinese assumption being that "our celestial empire possesses all things in prolific abundance." After 1760 all foreign trade was confined to Guangzhou, where the foreign traders had to limit their dealings to a dozen officially licensed Chinese merchants. Some historians maintain that the restriction on foreign contacts was to prevent the anti-Manchu southerners from seeking aid from Overseas Chinese (see Glossary).

Trade was not the sole basis of contact with the West. Since the thirteenth century Roman Catholic missionaries had been attempting to establish their church in China. Although only a few hundred thousand Chinese were converted by 1800, the missionaries—mostly Jesuits—contributed greatly to Chinese knowledge in such fields as cannon casting, calendar making, geography, mathematics, cartography, music, art, and architecture. The Jesuits were especially adept at fitting Christianity into a Chinese framework, but they were condemned by a papal decision in 1704 for having tolerated the continuance of Confucian and ancestor rites among Christian converts. This decision resulted in the rapid fading of the Christian movement, proscribed as heterodox and disloyal.

The Opium War (1839–42)

During the eighteenth century the market in Europe and America for tea, a new drink in the West, expanded greatly, and there was in addition a continuing demand for Chinese silk and porcelain. But China, still in its preindustrial stage, wanted little that the West had to offer, causing the westerners, mostly British, to incur an unfavorable balance of trade. To remedy the situation, the foreigners developed a three-cornered trade by which they exchanged their merchandise in India and Southeast Asia for raw materials and semiprocessed goods, which found a ready market in Guangzhou. By the early nineteenth century, raw cotton and opium from India had become the staple British imports into China, in spite of the fact that opium was prohibited entry by imperial decree. The opium traffic was made possible through the connivance of the imperial bureaucracy, which had become corrupt.

In 1839 the Chinese government adopted drastic countermeasures. In Guangzhou 20,000 chests of opium were confiscated and burned. The British retaliated with a punitive expedition, thus initiating what became known as the Opium War (1839–42). Unprepared for war and grossly underestimating the capabilities of the enemy, the Chinese were disastrously defeated and their image of their own imperial power tarnished beyond repair.

Under the Treaty of Nanking (1842), which was the first of a series of agreements with the western trading nations that the Chinese have called the "unequal treaties," the emperor had to cede the island of Hong Kong to the British; abolish the licensed monopoly system of trade; open five ports to foreign trade; limit the tariff on trade to five percent ad valorem; grant British nationals extraterritoriality (exemption from Chinese laws); and pay a large indemnity. In addition Britain was to receive the most-favored-nation treatment, a formula under which it would receive whatever trading concessions the Chinese granted other powers then or later. The Nanking treaty set the scope and character of an unequal relationship for the ensuing century of what the Chinese call "national humiliations." It was followed by other treaties that granted new concessions and added new privileges.

The Taiping Rebellion (1851–64)

During the mid-nineteenth century China's problems were compounded by natural calamities of unprecedented proportions, including droughts, famines, and floods. Government neglect of public works was in part responsible for this and other disasters, and the Qing administration did little to relieve the widespread misery caused by them. Economic tensions, military defeats at western hands, and anti-Manchu sentiments all combined to produce widespread unrest. This was especially the case in South China, the last area to yield to the Qing conquerors and the first place to be exposed to western influence and hence the natural haven for the most famous rebellion in China, the Taiping Rebellion.

The uprising was led by Hong Xiuquan (Hung Hsiu-ch'üan; 1814–64), a village teacher and unsuccessful candidate for degree-holding status. He formulated an eclectic ideology combining the ideals of pre-Confucian utopianism with Protestant beliefs. He soon had a following in the thousands who were heavily anti-Manchu and antiestablishment. A military organization to protect against bandits was formed and recruited troops not only among believers but also from other armed peasant groups and secret societies. In 1851 Hong Xiuquan proclaimed himself Heavenly King of the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace and began openly to rebel against the Manchus and prepare for the establishment of his kingdom. The new order was to be a reconstitution of a legendary ancient state in which the peasantry owned and tilled the land in common; slavery, concubinage, arranged marriage, opium smoking, footbinding, judicial torture, and the worship of idols were all to be eliminated.

Taiping (meaning "great peace") tolerance of the esoteric rituals and quasi-religious societies of South China and relentless attacks on Confucianism contributed to the ultimate defeat of the rebellion. Its advocacy of radical social reforms alienated the Han Chinese scholar-gentry class and the multitude of commoners beholden to that class. Internal feuds, defections, and corruption also undermined cohesion and continuity. Before the Chinese army succeeded in crushing the revolt, however, fourteen years had passed, and well over 30 million people had been reported killed.

In order to crush the rebellion, the Qing court needed a stronger and more popular army than the demoralized imperial forces. It ordered a Hunan scholar-official, Zeng Guofan (Tseng Kuo-fan; 1811–72), to raise a militia to defend his province, not to mention the Confucian orthodoxy. The army created and paid for by local taxes became the nucleus of a new Han Chinese-led army, presaging the rise of regional warlords on an extensive scale.

The Self-Strengthening Movement

The challenge posed by western imperialism and the Taiping Rebellion stirred the court and scholar-officials to an effort at averting further national humiliations and reversing the dynastic decline. This was to be accomplished using foreign technology to control the barbarians and to preserve the Confucian-based character of Chinese tradition. The effort to graft western technology onto Chinese institutions and practices became known as the Self-Strengthening Movement; it was championed by such generals as Zeng Guofan, Zuo Zongtang (Tso Tsung-t'ang), and Li Hong Zhang (Li Hung-chang), who fought on the side of the government in the Taiping Rebellion.

In the 1860s, as a result of this spirit of renewal, a semblance of order was restored to the central provinces; agricultural rehabilitation was undertaken; government examination for officeholders, a practice that had lapsed, was resumed; and private schools and libraries were opened. Arsenals of western-style arms were collected; western technical works were translated; steamships were built; and an office was created to deal with the foreign powers along the lines of a foreign ministry. By the 1870s government-sponsored industrial enterprises were also begun in mining, textile manufacturing, and shipbuilding. Modern communications began with the introduction of telegraph and railroad lines and the building of new harbors. These efforts at modernization were severely hindered, however, by the interference of the bureaucracy, corruption, and mismanagement. The Confucian bureaucrats tended to discourage innovations as risky and also tended to take profits rather than reinvest them. There was also a lack of coordination of projects.

The process of industrialization then under way would have been difficult even under the best of circumstances. The bureaucracy was lethargic, petrified by Neo-Confucian orthodoxy. The society was still reeling from the ravaging effects of the Taiping Rebellion. The empire began to teeter on the brink of territorial dismemberment.

The first step in the foreign powers' effort to carve up the empire was taken by the Russians who had been expanding into Central Asia and who, by the 1850s, had invaded the Amur watershed of Manchuria, from which they had been ejected by the Treaty of Nerchinsk. The superior knowledge of China acquired by the Russians through their century-long residence in Beijing was used skillfully to further their aggrandizement. In 1860 the Russians secured by diplomacy the secession of all of Manchuria north of the Amur River and east of the Ussuri River.

Foreign encroachments intensified after 1860 through a series of treaties that were imposed on China for one pretext or another. The foreign stranglehold on the vital sectors of the Chinese economy was reinforced through a lengthening catalog of concessions. Foreign settlements in the treaty ports became extraterritorial—sovereign pockets of territories over which China had no jurisdiction. The safety of these foreign settlements was ensured by the menacing presence of warships and gunboats.

The foreign powers also at this time took over the peripheral states that had acknowledged Chinese suzerainty and given tribute to the emperor. France, victorious in a war with China in 1883, took Annam. The British took Burma. Russia penetrated into Chinese Turkestan (the modern-day autonomous region of Xinjiang). Japan, emerging from its century-long seclusion, annexed the Liuqiu (Ryukus) Islands and, by defeating the Chinese in Korea (1894–95), began to exert control over that peninsula as well as the island of Taiwan. The defeat by Japan in Korea stripped China of its remaining prestige. In 1898 the British acquired a ninety-nine-year lease over the so-called New Territories of Kowloon, which increased the size of their Hong Kong colony. Britain, Japan, Russia, Germany, France, and Belgium each gained spheres of influence in China. The United States, which had not acquired any territorial cessions, proposed in 1899 that there be an "Open Door" policy in China, whereby all foreign countries would have equal duties and privileges in all treaty ports within and outside the varous spheres of influence. All but Russia agreed to the United States overture.

The Hundred Days' Reform (1898) and the Aftermath

In 1898, in the hundred days from June 11 to September 21, the Manchu court initiated a series of reforms aimed at sweeping social and institutional changes. This effort reflected the thinking of a group of progressive scholar-reformers who had impressed the court with the urgency of making innovations if the dynasty were to survive. Influenced by the Japanese success with modernization, the reformers emphasized that what China needed was more than "self-strengthening" and that the change envisioned must be accompanied by institutional and ideological innovation.

The imperial edicts for reform covered a broad range of subjects and were aimed at stamping out corruption and remaking, among other things, the school and examination systems, the legal system, governmental structure, the defense establishment, and the postal services. They also attempted to modernize agriculture, medicine, and mining and to promote practical studies at the expense of classical studies. The court also planned to send students abroad for first-hand observation and technical studies.

Opposition to the reform was intense among the ruling elite, especially the Manchus who, in condemning the announced reform as too radical, proposed instead a more moderate and gradualist course of change. Supported by ultraconservatives, the Empress Dowager Cixi (Tz'u-hsi) engineered a coup on September 21, 1898, forcing the young reform-minded Emperor Guangxu (Kuang-hsu) into seclusion, and took over the government as regent. The Hundred Days' Reform ended with the execution of six of its principal advocates and the flight of the two leaders, Kang Youwei (K'ang Yu-wei) and Liang Qichao (Liang Ch'i-ch'ao), to Japan.

The conservatives then gave clandestine backing to an antiforeign and anti-Christian organization of secret societies known to the West as the Boxers; in 1900 this group rampaged North China in what became known as the Boxer Rebellion. The uprising was crushed by expeditionary forces of the foreign powers, and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901 the court was made to consent to the payment of a large indemnity, the stationing of foreign troops in China, and the razing of some Chinese fortifications.

Despite the ill-fated "hundred days," the court belatedly put into effect in the decade that followed some reform measures. These included the abolition of the Confucian-based examination (actually required under the terms of the Boxer Protocol as a punitive measure), educational and military modernization patterned after the model of Japan, and an experiment, if half-hearted, in constitutional and parliamentary government. The suddenness and ambitiousness of the reform effort actually hindered its success.

The Republican Revolution of 1911

Failure of the reform from the top and the fiasco of the Boxer Rebellion convinced many Chinese that the only real solution lay in outright revolution, in sweeping away the old order and erecting a new one patterned preferably after the example of Japan. The revolutionary leader was Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen; 1866–1925), a republican and anti-Manchu activist who became increasingly popular among the Overseas Chinese and the young Chinese abroad, especially in Japan, where a large number of Chinese students had been sent. In 1905 Sun founded in Japan the Tong Meng Hui (T'ung-meng-hui—the United League or Brotherhood Society), a forerunner of the Guomindang (Kuomintang or KMT—the Nationalist Party). His movement, generously supported by Overseas Chinese funds, gained support also with regional military officers. Among the officers joining the Tong Meng Hui was a young cadet named Chiang Kai-shek, who had been sent to Japan for military training.

Sun's political philosophy, as first enunciated in Tokyo in 1905 and as modified through the early 1920s, centered on the Three Principles of the People: "nationalism" (anti-Manchu and anti-imperialist); "democracy" (egalitarianism and constitutional government); and "people's livelihood" (people's welfare or socialism). Sun continued to lead his movement in Japan, where most of the Overseas Chinese students were, as well as a few reformers who had fled China after the Hundred Days' reform.

The republican revolution, preceded by numerous plots and organized protests inside China, broke out accidentally on October 10, 1911, at the imperial garrison in Wu-Ch'ang. About three thousand soldiers rose in revolt. The city fell without resistance, and the relatively bloodless revolution spread quickly attracting spontaneous popular support in most parts of China. Sun was inaugurated on January 1, 1912, in Nanjing as the provisional president of the new Chinese republic, but power in Beijing had already passed to Yuan Shikai (Yuan Shih-k'ai), the strongest regional military leader at the time (sometimes called the "father of the warlords") and commander in chief of the imperial army. In order to prevent civil war and possible foreign intervention from undermining the infant republic, Sun agreed that China be united under a Beijing government headed by Yuan Shikai at the latter's insistence. On February 12, 1912, the last Manchu emperor, Puyi (P'u-yi), abdicated, and on March 10 Yuan Shikai was sworn in as provisional president of the republic.

Republican China

The republic that Sun Zhongshan and his associates envisioned evolved slowly. The revolutionists lacked an army, and the power of Yuan Shikai began to outstrip that of parliament. Yuan Shikai revised the constitution at will and became dictatorial. In August 1912 a political party was founded by one of Sun's associates, Song Jiaoren (Sung Chiao-jen). The new party, called the Guomindang, was an amalgamation of small political groups including Sun's Tong Meng Hui. In the national elections held in February 1913 for the new bicameral parliament, Song campaigned against the Yuan Shikai administration, and his party won a majority of seats. President Yuan Shikai had Song assassinated in March; he had already arranged the assassination of several prorevolutionist generals. Revulsion against Yuan Shikai grew. In the summer of 1913 seven provincial governments staged an attempted coup, and when it was suppressed Sun and other republican revolutionists fled to Japan. In October 1913 an intimidated parliament elected Yuan Shikai president of the Republic of China, and the major powers extended recognition to his government. To achieve international recognition, Yuan Shikai had to agree to autonomy for Outer Mongolia and Tibet. China was still to be suzerain but would have to allow Russia a free hand in Outer Mongolia and Britain continuance of its influence in Tibet.

In November Yuan Shikai, legally president, ordered the Guomindang dissolved and its members removed from parliament. Within a few months he suspended parliament and the provincial assemblies and proceeded to establish a monarchy centered on himself as emperor. When this failed because of the strong opposition of the provincial military governors, he proclaimed himself president for life in 1915. Yuan Shikai died a natural death in 1916.

Nationalism and Communism

After Yuan Shikai's death, shifting alliances of regional warlords fought for control of the Beijing government. Apart from this internal disunity, the nation was also threatened from without by the Japanese. When World War I broke out in 1914, Japan fought on the Allied side and seized German holdings in Shandong (Shantung) Province. In 1915 the Japanese set before the Beijing government the so-called Twenty-One Demands, which would have placed China under their protectorate. With United States support, China rejected some of these demands but yielded to the Japanese insistence that it keep the Shandong territory already in possession. In 1917, by secret notes, Britain, France, and Italy confirmed the Japanese claim in exchange for the latter's naval action against Germany.

In 1917 China declared war on Germany in the hope of recovering its lost province, but in 1918 it also accepted a secret deal with Japan accepting the latter's claim to Shandong. When the Paris peace conference of 1919 confirmed the Japanese claim to Shandong and the truth regarding the Beijing government's sellout became public, internal reaction was shattering. On May 4, 1919, there were massive student protest demonstrations against the Beijing government, not to mention Japan. The political activity, student activism, and the iconoclastic and reformist intellectual currents set in motion by the patriotic student protest developed into a national awakening known as the May Fourth Movement, the intellectual derivative of which was known as the New Culture Movement.

The movement helped to rekindle the then fading cause of the republican revolution. In October 1919 Sun Zhongshan, who had established in 1917 a rival government in Guangzhou in collaboration with southern warlords, reestablished the Guomindang to counter the government in Beijing that, under a succession of warlords, clung to its shadow of legitimacy. Sun persisted in his effort to obtain aid from the western democracies but was ignored because they continued to support the warlord regime in Beijing. Thus in 1921 he turned to the Soviet Union, which sought to befriend the Chinese revolutionists by scathing attacks on western imperialism and which for political expediency initiated a dual-track policy of supporting Sun and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), founded in 1921 by a leader of the May Fourth Movement. Then began the struggle for power in China between two groups, the Guomindang and the CCP—a struggle that was to culminate in a communist triumph in 1949.

In 1922 the Guomindang-warlord alliance in Guangzhou was ruptured, and Sun fled to Shanghai. By then Sun had become committed to receive Soviet support for his cause. In 1923 a joint statement by a Soviet representative and Sun in Shanghai pledged Soviet assistance of China's national unification. Soviet advisers, the most prominent being the Comintern (Communist International) agent Michael Borodin, began to arrive in China in 1923 to aid in the reorganization and consolidation of the Guomindang along the lines of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The CCP was under Comintern instructions to cooperate with the Guomindang, and its members were encouraged to join the latter as individuals while maintaining their party identities. The CCP was still small at the time, having a membership of 300 in 1922 and 1,500 by 1925. The Guomindang in 1922 already had 150,000 members.

The Soviet advisers also helped the Nationalists set up a political institute to train propagandists in mass mobilization techniques and in 1923 gave Chiang Kai-shek, one of Sun's lieutenants, several months' military training in Moscow. When Chiang returned in late 1923, he began to establish the Whamboa Military Academy at Guangzhou, which was the seat of government under the Guomindang-CCP alliance. In 1924 when he became head of the academy, Chiang began the rise to prominence on the basis of his influence with the Nationalist Revolutionary Army that was to make him Sun's successor as head of the Guomindang and the unifier of all China under the right-wing Nationalist government.

Sun died at Beijing in March 1925, but the Nationalist movement he had helped to initiate was gaining momentum. By 1926 the Guomindang had come to be divided into the left- and right-wing factions, however, and the communist bloc within it was also growing. In March 1926 Chiang staged a coup in his party, ousting some of the

Communists from positions of leadership and emerging as the Guomindang leader. The Soviet Union, for reasons concerning the rivalry between Joseph Stalin and Leon Trotsky, continued to support the Guomindang. This helped to make possible military campaigns in the north to reunify China, which were launched by Chiang from Guangzhou in July 1926.

In early 1927 the Guomindang-CCP rivalry led to a split in the revolutionary ranks. The CCP and the left-wing of the Guomindang had attempted to move the seat of the Nationalist government from Guangzhou to Wuhan (Wu-han), but Chiang, whose northern campaign was proving successful, set his forces to destroying the Shanghai CCP apparatus and established an anticommunist government at Nanjing in April 1927. For the moment there were three capitals in China: the internationally recognized warlord regime in Beijing; the communist and left-wing Guomindang regime at Wuhan; and the right-wing civilian-military regime at Nanjing, which would remain the Nationalist capital for the next decade.

By mid-1927 the CCP was at low ebb. The Communists had been expelled from Wuhan by their left-wing Guomindang allies who in turn were toppled by a military regime, and Nanjing became the only capital contesting Beijing. By 1928 all of China was at least nominally under Chiang's control, and the Nanjing government received prompt international recognition as the sole legitimate government of China.

In 1928 the nationalist government announced that in conformity with Sun's formula for the three stages of revolution—military unification, political tutelage, and constitutional democracy—China had reached the end of the first and would embark on the second phase, which would be under the Guomindang direction.

The decade of 1928–37 was an era of consolidation and accomplishment by the Nationalists. Some of the harsh aspects of foreign concessions and privileges in China were moderated through diplomacy. The government acted energetically to modernize the legal and penal systems, stabilize prices, amortize debts, reform the banking and currency systems, build railroads and highways, improve public health, legislate against traffic in narcotics, and augment industrial and agricultural production. Great strides were also made in education and in a program to popularize the national language and overcome dialectal variations, as an aid to the unification of Chinese society in all its varied dimensions. The spread of printed media, the use of radio and films, and the improvement of communications facilities further enhanced a sense of unity and pride among the people.

During the period of Nationalist progress there were two forces at work that would eventually undermine Chiang's Guomindang government—the gradual rise of the Communists and aggression by the Japanese.

By mid-1927 the Comintern cause had appeared bankrupt. A new policy was instituted calling on the CCP to foment armed insurrections in both urban and rural areas in preparation for an expected rising tide of revolution. Attempts were made by Communists to take cities such as Nanzhang, Changsha, Swatow, and Guangzhou, and an armed rural uprising, known as the Autumn Harvest Insurrection, was staged by peasants in Hunan. The insurrection was led by Mao Zedong (1893–1976), a man of peasant origins who would become chairman of the CCP and eventually chairman (head of state) of the People's Republic of China.

Mao, who became a Marxist while working as a librarian at Beijing (formerly Peking National) University at the time of the emergence of the May Fourth Movement, had boundless faith in the revolutionary potential of the peasantry. He advocated that revolution in China focus on them, rather than on the urban proletariat, as prescribed by orthodox Marxist-Leninist theoreticians. Despite the failure of the Autumn Harvest Insurrection, Mao continued to work among the Hunan peasants, turning them into a politicized guerrilla force in collaboration with his military commander, Zhu De. Without waiting for the sanction of the CCP center, then in Shanghai, Mao began establishing peasant-based soviets (communist-run local governments) along the border between Hunan and Jiangxi (Kiangsi) provinces. By the winter of 1927–28 the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had some 10,000 men. Mao's prestige rose steadily after the failure of the Comintern-directed urban insurrections. In late 1931 he was able to proclaim the establishment of the Chinese Soviet Republic under his chairmanship in Ruijin (Jui-chin), Jiangxi Province. Mao's control of the Chinese communist movement became firmer and beyond challenge after 1932 when the CCP Central Committee, which had faithfully echoed the Comintern line, fled Shanghai to the sanctuary of Mao's soviet republic. Mao's strength within the communist movement was reinforced after the early 1930s by the survival of his Red Army and its supporters, who were scattered about central China, against a series of "encirclement and extermination" attacks mounted by Chiang's forces. In 1934 Mao's supporters, numbering 100,000 to 190,000, were forced out of their areas and began the epic Long March, the circuitous retreat overland for some 10,000 kilometers through southwest China to the northern province of Shaanxi (Shensi) where some 20,000 survivors arrived in 1935. The Communists set up their headquarters at Yan'an, in southern Shaanxi. The Yan'an era (1936–45) was marked by a rapid growth of the communist movement owing to a combination of internal and external circumstances, of which the Japanese aggression was perhaps the most significant catalyst.

Japanese Aggression

Few Chinese had any illusions about Japanese designs on China. Hungry for raw materials and pressed by a rising population, Japan initiated the seizure of Manchuria in September 1931 and set up a puppet regime in 1932. The loss of Manchuria, and its vast potential for industrial development and war industries, was a blow to the nationalist economy. The League of Nations, established by the western democracies, was helpless in the face of the Japanese defiance. The Japanese began to push down over the Great Wall into northern China and along the coastal provinces.

The fury of national anger against Japan was predictable; it was also directed against the Nationalist government, which at the time was more preoccupied with anticommunist extermination campaigns than resisting the Japanese invaders. The notion of "internal unity before external danger" was forcefully brought home in December 1936 when Nationalist troops (who had been ousted from Manchuria by the Japanese) mutinied at Xi'an and kidnapped Chiang for several days until he agreed to collaborate with the Communists in the common fight against Japan.

The Chinese resistance stiffened after July 7, 1937, when a clash occurred between Chinese and Japanese troops near Beijing at a site known as the Marco Polo Bridge. This not only marked the beginning of open, though undeclared, war between China and Japan but also hastened the formation of the Nationalist-CCP united front against Japan. The collaboration took place, however, in scarcely veiled mutual distrust. The uneasy alliance began to break down after late 1938, despite Japan's steady territorial gains in northern China, the coastal regions, and the rich Yangtze River valley of the central part of the country. Conflicts became more frequent after 1940, results of the successful communist expansion of strength wherever opportunities presented themselves through mass organizations, administrative reforms, and the land- and tax-reform measures favoring the peasants—while the Nationalists attempted to neutralize the spread of communist influence.

At Yan'an and elsewhere in the "liberated areas," Mao was able to adapt Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese situation. He taught party cadres to lead the masses by learning to live and work with them, eating their food, and thinking their thoughts. The Red Army troops were trained to conduct a guerrilla warfare as the defenders of the people through defensive or offensive actions depending on the ebb and flow of the enemy strength in a given situation. Mao also began preparing for the establishment of a new China. In 1940, Mao outlined the program of the Chinese Communists for an eventual seizure of power. His teachings became the central tenets of the CCP doctrine that has come to be formalized in Mao Zedong Thought. By skillful organizational and propaganda work, the Communists increased party membership from 100,000 in 1937 to 1.2 million by 1945.

In 1945 Nationalist China emerged from the war nominally a great military power but actually a nation economically prostrate and politically divided. The economy, sapped by military demands of foreign and civil war and by spiraling inflation, sabotaged by the Communists, and undermined by speculation and hoarding, deteriorated despite massive aid from the United States. Famine came in the

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wake of the war, and millions were rendered homeless by floods and the unsettled conditions in the countryside. The situation was further aggravated by an Allied agreement at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 that brought Soviet troops into Manchuria to hasten the termination of war against Japan (though the Chinese were not present at Yalta, they were informed and agreed to have the Russians come into the war). After the war the Soviet Union dismantled and removed more than half the industrial equipment of Manchuria left by the Japanese. In addition the Yalta Pact had the effect of enabling the Chinese Communists to move into Manchuria long enough to arm themselves with the equipment surrendered by the withdrawing Japanese army. The problems of rehabilitating the formerly Japanese-occupied areas and of reconstructing the nation from the ravages of a protracted war were staggering, to say the least.

In the years after Pearl Harbor the United States emerged as a major factor in Chinese affairs. As an ally it embarked in late 1941 on a program of massive military and financial aid to the hard-pressed Nationalist government. In January 1943 the United States and Britain led the way in revising their treaties with China, bringing to an end a century of unequal treaty relations. Within a few months a new agreement was signed between the United States and China for the stationing of American troops in China for the common war effort against Japan. In December 1943 the Chinese exclusion acts of the 1880s that the United States Congress had enacted to restrict Chinese immigration into the United States were repealed.

The wartime policy of the United States was initially to help China become a strong ally and a stabilizing force in postwar East Asia. As the internecine conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists intensified, however, the United States sought unsuccessfully to reconcile the rival forces for a more effective anti-Japanese war effort.

Through the mediatory influence of the United States, a military truce was arranged in January 1946, but civil war resumed intermittently thereafter. The American mission, headed by General George C. Marshall, was withdrawn in early 1947 evidently in the realization that no American efforts "short of armed intervention on a very large scale" could check further deterioration. The civil war, in which the United States chose not to intervene militarily, became more widespread. Battles raged not only for territories but also for the allegiance of cross-sections of the population.

Belatedly the Nationalist government sought to enlist popular support through some internal reforms. The effort was in vain, however, in light of the rampant corruption in government and the accompanying political and economic chaos. By late 1948 the situation had reached an advanced state of deterioration. The demoralized and undisciplined Nationalist troops proved no match for the communist armies. The Communists were well established in the North and Northeast. The Nationalists had an advantage in the number of men and weapons and controlled a much larger territory and population than their adversaries, besides enjoying considerable international support, but they were exhausted by the long war with Japan and the attendant internal responsibilities. In January 1949 Beijing was taken by the Communists without a fight. Between April and November major cities passed from the Nationalists to communist control with only occasional resistance. In most cases the surrounding countryside and small towns had come under communist influence long before the cities. After Chiang and a few hundred thousand Nationalist troops fled from the mainland to the island of Taiwan, there remained only isolated pockets of resistance. In December 1949 Chiang proclaimed T'ai-pei, Taiwan, to be the temporary capital of China.

The People's Republic of China (1949-)

On October 1, 1949 the People's Republic of China was established, with the national capital at Beijing. New China was declared to be under a "people's democratic dictatorship," the people being defined as a coalition of four social classes: the workers, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, and the nationalists-capitalists. The four classes were to be led by the CCP, as the vanguard of the working class. At the time the CCP claimed a membership of 4.5 million, of which the members of peasant origin accounted for nearly 90 percent. The Party was under Mao's chairmanship and the government was headed by Zhou Enlai, as premier.

The Soviet Union recognized the People's Republic of China on October 2, 1949. In February 1950 China and the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance, valid until 1980. The pact also was intended to counter Japan or any power joining Japan for the purpose of aggression. By early 1950 international recognition of the communist government had grown considerably but was slowed by the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. In October 1950, sensing threat to their industrial heartland in southern Manchuria from the advancing United Nations (UN) forces in northern Korea, units of the PLA—calling themselves the Chinese People's Volunteers—crossed the Yalu River into North Korea on the pretense of answering a North Korean request for aid. Almost simultaneously the PLA forces also marched into Tibet to reassert Chinese sovereignty over a region that had been in effect independent of Chinese rule since the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. In 1951 the UN declared China to be an aggressor in Korea and sanctioned a global embargo on the shipment of arms and war matériel to China. This step by the world organization foreclosed for the time being any possibility that the People's Republic might replace Nationalist China on Taiwan as a member of the UN and as a veto-holding member of the UN Security Council.

In its first year the Chinese government followed moderate social and economic policies with skill and effectiveness. This was born of the realization that the overwhelming and multitudinous task of rehabilitation and stability required the goodwill and cooperation of all classes of the people. Results were impressive by any standard and popular support was widespread.

After China entered the Korean War, however, the initial moderation gave way to a massive campaign against the "enemies of the state," actual and potential. These enemies consisted of "war criminals, traitors, bureaucratic capitalists, and counterrevolutionaries." The campaign was skillfully combined with the party-sponsored participation of mass organizations in public trials and in the party propaganda against "American imperialism." Among the major target groups in this drive were foreigners and Christian missionaries who were branded as United States agents at mass trials. The 1951–52 drive against the political enemies was accompanied by a land reform that had actually begun under the Agrarian Reform Law of June 28, 1950. A redistribution of land was stepped up, coupled with a "class struggle" against landlords and wealthy peasants. An ideological reform campaign was also launched. Self-criticism and public confessions by university faculty members, scientists, and other professional people were given wide publicity. Artists and writers were soon subject to similar treatment for failing to heed to Mao's dictum that culture and literature must reflect the class interest of the working people led by the CCP.

These campaigns were paralleled in 1951 and 1952 by the so-called "three anti" and "five anti" movements. The former was directed ostensibly against the evils of "corruption, waste, and bureaucratism"; its real aim was to eliminate incompetent and politically unreliable public officials and to bring about an efficient, disciplined, and responsive bureaucratic system. The "five anti" movement had as its aim the elimination of recalcitrant and corrupt businessmen and industrialists, who were in effect the targets of the CCP's condemnation of "tax evasion, bribery, cheating in government contracts, thefts of economic intelligence, and stealing of state assets." In the course of this campaign the Party claimed to have uncovered a well-organized attempt by businessmen and industrialists to corrupt party and government officials. This charge was enlarged into an assault on the bourgeoisie as a whole. The number of people affected by the various punitive or reform campaigns was estimated to be in the millions.

The "Transition to Socialism" (1953–57)

The period of officially designated "transition to socialism" corresponded to China's first five-year plan. It was characterized by efforts to achieve industrialization, the collectivization of agriculture, and political centralization.

The First Five-Year Plan (1953–57) stressed the development of heavy industry on the Soviet model. Soviet economic and technical assistance was expected to play a significant part in the implementation of the plan. Sino-Soviet agreements were signed in 1953 and 1954. For the purpose of economic planning, the first modern census was taken in 1953; the population of mainland China was shown to be 583 million, a figure far greater than had been anticipated.

In the early 1950s among China's most pressing needs were food for its burgeoning population and domestic capital for investment and for the payment of Soviet-supplied technology, capital equipment, and military hardware. To satisfy these imperatives, the government began to collectivize agriculture. Despite internal disagreement as to the speed of collectivization, which at least for the time being was resolved in Mao's favor, the "semisocialist" stage of collectivization had been nine-tenths completed by the end of 1956. In addition the government nationalized banking, industry, and trade. Private enterprise in mainland China was virtually abolished.

Major political developments included the centralization of party and government control through the abolition of six large regional administrations. Elections were held in 1953 for delegates to the first National People's Congress (NPC), China's national legislature, which met in 1954. The congress formally elected Mao chairman of the People's Republic of China and Liu Shaoqi as chairman of the NPC Standing Committee; Zhou Enlai was named premier. The NPC also promulgated the State Constitution of 1954, which was based on the Soviet model.

The transition was characterized also by an improvement in party organization, then under the administrative direction of Secretary-General Deng Xiaoping. There was a marked emphasis on recruiting intellectuals who by 1956 had constituted nearly 12 percent of the party's 10.8 million members. The peasants had decreased to 69 percent—an indication of the increasing need for experts for the party and governmental infrastructures.

In mid-1956 there began an official effort to liberalize the political climate. This was done especially to encourage the cultural and intellectual figures to speak their minds on the state of CCP rule and programs. Mao personally took the lead in this movement that was launched under the classical slogan, "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let the hundred schools of thought contend." At first, response was cautious to the party's repeated invitation to air constructive views freely and openly. By mid-1957, however, the movement unexpectedly turned into waves of denunciation and criticism against the Party in general and the excesses of its cadres in particular. Startled and red-faced, leaders turned on the critics as "bourgeois rightists" and launched the so-called "antirightist" campaign. The hundred flowers campaign apparently had a sobering effect on the party leadership.

The Great Leap Forward (1958–60)

The antirightist drive was soon accompanied by a more militant approach toward economic development. In 1958 the CCP launched the Great Leap Forward (see Glossary) campaign under

Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, and Mao Zedong in 1957
Courtesy China Pictorial

the new "General Line for Socialist Construction" that was aimed at accomplishing the economic and technical development of the country at a vastly faster pace with greater results. The shift to the left was brought on by a combination of domestic and external factors. Although the party leaders appeared generally satisfied with the accomplishment of the First Five-Year Plan, they—Mao and his fellow radicals in particular—believed that more could be achieved in the Second Five-Year Plan (1958–62) period if the people could be ideologically aroused and if domestic resources could be utilized more efficiently for the simultaneous development of industry and agriculture. These assumptions led the Party to an intensified mobilization of the peasantry and mass organizations, stepped-up ideological guidance and indoctrination of technical experts, and efforts to build a more responsive political system. The last of these undertakings was to be accomplished through a new *xiafang* (transfer downward) movement under which higher level cadres in and outside the Party would be sent to lower levels for manual labor and firsthand familiarization with the grass-roots conditions. Although evidence is sketchy, Mao's decision to embark on the Great Leap movement was based in part on his uncertainty about the Soviet policy of economic, financial, and technical assistance toward China—a policy that in Mao's view not only fell far short of the level of his expectations and needs but also was laced with political strings (see ch. 12, Foreign Relations).

The Great Leap approach was centered on a newly created socioeconomic and political system in the countryside (also in limited urban areas)—the people's communes (see Glossary). By the fall of 1958 some 750,000 "semisocialist" agricultural producers' cooperatives, now designated as production brigades, had been amalgamated into about 23,500 communes, each averaging 5,000 households or 22,000 people. The individual commune was placed in control of all the means of production and was to operate as the sole accounting unit. Each commune—subdivided into production brigades (generally coterminous with traditional villages) and production teams—was planned as a self-supporting community for agriculture, small-scale local industry (for example, the famous backyard pig-iron furnaces), schooling, marketing, administration, and local security (through militia organization). Organized along paramilitary and laborsaving lines, it had communal kitchens and mess halls, nurseries, and in some cases large dormitories in place of the traditional nuclear family housing. In a way the people's commune system constituted a fundamental attack on the institutions of the family, especially in a few model areas where radical experiments in communal living occurred but were quickly dropped. The system was also based on the assumption that it would release additional manpower for such major projects as irrigation works and hydroelectric dams, which were seen as integral parts of the plan for the simultaneous development of industry and agrarian culture (see Agricultural Policies, ch. 6).

The Great Leap Forward was an economic failure. In early 1959, amid signs of rising popular restiveness, the CCP admitted that the favorable production report for 1958 had been exaggerated. Among its economic consequences were a food shortage (in which natural disasters also played a part); shortages of raw materials for industry; overproduction of poor-quality goods; deterioration of industrial plants through mismanagement; and exhaustion and demoralization of the peasantry and of the intellectuals, not to mention the party and governmental cadres at all levels. In early 1959 efforts to modify the administration of the communes got under way; these were intended partly to restore some material incentives to the production brigades and teams, to decentralize control, and partly to house families that had been reunited as household units.

Political consequences were not inconsiderable. In April 1959 Mao, who bore the chief responsibility for the Great Leap fiasco, stepped down from his position as chairman of the People's Republic (actually the decision to do so had been expressed by Mao at the end of 1958). The NPC elected Liu Shaoqi as Mao's successor. Mao still remained chairman of the CCP, however. Moreover, Mao's Great Leap policy came under open criticism at a party conference at Lushan, in Jiangxi Province. The attack was led by Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai, who had become troubled by the potentially adverse effect Mao's policy would have on the modernization of the armed forces. Peng Dehuai argued that "putting politics in command" was no substitute for economic laws and realistic economic policy; unnamed party leaders were also admonished for trying to "jump into Communism in one step." After the Lushan showdown, Peng Dehuai was deposed from his defense portfolio and replaced by Lin Biao, a radical and opportunist Maoist. The new defense minister initiated a systematic purge of Peng Dehuai's supporters from the military's ranks.

Militancy on the domestic front was echoed on the external front as well. The "soft" foreign policy based on the principles of peaceful coexistence to which China had subscribed in the mid-1950s gave way to a "hard" line in 1958. From August through October of that year, the Chinese resumed a massive artillery bombardment of the Nationalist-held offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. This was accompanied by an aggressive propaganda assault on the United States and the declared intent to "liberate" Taiwan.

In mid-1959 relations with India deteriorated as a consequence of the aftermath of the Tibetan revolt in 1958, quickly suppressed by China. Tibetan refugees fled to India, and the Chinese government accused India of having abetted the rebels. In addition, China laid claim to nearly 103,600 square kilometers of territory that India had regarded as within its own borders (see Physical Environment, ch. 2). In the Sino-Indian dispute, the Soviet Union gave moral support to India—a result as much as it was a cause of growing tension between Beijing and Moscow.

The most significant development externally was of course the surfacing of a Sino-Soviet dispute in the late 1950s. Relations with the Soviet Union, China's principal benefactor and ally, were correct but lacked the warmth of comradeship. The Soviet agreement in late 1957 to help China produce its own nuclear weapons and missiles was terminated in mid-1959 (see ch. 14, National Defense). By mid-1960 the rift had widened to the point where Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev reduced or canceled economic and technical aid programs to China and recalled all Soviet technicians and advisors from China. (The withdrawal of the technicians had begun in mid-1959.) The Sino-Soviet discord was occasioned by several factors. The two countries differed in their interpretation of the nature of "peaceful coexistence," the Chinese taking a more militant and unyielding position on the issue of anti-imperialist struggle but the Soviets unwilling, for example, to give their support on the Taiwan question. In addition the two communist powers disagreed on doctrinal matters. The Chinese accused the Soviets of "revisionism"; they in turn countered with charges of "dogmatism" against the Chinese. Rivalry within the world communist movement also aggravated Sino-Soviet relations. An additional complication was the history of suspicion each side had toward the other, especially the Chinese who had lost a substantial part of territory to tsarist Russia in the mid-nineteenth century. Whatever the causes of the dispute, the Soviet suspension of aid was a blow to the Chinese scheme of developing industrial and sensitive technology (including nuclear).

Readjustment and Recovery (1961–65)

In 1961 the political tide at home began to swing to the right as evidenced in the ascendancy of pragmatists. In an effort to stabilize the economic front, for example, the Party—then under the dominant influence of Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, Bo Yibo, and the like—initiated a series of corrective measures. Among these measures was the reorganization of the commune system resulting in more administrative and economic leeway for the production brigades and production teams. For more effective control from the center, the Party reestablished its six regional bureaus and also initiated steps aimed at tightening party discipline and encouraging the leading party cadres to develop populist-style leadership at all levels. The so-called rectification campaign was prompted by a growing realization of popular apathy toward the arrogance or "commandism" of party and government functionaries. On the industrial front, much emphasis was now placed on pragmatic and rational planning; ideological fervor and mass movement were no longer the controlling themes of industrial management. Production authority was restored to factory managers. Another notable emphasis after 1961 was the party's greater interest in strengthening the defense and internal security establishment. By early 1965 the country had been well along on its way to recovery under the direction of the party apparatus, or to be more specific, the Central Committee Secretariat headed by Secretary-General Deng.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–68)

In 1960–61 Mao was, for all practical purposes, on the sidelines and in semiseclusion. In 1962, however, he began the offensive, having grown increasingly uneasy about what he believed was the creeping "capitalist" and antisocialist tendencies in the country. As a hardened veteran revolutionary who had overcome the severest adversities, Mao continued to believe that the material incentives the pragmatists had restored to the peasants and others were corrupting the masses and were counterrevolutionary.

To arrest the so-called "capitalist" trend, Mao in early 1963 caused the launching of a socialist education campaign in which the primary emphasis was on the restoring of ideological purity, the reinfusion of revolutionary fervor into the party and government bureaucracies, and the intensification of class struggle. There were internal disagreements, however, not on the aim of the movement but on the methods of carrying it out. Opposition came mainly from the pragmatist wing of the party apparatus. The socialist education drive was soon paired with another Mao campaign, the theme of which was "to learn from the People's Liberation Army." Lin Biao's rise to the center of power was increasingly conspicuous. This was accompanied by his call on the PLA and the Party to accentuate Maoist thought as the operational code for the socialist education campaign and for all revolutionary undertakings in China.

In connection with the socialist education campaign, a thorough reform of the school system, which had been planned earlier to coincide with the Great Leap Forward, went into effect. This reform had the dual purpose of providing mass education less expensively than previously and of reorienting the values of intellectuals and scholars so that they would no longer shun manual labor. It was also intended as a work-study program in which schooling was programmed to fit in with, and be oriented toward, the work schedules of communes and factories. Moreover, the drafting of intellectuals for manual labor was part of the party's rectification campaign, publicized through the mass media, to remove "bourgeois" influences from the intelligentsia and technical experts—particularly, their tendency to have greater regard for their own specialized fields than for the goals of the Party. Official propaganda accused the intellectuals and professionals of putting "expertise" ahead of "redness."

Gradually but systematically Mao had by mid-1965 regained control of party policy with the support of Lin Biao, Jiang Qing (Mao's wife), and Chen Boda, who at the time had their base of operation centered in Shanghai. In late 1965 he sought to bring about an ideological purge first within the cultural and academic communities. The assault on these communities widened in the spring of 1966 to include the party's leading cadres responsible for ideological guidance of cultural and academic affairs. Zhou Yang, then the czar of the arts and literature, was purged. By mid-1966 Mao's campaign had erupted into what has come to be known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the first mass action to have emerged against the CCP apparatus itself. It was in effect the first movement in China's history to have been aided and abetted by one leadership faction against the other rival leadership group.

Considerable intraparty opposition to the Cultural Revolution was evident. On one side was the Mao-Lin Biao group supported by the PLA; on the other side was a faction led by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, which had its strength in the regular party machine. Premier Zhou Enlai, while remaining personally loyal to Mao, tried to mediate or reconcile the two factions.

Mao suspected that he could no longer depend on the formal party organization, convinced that it had been permeated with the "capitalist" and bourgeois obstructionists. He turned to Lin Biao and the PLA to counteract the influence of those who were allegedly "Left in form but Right in essence." The PLA was widely extolled as a "great school" for the training of a new generation of revolutionary fighters and successors. Maoists also turned to middle-school students for political demonstrations on their behalf. These students, joined also by some university students, came to be known as Red Guards (see Glossary). Millions of Red Guards were encouraged by the Cultural Revolution group to "bombard" the regular party headquarters in Beijing and also at the regional and provincial levels. Their activities were promoted as the reflection of Mao's policy of rekindling revolutionary enthusiasm and destroying outdated, counterrevolutionary symbols and values. The thoughts of Mao, popularized in the form of *Quotations from Chairman Mao*, became the standard by which all revolutionary efforts were to be judged.

The result was a massive civil disorder, punctuated also by clashes between rival Red Guard gangs and between these gangs and local security authorities. The party organization was shattered from top to the bottom. (The Central Committee Secretariat became defunct in late 1966.) The effectiveness of public security organs became severely strained. Faced with the certainty of impending anarchy, the PLA—the only organization that was for the most part not radicalized by Red Guards—emerged as the principal guarantor of law and order and the de facto source and excerciser of political power. The PLA was of course under Mao's order to "support the left," but largely as a result of the practical wisdom of regional military commanders its support of the Red Guards was qualified. In fact, the PLA was more often than not a restraining influence on the leftist radicals. Such influence was brought to bear either in the suppression of Red Guard excesses or in the operation of new vehicles for local government—the revolutionary committees that had begun appearing in early 1967 as replacements for the former local party committees and local administrative bodies.

The radical tide receded somewhat beginning in late 1967 but it was not until after mid-1968 that Mao came to realize the uselessness of further revolutionary violence. Liu Shaoqi and his fellow "revisionists" and "capitalist roaders" had been purged from public life by early 1967, and the Maoist group had since been in full command of the political scene.

Viewed in larger perspective, the need for domestic calm and stability was occasioned perhaps even more greatly by pressures emanating from the external environment. The Chinese were alarmed in 1966–68 by steady Soviet military buildups along their common northern border. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia only served to heighten the Chinese perception of threat from the north. The Chinese fear was confirmed in March 1969 when the Chinese and Soviet border troops clashed on the island of Zhenbao (Damanskiy in Russian) in the Ussuri River (see ch. 12, Foreign Relations; ch. 14, National Defense).

The Cultural Revolution was brought to an end in April 1969. This was formally signaled at the CCP's Ninth National Party Congress convened at that time under the dominance of the Maoist group. Mao, of course, remained the supreme leader, and Lin Biao, promoted to the post of vice chairman of the Party, was named as Mao's successor. The party congress also marked the rising influence of Premier Zhou Enlai in both internal and external affairs.

68

China in Transition (1969–76)

The general emphasis after 1969 was on reconstruction through party rebuilding, economic stabilization, and greater sensitivity to the foreign policy environment. Pragmatism gained momentum as a central theme of the post-Cultural Revolution years, but this was paralleled by the efforts of the radical group to regain its former strength, which was steadily waning in the early 1970s. Evidently the radical group, led by Mao's wife—Jiang Qing—and including Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen, no longer had Mao's unqualified support. By 1970 Mao had seen his role more fitting as the supreme elder statesman than as an activist in the policymaking process. This was probably as much because of his declining health as because of his view that a firm stabilizing influence should be brought to bear on a divided nation. As Mao saw it, China needed both pragmatism and revolutionary enthusiasm, each acting as a check on the other. As political scientist Harry Harding Jr., put it, "Mao seemed to shift his support periodically between the radicals and the moderates, to ensure that neither group was able to gain dominance over the other." Factional infighting continued unabated through the mid-1970s. An uneasy coexistence was maintained while Mao was alive.

Party rebuilding got under way in 1969. The process was difficult, however, given the pervasiveness of factional tensions and cleavages carried over from the Cultural Revolution years. Differences persisted among the PLA, the Party, and left-dominated mass organizations, to say nothing of the radical-moderate rivalry, over a wide range of policy issues. It was not until December 1970 that a party committee could be reestablished at the provincial level. In political reconstruction two developments were noteworthy. Being the only institution of power that was left unscathed for the most part during the Cultural Revolution, the PLA's role was particularly important in the politics of transition and reconstruction. The PLA was, however, not a homogeneous body. In 1970–71 Zhou Enlai was able to forge a centrist-rightist alliance with a group of regional military commanders who had taken exception to certain of Lin Biao's policies. This coalition paved the way for the eventual dominance of the pragmatists in the late 1970s (see ch. 11, The Political Process).

An internal schism in the PLA appeared to exist largely over policy issues. On one side of the infighting was the Lin Biao faction that continued to exhort the need for "politics in command" and an unremitting struggle against both the Soviet Union and the United States. On the other side was a majority of the regional military commanders who had become concerned about the effect Lin Biao's political ambitions would have on military modernization and economic development. These commanders' views were generally in tune with the positions taken by Zhou and his moderate associates. On a more specific level, the moderate groups within the civilian bureaucracy and the armed forces spoke for more material incentives for the peasantry; rational economic planning; a thorough reassessment of the Cultural Revolution; and for improved relations with the West in general and the United States in particular—if for no other reason than as a means of countering the perceived expansionist aims of the Soviet Union. Generally, the radicals' objection notwithstanding, the political tide shifted steadily toward the right of center. Among the notable achievements in the early 1970s was China's decision to open its door to the United States as dramatized by President Richard M. Nixon's celebrated visit to China in February 1972. In September 1972 diplomatic relations were established with Japan (see Appendix B).

Without question the critical turning point through the mid-1970s was the death of Lin Biao in September 1971. The immediate consequence was a steady erosion of the fundamentalist influence of the left-wing radicals. Lin Biao's closest supporters were systematically purged. Efforts to depoliticize and promote professionalism were intensified within the PLA. These were also accompanied by the rehabilitation (see Glossary) of those persons who had been persecuted and fallen into disgrace in 1966–68. Among the most prominent of the rehabilitated was Deng Xiaoping, who was reinstated as a vice premier in April 1973—under the aegis of Premier Zhou Enlai. Together Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping came to exert strong influence as eclectic modernizers. Their moderate line was formally confirmed at the Tenth National Party Congress held in August 1973, at which time Deng Xiaoping was made a member of the Party Central Committee (but not yet on the Political Bureau).

The radical camp fought back by building an armed urban militia, but its mass base of support was limited to Shanghai and parts of the Northeast—hardly sufficient to arrest what it denounced as "revisionist" and "capitalist" tendencies. In January 1975 Zhou Enlai, speaking before the NPC outlined a program of what has come to be known as the "four modernizations" (see Glossary)—in the four sectors of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology (see ch. 5, Economic Context). This program would be reaffirmed at the Eleventh National Party Congress that convened in August 1977. Also in January 1975 Deng Xiaoping's position was solidified by his election as a vice chairman of the CCP and a member of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee. He also was installed as China's first civilian Chief of Staff of the PLA.

Deng Xiaoping had a temporary setback after Zhou Enlai's death in January 1976, when radicals launched a major counterassault against him. In April 1976 the vice premier was again removed from all his public posts, but not for long. The radicals became vulnerable after Mao's death on September 9, 1976, as Deng had been after Zhou Enlai's demise. On October 6 or 7, 1976, Jiang Qing and her three principal associates—to be denounced as the Gang of Four (see

Glossary)—were placed under house arrest. In October Hua Guofeng, who had been a party vice chairman and interim premier, was formally sworn in as party chairman and premier.

In July 1977 Deng Xiaoping was rehabilitated again at a Party Central Committee session and reassumed all the posts from which he had been removed in 1976. The post-Mao political order was given a first vote of confidence at the Eleventh National Party Congress held August 12–18, 1977. The congress elected a new Party Central Committee, a Political Bureau, and a Standing Committee of the bureau. The party congress also marked the formal ending of the Cultural Revolution—or at least so declared Party Chairman Hua Guofeng in his report to the congress: "The gang of four tried its hardest to cause damage and disruption. Now that the gang has been overthrown, we are able to achieve stability and unity and attain great order across the land, in compliance with Chairman Mao's instructions. Thus the smashing of the gang of four marks the triumphant conclusion of our first Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which lasted 11 years." By mid-1978 Deng emerged as the dominant party and government leader of China.

* * *

Chinese history remains a field of continuing and vigorous scholarly interest as evidenced in burgeoning works in recent years. Some of the best article-length studies on the prerepublican centuries are found in the *Journal of Asian Studies*. A best single source of scholarly enlightenment on contemporary China is the London-based *China Quarterly*. By far the most widely used introductions to the field still remain *The Great Tradition, I: A History of East Asian Civilization*, by Edwin O. Reischauer and John K. Fairbank; and *East Asia: The Modern Transformation* and *A History of East Asia Civilization* by Fairbank, Reischauer, and Albert Craig. Since the late 1970s historians in China have themselves begun to raise searching questions with respect to their past. One notable outcome was a conference held under the auspices of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, October 26 to November 1, 1980. The conference, centered on the theme of "Social and Economic History in China from Sung Dynasty to 1900," was attended by twenty Chinese historians and ten American historians. The purpose of the conference was to discuss and review the state of historical research both in China and the United States, and a short report was expected to be made available in 1981 by the Washington-based Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China.

Chapter 2. Physical Environment and Population



Artist's rendition of a Han Dynasty (A.D. 25–220) funerary object.

AT THE START of the 1980s the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership perceived the control of population growth to be fundamental to the achievement of the "four modernizations" (see Glossary). In the party's view, China's capacity to accumulate development funds and improve the living conditions of the country's nearly 1 billion inhabitants was to a large extent determined by the ratio between expansion of the economy and population growth. The CCP blamed spiraling population increases in the preceding decades for having hampered scientific and cultural development and having obstructed progress in bettering living standards. Whereas party support for family planning programs had vacillated in the past, in late 1980 party representatives spoke of the fundamental need in a socialist economy for planned development of the human population.

The People's Republic of China is the world's most populous country. Since 1949 its population has increased from 540 million to about 1 billion. In 1980 persons under twenty-one years of age constituted roughly one-half this total, implying even higher growth rates in the future. Anticipated changes in the age-sex distribution of the population would mean continuation through the 1980s of a trend bringing increasing numbers of women into the childbearing age group.

In the transitional period from the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966–68) until 1976, when the national leadership was increasingly emphasizing pragmatism as a policy determinant and was focusing on reconstruction and economic stabilization efforts, the CCP brought its influence to bear directly on the population control issue. An apparatus for an all-out attack on excess population growth was established, and a central role in a nationwide birth control campaign was assigned to party and government cadres (see Glossary).

By 1980 much of the apparatus was in order, and the accelerating effort had already shown results. The rate of population growth reportedly had declined significantly from 2.5 percent in 1971 to less than 1.2 percent in 1979. Advocacy and encouragement of family planning had been written into the new Constitution. Sections for population control existed in most public security offices, and family planning work was on the agenda of CCP committees at all levels. Party committee members were expected to make models of themselves as birth control practitioners. Most importantly, a far-reaching system of economic rewards and sanctions had been instituted to encourage the "one-child family," at least in urban areas.

In his address to the Fifth National People's Congress session in August-September 1980, Premier Hua Guofeng called for an intense drive in the next three to four decades by all Chinese (except in sparsely populated minority nationality areas) to participate in the one child per family program. Hua declared that China must strive to limit its population to 1.2 billion by the end of the century.

In pressing its birth control policy the Party faced a herculean task, as it readily admitted. The incentive system of economic rewards and penalties might prove effective in urban areas where considerations of living space and wage increases were fundamental and where social control was relatively easy. The indirect form of CCP rule in the countryside, however, made it much more difficult to implement changes in rural areas (see Rural Social Organization, ch. 3). This was especially true where proposed changes flew in the face of peasant perceptions of family and community interest. For example, children in rural China—especially male children—were highly valued both for added manpower and as a form of support and security in old age.

The vast majority of China's people are found in the eastern segment of the country, the traditional China Proper (see Glossary). Most of them are peasants living, as did their forebears, in the low-lying hills and central plains that stretch from the loess highlands eastward and southward to the sea. In this vast area generally favored by a temperate or subtropical climate, meticulously tilled fields bespeak the predominance of agricultural pursuits and a continuing concern over farm output and its bearing on the food supply (see Resource Endowment, ch. 6).

Since the late 1950s migration to urban areas had been restricted, and in 1980 only 20 percent or less of the population was urban. An urban and industrial corridor formed a broad arc stretching from Harbin in the Northeast through the Beijing area and southward to China's largest city, the huge industrial metropolitan complex of Shanghai.

The uneven pattern of internal development, so strongly weighted toward the eastern segment of the country, doubtless would change little even with developing interest in exploiting the mineral-rich and agriculturally productive portions of the vast Northwest and Southwest regions. The adverse terrain and climate of most of those regions mitigated against dense population concentration. Existing settlements were largely of so-called minority nationalities, the name officially used for the country's numerous ethnic minorities (see The Minority Nationalities, this ch.).

Physical Environment

China is geographically diverse and includes vast areas of rugged inhospitable terrain. The third largest country in the world, it reaches across some 5,000 kilometers of the East Asian landmass, an erratically changing configuration of broad plains, expansive deserts, and lofty mountain ranges. Eastern China, its seacoast fringed with offshore islands, is a region of fertile lowlands, foothills and mountains, desert and steppe. Western China is a realm of sunken basins, rolling plateaus, and towering massifs, including a portion of the highest tableland on the globe. The vast size of the country and the barrenness of the western hinterland have important implications for defense strategy (see Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, ch. 14). For all the many good harbors along the approximately 18,000-kilometer coastline, historically the nation oriented itself not toward the sea but inland, developing as an imperial power whose center lay on the middle and lower reaches of the Huang He on the northern plains.

Figures for the size of China differ slightly depending on the location of a number of ill-defined boundaries. The officially cited figure is 9.6 million square kilometers, making the country substantially smaller than the Soviet Union, slightly smaller than Canada, and somewhat larger than the United States. It is reasonably comparable to the latter in contour, however, and lies largely at the same latitudes.

China's borders—more than 20,000 kilometers of land frontier shared with one or another of nearly all the nations of mainland East Asia—are disputed at a number of points. The 6,452-kilometer frontier with the Soviet Union has long been a source of intermittent friction. In 1954 China published maps showing substantial portions of Soviet Siberian territory as part of China. In the western sector, China claimed portions of the 41,000-square-kilometer Pamir area, a region of soaring mountain peaks and glacial valleys where the borders of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union and China meet in central Asia. North and east of the Pamir region, some sections of the border were undemarcated (see fig. 3). In the Northeast, border friction produced a tense situation in remote regions of Nei Monggol Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolia) and Heilongjiang Province along segments of the Argun, Amur, and Ussuri rivers. Each side had massed troops and had several times exchanged charges of border provocation in this area (see The Soviet Union, ch. 12; The Soviet Union, ch. 14).

On the western end of China's border with India, formed by the formidable mountain barrier of the Himalayas, a major dispute focuses on the Aksai Chin area of northeastern Jammu and Kashmir (see fig. 3). The area is under Chinese control but claimed by India. Eastward from Bhutan lies another large area north of the Brahmaputra River which India controls and administers, but to which the Chinese laid claim in the aftermath of the 1958 Tibetan revolt. In June 1980 China made its first move in twenty years to settle the border disputes with India, proposing that India cede the Aksai Chin area in Kashmir to China, in return for Chinese recognition of the McMahon Line drawn by the British as the border on the east. Many islands in the South China Sea, held by Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines, are contested by China. Conversely, Vietnam claimed the Chinese-held Paracel Islands. Meanwhile, in 1980, the island province of Taiwan continued to be under the control of the Chinese Nationalist Party—Guomindang—(see Nationalism and Communism, ch. 1).


Western Sector
Names and boundary representations not necessarily authoritative
75
80
85
90
45
40
35
Ozero Balkhash
Ozero Alakol'
Ozero Zaysan
ALTAI MOUNTAINS
MONGOLIA
JUNGGAR PENDI
(Dzungarian Basin)
SOVIET UNION
CHINA
Ozero Issyk-Kul
TIAN SHAN
XINJIANG
TARIM PENDI
(Torim Basin)
Kashgar
PAMIR
Khunjerab Pass
AFGHANISTAN
KARAKORAM RANGE
PAKISTAN
Karakoram Pass
Indian claims
AKSAI CHIN
Chinese line of control
INDIA
Border History
Treaty of Peking, 1860
440,000 sq. km. to Russia
SOVIET UNION
MONGOLIA
Demarcated border
Treaty of St. Petersburg 1881
Area yielded by China
(70,000 sq. km.)
CHINA
Demarcated border
Treaty of St. Petersburg 1881
Area yielded by Russia
Pamir
In dispute. Based on 1895 Anglo-Russian Treaty; boundary not recognized by China.

Figure 3. China-Soviet Union Border Areas

Terrain and Drainage

The country exhibits great variation in terrain and vegetation. Mountains cover more than two-thirds of the nation's territory, impeding communication and leaving only limited areas of level land for agriculture. Most ranges, including all the major ones, trend east-west. In the Southwest region the Himalayas and the Kunlun Mountains enclose the Plateau of Tibet, the most extensive plateau in the world, where elevations average more than 4,000 meters above sea level and the loftiest summits rise to over 7,200 meters (see table 3, Appendix A).

From the Plateau of Tibet other less elevated highlands, rugged east-west trending mountains and plateaus interrupted by deep depressions, fan out to the north and east. A continental scarp marks the eastern margin of this territory extending from the Greater Khingan Range in Manchuria, through the Taihang Shan (a range of mountains overlooking the North China Plain), to the eastern edge of the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau in the South (see fig. 4). Virtually all of the low-lying areas of China, the regions of dense population concentration and intensive cultivation, are found east of this scarp line.


Eastern Sector
115
120
125
130
50
45
Names and boundary representations not necessarily authoritative
SOVIET UNION
Ergun He (Argun River)
Heilong Jiang (Amur River)
Manzhouli
Hailar
HEILONGJIANG
CHINA
Border History
Treaty of Nerchinsk, 1689
Indefinite treaty boundary
Shilka River
Argun River
Manzhouli
Zeya River
Treaty of Aigun, 1858
598,000 sq. km. to Russia
Treaty boundary
Amur River
Soviet maps show boundary according to 1911 Treaty of Tsitsihar
Chinese maps show boundary according to 1727 Treaty of Kiakhta
Territorial difference is about 900 sq.km.
Ussuri River
Treaty of Peking, 1860
400,000 sq. km. yielded to Russia
Boundary west of Ussuri headwaters was demarcated in 1861 and redemarcated in 1886.
Treaty boundary
Vladivostok
Trans-Siberian Railroad
River
Amur
SOVIET UNION
Boundary shown on Chinese maps
Fuyuan
Kazakevicheva Channel
Ussuri River
Khabarovsk
Boundary shown on Soviet maps
CHINA
Amur River
Khabarovsk
Fuyuan
Songhua Jiang (Sungari River)
Wusuli Jiang (Ussuri River)
Harbin
Jixi
Mudanjiang
Xingkai Hu
JILIN
Tumen Jiang
International boundary
International boundary in dispute
Other line of separation
Provincial-level boundary
0 50 100 150 200 250 Miles
0 50 100 150 200 250 Kilometers

Figure 3. (continued).

East-west ranges include some of Asia's greatest mountains. In addition to the Himalayas and the Kunlun Mountains, there are the Kailas Range and the Tian Shan (the latter standing between two great basins), the massive Tarim Basin on the south, and the Dzungarian Basin to the north. Rich deposits of coal, oil, and metallic ores lie in the area. The largest inland basin in China, the Tarim measures 1,500 kilometers from east to west and 600 kilometers from north to south at its widest parts.

The Himalayas form a natural boundary on the southwest as the Altai Mountains do on the northwest. Lesser ranges branch out, some at sharp angles to the main system, from the major ranges. The mountains form the chief watersheds of all the principal rivers.

The spine of the Kunlun mountain range separates into several branches as it runs eastward from the Pamirs. The northernmost of the branches, the Altun Shan and the Qilian Shan, rim the Plateau of Tibet in west central China and overlook the Tsaidam Basin, a sandy and swampy basin containing many salt lakes. A southern branch of the Kunlun forms the watershed between the Huang He and the Yangtze River. The Gansu Corridor, west of the great bend in the Huang He, has traditionally been an important communications link with Central Asia.


SOVIET UNION
Ozero Baykal
ALTAI MOUNTAINS
JUNGGAR PENDI (Dzungarian Basin)
MONGOLIA
TIAN SHAN
TURPAN
Lop Nur
PAMIRS
AFGHANISTAN
PAKISTAN
Chinese line of control
North
NEI MONGOL GAOYUAN
MU US SHAMO (Ordos Desert)
QAIDAM PENDI (Tsaidam Basin)
QING ZANG GAOYUAN
SICHUAN PENDI
NEPAL
BHUTAN
INDIA
BANGLADESH
BURMA
YUNGUI GAOYUAN (Yunnan-Guizhou)
Huai He
Shanghai
Bay of Hangzhou
CHANGJIANG (Middle)
Yellow Sea
East China Sea
NORTH KOREA
SOUTH KOREA
Sea of Japan
JAPAN
TAIWAN
HONG KONG (U.K.)
MACAO (Port.)
South
VIETNAM
LAOS
THAILAND
Gulf of Tonkin
HAINAN DAO
South China Sea
PARACEL ISLANDS
Philippine Sea
PHILIPPINES
Bay of Bengal
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
50
40
30
20
International boundary
International boundary in dispute
Other line of separation
National capital
white line Regional boundary
Great wall
Regional breakdown for general descriptive purposes only; regional units have no administrative significance
0 100 200 300 400 Miles
0 100 200 300 400 Kilometers

Figura 4a

Figure 4. Topography and Drainage

Figure 4 has been split up into two pages by ERIC

Most of the Great Wall along the country's northern flank, the actual length of which is more than 3,300 kilometers, was built about 220 B.C., under the Qin Dynasty. North of the Great Wall, between Gansu Province on the west and the Greater Khingan Range on the east, lies the Plateau of Inner Mongolia, at an average elevation of 1,000 meters above sea level. The Yin Shan, a system of mountains with average elevations of 1,364 meters, extends east-west through the center of this vast desert and steppe peneplain. To the south is the largest loess plateau in the world, covering 600,000 square kilometers in Shaanxi Province and parts of Gansu and Shanxi provinces and of Ningxia-Hui Autonomous Region. The plateau is veneered by a layer of loess—a yellowish soil blown in from the deserts of Inner Mongolia. The loose, loamy deposit travels easily on the wind, and over the centuries the Huang He has become choked with silt.

Because the level of the river drops precipitously as it reaches the North China Plain, where it continues a sluggish course across the delta, it brings down a heavy load of sand and mud from the upper reaches, much of which is deposited on the flat plain. The flow is channeled mainly by a constant repair of man-made embankments; the river now actually flows on a raised ridge, the riverbed having risen to fifty meters or more above the plain. As a result waterlogging, floods, and course changes have been recurrent in past centuries. Emperors were judged by their concern or indifference to preservation of the embankments. In the modern era the new leadership has evidenced a deep commitment to dealing with the problem and has undertaken extensive flood control and conservation measures.

Flowing from its source in the Tibetan highlands, the Huang He courses toward the sea through the North China Plain, the historic center of Chinese expansion and influence. Han (see Glossary) people have farmed the rich alluvial soils of the plain since ancient times, constructing the Grand Canal for north-south transport (see The First Imperial Period, ch. 1). The plain itself is actually a continuation of the central Manchurian Plain to the northeast, but separated from it by the Bo Hai, an extension of the Yellow Sea.

Like other densely populated areas of China, the plain is subject not only to floods but to earthquakes. For example, the mining and industrial center of Tangshan, about 165 kilometers east of Beijing, was leveled by an earthquake in July 1976. The Chinese reported 242,000 persons killed and 164,000 injured.

The Qin Ling, a continuation of the Kunlun Mountains, divides the North China Plain from the Yangtze delta and accounts for the major geographic boundary between the two great parts of China Proper. It is in a sense a cultural boundary as well, influencing the distribution of custom and language. South of the Qin Ling divide, lie the densely populated and highly developed areas of the lower and middle plains of the Yangtze River and, on its upper reaches, the Szechwan Basin, an area encircled by a high barrier of mountain ranges.

The country's longest and most important waterway, the Yangtze is navigable over much of its length and has a vast hydroelectric potential. Rising on the Plateau of Tibet, it traverses 6,300 kilometers through the heart of the country, draining an area of 1.8 million square kilometers before emptying into the East China Sea. The roughly 300 million persons who live along its middle and lower reaches cultivate a great rice and wheat producing area. The Szechwan Basin—favored by a mild, humid climate and a long growing season—produces a rich variety of crops; it is also a leading silk producing area and an important industrial region with substantial mineral resources.

Second only to the Qin Ling as an internal boundary is the Nan Ling, the southernmost of the east-west mountain ranges. The Nan Ling defines that part of China where a tropical climate permits two crops of rice to be grown each year. Southeast of the mountains lies a coastal, hilly region of small deltas and narrow valley plains; the drainage area of the Zhu Jiang and its associated network of rivers occupies much of the region to the south. West of the Nan Ling stands the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau, more or less rising in two steps, averaging respectively 1,200 and 1,800 meters in elevation toward the precipitous mountain regions of the eastern Plateau of Tibet.

The Hai He, like the Zhu Jiang and other major waterways, flows from west to east. Its upper course consists of five rivers which converge near Tianjin, then flow seventy kilometers before emptying into the Bo Hai. Another major river, the Huai He, rises in Henan Province and flows through several lakes before joining the Yangtze.

Inland drainage involving a number of upland basins in the North and Northeast accounts for less than 40 percent of the country's total drainage area. Many such rivers and streams flow into lakes or diminish in the desert. Some are useful for irrigation.

China's extensive territorial waters are principally marginal seas of the western Pacific, washing a long and much indented coastline and having many islands. Taiwan and Hainan are the largest and second largest, respectively, of the 5,000 islands. The Yellow, East China, and South China seas are marginal seas of the Pacific Ocean. More than half the coastline (predominantly in the south) is rocky; most of the remainder is sandy. The Bay of Hangzhou roughly divides the two types of shoreline.

Climate

Monsoon winds, rising out of differences in the heat-absorbing capacity of the continent and the ocean, dominate the climate. These alternating seasonal air mass movements and accompanying winds are moist in summer and dry in winter. The advance and retreat of the monsoons account to a considerable degree for the timing of the rainy season and the amount of rainfall throughout the country. Tremendous differences in latitude, longitude, and altitude give rise to sharp variations in precipitation and temperature

Plateau of Tibet, in central Asia, the highest region in the world
Courtesy China Pictorial

Huangpu Jiang flowing through southern Jiangsu Province (Shanghai area)
Courtesy China Pictorial

Scene on the Grand Canal, inland waterway about 1,600 kilometers long from Tianjin to Hangzhou. Earliest portion dates from late fifth century B.C.
Courtesy China Pictorial

within China, however; although most of the country lies in the temperate belt, its climatic patterns are fairly complex and characterized by significant regional contrasts.

China's northernmost point lies along the Amur River in Heilongjiang Province which is in the cold-temperate zone; its southernmost point, Hainan Island, has an equatorial climate. As might be expected, there is wide north-south temperature variation. Temperature differences in winter are great, but in summer the diversity is considerably less. For example, the northern portions of Heilongjiang Province experience an average mean January temperature of below 0° C, and the reading may drop to minus 30° C; average July mean in the same area may exceed 20° C. By contrast, the central and southern parts of Guangdong Province experience an average January temperature of above 10°C while the July mean is about 28° C.

Precipitation varies regionally even more than temperature. China south of the Qin Ling enjoys abundant rainfall, most of it coming with the summer monsoons. To the north and west of the range, however, rainfall is uncertain, and the farther north and west one moves the scantier and more uncertain it becomes. The Northwest has the lowest annual rainfall in the country and no precipitation at all in its desert areas.

Resource Development

In the late 1970s debate arose among the nation's economic planners as how to best provide energy for industrial development in the southern provinces, insofar as 70 percent of the country's coal reserves were located in the northern provinces. Some planners favored the development of coal-burning thermal stations; others called for hydroelectric power-generating stations. Weakness in the transportation system, however, argued against the former; intervals of decreased power output owing to drought argued against the latter (see ch. 7, Industry).

Economic planners and scientists were concerned also about the impact of overexploitation of forests and development of marginal areas for crop cultivation on the overall environment. They warned that related soil erosion was adversely affecting areas from Hainan Island to the Greater Khingan Range—including notably, areas along the upper reaches of the Yellow River—and called for restraint in cutting timber. The cutting of large tracts of forest was reported to have led to the spreading of the Northwest deserts and the disappearance of pastoral lands. Scientists also voiced concern over the increasing scarcity of precipitation in some areas. An area in Gansu Province, not far from the Gobi Desert, which had been selected with eleven other regions to be developed into a high-yielding agricultural zone, reported a 12-percent decrease in precipitation in twenty years. At the start of the 1980s the leadership had undertaken an ambitious reforestation project that envisioned a "wall of green" along the northern margin of the country.

Population

The Data Base

Between 1960 and 1978 China released little demographic data; even the 1964 census was shrouded in secrecy and the results were never widely publicized. Since 1976, however, the State Statistical Bureau (SSB) has published an increasing amount of data, including estimates of the total population for 1965 and 1975 through 1979, and birthrates and death rates for 1979 and selected previous years. Age distributions from the 1964 census and a 1975 survey also became available to Westerners.

Despite the official imprimatur, a variety of circumstances raised serious questions about the reliability of these figures. Population experts often view them as the least credible of Chinese statistics, which at best must be approached with caution. The statistics themselves often suffer from distortions and internal inconsistencies; and there has been no recent census. China's only two censuses were conducted in 1953 and 1964. There is some possibility also that the two censuses, particularly the 1964 census, significantly undercounted population. The chaos and disorder of the Cultural Revolution in 1966–68 (see Glossary) was a major setback to the attempt to collect and maintain official records. Additionally, all the population data are based on figures taken from registers maintained by public security personnel for other purposes and any such registers tend to provide inaccurate counts—usually too low. In China this may be offset by a countervailing pressure to overcount, since registers are the basis for the issuance of commodity rations; however, this is not at all certain.

Further reason to question reliability of the figures is the fact that some of the officials who supply figures to SSB authorities may be the same administrators charged with implementing the birth control campaign. This circumstance puts them under considerable pressure to underreport figures.

John Aird, a leading specialist on Chinese demography with the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division (FDAD) of the United States Bureau of the Census, has constructed an internally consistent model of China's demographic history (1953–80), which accepts certain official data, rejects other official data inconsistent with that selected, and makes certain adjustments in still other pieces of official data (see table 5, Appendix A).

Another model also generated by Aird (here termed the "Intermediate" or "FDAD" model) uses the official data for reference but accepts without adjustment only the 1953 census figures (see table 6, Appendix A). Its methodology and assumptions are rather complicated, but in general, it concludes that birth, death, and natural increase rates have all been somewhat higher than officially reported, particularly in the 1970s. It suggests a total population on January 1, 1980, of somewhat more than 1 billion, about 5 percent higher than the official figure of 971 million. All estimates are necessarily tentative. China was planning a new census in the early 1980s, however, which if conducted carefully could finally resolve some of the long-standing demographic uncertainties.

Regardless of uncertainty about precise figures, one thing was clear. Whereas warfare and natural disasters had prevented significant population increases during the preceding century, the country experienced a phenomenal population explosion after 1949, probably increasing by 400–440 million persons (or 69–77 percent) in the 1949–80 period. This corresponds to an average increment of about 2 percent or about 15 million persons per year.

Decline in Mortality and Fertility

In 1949 crude death rates were probably higher than thirty per 1,000 and life expectancy was only thirty-two years. Mortality steadily declined from these high levels in the early 1950s and continued to decline through 1980 with only temporary interruptions. In 1979 the government claimed that the crude death rate had fallen to 6.2 per 1,000 and that life expectancy had risen to 68.2 years. Although possibly exaggerated, these figures represented a significant achievement which was due primarily to the major improvements in public health beginning in the 1950s and probably also the improvement in rural medical services after the Cultural Revolution (see Health, this ch.).

The incomplete available evidence suggests that the traditionally high birthrates, which were probably forty to forty-five per 1,000, declined only very slowly until the early 1970s. At that time, however, the decline accelerated sharply as a result of the birth control policies. The government claimed a crude birthrate of only 17.9 per 1,000 in 1979—a figure some analysts believe might have been exaggerated. Urban birthrates were generally lower than rural ones, with many cities reporting levels of ten per 1,000 or less. Reported 1979 natural increase rates, however, also varied by as much as ten per 1,000 even among overwhelmingly rural provinces, possibly owing to the zeal of birth control efforts of different provincial authorities.

Whereas the government birth control campaign was primarily responsible for declining fertility, elements of socioeconomic change acting in a gradual way may have played some role, particularly in the cities. These include increased employment of women in both urban and rural areas (see Labor Force, this ch.); reduced infant mortality (a greater percentage of surviving children would tend to reduce demand for additional children); and later marriage age. The Party has set the minimum marriage age in the cities at twenty-three for women and twenty-six for men, a policy it could readily enforce owing to its control over marriage permits and the allocation of scarce urban housing space. Target marriage ages were lower in the countryside and less easy to standardize, but nonetheless the

Karst topography of Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region; in upper right of photo, Li Jiang courses toward South China Sea.
Courtesy China Pictorial

average is undoubtedly somewhat higher than before 1949 when early arranged marriages were common.

In urban areas the housing shortage has probably also acted as a constraint on the number of children. The policy of sending large numbers of high school graduates to the countryside, depriving cities of a significant proportion of persons of childbearing ages, undoubtedly had some effect on birthrates.

In the absence of an old-age welfare system in the countryside, there continue to be major economic incentives to have many children, especially sons, for support in old age. Under such conditions the degree to which propaganda and the undoubted improvements in education have eroded traditional values favoring large families was open to question.

Population Control Programs

Initially Chinese leaders were ideologically disposed to view a large population as an asset. But the liabilities of a large, rapidly growing population gradually became apparent to segments of the leadership in the 1950s. For one year starting in August 1956 vigorous propaganda support was given to mass birth control efforts of the Ministry of Public Health which, however, had little impact on fertility. After an interval during the Great Leap Forward of 1958–60 (see Glossary), it was once again asserted that rapid population growth posed an obstacle to development. Leadership interest in birth control revived in the early 1960s.

Propaganda, somewhat more muted than during the first campaign, emphasized the virtues of late marriage. Birth control offices were set up in the central government and some provincial governments in 1964. The results of the second campaign may have been somewhat more favorable, particularly in the cities, but the chaos of the Cultural Revolution brought it to a halt.

By 1973 Chairman Mao Zedong had been publicly identified with the family planning movement, signifying a greater leadership commitment to controlled population growth than ever before. Yet until several years after his death, the leadership was reluctant to directly put forth the rationale that population control was necessary for economic growth and improved popular living standards. Nonetheless the Party mobilized its resources for a nationwide birth control campaign in 1972–73. A national administrative apparatus was established, headed by a group in the State Council (see The Government, ch. 10). Committees to oversee birth control activities were established at all levels of government and in various collective enterprises. This extensive and seemingly effective network covered both the rural and urban population. In urban areas public security forces contained population control sections. In rural areas the country's so-called barefoot doctors distributed information and contraceptives supplied free by the national government to commune (see Glossary) members.

Population growth targets were set both for administrative units and individual families. In the mid-1970s the recommended size was a maximum of two children in cities and three or four in the countryside. Since 1979 two children have been the maximum officially permitted throughout the country. In many local units, plans formulated by birth control committees were specified to the point of determining and publicly posting which women would be allowed to have children in a given year. In September 1980 China's then Premier Hua Guofeng called on all families other than those of minority nationalities to limit themselves to one child.

Contraception has been the preferred method of implementing birth control plans. Under the leadership of cadres pressured to fulfill stringent birth control plans, however, voluntary sterilizations and abortions have also been employed. Abortion has been encouraged as a method of preventing "accidental" births not in accord with local plans.

Although participation in the birth control campaign was officially purported to be voluntary, many local birth control committees organized discussion groups, posted individual birth control plans, and encouraged public criticism of laggard units and individuals. More direct pressure was sometimes applied by party workers who held "heart to heart" talks with reluctant individuals. The power of the Party has made such appeals difficult to resist.

Although official policy has consistently forbidden direct coercive tactics, local cadres under pressure may stray beyond the sanctioned limits. Some party committees reportedly threatened to withhold ration coupons in cases of unauthorized births, refused to register such births, and forced sterilizations or abortions.

Other party committees were considerably less enthusiastic. In one county in Guizhou Province where the birthrate was over thirty per 1,000 in 1979, the party committee was reproved for "not having grasped [planned parenthood work] as a major affair" and having "gone no further than issuing general calls." Many party members have refused to practice birth control themselves.

Government reports indicated with increasing frankness in 1980 that success in birth control work has been crucially dependent on the degree to which party units have continuously cajoled and pressured the people under their control and on the degree to which CCP members have made examples of themselves by practicing birth control. This strongly suggests that despite years of propaganda there has been considerable resistance to the birth control campaign, which runs counter to traditional attitudes and to the perceived economic interests of many in the countryside. In the cities popular attitudes have been less tradition bound and party discipline somewhat easier to enforce.

Because of the large numbers of persons who would reach childbearing age in the late 1980s (far larger than the number who did so in the 1970s), birth control committees at all levels switched the focus of their work toward promoting one-child families in 1979. The most notable new tactic was the institution of material incentives for having one child, and material penalties for having more than two. The positive incentives proposed in 1979, although differing slightly from province to province, generally included: extra money for health care; an adult's as opposed to a child's grain ration; priority in medical treatment, labor recruitment, and school enrollment; and in the countryside, larger private plots for one-child families. Under the regulations, all these benefits are lost upon the birth of a second child. Proposed negative sanctions included reductions in income for parents of three or more children, which would become more severe with the birth of each child after the second one; denial of access to food grains at special prices for third or later children over the age of fourteen; and denial of ration coupons for supplementary foodstuffs or commodities other than cloth for third children under the age of fourteen.

It was unclear in 1980 how effective these material incentives and penalties would prove. In many areas they had not as yet been put into practice very smoothly or effectively. Administering them was a cumbersome process, dependent on the enthusiasm of cadres who may find that such discriminatory measures generate instability and resistance in local units. Even if they could be effectively implemented without corruption, how much weight they would carry relative to the perceived benefits of having more children is uncertain. Stories in the press detailed severe penalties meted out to party members, including some family planning workers who were personally disregarding the injunctions against large family size. There were cases of forced sterilization of reluctant CCP members. The intensity of monitoring the progress of lower level units through meetings, reports, and inspection tours also increased markedly.

Density and Distribution

Overall population density in 1980 was about 100 people per square kilometer. Density was only about one-third of that of Japan and it was less than that of many other countries in Asia and Europe as well. The overall figure, however, concealed major regional variations and the high person-land ratio in densely populated areas (see fig. 5).

Over 95 percent of the population lived on approximately 40 percent of the land. Broadly speaking, population was concentrated in China Proper, east of the mountains and south of the Great Wall. The most densely populated areas included: the Yangtze Plain, of which the delta region was the most populous, and the Szechwan Basin; the North China Plain; the delta of the Zhu Jiang; and the industrial area around the city of Shenyang in the Northeast.

The most sparsely populated areas are the largely mountainous, desert, and grassland regions of the Northwest and Southwest, and Inner Mongolia—portions of which are completely uninhabited and where only a few sections have populations more dense than ten


N
Heilongjiang
Harbin
Changchun
Jilin
Shenyang
Liaoning
Nei Monggol (Inner Mongolia)
Beijing
Tianjin
Hebei
Shandong
Jiangsu
Shanghai
Zhejiang
Xinjiang
Ningxia
Taiyuan
Qinghai
Gansu
Xi'an
Henan
Nanjing
Anhui
Xizang (Tibet)
Sichuan
Chengdu
Chongqing
Hubei
Wuhan
Jiangxi
Hunan
Fujian
Guizhou
Yunnan
Guangxi
Guangdong
Guangzhou
Provincial-level boundary
City over 1,000,000 population
Persons per square kilometer
0 10 100 200 300 500
Data not adjusted to account for changes in the provincial boundaries of Nei Monggol, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Gansu, and Ningxia in 1979
0 200 400 Miles
0 200 400 Kilometers

Source: Based on information from United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, *Population Headliners* [Bangkok], No. 63, June 1980, p. 5.

Figure 5. Population Distribution

people per square kilometer. Inner Mongolia, the Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region, Xizang Autonomous Region (Tibet), and Qinghai Province account for more than 50 percent of the country's land area but about 3 percent of the population in 1980.

Migration

Internal

For more than twenty years China has employed a variety of means to restrict internal movement. Efforts to limit prevailing free migration between villages and cities began in 1958 when the leadership initiated a series of measures to prevent persons—who were attracted to towns because of their generally higher living standards—from migrating except with permission for a special purpose. The restrictions remained in force in 1980 (see Social Groups and Social Cleavages, ch. 3).

Movement from city to countryside occurred on a large scale during the last two decades of the Maoist era specifically by party direction for economic and political reasons (see Youth and the Party, ch. 11). Most of these migrants were unmarried urban youths.

In late 1980 even though substantial numbers of relocated youths had been allowed to return to the cities, millions more remained in the countryside, where they appeared destined to stay until the government was able to resolve the urban unemployment situation.

Policy differed on the question of populating sparsely settled frontier regions. As early as the 1950s the government began to organize and fund migration for the purposes of land reclamation, industrialization, and construction in the interior and frontier regions. Land reclamation was carried out by state farms, located largely in Xinjiang Autonomous Region and Heilongjiang Province. In 1980 some 5 million migrants were estimated to be working on these farms which—like many of the construction, mining, and industrial ventures in the frontier regions—were established under the auspices of the Production and Construction Corps (PCC) of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Large numbers of migrants also went to fast-growing cities in the Northwest such as Baotou and Ürümqi, as well as to important development sites such as the Daqing oil field in Heilongjiang. Possibly 25 to 35 percent of the populations of Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Heilongjiang and Qinghai provinces in 1978 consisted of recent migrants and their children, judging by the degree to which population increases in the 1953–78 period exceeded the national average.

In Xinjiang in particular migration served the dual purpose of consolidating central control in areas populated chiefly by ethnic minorities. By 1980 influx of several million Han Chinese to Xinjiang's state farms and cities had increased the Han percentage of the population from around 10 to 40 percent of the total.

Immigration and Emigration

Immigration and emigration have been of little demographic significance. Their political significance, however, has been somewhat greater.

There were an estimated 24 million Overseas Chinese (see Glossary)—over 90 percent of them in Southeast Asia—in 1978 as a result of several hundred years of migration. Except during the Cultural Revolution, Overseas Chinese have been offered various enticements to return. Several million may have done so. The single most significant influx was that of about 160,000–250,000 ethnic Chinese who fled to southern China from Vietnam in 1978–79 when relations between the two countries worsened. Many of them were reportedly settled in state farms on the island of Hainan in the South China Sea.

Throughout most of China's history, strict controls have prevented large numbers of people from leaving the country, except for the early 1960s when about 100,000 people were allowed to go to Hong Kong. Tens of thousands of minority refugees fled Tibet and Xinjiang to India and the Soviet Union in the wake of rebellions.

In the late 1970s vigilance against illegal flight to Hong Kong was relaxed somewhat. Perhaps as many as 200,000 reached Hong Kong in 1979. In 1980 Chinese authorities were attempting to reduce the flow to Hong Kong. Eased foreign travel regulations, particularly for people with family connections overseas, may result in a somewhat larger legal emigration in the future.

The Minority Nationalities

Demographic Overview

According to official data, 94 percent of the population is Han Chinese; Han refers to the ancient dynasty which ruled China from 206 B.C. to A.D. 220. Sharp regional and cultural differences including major variations in the spoken form of Chinese exist among the Han, who are a mingling of many peoples. All the Han nonetheless use a common written form of Chinese, and they share the social organization, values, and cultural characteristics that are universally recognized as Chinese civilization.

China has, according to the official view, fifty-six "nationality" groups of which the Han are one. Members of non-Han groups—referred to as the "minority nationalities"—constitute only a very small proportion of the total population, numbering about 56 million in 1978. In no small part because the ethnic minorities are distributed over more than 50 percent of China's territory—much of which is located in politically sensitive frontier areas—they had acquired an importance disproportionate to their numbers. Some groups have kin across the frontiers in the Soviet Union and Mongolia (see fig. 6).

Defining the minorities has proved complicated as their origins and their relationship to the Han and each other have not always been clear. The People's Republic, the first government to attempt to systematically define and classify the minorities, published a list identifying fifty-five separate groups in 1980 (see table 9, Appendix A). But in doing so it offered no clear-cut set of criteria as the basis for identifyng each group. Perhaps because government policy emphasized the rights and interests of the minority nationalities, its list included some groups such as the Manchus, which had been partially or totally assimilated into the Han majority. Nine of the minority nationalities recognized on the list included fewer than 10,000 individuals.

Some minority nationalities could be found only in a single region; others may have settlements in two or more. In general however the minorities are concentrated in the provinces and autonomous regions of the Northwest and the Southwest. In Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet, where they occupy large frontier areas (many are traditionally nomadic), they engage primarily in agriculture or pastoral pursuits. Lamaistic Buddhism and Islam made deep inroads into their culture. Minority groups in Yunnan and Guizhou provinces and in the Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region are more fragmented and inhabit smaller areas.

Over 90 percent of Tibet's 1.8 million inhabitants are Tibetan. An internally cohesive group, they have proven the most resistant of the

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minority groups to the government's efforts at integration. Xinjiang, equally vast and distant from Beijing, is next in demographic and political significance. Despite a large-scale immigration of Han since the 1950s, around 60 percent of its 12.33 million population in 1978 belonged to minority nationalities. Of these, the most important were 5.5 million Uygurs and 700,000–800,000 Kazaks; both are Turkic Central Asian peoples.

Other provinces with large concentrations of minorities include Yunnan, where the Yi and other minority groups comprised an estimated 25–30 percent of the population; Guizhou, home of more than half of the approximately 4 million Miao; and sparsely populated Qinghai Province which—except for the area around the provincial capital of Xining is inhabited primarily by Tibetans and other minority nationality members, amounting in 1980 to 38.7 percent of the total population. Additionally, in the late 1970s minority nationalities constituted about 33 percent of the 3.66 million inhabitants of Ningxia and 15 percent of those of Inner Mongolia. Guangxi contains almost all of the 12 million members of what is nominally China's largest minority nationality, the Zhuang; however most of them are highly assimilated.

The leadership established special minority autonomous administrative regions. In 1980 these included five provincial-level units: Xizang, Xinjiang, Guangxi, Nei Monggol, and Ningxia (named respectively for the Tibetan, Uygur, Zhuang, Mongol, and Hui [Chinese-speaking Muslims] minority nationalities). In addition there were in 1980 twenty-nine autonomous prefectures and seventy-three autonomous counties.

Minority nationalities were not required to practice birth control. Even without this constraint, however, their rate of natural increase has been lower than that of the Han.

Policy

Since 1949 government policy towards minorities has been premised on the somewhat contradictory goals of national unity and the protection of minority equality and identity. The State Constitution of 1954 declared the country to be a "unified, multinational state" and prohibited "discrimination against or oppression of any nationality and acts which undermine the unity of the nationalities." All nationalities were to have equal rights and duties. Policy toward the ethnic minorities in the 1950s was based on the assumption that they could and should be effectively integrated into the Han polity only by a gradual assimilation policy, initially permitting them to retain their own cultural identity and to enjoy a modicum of self-rule. Accordingly, autonomous regions were established in which minorities' languages were recognized along with Chinese, special efforts were mandated to recruit a certain percentage of minority cadres, and minority culture and religion were ostensibly protected. The areas also benefited from substantial government investment.

Yet the attention to minority rights took place within the larger framework of strong central control. Minority nationalities, many of which had strong historical and recent separatist or anti-Han tendencies, were given no rights of self-determination. With the special exception of Tibet in the 1950s, minority regions were in no sense administered more loosely by Beijing than Han areas, and Han cadres filled the most important leadership positions. Minority nationalities were integrated into the national political and economic institutions and structures. Party statements hammered home the idea of the unity of all the nationalities and downplayed that part of minorities' history in which identification with China Proper was weak.

Relations with the minorities have been exacerbated by traditional Han attitudes of cultural superiority. Central authorities have criticized this "Han chauvinism" but have found its influence difficult to eradicate.

Pressures on the minority peoples were stepped up in the late 1950s and subsequently during the Cultural Revolution and the ultraleftist Gang of Four period. Ultraleftist ideology maintained that minority distinctness was an inherently reactionary barrier to socialist progress. Although the commitment to minorities' rights remained in theory, repressive assimilationist policies were pursued. Minorities' languages were downgraded, and cultural and religious freedom was severely curtailed or abolished. Minority group members were forced to give up animal husbandry in order to grow crops, at times unfamiliar crops. State subsidies were reduced. Some autonomous areas were reportedly abolished. These policies caused a great deal of resentment, resulting in a major rebellion in Tibet in 1959 and a smaller one in Xinjiang in 1962, the latter bringing about the flight of some 60,000 Kazak herders across the border to the Soviet Union. Scattered reports of violence in minority areas in 1966–76 suggest that discontent was high at that time also.

After the purge of the Gang of Four in 1976, policies toward the ethnic minorities were moderated in fields such as language, religion and culture, and land use patterns, with the admission that they had caused considerable alienation. The new leadership placed great emphasis on the need to recruit minority cadres. The commitment to national unity and the overall framework of strong central control remains, however, and it was not certain in 1980 what the ultimate effects of the new policies would be.

The Tibetans

About half of China's 3.4 million Tibetans lived in Tibet, and the remainder were located in order of importance in western Sichuan, Qinghai, where they occupy most of the inhabited territory, far northwest Yunnan, and far southwest Gansu provinces. Their native language, which has a written form modeled on an Indo-Aryan script, is related to Burmese. An estimated 80 percent are farmers in river valleys, and the remainder engage in animal husbandry, primarily in the plateaus of the northern part of Tibet and in Qinghai Province.

Traditionally Tibetans adhered to Lamaistic Buddhism, which was the state religion. The Dalai Lama, its chief dignitary domiciled at Lhasa, was the religious as well as secular leader of Tibet. Monasteries housed upwards of 100,000 monks, or Lamaist priests. Despite occasional challenges to the power of Lhasa and complex social cleavages, the Lamaist theocracy provided a cohesive framework for society.

The Tibetan areas were often only tenuously controlled by imperial dynasties and maintained a de facto independent state in the Republican period (see Republican China, ch. 1). After 1949 the new Chinese leadership, while maintaining an army presence to start schools, train cadres, and build roads, allowed the Dalai Lama to continue to rule without introducing fundamental social reforms. Tibetans nonetheless, fearing that the Great Leap Forward portended major changes, rebelled in 1959. Upon suppression of the revolt the Dalai Lama and tens of thousands of followers fled to India, and the PLA took direct control. The clergy was cast down and land reform instituted. The Chinese position was sufficiently consolidated by 1965 to formally establish the Xizang Autonomous Region, and collectivization was instituted after the Cultural Revolution.

Despite severe repression during the ultraleft period, religious feeling among Tibetans remained strong in the early 1980s. Only 2,000 persons were permitted to hold positions as lamas in 1979; nonetheless teachings of the faith were clandestinely transmitted. The Dalai Lama has retained his prestige among significant segments of the people. The Chinese government was attempting in 1980 to negotiate his return without giving him real power, hoping thereby to appease Tibetan sentiment and neutralize the threat the Dalai Lama represents to Tibetan loyalties to China.

In the 1960–80 period Tibetans were given relatively fewer important leadership positions in the administration of their own regions than were their counterparts in other regions. There were 120,000 Han in Tibet in various capacities in 1979 in addition to members of the PLA, making for what one visitor described as a colonial atmosphere.

In mid-1980 apparently regarding the situation in Tibet as unfavorable, the leadership in Beijing undertook a major initiative to change the atmosphere, turning over important official positions to Tibetans. The longtime first party secretary in Tibet, a Han Chinese, was removed and replaced by a Tibetan-speaking Han with long military experience in Tibet who was designated acting first secretary, a title suggesting that Beijing was aiming to groom a Tibetan to replace him. Further personnel shakeups within the party bureaucracy aimed at promoting Tibetans were planned. At the same time the government—noting that living conditions had actually worsened in Tibet in the 1970s—pledged Tibetans considerably more freedom to choose what types of crops to grow and animals to raise and pledged to liberalize regulations regarding private ownership of animals and to reduce central state purchase of output. The government also promised to funnel subsidies into agricultural production and animal husbandry. Thus one of the principal tactics for winning the loyalty of the Tibetans appeared to be to improve material conditions in the 1980s.

Urbanization

With its capital at Beijing, China in late 1980 had a total of twenty-nine provincial-level administrative units directly under the central government. In addition to the five autonomous regions (*zizhiqu*) for minority nationalities, there were twenty-one provinces (*sheng*) and three special municipalities—the three largest cities of Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin (see fig. 6). A recent change in province-level administrative boundaries in the Northeast region had enlarged the area of Inner Mongolia at the expense of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning provinces. Urban areas were further subdivided into lower level administrative units beginning with municipalities on the county level and extending down to the neighborhood level (see Local Administration, ch. 10).

The exact rate of urbanization was probably the most difficult to determine of all China's major demographic indicators. The few statistics regarding overall urban population available in 1980 were wildly contradictory. Survey results announced in 1979 in the authoritative *Renmin Ribao* (*People's Daily*) indicated that urban population was 110 million, or about 11.5 percent of the official population total for 1978. Yet official statements routinely have made reference to China's "80 percent rural population," and a newspaper article on urban food rations in 1979 implied that the number of people receiving such rations was 195.4 million, or almost 20 percent of the officially reported 1979 population.

Interpretation of the data is made even more difficult by lack of clarity regarding the definition of "urban" and "rural" in China. The "urban" or "rural" status of many very small settlements in which the population engages in both industrial and agricultural activities appears ambiguous. Municipal administrative divisions usually include a large portion of the agricultural land surrounding large and medium-sized cities and towns. Official figures often do not indicate whether they refer to the urban portion only or to the entire municipality. In addition the boundaries of municipalities, particularly large ones, have undergone considerable changes since 1949 as areas have been added to or taken away from their jurisdiction.

Most observers, however, tend to believe that urban population—not including residents of settlements centered around industry at the commune level—was probably closer to 20 percent than to 10 percent of the total population in 1980. By all accounts the increase in the urban proportion of the population, reported at 13.21 percent in the 1953 census, has been quite slow since 1949.

In 1980 there were 194 urban areas classified as municipalities. The three largest cities—Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin—had


N
Heilongjiang
Jilin
Liaoning
Nei Monggol (Inner Mongolia)
Beijing
Tianjin
Xinjiang
Gansu
Qinghai
Ningxia
Shanxi
Hebei
Shandong
Shaanxi
Henan
Jiangsu
Shanghai
Hubei
Anhui
Zhejiang
Xizang (Tibet)
Sichuan
Guizhou
Hunan
Jiangxi
Fujian
Yunnan
Guangxi
Guangdong
Provincial-level boundary
Mongol
Hui
Tibetan
Uygur
Miao
Yi
Zhuang
Bouyei
Korean
Manchu
Data is for groups numbering over 1.5 million.
0 200 400 Miles
0 200 400 Kilometers

Figure 6. Distribution of Major Minority Nationalities

provincial status. The size of the urban portion of the municipalities ranged from 6 million in Shanghai to as low as 30,000 in others. Thirteen cities contained more than 1 million people, and for an additional sixteen municipalities the total population of the city plus surrounding agricultural area exceeded 1 million, although in some of them the actual urban portion was quite small (see table 10, Appendix A). There were reportedly an additional 3,200 towns (including the 2,000 county seats), having populations between 10,000 and 50,000.

Before 1949 urban population was concentrated mainly in eastern and northeastern China, a result in part of foreign influence and control in these areas. Shanghai, for example, was developed by Western powers in the 19th century on the site of a small fishing village.

In 1980 Liaoning was the most urbanized province—a direct result of the development of the industrial belt around Shenyang and the Liaodong Peninsula area by first the Japanese between the two World Wars and then the Chinese government. The next most heavily urbanized areas were Jiangsu Province, Shanghai, and Hebei Province, together with Beijing and Tianjin.

The most rapidly developing big cities since 1949, however, have in general not been the older eastern cities but new cities further west. A 1978 survey claimed that 45 percent of the population was concentrated west of the line connecting Beijing and Guangzhou, in contrast to 35 percent twenty-five years earlier. A calculated decision was made in the 1950s to develop new urban-industrial centers in the interior, and the result was fantastic, rapid growth during the period 1953–80 in such cities as Lanzhou (397,000 to an estimated 1 million), Baotou (149,000 to an estimated 900,000), and Ürümqi (141,000 to an estimated 800,000). The bulk of the growth in these often dreary, ill-planned cities probably occurred before the 1970s.

Construction of small and medium-sized cities and towns—perceived as a way of forestalling increased pressure on the overcrowded, polluted older cities and as a method of spreading urban wealth more evenly—has been emphasized. These cities and towns were probably the fastest growing urban units after 1968, and their construction seems to have followed no particular master plan nor were their economic benefits and liabilities carefully considered. Their growth was facilitated by the development, in accord with Chairman Mao's ideas, of small and medium-sized factories in a variety of industries. Even some plants of national importance were deliberately located in small cities.

More than 3,200 semiurban "townships" were developed in the 1960s and 1970s centered on the construction of small machine shops, cement plants, and food-processing plants, by communes or brigades (see Glossary), and often also include schools, clinics, and commercial establishments. The population of many townships probably does not exceed 1,000.

The development of new inland population centers and townships has aimed at forestalling peasant migration to the large, old cities. The party's control of peasant mobility, through such mechanisms as the food and clothing rationing system and the maintenance of extensive dossiers on individuals which accompany them wherever they go, has been another important feature of this effort. To slow down urban growth the government even resettled large numbers of urban youth, particularly from Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin, in the countryside.

Some reevaluation of overall urban development strategy seemed possible in 1980. There continued to be sentiment in leadership circles for promoting the growth of small cities and towns and rural townships, rather than large cities, to absorb the expected increase of surplus agricultural labor. However there was another point of view which, while not negating the role of the smaller cities and towns and the townships, advocated a short-term emphasis on construction in large and medium-sized cities in order to more rationally utilize economic infrastructure. This view implied that overemphasis on construction of small cities and towns had proven economically wasteful. Even if the government was to decide to increase the pace of industrial construction in the larger cities, however, it would probably attempt to minimize the accompanying population increase.

Labor Force

In 1980 about 53 percent of the population fell within the working age—defined in the 1950s as sixteen to sixty for men, and sixteen to fifty-five for women. The size of the labor force itself could not be reliably estimated as the government did not publish, and was undoubtedly unable to gather, accurate aggregate statistics regarding rural employment.

The most comprehensive statistics published on the working population were those issued by the State Statistical Bureau (SSB), covering 76.93 million persons employed by the state and 22.74 million persons working in collective enterprises in cities and towns for a total of 99.67 million. The figure thus excluded the vast majority of agricultural workers, who lived in collectively owned rural communes. Included in the group were about 6 million workers in forestry, on state farms and on major state water conservancy projects, and it probably included some nonagricultural workers in the rural areas such as health personnel, teachers, and ranking commune party cadres. Subtracting persons in these categories from the 99.67 million total suggests 85 to 90 million persons as a reasonable estimate of the size of the urban labor force. Workers in small collective enterprises at the commune or brigade level were not represented. John Emerson, a United States government specialist on Chinese labor, estimates that about 50 million such persons, including 20 million in industry and about 15 million in construction, were working close to full time in 1979.

Employment in the industrial sector was reported to be 42.5 million for 1978, or 46 percent of the total covered by SSB statistics. Of these, 30.4 million were in state-owned enterprises; the remainder were in collective-industrial enterprises, whose level of technological sophistication varied but which on the whole were smaller, and more labor intensive than the state enterprises. When the Emerson estimate of 20 million commune-level industrial enterprises is also considered, it appears that over half of the total industrial labor force worked in collective-industrial enterprises.

In contrast to the industrial labor force, whose proportion to the entire labor force probably increased somewhat between 1960 and 1980, the proportion of commercial and service workers was said to have decreased by 33 percent in that period (see Retail Sales, ch. 8).

Of the 99.67 million persons counted by the SSB, about 31 million, or a little less than one-third, were women. Women probably accounted for a disproportionately high share of the labor force in urban-collective enterprises, particularly handicraft and food processing.

Available evidence suggests that men constitute the great majority of full-time, nonagricultural workers in rural areas. The movement

ZHAN
SHI PIN

Courtesy Harvey Epstein

Courtesy Frederica M. Bunge   Courtesy William H. Young, Jr.

The faces of China: top, street scene, Shanghai; lower left, children, Beijing; lower right, village near Kunming, Yunnan Province, home of many minority nationalities.

of men to construction and industrial work in the countryside has, however, increased the proportion of rural women in agricultural labor, estimated by one foreign observer to have reached 70 percent of all rural women from the ages of sixteen to sixty by the mid-1970s. In both urban and rural areas elderly women, usually family members, have played increasingly important roles in child rearing. Rural children participate in agricultural pursuits from an early age, entering the full-time labor force on completion of schooling, or earlier, in accordance with local practice.

Health

The dramatic improvement in the health of the people as reflected in greatly increased life expectancy since 1949 constitutes one of China's most impressive achievements. The change is due chiefly to disease control and epidemic prevention.

An emphasis on public health and preventive treatment characterized health policy from the beginning of the 1950s. At that time the Party began to mobilize the population to engage in mass "patriotic health campaigns" aimed at improving the abysmal level of environmental sanitation and hygiene and attacking certain specific diseases. This approach was perhaps best exemplified by mass assaults on the "four pests"—rats, sparrows, flies, and mosquitoes—and on schistosoma-carrying snails.

Particular efforts have been devoted in these campaigns to improving water quality through measures such as deep-well construction and human waste treatment. Only in the larger cities is human waste centrally disposed. In the countryside, where it has always been collected and applied to the fields as fertilizer, it was traditionally a major source of disease. Rudimentary treatment measures such as storage in covered pits, composting, and mixture with chemicals have been popularized.

The patriotic health campaigns continued through 1980 to be promoted several times a year. Their initial impact on personal and environmental cleanliness was great, but in the late 1970s enthusiasm and support for them among party members and bureaucrats and among the peasants themselves had deteriorated. Mass immunizations against certain diseases conducted by a network of antiepidemic stations have complemented the mass campaigns. The stations have also played a major role in hygiene education and food inspection.

As a result of the preventive efforts, the most dreaded epidemic diseases such as cholera, plague, typhoid, and scarlet fever were eradicated. The mass mobilization approach proved particularly successful in the fight against syphilis, which was reportedly eliminated by the 1960s. The incidence of other infective and parasitic diseases has been reduced and controlled. However, relaxation of certain sanitation and antiepidemic programs may have resulted in some increase in incidence. Continuing deficiencies in human waste treatment were indicated by the persistence of diseases such as hookworm and schistosomiasis. Control of the latter remained a major public health priority. Tuberculosis, the number one cause of death in 1949, has remained a problem to some extent, as have malaria and hepatitis.

The most common causes of death in 1980, however, were believed to be, in order: respiratory diseases, circulatory diseases, and cancer. Chronic bronchitis was reported to be a "common disease," and major efforts were under way to combat the rising incidence of hypertension. A nationwide survey of cancer mortality in the mid-1970s revealed striking regional patterns of high cancer occurrence, strongly suggesting environmental and/or dietary causes. Esophageal cancer incidence in certain areas of North China was about fifty times greater than the world average, and nasopharyngeal cancer rates were very high throughout large areas of South China. Some Western scientists believed that major breakthroughs in understanding causes of cancer could result from the Chinese research. Major efforts have been devoted to developing methods of mass screening for cancer and impressive long-term survival rates for some types of cancer have been reported.

The dramatic rise in respiratory and cardiovascular disorders and in cancer in the 1960s and 1970s strongly implied that industrial pollution was becoming a serious hazard. Industrial plants generally lacked pollution control devices, and the widespread use of coal contributed to an extremely dirty atmosphere in cities. Efforts to control pollution were halfhearted at best prior to 1979; since then strict pollution control measures have been enacted. Improvement prospects were linked to the cost factor and competing priorities in improving production.

The availability of medical care increased substantially between 1949 and 1980. China had 393,000 senior and 435,000 junior physicians trained in Western medicine in 1980 compared to about 50,000 in 1949. ("Senior" probably refers to graduates of five- to six-year medical courses.) There were also 1.8 million other medical workers, including 238,000 physicians trained in traditional Chinese medicine, and 421,000 nurses. Not counted in that total were another almost 1.6 million paramedic "barefoot doctors" in the countryside. The number of hospital beds had risen to 1.93 million, approximately one per 500 persons.

Despite these advances, high quality medical care could not yet be provided to the entire population and allocation has been a focal point of political controversy. Policy lines had shifted several times in the preceding decades but by 1980 had settled on a program combining traditional and Western medical techniques performed by medical specialists and paramedical support personnel.

In the 1950s an urban-based medical care delivery system much like that in the Soviet Union was developed. The Ministry of Public Health began to administer hospital construction and operation,

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equipment and pharmaceutical manufacture, and education and research. A large proportion of state medical investment was devoted to the development of a network of modern hospitals in cities and towns. By the mid-1960s all of the roughly 2,000 counties boasted at least one general hospital having an average size of perhaps 100 beds, which were for all practical purposes the lowest level providers of modern medical care. A considerable number of high quality hospitals were also developed under the auspices of the PLA.

All state employed workers and retirees are entitled to free, state-subsidized medical care granted to cadres and ranking party members. Large industrial and mining enterprises and state farms were required to provide medical services to their employees or finance their treatment elsewhere in exchange for a small annual premium payment. State-funded treatment plans do not cover peasants or urban workers in collective enterprises, temporary workers, the unemployed, and other groups.

Until 1966 relatively little emphasis was placed on rural curative services, beyond establishment of a network of maternal and child care centers. Inability to pay as well as distance have consistently made peasant access to overcrowded county hospitals difficult.

Some important changes were made after the Cultural Revolution reflecting Mao's concern that rural areas were slighted. Skilled doctors were transferred to county hospitals and rural clinics to provide training and curative services and, so as to quickly expand the number of physicians, the medical school curriculum was shortened to a maximum of three years or less, part of an effort to diminish professional leanings towards relatively comfortable urban careers.

At the same time, rural-cooperative medical centers were successfully revived. Eighty percent of all production brigades had simple health stations by the late 1970s. These centers have been funded partly through premiums paid by brigade members, partly by allocations from brigade collective welfare funds, and perhaps some help from the state in the initial formation stage. Users were required to pay a small registration fee upon visits to the centers.

The brigade stations were staffed by "barefoot doctors"—local residents selected for training by their fellow brigade members. Over 1.5 million such paramedics, or about two to three per brigade, were given training of typically three to six months duration during the 1970s. Training has emphasized the diagnosis of common diseases (including cancer in some areas), prescription of common Western and Chinese pharmaceuticals, acupuncture, preventive medicine and hygiene, as well as birth control service. Although there are some public health workers below the brigade level, the brigade health stations are the basic curative units. They refer difficult cases to better equipped clinics at the commune level.

Commune clinics were funded partially by the Ministry of Public Health resources and partially by the communes or brigades. Most did not provide inpatient care, although some were fairly well equipped to provide birth control services on an outpatient basis. They are staffed by a mixture of somewhat better trained paramedics and practitioners of traditional medicine.

Commune clinics in turn refer difficult cases to county hospitals, which in turn refer difficult cases to city hospitals. Thus in theory the referral system permits peasants to receive routine medical treatment locally and to have access to more sophisticated treatment when necessary. A somewhat similar system was adopted for urban residents not covered by state insurance plans.

Collective agricultural units have experienced considerable difficulty in meeting the costs of operating the clinics. Some of the least prosperous units had difficulty in even establishing them. Peasants may be unable to pay the relatively low fee. The high costs of referrals to higher level units have placed strains on many units, as have profligate drug consumption and mismanagement. Bankruptcies and collapses have resulted. The quality of service is often poor, both because of financial costs and the inadequate training of "barefoot doctors." Their numbers were reduced in the late 1970s, perhaps in part because peasants were no longer willing to continue to support them. Great emphasis was placed in 1979 to giving them further training at higher level health centers.

In 1980 the Party was shifting away from the emphasis on rural health care. In the transitional 1968–76 period, many physicians who had been sent to outlying provinces were permitted to return to their urban practices or research positions. The medical school curriculum was restored to its original five-year term. County hospitals were scheduled for modernization, one-third of them by 1985.

Traditional Chinese medicine remained a major component of the health care picture. Not only were many aspects of treatment demonstrably effective, but also traditional Chinese medicines and medical practitioners were in relatively greater supply than Western-trained physicians or Western pharmaceuticals. Moreover in the rural areas in particular, people felt more comfortable with traditional treatments. As far as China's medical professionals are concerned, the goal is to synthesize the best elements of traditional and Western approaches. In practice, however, this has not always worked smoothly. In many respects, physicians trained in traditional medicine and those trained in Western medicine constitute separate groups with different interests. There has been both some reluctance on the part of Western doctors to accept "unscientific" traditional practices and a desire on the part of traditional practitioners to preserve their authority in their own sphere. Although those medical schools that provide training in Western medicine also provide some work in traditional medicine, the number of physicians regarded as competent in both kinds numbered only about 10,000.

The extent to which traditional and Western treatment methods were combined and integrated in the major hospitals varied greatly.

Some hospitals and medical schools of purely traditional medicine had been established. In most urban hospitals, the pattern seemed to be to establish separate departments for traditional and Western treatment; the traditional doctors were often relegated to outpatient clinics. In the county hospitals, however, traditional medicine received greater emphasis.

Traditional medicine depends significantly on herbal treatments, acupuncture, acupressure, moxibustion (the burning of herbs over acupuncture points), and "cupping" of skin with heated bamboo. Such approaches are believed to be most effective in treating minor and chronic diseases, in part because of milder side effects. Traditional treatments may be used for more serious conditions as well—particularly acute abdominal conditions such as appendicitis, pancreatitis, and gallstones; sometimes they are used in combination with Western treatments. A traditional method of orthopedic treatment, involving less immobilization than Western methods, is common.

Western physicians have adopted selected elements of traditional treatments into their practice. The most notable example is the use of acupuncture for anesthetic purposes. The analgesic effect of this ancient technique came only to be recognized in the West in the 1950s.

* * *

Studies on population were limited prior to 1979 by the paucity and unreliability of published demographic data. Analysts often reached strikingly divergent conclusions, and the more careful of them offered only tentative findings.

The broadest available survey of demographic issues, *Every Fifth Child*, by Leo A. Orleans, remains useful but is becoming increasingly outdated. The most detailed analyses of trends in population growth and total population figures are those of John S. Aird, whose "Reconstruction of an Official Data Model of the Population of China" was scheduled for release by the United States Bureau of the Census in early 1981. Aird's "Population Growth in the People's Republic of China" in *Chinese Economy Post-Mao* is a slightly older but thorough exposition of his views. Other works by Aird and Orleans were also scheduled for 1981 publication.

The opening up of China to Western scholars will undoubtedly result in a number of in-depth studies in the years to come. Publications by the Chinese are likely to become increasingly frequent and informative, and the census planned for the first half of the 1980s promises to be a most significant source of demographic information.

Very little in-depth work on minority nationalities has been published. June Teufel Dreyer's *China's Forty Millions* is the most comprehensive study available but deals more with government policy than with demographic issues. Much of the available information on minorities must be culled from the Chinese press and various Asian and Western journals and periodicals. George Moseley's *A Sino-Soviet Cultural Frontier: The Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou* and *Consolidation of the South China Frontier* constitute informative if somewhat outdated studies of minorities in specific areas.

Orleans' *Health Policies and Services in China* remains one of the best general overviews of health indicators and medical care delivery policies despite some changes that have taken place since it was written. The lack of hard data has in general rendered detailed analysis of disease patterns difficult. Haitung King's "Selected Indicators of Current Health Status and Major Causes of Death in the People's Republic of China" is among the more thorough treatments of the subject. But information on some diseases is also available through trip reports such as that of Thomas Bailey in his article "Tropical Medicine and Hygiene in Modern China."

David M. Lampton's *The Politics of Medicine in China* is a very thorough exposition of the policies behind the development of the medical care delivery system. Pi-chao Chen's *Population and Health Policy in the People's Republic of China* provides a description of how the system operates, and Lampton's "New Revolution in China's Social Policy" in *Problems of Communism* details the changes in medical care delivery patterns and policies since the death of Mao. Myron E. Wegman's "Biomedical Research" in *Science in Contemporary China*, edited by Orleans, contains useful discussion of trends in medical research and development.

Among the most detailed studies of the role of traditional Chinese medicine is Ralph Croizier's *Traditional Medicine in Modern China*. The report of the National Academy of Sciences Herbal Pharmacology delegation to China treats the patterns of use and effectiveness of traditional treatments and drugs in some detail. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 3. The Social System

The realism of the plastic arts of the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–220 A.D.) is shown in this pottery model of a courtyard belonging to a landlord or noble, unearthed in Henan Province.

WHEN THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS came to power in 1949 they set about to produce major changes in the way Chinese society—the social system encompassing the Han (see Glossary) majority—was organized. Their goal was a social revolution and not simply a political revolution. Many aspects of traditional social life—class relations, family organization, women's roles, personal values, and so forth—were heartily disliked by the country's new rulers and were slated for fundamental change. But a revolution is a complex process, and many of the social forms of the People's Republic of China had evolved slowly over the centuries and were imbued with deep meaning for the general population. All could not simply be swept aside overnight. And in order to mobilize the population in support of the goals of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it was necessary to selectively build upon and reinforce some elements of traditional social life in order to try to change other elements. Striking the desirable balance has not been easy, and over time the Chinese revolution has lurched back and forth between frontal attacks on traditional social life and accommodation with surviving traditions.

The result of this complex change process has been a fundamental transformation of society. Socialist property relations have superseded private enterprise, bureaucratic control over society has been enormously expanded, and no corner of Chinese society has escaped the influence of the CCP's policies. Social forms that once played central roles in Chinese life—lineages, secret societies, and native place associations, for example—are now of little or no importance in Chinese social life. But at the same time the contemporary social system is in many clearly identifiable ways still very Chinese, and present social institutions are a complex mixture of old and new. The Chinese family survives and even thrives, and much the same can be said for Chinese styles of bureaucratic behavior, the stress placed on personal ties, and many traditional social values. In some realms the revolution has actually strengthened traditional social forms and delayed the social changes that economic development might have been expected to produce.

As a result of the changes that have occurred since 1949 some of the lines of social cleavage that used to be paramount—based upon wealth, kin group membership, and regional origin—are no longer so important, as substantial mobility and intermingling of groups has occurred. But by the same token new lines of cleavage have emerged, based upon party membership, political status, work unit affiliation, and other factors, and these provide the potential for new forms of social conflict. In a parallel fashion, some social problems have been dramatically reduced by the changes over the last three decades, but new kinds of problems have emerged to concern China's leaders and worry the ordinary citizens.

So Chinese society in 1980 was different in many ways from that existing prior to 1949 but not totally different. The social system bore the clear stamp of its dual origins of Chinese tradition and in Leninist-style organizational principles. The death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the dramatic changes introduced by China's new leaders since then seem to leave the question of what form the Chinese social system will take in the future. Initially these new leaders seemed to be simply trying to turn back the clock to restore policies of the 1950s and early 1960s, but they have also adopted some totally new policies tht suggest new social forms and cleavages will be created (see ch. 11, The Political Process). In future years, however, we are likely to observe what China's leaders have long had to recognize: dramatic changes in policies formed in Beijing result in much less dramatic, incremental modifications in the fabric of society. Transforming the Chinese social system is still no easy matter.

Social Values

China's traditional system of values evolved over many centuries in directions that are quite distinct from the West. For example, the West's emphasis on individualism, human rights, and equality never assumed primary importance in traditional China, and there is not even a Chinese term for "privacy." The impact of the West, particularly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, introduced Western values to educated Chinese, and eventually resulted in a Western doctrine, Marxism, being proclaimed the basis for the official values of Chinese communist society. Western values, and Marxism in particular, provided a critical basis for a reexamination of Chinese values and customs. The Chinese communist leaders arose within the Chinese traditions but, as educated people, they were exposed to these Western criticisms and alternatives. As a result they developed deeply ambivalent feelings about traditional values. Some they continued to accept as natural and proper, while others they were determined to change.

China's traditional value system is a complex amalgam of ideas that evolved over centuries from roots in Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and other influences. Much concern, particularly in the Confucian strain, centers on the need for properly ordered social relationships. Society was seen as a hierarchical pyramid of roles, and these roles entailed fairly well-established norms governing how people in those roles were supposed to act and behave in relation to people in other roles. Traditional philosophical texts are full of descriptions of what it means to be a filial son, a loyal official, and even a benevolent ruler. Even the emperor was in theory to be bound by obligatory sets of role relationships with subordinate officials and subjects and with a higher, supernatural hierarchy of

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gods and spirits. It was assumed that if every person, from emperor to the poorest peasant (and women and children in families at every level), could be socialized to play their designated roles properly, then society would be well run, and happiness and harmony would be generally enjoyed. So a great deal of effort was placed on the need for constant socialization efforts to get people to fill their designated roles properly. Of course the desired perfect harmony was never achieved, and a legal system and a wide range of coercive instruments were available to deal with deviants and unorthodox behavior. But it was generally assumed that it was preferable to use educational methods to secure social order and that the need to use coercion and legal methods was a sign of the failure of authorities to provide the proper socializing influences.

The heavy emphasis on socialization into a network of hierarchical roles has a number of implications. For one thing, hierarchy and relations of superiority and subordination were considered natural and proper. However, allocation of people into positions in the social hierarchy was not seen as based upon divine right or ascribed privilege. Mobility into elite positions was supposed to be open to all, and in late Imperial China there were few caste-like barriers preventing such mobility. In theory, at least, even the son of a poor peasant could aspire to become an official, and if able to receive the necessary education and pass the required imperial examinations, he could do so. Even the emperor's throne was not completely out of reach. The position was inherited—generally passed from father to son—but an imperial house could lose "the mandate of heaven" and be overthrown, and several dynastic founders were men of humble origins who led rebellions against a decaying imperial house. In other words the Chinese accepted hierarchy as proper and inevitable, but one's place in that hierarchy was not rigidly fixed. People were supposed to properly fulfill their roles in the social hierarchy, but the roles they occupied were not strictly ascribed from birth, and people could and did rise and fall.

This openness to social mobility has further implications in turn. The development of class consciousness and solidarity among the oppressed was inhibited by the emphasis on mobility opportunities. But by the same token the belief that those who managed to rise into elite positions were worthy and were entitled to official privileges was enhanced. Since education was the primary route to mobility through the orthodox path provided by the imperial examinations, this belief gave rise to a general feeling that those possessing education were superior to those who had none, and that those who labored with their minds were superior to those who labored with their hands. Furthermore, this absence of caste-like barriers in Chinese society reinforced an emphasis on human beings as malleable creatures, rather than as inherently good or evil. This emphasis fits well with the stress already noted on proper socialization as the effective way to insure social order. In this sense the Chinese have long been firm social environmentalists, believing in the power of social influences, rather than subscribers to any sort of view of immutable human nature.

Since proper socialization was seen as necessary for social order, it followed in the Chinese view that a uniform set of values was also required. After all, if people subscribed to conflicting values, how could they all fit into an orderly social hierarchy? For this reason there has never been a high value placed on the free competition of ideas and values in Chinese culture, and in fact vigorous efforts were generally made to incorporate or suppress heterodox ideas that arose.

If society needed a uniform set of values to which all could subscribe, the emperor and his officials were seen as having a major responsibility of propagating and supporting those values. In this sense Chinese officials have always been preachers as well as politicians, and much of the content of the education that prepared one to become an official can be seen as theological, involving the learning of the officially approved set of moral doctrines. It has therefore always been seen as right and proper that China's rulers should proclaim what values people should use to guide their lives and take action against competing ideas. Underlying this official role is constant anxiety that value conflicts, if not strictly controlled, will lead to social disorders and confusion (*luan*) and that as a consequence all of society will suffer. Thus maintaining social order through enforcing a unitary set of moral rules is seen as a primary obligation of the ruling elite.

The ideal society was traditionally seen, then, as a harmonious hierarchical system in which all individuals learned and played their designated roles. To fit into such a system required self-discipline and moderation in dealing with those one had role relations with, and there was a strong cultural emphasis against displays of uncontrolled emotions and lack of self-control. A further implication, however, was that strangers with whom one had no established role relationships could be treated with indifference or contempt and there was no well-developed concept of generalized citizenship and public obligation.

With such a preeminent emphasis on societal order and value consensus, it is perhaps not surprising that notions of individualism and inalienable rights never flourished on Chinese soil. Individuals were seen as finding their meaning as members of ordered collectivities, and an isolated person without familial or other ties was an object of pity or a source of danger. Striving for individual achievement and excellence was highly valued, but success was seen as the result of the support of one's kin group or other collectivity and not solely an individual matter. Similarly, individuals who committed crimes were not seen simply as bad individuals but as products of bad

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Work buildings and dormitory-apartment complexes are located within the walls of this modern, high technology textile mill in Shanghai. Building on right is single women's dormitory.
Courtesy Frederica M.Bunge

family and other influences. Credit or blame for individual acts was spread outward to affect these wider groups, as in the traditional *bao jia* social control system, in which groups of families could be punished for the misbehavior of one of their number. Acts of deviance were generally seen as threats to social order, and there was no doctrine of individual rights to cite in one's defense. The individual mattered little, then, in contrast with the harmony of society.

This bundle of traditional ideas and values was not rejected in toto by the Chinese Communists. Rather, they continue to accept some traditional values as right and proper while they denounce and try to undermine the public acceptance of others. Still basic to Chinese communist thinking is the idea that society requires a unitary set of values. Today's Chinese leaders are still preachers and proclaimers of the proper moral values. Likewise accepted as a matter of course is the notion that individuals are malleable and can be socialized and influenced to behave in proper ways, as well as the notion that society should be open to mobility. Given these continuities, persuasion is still seen as preferable to coercion as a means of

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exacting compliance, at least in regard to the majority of the population not classified as "class enemies." Conceptions of privacy, individualism, and human rights still have little appeal to China's leaders, although the various constitutions since 1949 have made ritualistic proclamations about guaranteed rights (see Historical Background, ch. 13). Individuals are still expected to subordinate themselves to the interests of society now as these are interpreted by the Party and the government.

Views toward other traditional values are either ambivalent or hostile. The traditional emphasis on harmony is seen as interfering with the struggles and class conflict that are necessary to bring about social change. China's new leaders have spent a great deal of energy trying to get the population to accept the Marxian idea that historical progress requires class conflicts and that social harmony is therefore not a desirable state. Mao Zedong, probably more than other leaders, showed a willingness to foster social disorder as a way of breaking through societal inertia. And while uncontrolled emotionalism is not seen as desirable, the traditional emphasis on emotional control is seen as leading to fatalistic acceptance rather than zealous efforts to surmount obstacles. Again a new style of purposeful emotionalism is seen as desirable to create the atmosphere for bringing about social change.

The emphasis on a fixed hierarchy of subordination is also rejected by the Chinese Communists. In their view (and particularly in Mao's) elites are forever prone to arrogance and softness, and they must be regularly "tested" by criticism from below, stints of manual labor, and other devices if they are to remain effective as leaders and not alienate the ordinary workers and peasants whose efforts are so crucial to China's development. Intellectuals and bureaucrats also want to build up their careers and accumulate privileges, while the state needs to be able to shift people to positions high and low, as they are needed. Also by developing systems whereby intellectuals and bureaucrats have to go to the fields and factories and labor with their hands and by espousing the notion that the contributions of China's laboring masses are not any less important than those of her experts and intellectuals, authorities have tried to overcome the traditional view that mental labor is morally superior to manual labor.

In a variety of ways, in fact, the Chinese Communists have tried to foster an ethic of egalitarianism to replace the earlier stress on an ordered hierarchy. Of course, given the Leninist nature of the Chinese political system, this ethic is promoted in a social system that is in many ways more rigidly hierarchical than were its predecessors. The primary goal of this egalitarian ethic is thus not to eliminate hierarchies in Chinese society but to ease the relations between people at higher and lower levels, so that among people at the bottom a spirit of active involvement rather than passive acceptance can be cultivated. This new spirit is supposed to go along with broader, more universalistic citizenship conceptions. In theory personal relationships with kin and bureaucratic patrons are not to be the building blocks of society, and instead general obligations to the Party and state are to pervade organizations. An ethic of comradeship is supposed to link individuals even to strangers now and promote a general sense of responsibility for upholding state authority. Nepotism and promoting personal factions are strongly discouraged, although the great amount of attention that such "deviations" have received in the press in recent years shows that it is extremely hard to change these time-honored ways of ordering human relationships.

The CCP has thus built upon some traditional values while seeking to transform others. At times they have waged campaigns specifically designed to try to get people to change their attitudes, as during the "anti-Lin Biao, anti-Confucius" campaign of 1973–75, when Confucian philosophy was denounced for its emphasis of harmony, the superiority of mental labor, sexual inequality, and other themes. The current ideals involve both new concepts (equality, struggle, class conflict) as well as traditional precepts (the malleability of man, individual subordination to society, and the need for a uniform set of values in society). The new elements mostly derive from the Marxian strain of Western values, and the contrast with the values of Western pluralist societies is still marked. Not all of the newer values have been easily accepted within the Chinese context and since the death of Mao, China's leaders have moderated the emphasis on class struggle, fostered more respect for experts and mental labor, and given encouragement to a general craving of social harmony. In this context Confucius is no longer vilified, and his contributions to Chinese culture and social harmony are once again acknowledged. Thus subtle shifts in the emphasis on different elements in the official set of values have occurred and can be expected in the future. But proclaiming a set of values is not the same as getting people to accept those values and act in accordance with them, and the gaps between official ideals and social reality will be apparent in subsequent sections.

Social Groups and Social Cleavages

The transformations carried out by the CCP since 1949 have modified the basic organizational characteristics of Chinese society in a number of respects. For example, traditionally, lineages were fundamental units in rural society, and in some parts of China—particularly in the southeastern part—they possessed much corporate land, had large lineage halls and annual rituals, and fought pitched battles against rival lineages. Rural pacification, land reform, and then collectivization removed the arms, property, and other resources from lineages and developed new resource-bearing units (communes, brigades, and teams) to orient the loyalties of Chinese peasants. Although lineage sentiments remain and occasionally cause problems for rural leaders, still it is clear that lineages are not the basic social groupings that they once were.

Regional differences have also been very important throughout Chinese history. Although the elite of Mandarin speakers was drawn from the educated classes throughout the realm and they were assigned to serve as officials in locations distant from their native places, their numbers and influence were too small to promote a general homogenization of Chinese culture. Ordinary citizens were intensely aware of regional differences. Chinese from other localities ate different foods, had different sets of customs, wore other kinds of clothing, and might even speak dialects of Chinese that were not intelligible. (Even within one major dialect area, such as of Cantonese or Fukienese, the subdialect differences can be so great as to be virtually mutually unintelligible.) Over the centuries groups from particular areas came to specialize in particular crafts and trades—Shanxi bankers, Hakka barbers, Ningbo merchants—and within China's large cities both neighborhoods and particular trades came to be monopolized by natives of particular counties or districts. These local groupings were reinforced by native place associations (*tongxianghui*) in Chinese cities, which fostered urban recruitment and tried to protect the interests of natives of a particular place. Out of the rivalry and cultural differences between such groups arose regional stereotypes—crafty and sly Cantonese, stolid and naive northerners, avaricious and ambitious Shanghainese, and so forth. These regional differences and stereotypes made it difficult to organize people in projects requiring them to cooperate with people from other localities and regions.

Since 1949 several policies have blunted regional sentiments. The universal use of Mandarin (now called common speech—*putonghua*) in schools throughout China has made communication among people of different regional origins much easier. The much larger state bureaucratic machine constructed by the Chinese Communists has moved people from one area to another on an unprecedented scale, producing much more mixing of populations from different origins than occurred in the past. And the socialist transformation of the economy has produced work organizations that are no longer based on regional origin, and the native place associations have disappeared. Sentiments of local loyalty and stereotypes of outsiders remain, perhaps particularly in non-Mandarin speaking areas of South China where "northerners" running many organizations may be seen as an outside ruling class. But still on balance, regionalism is a less important basis for social solidarity and conflict than in the past.

Regional differences among the Han Chinese are not officially regarded as "real" ethnic differences, for a common written language and cultural origins unite the various regional Chinese groups. But there are also non-Chinese ethnic groups, and the minority-Han distinction remains a crucial line of cleavage. Minority groups constitute about 6 percent of the total population, but they inhabit a much larger portion of Chinese territory than their numbers suggest, and they tend to be concentrated in sensitive border areas (see The

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Minority Nationalities, ch. 2). Some minority groups, such as the Manchu and many Zhuang, are highly sinicized, and in areas where they live interspersed with the Han they may be hard to distinguish from their Chinese neighbors. But among China's minority nationalities are many groups with economic organizations, family forms, and religious customs which are quite different from those among the Chinese.

Official policies toward minority groups since 1949 have shifted back and forth between limited tolerance of minority cultures and strict demands for conformity with national policies, and on balance these policies may have accentuated ethnic group consciousness, rather than reduced it. Official policies promote this effect in a number of ways. Minority groups are subject to official classification by the government, and fifty-five such groups have been officially recognized, while the claims for minority group status for others have been rejected. Special minority group autonomous regions, districts, and counties have been established in areas where particular groups on the list live in concentrated numbers. There are also special minorities academies designed to give advanced training to young people from minority areas as well as to some Han who will be assigned to work in minority regions. As part of the official classification process, minority groups have also been pigeonholed into the rigid developmental "stages" of China's Soviet-style Marxism, with their traditional cultures labeled as primitive communism, slavery, feudalism, or incipient capitalism. In terms of culture, there have been efforts to produce modified forms which are "national in form but socialist in content," which involves things like popularizing songs and dances about the CCP that are performed with traditional dress and dance steps. But at the same time there are areas in which members of minority groups are allowed to follow ways that are different from Han Chinese, such as being able to ignore the strict rules of the birth control campaigns.

These policies have had the effect of reinforcing the separate identities of many minority groups. Reduction of such separateness would involve two distinct processes: acculturation—the adoption of the culture of the majority group, and assimilation—social integration with members of the majority group. Official policies seem designed to produce some acculturation but inhibit real assimilation. The notion that minority groups are distinct peoples with separate territories and stages of development sets them apart from the Han Chinese very clearly. In the eyes of many Han Chinese living in minority areas, a conception of minority groups as people with bizarre customs and sexual habits is reinforced, and the combination of Han chauvinism and Marxist stage theory often contribute to a patronizing condescension on the part of many Chinese that conflicts with the professions of ethnic equality put forth by China's leaders. There is little direct information available to Westerners on reactions within minority groups to the official policies of forced acculturation and patronizing separatism. At times discontent has led to major incidents, as in the Tibetan uprising of 1959 and the uprising and mass exodus of Uygurs and Kazaks from Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region in the early 1960s. More recently, in 1980 Chinese authorities became so concerned about poverty and popular discontent in the Xizang Autonomous Region (Tibet) and the effects these might have on opinions outside of China that they initiated a large-scale relaxation of controls and infusion of investment into that depressed minority region. No doubt the reactions to official minority policies have differed from one ethnic minority to another and have been more positive in groups that were already fairly sinicized. The cleavage between Han Chinese and the minority groups continues to be a major and sensitive one and if not managed well, ethnic conflict could endanger China's security. Since such a large proportion of China's minorities are confined to regional enclaves, however, this cleavage is not one of major importance within most of rural and urban China.

Within the population of Han Chinese there are a number of cleavages that continue to be very important: those between intellectuals and manual workers; between party and other leaders and those they lead; between people in one occupation or work unit and another; and between people with good and bad class labels, to mention just a few. However, over the years since 1949 one major line of cleavage has been reinforced and has come to dominate all others, and that is the gap between rural and urban China.

The centrality of the rural-urban gap is paradoxical in view of the Chinese commitment to the Marxian goal of reducing the gap between "town and country," and in view of the fact that many observers have credited China with carrying out a social revolution that has been unusually successful in serving rural interests, stressing agricultural development, and so forth. Improvements in areas like rural health care, education, and carrying out a Green Revolution have been quite impressive. However, it is still the case that official policies have reinforced the rural-urban gap, rather than reducing it.

It can be argued that traditionally China had less of a rural-urban gap than most societies in the West. No marked differences in dress and customs marked urbanites from their rural brethren, and students in village and town schools studied the same basic texts. Laborers and merchants moved back and forth between village and city, and many upwardly mobile families kept one foot (or rather branch) in rural landowning and another in urban trade. A large share of China's officials came from rural origins, and it was common for them to return to their rural homes after finishing their careers. The term peasant also did not have the derogatory quality often associated with it in other societies.

All of this began to change with Western contact and even more dramatically as a result of the Chinese revolution. Western influence and schools tended to be concentrated in the cities and to give rise to new customs and styles of life within urban places. After 1949 China's new leaders tried to restrict such Western influences, but they also began efforts to restrict the prevailing free migration between village and city. By 1958 they had adopted a set of measures designed to prevent people from moving into the city unless specifically picked to do so (as for example when selected to attend an urban university or work in a newly opened factory). In fact there is an entire urban hierarchy mandated by the authorities, and individuals are not supposed to be able to move even one rung up this hierarchy without special permission. Peasants are not allowed to move into commune towns, people in towns are not supposed to move into small cities, and at the other end of the scale even people living in provincial capitals like Guangzhou or Zhengzhou are not supposed to move into what are called the national-level cities: Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. The result is a series of compartments on the urban-rural continuum between which upward movement is difficult, rather than the free-flowing migration of traditional times.

Of course some people do get assigned to move upward in this hierarchy (particularly to become workers in newly developing industrial cities in the interior), and others manage to find ways around the official migration restrictions. Still, on balance, these policies seem to have been quite effective in closing off much migration to the city. China's statistics on urban population are notoriously vague and inexact, but it is striking that after considerable economic development China still has about 80 percent of its population classed as rural (see Urbanization, ch. 2). The consequences of migration restrictions include a weakening of kinship and other ties between the population of cities and countryside and barriers against rural people being mobile into urban occupations and elite positions. Perhaps as important are the psychological consequences of having people officially classified as having rural or urban households, designations that cannot readily be changed.

Another important feature reinforcing the gap between town and countryside is the distinct forms of socialist organizations introduced since 1949. The rural commune is a collective enterprise, while in the city, state enterprises predominate. This distinction is important in two main ways. First, this means that urban organizations and the urban population are more directly and bureaucratically controlled by higher authorities, while in the countryside the role of the state is less direct. Thus social change can be more directly enforced in the cities than in the countryside. Second, it also means that the collective units in the countryside (the communes and their subdivisions) are primarily responsible for financing their own development, whereas in state enterprises in the city, funds come directly from the government. In spite of slogans about putting "agriculture first" and "serving the needs of the countryside," China's record in investing state funds in rural development is not particularly good in comparison with other developing societies (see "Agriculture First," ch. 6). So much of the upgrading of agriculture and financing of health care, education, and other expenditures comes from the communes themselves and ultimately the peasants, rather than the state (see Health, ch. 2). Precise figures are not available, but it appears that as a consequence urbanites' incomes had increased to three times that of peasants in 1979, a figure which also indicates a larger gap than in many other developing societies. Thus economically the countryside has not been catching up with cities.

Since 1949 the villages and cities of China have been increasingly closed off from one another administratively and psychologically, and the gap in incomes between the two sectors appears to have increased. As a consequence, social life in rural and urban China has developed in diverging ways.

Rural Social Organization

By late in the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911), intensive cultivation using traditional techniques—supplemented by handicrafts, animal raising, and trading activities—made it possible to support a huge population on the limited portion of land area that was arable. Land was generally freely bought and sold, as well as rented out, and the system of farming could be characterized as predominantly a smallholder- and tenancy-type. In other words plantations and large estates were quite rare, and most peasants either farmed small plots of their own or rented out land from others in order to farm enough to feed their families. (The CCP labeling of this system as "feudal" is very misleading, since most of the defining characteristics of European feudalism—serfdom, estates, military service obligations, and so forth—were not present in late imperial China.)

Several features of rural society hindered the development of any sort of class conflict, in particular the strong kin groups and kin loyalties, which served to pit Lis against Chens, rather than poor Lis against rich Lis. There was also a strong emphasis on fertility and bearing sons and this, combined with the custom of equal inheritance by sons, tended to result in division of the property of wealthy families into smaller and smaller portions. At the same time, trading, banditry, and sometimes simply hard work and good harvests allowed some poor families to purchase more land and move up the social scale. In other words rural society was characterized by a highly competitive and relatively fluid, kin-oriented structure, rather than by rigid class barriers. But in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as population pressure on the land mounted and as the traditional social order fell apart and rural elites increasingly fled to the towns for safety, the economic pressures on the poor increased, as did the potential for hostility betweeen poor and rich.

The CCP came to power in part by playing on these economic tensions, and the first stage of the rural transformations they introduced—land reform—was designed to consolidate support for the government among the majority of the rural population that did not possess enough land to make ends meet. Outside work teams descended upon villages and mobilized the poor within them to think in class, rather than kinship, terms and to recognize how they were being exploited by the elite families of the village (termed landlords and rich peasants) who owned disproportionate amounts of land, which they rented out to the poor. In climactic struggles that often involved considerable violence and loss of life, work teams assisted newly recruited local leaders in staging "struggle meetings" against this village elite and in redistributing their excess land to the poor peasants. Land reform also resulted in the formation of new political institutions in the village that were linked to the new government: local CCP branches, peasant associations, village militias, women's federations, and so forth. Land reform thus produced several major changes: a redistribution of land, the formation of new local political organs with closer links to higher authority, and an overturning of the village status hierarchy.

Land reform was in many ways an anomalous change in view of the government's commitment to establishing socialism, since it encouraged private landholding sentiments among the peasants. But the CCP did not allow the dust to settle after this campaign before embarking on the first steps toward socialism (see The "Transition to Socialism" [1953–57], ch. 1; The 1950s Period, ch. 6). The government used its new corps of local leaders to point out the limitations of family small holding to the peasants—in particular the difficulties caused by overpopulation, scattered small plots, and uneven access to tools and draft animals. They fostered the grouping of households into mutual aid teams, which regularized exchanges of labor, tools, and animals within the context of private family farming. The resulting cooperative units often formed the basis for the subsequent nationwide collectivization campaign which occurred in the 1954–56 period.

Two stages of rural transition were originally planned, although after Mao called for an acceleration of the pace of change in mid-1955 these were often telescoped together. At first a few dozen households or several mutual aid teams were to form a lower stage agricultural producers' cooperative. Their fields would be merged and farmed jointly by work teams of the cooperative rather than by family units, but families would continue to receive part of their income in the form of share payments, which depended upon how much land and other property they had brought with them upon joining the cooperative. (Land reform had not totally equalized landownership, and those classified as middle and rich peasants usually had more land and tools than those classified as poor and hired peasants.) The second stage involved the amalgamation of several of these lower stage producers' cooperatives into a higher stage so-called advanced producers' cooperative, which might include 200 or more families. At this stage the share payments would be eliminated, and the collective income of peasants would depend solely on the labor that family members contributed to work on the collectivized fields. However small amounts of land, usually only 5 to 7 percent of the total in a locality, were set aside as private plots, and families could grow crops on these for their private use and sale and could also continue to earn private income from household handicrafts and related activities. By the end of 1956 essentially the entire peasantry outside of China's minority areas had been organized into these higher stage advanced producers' cooperatives.

At this point socialism had been established in the Chinese countryside, and private ownership had been eliminated. (Private plots are for private use, but they are not formally owned privately, and the advanced producers' cooperatives could change and adjust their size periodically.) But China's leaders were not satisfied with the resulting arrangements, and they began to contemplate even more ambitious changes. If pooling land into producers' cooperatives could promote more cooperation and rational use of resources and make possible irrigation and other development projects, would not the transformation of rural life be accelerated still further by a leap into even larger units? In 1958 as part of the national Great Leap Forward (see Glossary) campaign, the advanced producers' cooperatives were amalgamated into precisely such larger farming units—people's communes (see Glossary)—which were supposed to plan the agricultural activities of 5,000 or more families. In the general utopian spirit of the times, these communes also included other innovative features: relatively egalitarian income distribution systems, with some free supply of food; elimination of private plots and the local "free" markets where the produce of these plots had been sold; formation of communal mess halls to feed the peasants; and the making of steel in small "backyard" furnaces—to mention only the most prominent experiments. The subsequent famine, which can be attributed to a significant extent to the impracticality of these huge, egalitarian farming enterprises, led to several rounds of reappraisal and readjustment which eliminated most of the innovative and communal features of the people's communes, reduced them in size, and decentralized their operations. By about 1962 communes had been reorganized into a form that has changed in only minor ways up to the present. In 1980 the commune was much the same as the one that emerged after the failure of the Great Leap Forward: a large but decentralized collective farm.

There were 50,000 plus people's communes in China in 1980, which means each had an average size of about 15,000 people, or roughly 3,000 families (see Planning and Organization, ch. 6). This is a somewhat smaller unit than the initial communes of 1958, but still today's communes cover a dispersed area and several dozen villages and hamlets. The commune headquarters is usually situated in the largest of these villages, often one that was a traditional market town for that area. The commune is the highest of three administrative levels, being divided into production brigades, which are in turn divided into production teams. (The average commune has about fifteen brigades and 100 teams.) The commune level of this structure has both governmental and economic functions. In terms of rural government, the registry of births and marriages, postal services, police headquarters, and other facilities are located there. Each commune also has a clinic and generally a middle school which are used by people in the surrounding villages. The commune also runs a broadcasting station, which sends its own messages as well as programs transmitted from provincial and national stations out over a spiderweb of wires to loudspeakers in each village and in many individual peasant homes.

On the economic front, the commune plays an intermediate role in agricultural planning, taking targets sent down by county authorities, dividing these up among subordinate brigades and teams, and negotiating their approval. The commune also plans and carries out projects that are too large for smaller units to run, such as dam-building and irrigation projects, and figures out how many laborers and other resources should be provided by various brigades and teams in order to complete these projects. Communes are also encouraged to set up factories to produce simple farm machinery, fertilizer, cement, and other useful products, and these enterprises provide employment for some peasants in surrounding villages. Commune authorities also supervise the procurement of grain and other crops from brigades and teams in order to meet the state's agricultural delivery obligations, and they maintain granaries where grain is stored to guard against famine. Finally, there are a variety of small shops and service facilities available in the commune town and generally at least one "free market" where peasants can sell output from their private plots and household sideline activities.

The commune is also the locus of political leadership in the countryside, featuring a commune management committee and party committee supervising all aspects of commune operations. The personnel who serve in these commune-level posts are a mixture of outsiders and natives from the local area, with outsiders more often appointed to serve in the leading positions. Most of the others employed at the commune level, including teachers, doctors, shop sales personnel in the commune town, and so forth, are classified as nonagricultural personnel and receive fixed salaries, unlike the local peasants. Even though commune cadres are supposed to spend obligatory periods engaging in agricultural labor alongside of the peasants, still the nature of these people and the way they are paid makes the commune the level at which the state's interests are most strongly considered.

There are many activities, however, that are not directly controlled by commune authorities but are managed by the subordinate brigades and teams. This fact is the basis for the relatively decentralized operation of commune administration. A production brigade encompasses about 1,000 people or 200 households on the average and will be subdivided into five to twenty teams. Brigades and teams are organized on a territorial basis rather than being specialized units engaged in particular agricultural tasks. Often a brigade consists of a large existing village or several small adjacent villages, along with the surrounding land area. A production team generally has twenty to fifty households or 100–250 people and is based upon a small hamlet or a neighborhood within a larger village, again with its adjacent land area. In general the people organized together into teams and brigades are the descendants of peasant families who have lived in a locality for centuries, and many of them will be closely related. Thus age-old solidarities and conflicts underlie these "new" farming structures.

The brigade, like the commune, has multiple functions. Often it runs a primary school and sometimes lower-middle school classes as well (see ch. 4, Education and Culture). It also generally has a brigade medical station staffed by "barefoot doctors," who are individuals with short-term medical training who provide simple medical care and refer cases up to the commune clinic. The brigade is also where the basic-level political organizations are located. The brigade party branch supervises the activities of the brigade management committee and takes charge of the political activities and indoctrination of all party members in the brigade. In the brigade one will also find a Communist Youth League (CYL) branch as well as basic-level units of the militia and the women's federation. (A poor and lower middle peasants' association was also organized at this level beginning in about 1964, but in recent years this organization seems to have atrophied.)

The brigade also provides for a whole range of economic activities. Again an intermediate role is played in negotiating agricultural production and delivery plans between teams and higher authorities. The brigade may organize labor and other exchanges between teams to assist them in meeting their targets. Farm machinery may be purchased by the brigade and then loaned or rented out to subordinate teams as needed. Some small brigade factories may provide a few jobs for local people, as well as useful manufactures, and it is common for brigades to run grain husking mills and tool repair shops. Some brigades also have established specialized farming units—orchards, collective pigsties, and so forth—which recruit laborers from subordinate teams. The leaders of the brigade are virtually always local people, and they are not paid fixed salaries but earn "work points" whose value depends upon the incomes and work points values of the subordinate teams.

Production brigades are not, however, the organizers of daily farming in most of rural China. That is the task of the production team level of the commune, and as a consequence the activities of the team are more exclusively focused upon economics. Sometimes political study and other kinds of meetings are held, but teams are mainly concerned with organizing agricultural production. The team is led by a management committee of six to twelve members, e.g., production team head, assistant heads, work point recorder, accountant, cashier, warehouse keeper, women's leader. These leaders are all local villagers, and they are elected by the team membership, with higher level supervision and approval. These leaders also earn work points rather than fixed salaries, so their incomes are tied to the success of the team's production efforts. Teams are supposed to agree to annual plans specifying cropping patterns, expected yields, crop deliveries, and so forth, and at times these plans may deviate from the pattern of crops that local peasants think would be most suitable. But once the agricultural plan is set, the decisions about day-to-day farming are made by team leaders rather than by higher authorities. Team cadres decide which tasks need to be performed each day on the team's fields and assign individual members of work groups to perform those tasks.

Members of the team have work points recorded in their names as they perform particular tasks, and these are graded in terms of the difficulty of the job, the skill of the laborer, and other factors. In this fashion the most skilled males in their prime may earn, for instance, ten to twelve points a day; women and less skilled men may earn seven to nine points; and old, young, and sickly members may earn four to six points. These work points are totaled up in the books of the team's work point recorder and then used to determine the shares of the collective income to be paid to each family in the team (see Planning and Organization, ch. 6). The amount of team income available for distribution in cash and in kind, which is affected by the team's yields, investment burdens, and other factors, is divided by the total number of work points earned by all members of the team to determine the value of each work point unit. This figure is then multiplied by the total number of points accumulated by all members of a family to determine the income to be distributed to that family. Thus a family's collective income is affected both by the efforts of its members and by the overall farming success of the team, and neighboring families and teams can differ very substantially in their earnings. The team is termed the "basic accounting unit," which means that the fruits of its success (or failure) in farming affect team members but not the people in other teams nearby. Cooperation is clearly involved in the team's operations, but there is not much in the way of communal sharing.

Since the early 1960s there have been shifts back and forth in the emphasis on incentives versus equality within the commune system, and each attempt to promote one of these goals has meant sacrificing the other to some extent. During the 1968–71 and 1974–76 periods, for instance, egalitarianism was the order of the day. This took several forms. In some localities the unit of accounting and management was raised up from the team to the brigade, which meant that this larger unit would be the one within which the fruits of member efforts would be shared. Some localities eliminated private plots and closed peasant free markets also, in an attempt to encourage maximum devotion to the collective economy (farming the team's fields) and reduce the income disparities private sources of income produced. Localities were also pressured to grow grain even when local conditions were suited for cash crops, and higher authorities in some places tried to place upper limits on the incomes peasant families could earn. These efforts were apparently motivated by the conviction of radical elements in China's leadership that more emphasis on collectivism and equality were necessary to develop agriculture and check capitalist tendencies in the countryside. The result, however, was growing peasant discontent and stagnating agricultural production (see "Agriculture First," ch. 6).

Since 1976 these policies have been repudiated, and by 1980 the pendulum had swung all the way back to a predominate emphasis on incentives and rural differentiation. Team autonomy and private plots and free markets were to be protected and expanded, and attempts to limit peasant incomes were denounced. Localities were being encouraged to specialize more in crops suitable for their locality and to think of new activities that would enable them to "grow rich." In terms of rural social structure, the most important changes involved modifications in the incentive system and a willingness to view some fundamental features of the commune as alterable rather than sacrosanct. In many localities permanent work groups within the team have been formed and given responsibility for farming specific areas of the team's land. These work groups are given production targets to fulfill, and if they surpass these they can distribute a proportion of the excess to work group members as rewards. In Sichuan and some other localities this "contracting down" has even extended to the level of the household. Individual families are assigned to farm a plot of land (or to raise a number of pigs, or tend fruit trees) and again are able to earn rewards for overfulfilling the contracts they receive from their teams. These reforms seem to threaten team solidarity and promote income differentiation within the team, and they remain quite controversial. A similar kind of family sharecropping within the framework of collectivized agriculture was practiced in the early 1960s, and it was later denounced as a dangerous deviation from socialist principles. It remains to be seen how widely such changes will be carried out and whether they will last this time around.

There is a final level of rural social organization yet to consider: the peasant family. In spite of occasional political rhetoric about putting the interests of the state before one's own family, in fact the family remains the basic unit of rural life. The general pattern has already been noted. Peasants live in family units alongside others with whom they have relationships of kinship and neighborliness stretching back over centuries. Almost everywhere the housing they live in is privately built and owned, and building a new home requires a lengthy period of saving and often assistance from relatives. Families also still have a corporate economic identity even when contracting down to the household is not practiced in the locality. Work points incomes from the team are paid to the family head rather than to each individual laborer. The family also carries out a variety of private moneymaking activities: growing produce on the family's private plot, raising pigs and fowl, engaging in household handicrafts, marketing these goods in nearby free markets, and so forth. Together these activities are likely to yield 30 percent or so of the family's total income and a higher proportion of their disposable cash income. (Much collective income from the team is distributed in kind—in the form of grain rations.) Families may also have members working in commune factories or engaged in short- or long-term labor outside of the commune and sending remittances back to the family. Families thus have complicated economic management tasks to engage in even though the organization of day-to-day farming is carried out by the team and not individual families. Team leaders realize they have to take family interests into account if they are to receive motivated efforts by peasants in the team's fields, for they know that discontented peasants can always reduce their efforts for the team and devote themselves more exclusively to these private moneymaking activities.

Families remain central to rural life in still other ways. Meals are prepared and eaten in the home in family units. Most young children are cared for by grandparents rather than being raised in collective nursery schools. There is also no general system of old age pensions except on an experimental basis in some wealthy suburban communes. So support of the aged falls upon the family as well. In general, then, in important ways peasants still depend heavily upon their families and not solely upon their commune or the state.

How then has socialism transformed rural social organization? First, the fact that the commune organization is built on top of preexisting village and family units means that the success of the commune depends upon its fit with these traditional social forms. The state, in attempting to bring about change, must work through local leaders who are not paid by the state, people who are bound by obligations and loyalties to the peasants they are supposed to be leading. Because of this somewhat indirect form of CCP rule in the countryside, it is difficult to implement changes that do not accord with peasant perceptions of village needs and interests and family obligations. This does not mean that changes do not occur and that peasants preserve all their traditional ways intact. Rather, change occurs in many areas of rural life in an indirect fashion, as the changing economic, health, and other environments of peasants undermine some old customs while sustaining and preserving others. At times the state has become frustrated with the slow pace of change in the countryside and has tried to speed things up by demanding compliance and by sending in outside work teams to enforce new policies. In most such instances more problems have been created than solved, and the state has had to back off and mend its fences with the peasantry. In sum, in recent years the commune organization has taken on a fairly stable institutional form that allows peasants to pursue the interests of their families and their villages, but as a consequence the state has not been able to force the pace of further change.

A further implication of commune organization and the system of migration restrictions mentioned earlier affects the mobility prospects of rural youths. Since there are such limited chances of mobility into the towns, most rural males end up settling down in their native villages, and this helps to sustain the solidarity of rural families. (Rural females move at marriage into the home of their husbands in keeping with traditional practice.) This fact of rural life also helps to prevent the draining of young talent away from the countryside, but by the same token it deprives most talented and ambitious rural youths of the chance to compete for positions in the larger society, which may be a source of personal frustration. The limited mobility out of or between villages also prevents poor localities from gaining relief from excess population pressure. The relative stability and closure of rural populations also contributes to a strong sense of corporate interest on the part of individual teams and brigades which inhibits broader cooperation and may even contribute to rivalry and conflict between such units. So the current structure promotes solidary families, teams, and brigades, but the consequences of this solidarity are not all favorable.

Urban Social Organization

Chinese cities are today tightly regulated entities, and they are organized along lines that are different in important ways from rural communes. China also has an urban history different from that of the West. The largest Chinese cities tended to be political-administrative centers, rather than simply economic marketplaces, and cities and urban classes never acquired the degree of political autonomy that occurred in the West. Walled cities and city centers arranged to align with ritual conceptions drawn from Chinese geomancy were also common. Institutions considered typical of modern Western cities—professional fire and police departments, chambers of commerce, and so forth, developed comparatively late in China's long urban history. Chinese urban guilds share some characteristics with their counterparts in the West, but the native place associations that oriented so many urbanites in China seem to have been much more important than similar organizations in early cities in the West. Rulers of urban populations also had a long tradition of trying to register and supervise the urban population, although the waves of migration to and from cities made these official efforts fairly ineffective.

When the Chinese Communists came to power they had to find ways to transform and control China's cities, which were areas that had all been under Nationalist control. Initially military control

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Urban family shares a festive meal.
Courtesy China Pictorial

The note on the left of the doorway announces the hours of service of this Residents Committee headquarters in Beijing.
Courtesy Rinn-Sup Shinn

commissions took charge in the cities as the PLA swept over the land. Army and party representatives moved into all large and important urban organizations, but the existing managerial and professional personnel generally were urged to continue running things, for the CCP did not have nearly enough trained cadres to replace the leadership personnel left over from the previous regime. Certain key institutions—banks, railways, very large factories, and so forth—were brought under direct governmental ownership and control almost immediately, but private ownership of many less important factories, hospitals, schools, and other facilities continued for some years.

The new government proceeded cautiously at first. It set up a variety of training courses to produce new managerial and skilled personnel of proven loyalty who could gradually share power with or take over from the "leftover" personnel. It banned a variety of organizations that had been closely associated with the old regime, it arrested large numbers of people in campaigns against counterrevolutionaries, and it vigorously suppressed organizations that were seen as particular rivals for the allegiance of the urban working class, particularly secret societies and Daoist religious sects. It organized a range of new mass organizations—trade unions, student associations, women's federations, and so forth—to replace the organizations of the previous regime and to mobilize new sources of mass support. And they used these organizations, mass campaigns, and the growing power of the government to control key resources—bank credit, trade outlets, and so forth—to reduce the autonomy and authority of the private owners and managerial personnel.

In these early years the government had not yet gained tight control over population movements and employment, but it began to develop ways to achieve such control. Special provisions were made for organizing unemployed people to return to their rural native places even as vigorous steps were being taken to restore and expand production in order to provide more jobs. Edicts of various kinds were adopted in the effort to discourage peasants from streaming into the cities. In 1951 efforts were taken to try to incorporate residential neighborhoods into the new government's organizational system, and by 1954 these efforts culminated in national regulations governing this neighborhood organizational system, including residents' committees, neighborhood police stations, household registration, and special organizations to deal with neighborhood security and disputes (see Enforcement, ch. 13). By the late 1950s a growing share of urban housing had been taken over by the government or newly constructed, and rationing of key commodities had become pervasive, so that it became increasingly possible to use these resources to make controls over urban population movements effective. In 1958 the strict set of migrations restrictions noted earlier was implemented, designed to prevent any unauthorized movement of individuals or families into larger urban places. These regulations remained in force in 1980.

On the economic side the government's controls—direct and indirect—over private enterprise had become secure enough by 1955 so that the government could carry out the socialist transformation of the urban economy with little effective resistance. Government-organized businessmen's associations pressured owners to join the cause, and as an inducement entrepreneurs often retained nominal "joint" authority in their enterprises, continued to receive high salaries, and were also entitled to receive interest payments for the next ten years based upon the government appraisal of the value of the capital investment they were turning over to the state. By the end of 1956 the socialization campaign had essentially been completed, except for the myriad of small peddlers, artisans, and shopkeepers. These people were grouped together with people plying similar trades into urban cooperatives over the next year or so, and so by early 1958 private enterprise and capitalism had been essentially eliminated.

The Great Leap Forward heralded a new effort to transform the urban system, but this effort turned out to be unsuccessful. During the high tide of the Great Leap Forward, efforts were made to form urban communes. The basic idea was that geographical areas of the city should be organized as communes and that these should be relatively integrated and self-enclosed units, as were the rural people's communes. So factories and shops in an urban commune should employ local youths, there should be work units financing and supervising local schools, and in general a well-integrated set of urban cells should emerge. Enthusiasm for the idea waned as the complexities of urban life became clear. Large factories, for instance, employed people from outside of the area of their "commune" for whom they felt responsible, while they were not eager to devote resources to meeting the needs of the nearby urbanites they did not employ. By the end of the Great Leap Forward the attempt had been abandoned, although in a few cities the term commune lingered on as a designation for an administrative area.

By the early 1960s, then, the essential organizational features of Chinese cities had been formed as was also the case in the countryside. A primary characteristic of this urban system is a tight network of controls over people and resources. As noted previously, individuals and families may not freely migrate into a Chinese city. Even a person marrying someone who comes from a larger urban place is generally forbidden to take up residence there, and this is one of the circumstances under which married couples end up living separately in China. The migration restrictions are enforced through a system of household registration. Each urban household has a registration book listing the members of the family who have legal residences there, and this information is duplicated in the household dossiers kept in the neighborhood police station. People who do not have valid registrations can only come for short visits, and they are also supposed to register with the police station. People found staying in the city without being registered there may be detained and shipped off to where they came from. Furthermore, large numbers of urbanites have in various periods and campaigns lost their urban registrations, temporarily or permanently, and been shipped off to live in a smaller town or the countryside. These restrictions on residence are as effective as they are (and they seem generally quite effective) in large part because the socialist economy and bureaucratic allocation system of Chinese cities insure that many of the essentials of life are not available except by playing by the official rules.

In large cities small portions of the housing stock still remain in private hands, most of it left over from before 1949, although in small towns and cities most housing is privately built and owned. This means that in the largest cities most housing is public and is allocated to people by work units and city housing management offices. Much the same can be said for jobs. City labor bureaus coordinate between the need of state firms for labor and the output of schools, and neighborhoods also employ some youths in their enterprises. People not assigned to jobs in state enterprises who also do not get picked for neighborhood jobs may still be mobilized to leave the city and settle down in the countryside, although by 1980 the scope and obligatory nature of the youth exodus was sharply reduced in comparison with the previous decade. Groups of young people can sometimes set up their own local enterprise and then get neighborhood sponsorship, and by 1980 liberalized policies were allowing the licensing of private repair workers and peddlers on a limited scale (see ch. 8, Trade and Transportation). But still on balance it is hard to get a job without going through the required bureaucratic channels, and once they are employed, people do not have the right to change jobs freely. Thus for both housing and jobs it is difficult to survive unless one has an urban registration and plays by the rules.

A detailed rationing system has also regulated distribution of many of the most important consumer goods. Grain (mainly rice and wheat), cooking oil, cotton cloth, pork, fish, soybean cake, eggs, soap, sugar, sewing machines, coal, bicycles, wristwatches, and various other items are commonly rationed, and persons without valid urban household registrations cannot purchase such goods except through the black market. However, improvements in agricultural production and supplies in 1978–80 allowed some items that had been rationed to be taken off the list and freely sold in some cities (such as pork and eggs in Beijing), which makes the degree of control by rationing slightly less tight.

Gaining access to health care also requires one to follow the proper bureaucratic procedures. There are no private doctors operating in urban China, and individuals gain access to designated clinics and hospitals depending upon where they live and work. They again need proper urban registration and work unit certificates.

(Urban hospitals do receive referrals from the surrounding rural counties, but again only by going through the proper channels, since one needs the correct papers in order to register for treatment.) Much the same can be said about gaining access to schooling, nursery schools, and other urban facilities. Without significant amounts of private enterprise activity, and with market forces playing only a restricted role, urbanites in China find themselves having to cope with a variety of bureaucratic gatekeepers in order to gain access to their daily necessities.

There is a dual organizational system regulating access to resources and enforcing social control in Chinese cities. One major part of this system revolves around work units: factories, offices, stores, schools, and other units of employment. The role of the work unit (*danwei*) in one's life is much more central in urban China than in the West, although some units are much more powerful and self-enclosed than others. Some large units provide not only jobs for several thousand people but also housing for a large portion of their employees and their families on the premises or nearby. In many cases this takes the form of a work unit compound, with work buildings and dormitory-apartment complexes located together, surrounded by walls, with guards at the gate. Large work units also typically run health clinics, cafeterias, nursery schools, and recreational facilities for their personnel. Employees have political study and some of their leisure time activities organized by work unit authorities; they are organized for militia training and security patrols, and their requests to marry or divorce must be approved by the work unit. Work units also monitor the contraceptive usage of members of their staff, administer rewards to those agreeing to have only one child, and impose penalties on those who have given birth to three or more children. Sometimes they even directly select which employees are allowed to have a child in a particular year. Work units also hold meetings to discuss and deal with deviant acts by employees, even if these are not job-related, and they serve as parole supervision agencies in relation to staff members who return to work after serving a prison term. So in general the work unit is a very important force in one's life.

For those who work in smaller units without walls, housing compounds, and so forth, and who commute to work from elsewhere in the city, the work unit is still very important but so too is the other major organizational system, which is based upon residential areas. Administrative terminology and divisions vary somewhat from city to city, but generally cities are divided territorially into districts and these are in turn subdivided into units called neighborhoods or streets (*jiedao*) (see Commune-level Organizations, ch. 13). Neighborhoods, with some 2,000–10,000 families in them, are divided again into residents' committees supervising 100–600 families, and these are finally subdivided into residents' small groups of fifteen to forty families.

At the neighborhood level, there is a neighborhood government office (called a neighborhood revolutionary committee for several years after the Cultural Revolution), a neighborhood party committee, and a neighborhood police station (*paichusuo*). These organs have full-time paid employees assigned to staff them, and they need not be residents of the particular neighborhood. The officers of residents' committees and heads of residents' small groups, on the other hand, are local people who serve as unpaid volunteers for the most part. A large portion of them are middle-aged or older women. In recent years people have been appointed to these lowly posts by the neighborhood authorities, but in 1980 an effort was underway to revive a local election procedure for picking these people. These grass-roots organizations are not comparable to voluntary and neighborhood associations in the West, since they are mandated by official regulation. (The original 1954 regulations were republished in the Chinese press in 1979.)

These organizations supervise the activities of the local residents and organize a variety of service and social control activities. Neighborhoods run small factories, repair shops, and canteens. These facilities provide employment for a portion of the local residents (again often middle-aged women, former housewives), while also supplying services residents need. Similarly, neighborhoods commonly run nursery schools, first aid stations, and "culture rooms" (rooms with recent newspapers and pamphlets where people can relax and also hold meetings). Some facilities located within neighborhoods, such as stores and schools, are of course run by higher agencies rather than by the neighborhood office itself.

A number of activities are carried out by the "grass-roots" residential organizations. Residents' committees organize political study meetings of those residents who do not have a work unit or school outside where they engage in such activity. They also convene meetings to transmit government directives to the population and to initiate cleanliness and other neighborhood improvement campaigns. To enforce such campaigns, residents' committee personnel also distribute free pesticides and carry out house-to-house cleanliness inspections on a seasonal basis, posting stickers on the outside of homes indicating whether they passed muster or not. These local organs also hold meetings to discuss official birth control policies, and they pressure residents to comply. Residents' committees distribute ration coupons from higher agencies to the local residents. They also notify residents when to come to local first aid stations or clinics to receive inoculations against various prevalent diseases.

The major focus of these neighborhood organizations, however, is on social control. Each residents' committee generally has a particular police officer assigned to work with it who provides most of the direction for these social control efforts. Residents' committee personnel are supposed to keep an eye out for suspicious activities and comings and goings in the neighborhood and to organize "activists" among the local residents to assist them in this regard. If they spot suspicious activities or illegal residents they are supposed to report these to the neighborhood police station, and they may lead the police on surprise nighttime searches of homes that are under some suspicion. The residents' committee often has a special "security defense officer" who is especially responsible for dealing with any threats to local security. Residents' committees convene meetings where this officer presents discussions of recent cases of crime in the city as a way of heightening local vigilance. There are usually several individuals or families in the neighborhood who are designated as having "problems," and they will be kept under especially close supervision. At times residents are also organized to stand guard and to patrol the streets at night to combat disorders (see Enforcement, ch. 13).

As a result of the characteristics already discussed, Chinese cities are relatively distinctive kinds of urban places. There is little migration into cities (except for newly developing industrial towns in the interior); there have been strong pressures to maximize participation in work and reduce urban fertility, and on repeated occasions unwanted urbanites have been "deported" to the countryside. The result is that Chinese cities tend to be quite "lean" and productive places, with very high proportions of the urban population employed. Beijing is obviously not a typical city, but there the proportion of the urban population employed went from about one in four before 1949 to more than 60 percent today. This shift has made it possible to keep the investment in welfare and social overhead services lower than it tends to be in cities in other societies, as well as to minimize the development of urban slum and squatter areas.

The most distinctive feature of Chinese cities, however, is the tightly knit system of bureaucratic controls already described. Because of this system it is possible to minimize or eliminate features that seem endemic to urban areas in other societies: nightclubs, prostitution, organized crime, church and temple worship, begging, hard drug traffic, and so forth. Even behavior that seems deeply imbedded in Chinese culture in other settings, such as gambling, seems to exist only on a very small and sub-rosa scale in Chinese cities, as the authorities have declared it illegal. The degree to which the lives of urbanites are directly supervised and controlled, and the difficulty of living "outside the system," makes control over people's behavior much tighter than is the case in the Chinese countryside.

The pervasiveness of bureaucratic controls also shapes the kinds of deviance that are widespread in Chinese cities. Much of the effort of urbanites is devoted not to trying to go outside the system, which is very difficult, but to trying to manipulate or beat the system. This particularly involves finding personal links and angles to shortcut established bureaucratic procedures in order to obtain access to better resources, or speedier access, than one could otherwise obtain. The term used for this general strategy is "going by the back door," and it is a game that is very widely played. Families call upon their kin networks and friends to mobilize help from medical personnel, bureaucrats, sales personnel, and others who have some control over access to scarce resources. In a paradoxical way, then, the bureaucratization of Chinese urban life has reinforced ancient Chinese proclivities to rely on patronage and personal ties, rather than producing a general acceptance of citizenship and universalistic bureaucratic procedures. The concentration of power in bureaucratic gatekeepers inevitably gives rise to favoritism and abuses of power as major problems, even though graft and corruption do not seem as serious as in many other developing societies. And for those with no well-connected "patrons," and even more for those "stuck" in a work unit or residential area where they have gotten on the wrong side of authorities, life can be very rough indeed.

To an outsider many aspects of city life in China today may not seem terribly appealing. Much of the traditional color of Chinese cities—roving peddlers, religious processions, curio shops, and so forth—is gone now, and low expenditure on upkeep gives most cities a drab appearance. Furthermore, the conditions of life are very tight. In China's 192 largest cities the average living space per person was only about 3.6 square meters in the late 1970s, less than it had been two decades earlier. Many urbanites have to share kitchen and toilet facilities with other families or even use wells or water taps and public toilets on the street for lack of facilities in their homes. The detailed rationing system and shortages of goods in the markets make providing for the needs of one's family a stressful experience. And one cannot avoid the bureaucratic system by relying on the efforts of family and kin to the extent that this is possible in the countryside, nor find the protection of an association of people from one's native place, as was often possible in Chinese cities before 1949. But on the other hand urban work organizations and neighborhood agencies provide a certain stability and security that is very appealing to many urbanites, a sense that there are familiar people looking after their problems and needs. This sense of security, combined with the generally higher pay and richer cultural life of urbanites in comparison with China's peasants plus the set of strict migration restrictions, encourages city residents to see themselves as a privileged group set apart from the peasants and to live in fear of being exiled to rural areas. For while controls on behavior are weaker in the countryside and one can depend more on one's kin group and less on hard labor to please bureaucrats, still labor there is more primitive and arduous, one's economic situation is less secure, and one has little hope of being able to escape again for the bright lights of the city. The combination of distinctive organizational systems, diverging patterns of social life, and administrative barriers to mobility are what makes the gap between city and countryside the most salient cleavage in Chinese society today.

Inequality, Stratification, and Social Mobility

Official policies have sharpened the gap between town and country and made this the primary cleavage in Chinese society. But there are many other lines of cleavage that are important as well, and Chinese society is by no means the homogeneous, egalitarian mass that some foreign visitors have reported. When the CCP came to power it was determined to change many aspects of the prevailing system of stratification. In part this involved an effort to displace the wealthy elites who monopolized power and privileges under the previous regime and replace them with new elites, many of them recruited from among the laboring classes. By socializing the economy, they also wanted to insure that, in the future, possession of wealth would not be a primary determinant of access to high positions for one's children. Military service had been seen as a lowly pursuit in traditional China, and the new government wanted to change this as well and make military careers sought after and prestigious (see ch. 14, National Defense). Education had been a route to elite status through the imperial examinations, and the CCP's views toward education have been complex and ambivalent. While they recognize the importance of education for development, China's leaders (and particularly Mao) have been suspicious of intellectuals and hostile to the notion that educational attainment automatically entitles one to certain privileges. The new government set out to expand the network of schools to give many more people a chance to get onto the educational mobility ladder, but they also took various steps to control intellectuals and to require them to demonstrate their humility in relation to the Party and the laboring masses.

The new government increasingly utilized criteria of political loyalty, activism, and ideological purity as the bases for rewards and promotions, so that wealth or expertise were not sufficient to guarantee one's status. The government also exerted pressure for simple life styles among the new elites as a way of inhibiting conspicuous consumption that would serve to alienate the ordinary population.

In most periods since 1949 total equality has not been espoused as a goal, the government instead trying to strike a balance by providing differentials wide enough to provide incentives for people while not so wide that they would undermine the solidarity of the population. But in certain periods, such as during the Great Leap Forward and after the Cultural Revolution, radical elements among the leadership were sufficiently concerned that existing differentials would give rise to an entrenched "new class" that they tried to restrict income differences, shuffle groups up and down, and make it difficult to pass advantages on to one's children. That these "destratification" policies have been abandoned and denounced by the post-Mao leadership illustrates how difficult it is to interfere with the tendency of people to see status advantages, mobility opportunities, and better lives for their children.

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These and other official policies have given rise to a complex system of crosscutting cleavages that make up the system of Chinese social stratification today. While the rural-urban gap is the most important cleavage, many others are very salient in people's lives. Within the countryside, for instance, there are major regional differences in income and well-being of the population. (Differences from one city to another are much smaller, since standard state wage scales regulate incomes in all urban places, with only modest regional variations in them.) No nationwide figures are available, but there are a number of indications that inequality of income within rural areas has increased since 1949 and that current policies are fostering further differentiation.

Several elements have contributed to these differentials, in addition to the major differences in soil fertility, terrain, population pressure, and access to markets that are so important in any agricultural society. The government's emphasis on local self-reliance has meant that localities are primarily responsible for pulling themselves up by their own bootstraps. But wealthier teams and brigades have more resources to invest in new technology and other improvements, and so they are able to pull themselves up faster than their poorer neighbors. When the state has poured funds into rural areas it has often acted to reinforce existing disparities rather than reduce them. A case in point is the Green Revolution that has been carried out in China since the early 1960s (see ch. 6, Agriculture). New, high-yielding seeds, fertilizer, and other inputs were directed primarily to China's "high and stable yield" areas where these inputs would have the greatest returns, and these were of course the areas that were already the most fertile and productive. Furthermore, as noted earlier, official migration policies make it difficult for males to leave depressed rural areas for the towns and cities, so that population pressure in such places cannot easily be relieved. The growing need for vegetables and other products in the cities has created prosperity in suburban communes, which again were among the wealthiest areas to begin with, while state and local investment in China's road system has not been adequate to overcome its backwardness to spread these opportunities broadly into outlying areas.

The disparities within particular provinces in the late 1970s were considerable. In 1978 in Hebei Province the ratio between the annual per capita collective income of the richest and poorest counties was on the order of five to one. Within a particular county there are often gaps of two to three to one between the average per capita collective income figures for particular communes, and similar gaps between the averages of brigades within a commune, and teams within a brigade. Furthermore, these figures ignore major differences in rural income among provinces, some of which have improved markedly since 1949, while others have stagnated. Official sources speak of substantial portions of the Chinese countryside, perhaps encompassing 100 million people or more, particularly in barren, mountainous, and minority areas, where little benefit from agricultural modernization has been seen. Finally, families differ in their number of wage earners and economic standing within their teams, and the policies of contracting production down to work groups and family units are likely to increase these differences.

Without overall rural income distribution figures available, it is difficult to say how the extent of income inequality within the Chinese countryside compares with other developing societies, but it is certainly the case that these differentials are of great importance among the Chinese peasantry. As noted earlier, these differences promote rivalry among teams and brigades, and even energetic young males stuck in poor teams will find it hard to attract brides and escape from poverty.

Among other lines of cleavage, the most distinctive to the Chinese scene is the system of class labels implemented for more than a generation after 1949. As part of the official policy of class warfare, peasants were given class labels during the land reform, and urbanites during the "three-anti" and "five-anti" campaigns of 1950–52. These were based upon the economic situation of the family in the three years prior to 1949. On this basis each family received either a good label—worker, poor peasant, lower middle peasant, revolutionary cadre, revolutionary soldier; a middling label—middle peasant, free professional, employee; or a bad label—landlord, rich peasant, capitalist, merchant.

These labels were used to differentiate how families and their members were treated in these initial campaigns, but they remained in use afterward. After the socialist transformation of the mid-1950s private property ownership was eliminated, so that these labels no longer described people's economic positions, but the system of labels was nonetheless maintained. Household registration books, personnel dossiers, and many other kinds of forms all required people's class labels to be recorded, and the labels were inherited in the male line, passed from father to son.

Over time one might have expected the importance of these labels to decrease, but in the 1960s and 1970s official actions and campaigns reinforced their importance. Local officials were encouraged or required to discriminate against those bearing bad class labels, and even the children and grandchildren of these bad class elements found it difficult to gain access to higher education, join the Party, secure good jobs, or even to marry. Short stories and the press regularly depicted problems in society as stemming from the nefarious activities of bad class elements seeking revenge and a return to the good old days, and in recurring campaigns these people were picked out as "struggle targets" and publicly humiliated. So what had once been a set of economic differences became transformed into a system of official political categories that stratified the population in both rural and urban China.

Occasionally moderating policies were proclaimed, particularly to the effect that the second and third generation of bad class families should not be automatically discriminated against, but nonetheless the general trends set in motion by China's leaders acted to keep consciousness of class labels sharp. Even though class labels no longer had any clear relationship to one's family's economic standing, they came to have a pervasive impact on one's life chances. A number of studies clearly indicate that during the Cultural Revolution, when central control weakened and individuals joined Red Guard (see Glossary) and rebel factions to do battle, people's class labels were the primary determinant of whether they ended up in a "conservative" or "rebel" faction. In general those with good labels joined conservative factions that did not want the system that benefited them to be completely overturned, while those with middling and bad labels ended up in radical factions, and the struggles between those opposing camps provided the basis for much of the chaos that resulted.

The post-Mao leadership seems to be attempting to dismantle this generation-long system of class label discrimination and defuse the enmities it has produced. Early in 1979 official documents declared that stigmatized class elements should be reviewed with the aim of rehabilitating (see Glossary) all of those who had not engaged in any harmful activity in recent years. Furthermore, class labels were not supposed to be used in the future as the basis for discriminating against the descendants of those who had originally received the labels. The exact details on how this new policy was being implemented were still unclear in 1980, and the Chinese press continued to be full of contentious debates about official class policy.

One issue is simply whether class struggle continues to be important in contemporary China or not. A second issue concerns whether, if class struggle retains some importance, the classes that are still struggling are those that were identified by the class label system or perhaps other kinds of groups with different roots. On a more mundane, procedural level, it remained unclear whether the class labels would be retained, inherited, and recorded as in the past but simply not used so much as a basis for discrimination, or whether the use of class labels would be encouraged to die out eventually. But given the long years of emotional investment in the conflict between the labeled groups and the strong commitment many local authorities had in maintaining this system, it seems clear that even if China's leaders were determined to completely eliminate the anachronistic labels it would take many years before they would cease to be an important element in public consciousness.

Within urban China a number of other principles of differentiation operate. The most general is the system of occupational groupings and ranks institutionalized in China's wage system. First, there is the difference between people employed in state enterprises, who make up about three-fourths of the urban work force, and those employed in collective enterprises, such as the neighborhood factories described earlier. Only people in the former category are governed by the formal state wage and fringe benefit regulations. As a result, the people in collective enterprises generally receive lower wages than people in state enterprises, they are entitled to only some of the substantial fringe benefits that state employees receive (medical insurance, sick leave and disability pay, paid holidays, retirement pensions, etc.), and they have less employment security, for their firms can go broke and close down. At the bottom end of the scale are individuals (usually women) sewing or knitting on a putting-out basis within their homes who may earn no more than ¥8–10 a month (for value of the yuan—¥—see Glossary). In terms of income and benefits, then, collective enterprise employees constitute a secondary, inferior sector of the urban labor market. However, in recent years liberalization in policy toward collective enterprises has made possible substantial increases in wages in some of them. This has occurred through profit sharing among employees which, though theoretically part of the distinction from the fixed-wage scales of state enterprises, had not been allowed in previous years.

State employees are classified into wage grades, and there are a large number of occupationally specific hierarchies used. For state cadres there are twenty-four ranks, plus six lower ranks of service personnel working in bureaucratic offices; for technicians and engineers there are eighteen ranks; for ordinary factory workers there are eight ranks; for culture and art workers there are sixteen ranks; thirteen ranks in the police, and twenty-seven in the army, and so forth. In general the lowest state wages are in the ¥18–24 per month range for apprentice workers, with the highest formal pay ranks being in excess of ¥400 for leading state, party and army cadres. The average pay in state enterprises is about ¥50. Thus the gap in wage levels is considerable, although the range is clearly less than in capitalist countries.

These differences in formal wages do not fully capture the income differences that exist in urban China, however. For one thing there are a variety of payments that are outside of this wage rank system. Bonuses and piece rates, largely proscribed after the Cultural Revolution (see Glossary), were back in favor in 1980 and might provide the equivalent of a month or more worth of extra pay for those selected to receive them. Similar payments to writers and journalists in proportion to the amount of written work they have published supplement their formal salaries, and there were also systems of cash rewards for prizewinning playwrights, technical innovators, and other special categories. For example, the maximum cash award for a moneysaving technical innovation or scientific discovery is ¥10,000, which is a princely sum in Chinese terms. There are also various kinds of special personnel receiving wage levels outside of, and generally higher than, the wages in the formal ranking system, such as former capitalists who continue to hold offices in the field of economic management. These wage differences also do not include the variety of perquisites

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that leading personnel have access to without charge. Highly placed people often have access to limousines and chauffeurs, servants, health resorts, special high quality medical treatment, banquets, foreign trips, and other desirable items. In scale these differences in income and perquisites do not seem as extensive as in capitalist countries or the Soviet Union, but nonetheless they still allow leading personnel to live much better than the ordinary person. Official concern that these differentials will give rise to an entrenched new class is now gone, and the authorities are openly advocating giving better housing and other rewards to those who make the most "contributions" to society, which generally means those who are already at the upper end of the income scale. However, even while arguing that there is no "new class" danger in China, authorities have become so concerned about abuses of cadre power and special privileges that they have issued a number of proclamations designed to restrict elites to those perquisites that official policy entitles them to.

Income and access to perquisites are not the only factors in the urban hierarchy, however. There are also important differences in power, institutional connections, and prestige. An engineer in a factory may earn more than a party cadre in the same enterprise but still have significantly less power. The position of Chinese intellectuals vis-à-vis party cadres has shifted back and forth over time and provides the clearest view of the conflicting principles in stratification in urban China. In lenient periods, such as in 1956 or since 1976, the most senior intellectuals not only have been able to earn high incomes and been given access to various kinds of perquisites, but they have been organized to give expert advice to government and party agencies on how to run society, and party cadres have been required to engage in technical study or lose their posts of leadership to intellectuals. In harsher periods, as in 1957–58 or for most of the decade after 1966, some leading intellectuals lost their spacious housing, had their incomes cut, had to engage in humbling manual labor jobs, had their shortcomings attacked, or were even beaten or lost their lives. Intellectuals have constantly tried to use their expert knowledge to try to gain authority and respect within society and have a stable set of professional rewards and prerogatives institutionalized, but since fundamentally it is the Party that regulates society and determines how benefits and privileges will be distributed, these aspirations have been recurrently thwarted. Even in periods when intellectuals were under attack, however, they seem to have retained a strong sense of their separate identity and a conviction that a proper society is one that rewards and pampers those with knowledge and schooling. It remains to be seen whether the current emphasis on catering to the needs of intellectuals and honoring their contributions will be more durable than previous swings away from "red" to "expert" (see ch. 9, Science and Technology).

The rewards of power to party cadres, military officers, and other leading personnel are subtle and complex. For the most part holding a

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powerful position does not allow one to accumulate wealth, and there are generally pressures on elites not to flaunt the perquisites that they do enjoy. (However, the Chinese press regularly denounces cadres who ignore these pressures.) But powerful posts do lead to access to a variety of perquisites and, perhaps more important, they enable incumbents to control subordinates and regulate their access to a whole range of needed items and benefits. As a result, individuals in powerful posts are able to build up pyramids of dependency and to wield their influence over large numbers of subordinates. So while theoretically the government would like to encourage leaders to be humble and followers to be critical and outspoken, the fact of concentrating so much control over resources in bureaucratic gatekeepers produces inevitable tendencies in the opposite direction—for leaders to become arrogant and dictatorial and subordinates to become submissive and acquiescent. Relations between leaders and led can thus take quite contradictory forms in contemporary China, with leaders perhaps dressing much like those they lead and being addressed in familiar, informal terms even as they are seen as people to be avoided and feared.

There is one other particular advantage of those in positions of power that has become a major issue in recent years. This concerns the ability of powerful people to gain advantages and secure protection for their children. Blatant examples of pulling strings to get one's son or daughter accepted into college, assigned to a good job, assigned housing out of turn, or protected from punishment after having committed a crime have been regularly criticized in the press in recent years, but in urban public opinion these publicized cases are seen as just the tip of a very large iceberg. It has become common to think of high cadre children as a spoiled and arrogant lot whose parents use their special powers to advance their careers as a matter of course. Given the great anxieties that all urban groups have had in recent years about jobs and futures for their children, these tendencies have given rise to public indignation and have made it difficult to convince the population that leading personnel are for the most part upstanding and devoted individuals who should be treated with respect.

It should be noted that power and prestige differentials are not distributed in urban China in a simple manner. The amount of power a person or office has depends not only on the post or occupation but also on the bureaucratic system and work unit within which it is located. Some systems (*xitong*), such as the PLA, the public security forces (police and others), the railways, and heavy and defense-related industries, are accorded much more importance in the Chinese administrative system than light industry, education, or trade and commerce. And within any one such system, large and relatively well-endowed enterprises have more clout than others. So within society at large, military officers are seen as having higher status than managers of department stores or school principals, and ordinary soldiers or railway workers can look down upon waiters, barbers, and sales clerks. Given the importance of work units in allocating urban resources, often the most important social fact about people is not their wage level or occupation, as in other societies, but their work unit. And although the official media sometimes try to persuade people that all kinds of work are equally valuable and should have the same status, people who work in collective enterprises, or within service and sales enterprises within the state sector or in temporary jobs, have no doubt that they are at the bottom of a very clear prestige hierarchy.

One other special line of cleavage that is peculiar to the Chinese scene needs to be noted. This is the distinction between ordinary citizens and Overseas Chinese (which includes both people who have lived outside of China and those who have not but who have relatives abroad). Large numbers of Chinese emigrated overseas, particularly during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the descendants of these emigrants have been important in the CCP policy, both as a source of cash remittances to relatives within China and as a source of new skilled manpower and capital that can aid China's development effort.

In order to foster human and material flows from overseas, people within China with overseas links or personal histories have been designated a specially favored social category. During the 1950s an overseas affairs commission was established to look after their interests, and they were allowed a whole series of privileges: special universities to attend, the ability to buy and build new private homes in urban areas, special stores where they could purchase goods not available to ordinary Chinese with their remittances, and even the ability to leave China to join relatives abroad. During the Cultural Revolution most of these forms of special treatment were eliminated, and some Overseas Chinese were suspected of treason because of their links overseas. Since about 1973 these privileges have been gradually restored, however, so that this element of the population is once again a specially favored group. Clearly the better standard of living made possible by remittances excites envy among some of the rest of the population, and in rural areas where many families receive overseas funds it may be difficult to motivate people to work hard in the fields. People in this category also have some special knowledge of the outside world that can threaten official myths. But still on balance the government seems to feel that the benefits received from establishing this privileged category within China—primarily an inflow of foreign exchange and the goodwill of foreign communities—more than compensate for the problems caused.

The success of the CCP in achieving desired changes in the stratification system has been mixed. Clearly the effort to dethrone the pre-1949 elites and prevent wealth from being a primary determinant of life chances has succeeded, although it is debatable how much the chances for mobility from humble origins into the elite has improved in view of the concern for special privilege and passing on advantages to one's children of China's current leading cadres. The prestige of the military has also been upgraded, and military careers are eagerly sought after today. Efforts to denigrate intellectuals and to place more stress on politics in determining rewards and mobility chances have been less successful and are now said to have gone too far—and as a result to have harmed China's modernization effort. The use of personal ties and nepotism rather than universalistic and meritocratic allocation also continues to be important. And efforts to moderate income inequalities and to reduce the rural-urban gap in relation to the levels achieved in the 1950s have not been very effective and have again been largely discarded in the current enthusiasm for incentives and differentiation. How people view Chinese society and its political system continues to depend on where they are located in relation to the major lines of cleavage that crosscut the social landscape: rural versus urban; rich village versus poor village; good class versus bad class; minority versus Han; leading cadres versus ordinary population; intellectual versus nonintellectual; Overseas Chinese versus ordinary Chinese; prestigious and resourceful unit members versus those in low status units; and so forth. That these cleavages exist and are important does not of course mean that they are all likely to give rise to acute social conflict. Given the tightly organized nature of the Chinese political system, grievances and conflicts usually cannot be directly expressed. But in the future these are the kinds of social cleavages that China's leaders will have to remain concerned about, and if factional conflict breaks out within the leadership and rivals seek to mobilize social support in this conflict, these are the lines of cleavage that are likely to come into play.

Family Life

Traditionally Chinese families were notable for their strong bonds of loyalty and obligation, reinforced through strict internal hierarchies. Individuals were socialized to put family interests first and taught that younger generations should be filial and obedient to older generations, and females should be subordinate to males. These principles were expressed in many different ways. Male bias was visible through preference for male children, inheritance by sons and not daughters, female moves at marriage into the home of the male, and by bias in favor of males for instance. Age dominance was expressed through strictly arranged marriage, the use of kin terms differentiated by relative age, and the turning over of most of one's earnings to the family head. Customs like child betrothal and the taking of concubines continued to exist into the modern age, even as they were denounced by Nationalist reformers and Christian missionaries. Among many twentieth-century liberals and radicals, the conviction grew that part of China's weakness and inertia stemmed from the conservative nature of her family customs and the way in which family loyalties interfered with efforts to forge broader social cohesion. During the Nationalist era legal reforms were enacted to try to modernize Chinese families, but these had little impact outside of the educated, urban classes (see Republican China, ch. 1).

The Chinese Communists found a number of aspects of traditional family relations repugnant, and in the guerrilla areas that they controlled they began to push for changes even before 1949. When they came to power this effort was directed nationwide and was symbolized by the 1950 Marriage Law of the People's Republic. The CCP wanted to foster marriage by free choice, to eradicate "marriage by purchase," to eliminate child betrothal and concubinage, to provide women with equal rights to divorce and to property ownership, and to generally provide for more equality in family relationships. However, they never attempted to destroy the family or eliminate all obligations to it, and in most respects their family policy was simply a continuation of the efforts of earlier reformers. Major propaganda efforts in the early 1950s were aimed at gaining popular compliance with the new Marriage Law, and although these were only partially successful, the authorities assumed that with the advent of socialism, entailing the loss of parental controls over property and mobilization of women into the work force, acceptance of the new family styles would inevitably grow. In more recent times inducing family change has not had a high priority, except that special campaigns have been launched to transform particular customs, particularly to reduce the birth rate and foster later marriages.

The forms of family life today are somewhat different in rural and urban areas. In the countryside it is still the general case that brides move at marriage into the homes of their husbands, a custom that has not been criticized by the authorities until recently. Three-generation families are still quite common, and most older peasants spend their declining years living with and being supported by a married son. Thus rural family units still tend to be based upon links through males, even though the larger lineages that were once formed on this basis are no longer so important. Peasants do marry at considerably later ages today than before 1949, but many of them still marry before they reach the new official late marriage ages, which are generally twenty-three for the female and twenty-five for the male. They are also still inclined to have more than the two children the government wants to establish as a limit. Strictly arranged marriages are rare today, but in the conservative atmosphere of the villages it is still hard for young people to get to know one another, and parents have an important say in whom their children will marry. Generally both the young people and their parents have to agree in order for a wedding to take place. One other condition required for a marriage is for the groom's family to agree to deliver a substantial bride price to the bride's family, even though such

Farming activity on rural commune near Nanning in
Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomus Region
Courtesy William H. Young, Jr.

payments are supposed to be illegal under the 1950 Marriage Law. And peasant families generally ignore the government's advocacy of frugality in wedding celebrations by holding a large feast with dozens of guests invited. The power of the older generation within the family has been reduced, and this is signified not only by the reduced power of parents to dictate marriage choices, but also by the fact that older peasants now have to manage many of the household chores so that younger males and females can go to work in the team's fields. But at the same time the obligation to support aging parents seems accepted as an absolute, and there is little sign of disrespect or rebellion by the rural young. Women are more important today in terms of their agricultural labor and earnings, but they still end up doing most of the household chores, and they still do not generally inherit family property or receive child custody in the event of a divorce. Rural families are thus still highly solidary units that have only been partially transformed by the Chinese revolution.

The family patterns of urban China were already diverging from customary forms even before 1949, and the differences have grown since that time. Three-generation families are still common in the city, but it is also common there to find older people living alone. Partly due to the bureaucratic system of housing allocation and the shortage of urban housing, it is difficult today to maintain a common residence for a large, extended family, and many youths move off

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into separate housing at or before marriage. Very few urban youths now marry below the officially designated late marriage ages, even though these are pegged higher than in the countryside—generally at twenty-five for females and twenty-seven or -eight for males. They also are unlikely to have more than the two children the government allows and might be persuaded to join the couples who are pledging themselves to be one-child families.

Parents also play a less central role in mate choice in the cities. In the majority of cases young couples meet on their own or through friends, and although parental approval is generally sought before marriage, cases of marriages against parental wishes are more common in the city. Urban marriages also rarely involve negotiation between families over a bride price. Instead there may be requests for gifts to be given to the bride or simply marriage without any gifts or exchanges at all. Urban wedding celebrations are also more modest than in the countryside. A festive meal in the home is common but without dozens of guests, or the couple may simply invite close friends and workmates to a simple tea party in their work unit in the style the authorities are trying to popularize. In some families of highly placed intellectuals and leading cadres the power of the older generation may remain strong but in most urban families, youths are not so obedient or subservient as in the countryside, and city parents can increasingly share the complaint of their counterparts in other societies that they cannot control their children or get them to behave. Children generally contribute some funds to the support of their aging parents, although the system of state pensions makes this less obligatory than is the case in the countryside. Urban daughters do generally inherit a share of family property these days, and in the event of a divorce they are more likely to receive child custody than is the case in the countryside. So while family loyalties remain strong in urban areas, the interests of the family are not so paramount as in the countryside, and the authorities have much more success in gaining compliance with official family ideals. These differences relate to the fact that the family continues to have a more important role in rural social life, while in the cities bureaucratic penetration has eliminated much of the autonomy that families once had.

Women

Women were traditionally expected to be subservient to men. They moved at marriage into the homes of their husbands, where they were as much under the authority of their in-laws as of their spouse. Many did not work outside the home after marriage, and they gained status by bearing sons and being obedient wives and daughters-in-law. Few received much education, and cases of infanticide and sale of daughters occurred in times of disaster. However, women's informal influence was much stronger than their formal status, particularly as they aged, and cases of dominant matriarchs were not at all uncommon.

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The CCP came to power determined to press for substantial female equality. The most central concern was to mobilize women for work and other roles outside the home so that women would "hold up half the sky." In good Marxist fashion, China's new leaders assumed that the advent of socialism and full labor force participation by females would eliminate the barriers to sexual equality. The provisions of the Marriage Law were designed to hasten that process, and a national Women's Federation was organized to oversee the implementation of these policies.

The results of these efforts have been mixed. Although there clearly have been substantial improvements in the rights and position of women since 1949, women still suffer from many of the same disadvantages that affect women in other societies. In two realms the gains have been marked. Women have entered the work force in much increased numbers, and now in urban areas and large parts of the countryside almost all able-bodied women aged twenty to fifty work outside the home on a full-time basis. In education as well the progress has been considerable, with the gap between male and female school attendance ratios shrinking considerably, even though it has not been totally eliminated. Most divorces these days are initiated by women, an area where they had few rights before, and the general pattern is for women to retain their own surnames after marriage, even though their children almost always assume the surname of their husband.

In other respects progress has been more uneven. Even within education at the highest levels women are still quite underrepresented. Only 24 percent of college students in China in 1979 were females, a figure much lower than in many other developing societies. Women also continue to be greatly underrepresented in politics and positions of leadership. No recent figures on the proportion of women in the CCP are available, but estimates put it in the 20 percent range. In 1977 at the Eleventh National Party Congress 19 percent of the delegates were women; they constituted 11 percent of the membership of the Central Committee selected then, and less than 4 percent (one out of twenty-eight) of the members of the Politburo. Women are similarly underrepresented in high government positions. The Chinese urban labor force continues to be quite segregated by sex, in spite of the great publicity given to women working in traditional male occupations. For instance, it is hard indeed to find any males working in nursery schools or as nurses, and not many can be found among textile workers. Largely because of this occupational segregation and because women predominate among the less well-paid workers in collective enterprises, women tend to earn less than men, in spite of the official commitment to equal pay for equal work. Most of the burden of domestic chores in both rural and urban China continues to fall upon women, with men helping little. And in rural China women experience some special disadvantages, particularly involving discrimination in property rights and in child custody in the event of divorce, and they still generally face a traumatic change in obligations from their own family's to their husband's at marriage. To be sure, many of these forms of sexual inequality are ones found in other societies around the world, but they do illustrate that in spite of impressive accomplishments the ability of the Chinese revolution to promote sexual equality has its limits.

Religion and Ritual Life

Traditionally Chinese society was aflower with a wide variety of religious practices and ritual observances. Not only proper role relationships in society but also proper ritual behavior in the religious realm were deemed necessary to achieve harmony and happiness. Since there were no unitary churches or centralized religious dogmas in China, as there were in the West, in their search for satisfaction Chinese could and did engage in a combination of ritual practices drawn from Taoist, Buddhist, Confucian, and folk traditions. Particularly important for most Chinese were ancestor worship activities, annual festival celebrations, and rituals connected with the life cycle. There were also a variety of places of worship and spirits to be propitiated, ranging from major temples with their particular patron gods to neighborhood earth god shrines and lineage temples, and finally down to the deities of the household—domestic ancestral tablets, spirit shrines, door gods, kitchen gods, and so forth. With the arrival of Christianity modest numbers of converts to western faiths were obtained, but many of these people treated their new faith as simply one more set of techniques designed to secure happiness and continued at least some of the traditional Chinese ritual practices as well.

The CCP came to power with an official policy of atheism, and in theory it wished to do away with all religious practices. In reality authorities have oscillated between limited tolerance and repression in their treatment of a broad range of religious customs. China's leaders continue to recognize the usefulness of established religion in their foreign relations with Islamic and Buddhist nations and associations outside of China. (Islam has been practiced within China mainly by a number of minority groups in the Northwest.) The leaders also recognize the difficulty of eliminating the pervasive religious beliefs and practices of the population.

Accordingly in tolerant periods, a number of policies have been proclaimed. Freedom to believe in and practice one's religious faith has been protected, but freedom to proselytize that faith has generally been proscribed. What's more, the government's right to conduct atheistic propaganda has been recognized. Friendly contacts with cobelievers outside of China have been allowed, but subordination to outside religious leadership is forbidden, and during the 1950s various Protestant faiths and the Roman Catholic Church were forced to cut their overseas links and proclaim themselves autonomous Chinese churches. The government has also tried to establish a distinction between "religion" and "superstition," with practitioners and believers in the latter (officially defined as involving efforts to manipulate supernatural forces to improve one's fate) treated harshly. Thus in tolerant periods monks and ministers have been able to conduct worship services, but attempts have been made to suppress fortune-tellers, spirit mediums, geomancy diviners, and other kinds of ritual specialists labeled as superstitious. Furthermore, attempts were made to break up particular sects and ritual groups that were seen as particular threats to CCP control, particularly Taoist sects, secret societies, and lineages.

For most of the period since 1949, then, official policy has sharply circumscribed religion while allowing some forms of worship to continue on the assumption that over time these beliefs and customs would eventually die out. The government recognized the popular thirst for rituals, however, and tried to introduce new, secular observances to try to replace the traditional forms. In this fashion a new set of state holidays was established: January 1st, International Women's Day (March 8th), International Labor Day (May 1st), Youth Day (May 4th), Children's Day (June 1st), the CCP anniversary (July 1st), the PLA anniversary (August 1st), and National Day (October 1st). In addition Chinese New Year was rechristened the Spring Festival, and a new set of secular activities was popularized for that occasion. Similarly, a new set of simplified and politicized wedding and funeral observances was fostered, the latter case involving cremation rather than the traditional burial. It might be noted that here the CCP was following the footsteps of Nationalist reformers, who also tried to discourage traditional ritual life and develop a new set of national holidays in the 1920s and 1930s.

At times official attitudes toward religion and ritual have become much more intolerant, and this was true particularly during the Cultural Revolution when most temples and churches were closed, many were ransacked and defaced, and many monks and priests were arrested or forced to become ordinary laborers. At the same time homes were searched and ancestral tablets, bibles, and other ritual objects were confiscated and destroyed, and even private worship within the home became a deviant and dangerous act. Since the death of Mao these practices have been condemned as excessive, and by 1980 the policy of restricted tolerance of religion had been restored.

The effects of these efforts to change religious practices have been different in rural and urban China. In the large cities, at least, active practice of traditional ritual activities is largely confined to the older generation and particularly to elderly women. Many urban youths do not celebrate or recall the significance of the full set of traditional holidays, although they may still eat the special food items that were associated with them, e.g., moon cakes for the mid-autumn festival. Many urban households no longer have domestic ancestral shrines to receive regular offerings, nor do they maintain images of kitchen gods, door gods, and other creatures of the other world. Weddings are generally rather simple affairs, and most of the traditional ritual customs have now been discarded. When a person dies in the city, most often there is a memorial meeting followed by cremation, with a simple armband or swatch of black cloth on the pocket worn by surviving family members and no sign of the traditional observances—full mourning dress, incantations by hired priests, and processions to the grave. So far as one can tell, worship at temples and in newly reopened Christian churches attracts only a small portion of the urban population. Whether the return to a policy of tolerance will allow a modest revival of some of the traditional rituals, with more young people involved, remains an open question.

In the countryside the situation is different in important ways. There, too, most temples were closed down or converted to other uses, before or during the Cultural Revolution; priests and other ritual specialists disappeared, and large-scale public religious observances were tabooed. But on a modest scale much of traditional ritual life survives in China's villages. The traditional holidays continue to be celebrated within peasant homes, and authorities have to offer people work points to get them to attend meetings called on the new state holidays. Weddings still involve large feasts and public celebrations, and when peasants die they are generally buried; in the process many traditional ritual elements still may be visible, such as full mourning dress, processions to the grave, the burning of ritual objects. In Guangdong Province one also still commonly finds a custom distinctive to that area, the second burial. This involves waiting for several years after the burial and then digging up the bones, placing them in a pottery urn, and placing this in a propitious spot in the hills. Domestic ancestor worship in some form is still common in many but not all peasant homes. The area of ritual life provides perhaps the clearest example of the diverging patterns of social change in rural and urban China.

Socialization and Social Control

One characteristic of contemporary Chinese social structure that has repeatedly struck outside observers is the great time and energy devoted by authorities to developing detailed organizational networks to penetrate social groups and achieve social control. Most of the centralized control systems found in East European socialist states exist also in China—a hierarchical Communist Party, state control over the mass media and schools, an extensive police system, a prohibition of autonomous organizations and interest groups, and so on. But in China there is also a pervasive network of semiofficial groups at the grass-roots level of society that seems more important in socialization and social control than is the case in other socialist societies, where this network may not even exist. No doubt China's

The brigade provides early schooling for children of peasant families.
Courtesy China Pictorial



Commune authorities established this hatchery to supply fish to brigades and teams.
Courtesy China Pictorial

long tradition of sensitivity to human relationships and organizational roles helps to explain the development of this grass-roots system. There are also some specific precedents, such as the traditional *bao jia* system used to enforce mutual responsibility for reporting criminal and other deviant acts, but the network of groups introduced by the CCP is far more penetrating and effective.

The general form that this social control network takes is usually termed simply a small group (*xiaozu*). In schools, factories, offices, military units, urban neighborhoods, and penal institutions individuals are organized into regular small groups of around eight to fifteen members. For example, the work groups in a factory or students in a row in a classroom constitute small groups, and they engage in other activities besides labor and academic study. These groups hold regular meetings to engage in political study and mutual criticism. In these sessions, ideological materials assigned by local party cadres are explained and discussed. The group is supposed to evaluate its regular work, academic study, or other activities in light of the demands and standards presented in these study materials, and individuals who have been deficient in some respect should criticize themselves and receive criticism and advice from others in the group to help them to conform. Each small group has an appointed head who reports regularly to the appropriate party authorities on the views expressed in these meetings. These groups are an effort to preempt or co-opt the informal primary groups that would otherwise exist in large-scale organizations in order to insure that individual Chinese are surrounded by social pressure in support of official goals.

This network, if it functions effectively, can have a number of consequences for how Chinese society operates and changes. Communication of official goals to a dispersed and partly illiterate population is facilitated by the impressive system of oral communication and feedback that this network provides. In theory this network makes it possible to use social pressure to secure compliance with official goals, and minimize the use of material rewards and coercion. In addition the regular group criticism sessions are expected to help eliminate "harmful" atttitudes and values left over from the old society, thus getting people not only to comply but to believe.

So large parts of the Chinese population hold regular small group meetings, sometimes several times a week, and these are important institutions for communicating and for changing attitudes and behavior. The ability of the CCP to organize and control such a large and potentially contentious population depends in no small part on this network. But the network often does not work as well as it is supposed to, and as a result socialization and social control are not as effectively pursued as the authorities would wish.

In many cases groups do not have enough solidarity for their pressure to have much effect in changing member attitudes. For example, one can easily imagine that prisoners in a forced labor camp who are required to criticize each other's wishes to escape do not take such criticism to heart. Small group sessions can also become routinized and slogan-filled, with members learning how to say what is expected of them while keeping their true feelings to themselves.

The effort to co-opt primary groups can never be fully successful either, because all social ties are not "captured" within the group network. Individuals have families, friends, former classmates, and a variety of other outside ties, and when with these people they are unlikely to use the political jargon of the small group session and may even share grievances and unorthodox thoughts. Furthermore, in the countryside where 80 percent of the population lives, repeated attempts to establish this deeply penetrating small group structure have found only limited success, and instead occasional political meetings in the team or brigade where peasants passively listen to indoctrinational lectures is the common pattern. This is one of the reasons that official control over peasant behavior is less effective than is the case in urban areas. Finally, since the small group network is officially sponsored and sustained, rather than arising naturally from society, when higher political controls are relaxed or factional fighting leads to conflicting messages from on high, then this social control network tends to fall apart, and autonomous behavior and attitudes are given more outlet as a consequence. Even when none of these problems are serious, and the small group network is operating well, it is generally much more effective in communicating official demands and securing compliance than it is in changing attitudes and reforming values. Because of this fact, it is possible for popular grievances and discontent to accumulate for long periods while on the surface people seem to be compliant and contented, and this helps to explain why, when dramatic reversals of official policies occur in China, outpourings of support and tales of past woe quickly appear. In sum, the small group network is a very important socialization and social control device and helps to make possible the mobilization of the population in a disciplined fashion for many purposes but it does not enable the government to fully control public opinion or eliminate all autonomous forms of social relations.

Social Problems

When the Communists came to power they launched reform efforts designed to attack and eliminate a broad range of social problems: unemployment, prostitution, venereal disease, gambling, drug addiction, organized crime, begging, and poverty, to mention only the most prominent of the country's ills. The new government recognized that, whatever new ideas and institutions they introduced, their popular legitimacy would depend substantially on their ability to solve such problems and produce a peaceful and well-ordered society. In some cases, particularly in regard to prostitution, drug addiction, venereal disease, and organized crime, they were able to make dramatic progress, and so far as one can tell these are insignificant problems in China today. In this sense Chinese society is a much more orderly and secure place today than it was before 1949, although tumultuous government-sponsored campaigns have introduced some new kinds of disorders. But other problems have not been so easy to solve or have been apparently solved only to reappear later. And in some instances government policies have directly contributed to the aggravation of particular social problems. As a result Chinese authorities in 1980 faced a number of serious social problems that have the potential of creating conflict and undermining the legitimacy of the government.

Poverty remains a central concern for China's leaders, even if large-scale famines have been rare since 1949. (The government-induced famine of 1959–60 is the primary example.) Large portions of the Chinese countryside have progressed little since the revolution, and in some minority areas conditions of severe deprivation continue to exist. For example, according to Chinese sources in Tibet the infant mortality rate still stands at around 200 per 1,000 children born, a frightfully high figure which contrasts with rates of about 13 per 1,000 in the major cities in developed parts of China. Although dealing with such poverty is primarily an economic issue, the social consequences of having large parts of the population confined to pockets of backwardness but continually made aware of the growing prosperity in other parts of China must prove very worrisome to CCP authorities.

Part of the poverty problem can be attributed to China's continuing population growth, which has seen the population nearly double in the last thirty years. China's leaders are now vigorously committed to using all means available to sharply reduce the rate of population growth. In the late 1970s the use of persuasion and pressure gave way to the direct use of a wide range of rewards and punishments, e.g., wage supplements and deductions, increases or cuts in rations, preference or discrimination in access to nursery schools and other facilities, and in 1980 a draft National Family Planning law was being discussed, designed to reward one-child families and make it illegal to have more than two children (see Population Control Programs, ch. 2). Significant success has already been registered in reducing the birth rate, but, with large numbers of youths entering the marrying ages, the danger of a population spurt remains. The increasingly draconian policies of the government are also likely to engender some problems. Peasant families in particular continue to depend upon their children to support them in their old age, and with daughters expected to marry out, this means they depend on having sons. They are likely to see the effort to require them to have only one or two children as a threat to their livelihood and to resist and complain. Devices that would reduce the dependence upon sons, such as developing pensions for aging peasants and encouraging husbands to marry into the homes of their brides are being fostered in some areas but are still not widespread enough to provide alternatives for most peasants. It is also conceivable that the great pressure local cadres are under to reduce local birth rates may lead to overzealousness in requiring abortions and sterilizations and produce the kind of backlash that occurred in India in the 1970s.

Elsewhere in family life a variety of problems and strains are being recognized. In China's cities the official late marriage policy, puritanical sexual policy, the scarcity of recreation facilities, and considerable occupational segregation by sex all make it difficult for young people to meet eligible partners and develop romantic relationships that can form the basis for marriage. In recent years the Chinese press has begun to discuss these problems more openly via articles about love, loneliness, the fear of remaining unmarried, and related issues. Authorities are beginning to be concerned that official prudery and these difficulties in finding a partner lead to sexual frustrations and contribute to a reported increase in cases of rape. A few experiments have been made to introduce modest forms of sex education into select urban schools in order to promote more realistic and healthy attitudes about sex. Authorities are concerned that if these romantic problems are not solved they will affect the happiness and work efforts of young people and may lead them to hasty and unwise marriages they will later regret.

There is also heightened official concern about problems within marriage relationships, particularly in urban China. These problems take several forms. Large numbers of married couples are separated by their work and live in different parts of the country, and many of these couples see each other only once a year during the annual vacation official regulations provide for in such cases. This separation causes great hardship for the couples involved and also makes it difficult for them to care for and rear their children. In recent years the Chinese press has carried a number of articles describing meetings of bureaucrats to try to arrange transfers so that couples can be reunited, but it remains unclear how large a proportion of separated couples these transfers have affected.

Marital disharmony is also a problem. Some couples in China, as in any society, argue and fight and have difficulty getting along together. In some cases they become so miserable that one partner or both demands a divorce. However, in recent years official policy has strongly discouraged divorce. Work unit and neighborhood authorities exert strong pressures on such couples to work things out, and Western observers have reported a number of court divorce hearings resulted in the judge browbeating the couple into agreeing to go home and try again. This policy has the virtue of limiting the number of "broken homes" in China, but it also means that there are large numbers of couples who feel they have to go on living together even when they are miserable. In 1980 authorities were discussing ways to liberalize official divorce policy somewhat, and these were incorporated into a revised Marriage Law adopted during the third session of the National People's Congress (NPC) that year.

The pressures of unhappy family situations, combined with the even greater tensions of political struggles in China, make mental illness and suicide continuing problems of some importance. Unfortunately there is no way to judge how serious these problems are in comparison with other societies. For the first time the Chinese press has recently begun to release statistics on the number of mentally ill people, and these indicate rates of mental disorders of about six to eight per 1,000 in major Chinese cities, not counting neuroses and other lesser problems. However, since the ways in which such figures are compiled and people are classified are unclear, there is no way to compare these statistics with figures on the prevalence of mental illness in other countries. But it has been clear for some time that the regular rigors of political life in China tend to produce neurotic symptoms in the population and that major campaigns often produce waves of suicides and mental breakdowns. The tightly regulated, self-enclosed life in Chinese work organizations has contradictory tendencies here. On the one hand this sort of social structure provides forms of security and ideological consistency that make anomie as a source of mental disorders unlikely; on the other hand the inability of people to leave unpleasant jobs and living situations makes relief from mounting psychic pressures difficult. Perhaps dramatic revelations about the great human suffering caused by the Gang of Four (see Glossary) give an exaggerated view of the extent to which the contemporary social structure produces mental problems and suicide pressures, but it is clear at least that these are not unimportant problems, and that the authorities are beginning to show some concern for them.

These problems were the source of general, low-running concern in 1980. However, there existed another set of problems that were seen as of more crisis proportions. These concerned crime, unemployment, and alienation, particularly among the younger generation. During the 1950s urban unemployment had been largely brought under control as the economy expanded and controls on migration into the city tightened. However, the collapse of the Great Leap Forward and the growing numbers of young people being graduated from urban schools produced a crunch in the early 1960s, with more young people to place each year than there were jobs to fill. Competition for further educational opportunities and urban jobs became more intense, and authorities began to try to export the excess of educated urban youths to the countryside.

Later this policy was applied more forcefully. After the Cultural Revolution the countryside served as the dumping ground for large numbers of former Red Guards, and in subsequent years the large majority of urban secondary school graduates were also assigned to settle down in the countryside. In the course of the decade after

1968, 17 million urban youths were reportedly sent to the countryside in this manner, and this meant large numbers of ambitious urban youths had their hopes for the future frustrated. Some managed to secure a niche for themselves in their rural villages, but many were miserable there and fled back to their cities of origin, where they lived illegally with family or friends. Since they could not get jobs or ration coupons legally, some of these illegally returned youths turned to crime and other deviant activities. By the early 1970s urban crime and particularly juvenile delinquency were clearly on the rise. Youth gangs began to emerge and do battle with each other, as in cities elsewhere on the globe. At the same time students and young workers, who were also deprived of secure mobility opportunities, sometimes became involved in criminal activities themselves. The levels of crime were probably still modest in comparison with many other societies, but to Chinese urban residents, accustomed to the high degree of security and safety of earlier years, the increasing danger of being robbed, mugged, or raped became a source of high anxiety. For a long time the press was silent about these problems, but since the death of Mao they have been increasingly acknowledged, and in fact lurid crime stories have now become regular features of Chinese newspapers. Of course stories about gangs of toughs who gamble and steal and who use homemade zip guns and knives to attack people they do not like can only heighten public anxieties about crime. Furthermore, official efforts in recent years to curtail the program of sending youths to the countryside has made it difficult to get youths to leave the city and has brought back large numbers of youths who had gone. As a result problems of youth unemployment have been aggravated, and the danger of juvenile delinquency has increased.

In the late 1970s authorities reacted to the crisis caused by growing youth unemployment and crime by instituting a variety of measures. A vigorous police crackdown on crime was ordered, and juvenile reformatories were expanded. A new criminal code was adopted, and a nationwide campaign was launched to encourage popular participation in the effort to use the law to combat crime (see The Return to Socialist Legality, ch. 13). Posters and banners urging vigilance against thieves, rapists, and other criminals were visible everywhere in urban China in 1980. And vigorous efforts were underway to rapidly increase the number of urban jobs, particularly by expanding service-sector jobs in the collective portion of the urban economy, in hopes of being able to absorb an increasing share of the young people finishing school and returning from the countryside. Furthermore, in the schools and work units, ladders of mobility opportunities have been reinstituted to try to foster discipline and competitiveness among youths and make the costs to their futures of engaging in deviant acts clearer.

The success of these efforts remains to be seen. For younger people coming up through the educational system the revived opportunities to go straight from secondary school into the university are attractive, but the very small proportion of those aspiring to go who are being selected for university enrollment (about 4 or 5 percent) means that many youths will still end up with frustrated aspirations. Even if fewer urban youths are now being sent to the countryside, those assigned after middle school graduation to work in service-sector jobs in collective enterprises are likely to feel disappointed at being stuck in low-prestige jobs not suited to their talents. Very few youths can realistically expect to end up becoming the scientists and engineers who are now so gloriously praised in official propaganda. So for the youths coming up through the school system in urban areas now, it will be difficult to avoid large-scale disappointment and frustration about their lot in life, and so the danger of deviance will continue to exist.

For yesterday's youths this is even more the case. Large numbers of young people who have spent years in the countryside are now being reassigned urban residences and jobs. While they may be grateful for the chance to escape their rural exile, they are also likely to feel they have been cheated out of chances for schooling and jobs that they should have been entitled to, and that some of the best years of their lives have been wasted in the countryside. Most of them will also end up in low-prestige jobs and with little chance of making up for the poor education they received. Some of these youths are former Red Guards who are still nursing wounds left from the way China's leaders discarded them after using them during the Cultural Revolution. In the less tightly controlled political atmosphere of the countryside, they may have had time to think deeply and critically about their society and develop some radical ideas. Bringing large numbers of these people back from the countryside may thus be a risky venture in terms of the desire of the authorities for order and commitment.

At a more general level, China's leaders must be concerned about the spread of alienation and cynicism, particularly among the young, but in many other segments of society as well. The success of China's political system depends on the ability to mobilize sentiments of sacrifice and commitment among the population, which makes it possible to direct human energies toward achieving officially set goals. This spirit is expected to derive from a belief that the CCP's programs are wise and proper and that sacrifice and dedication today will produce a better life tomorrow for oneself and one's family, as well as for the nation at large. But when major leadership purges take place—as they did after 1966 and again after 1976—accompanied by public revelations about abuses of power, official hypocrisy, and irrational policies pushed by coercion, these are bound to make it difficult to generate the desired degree of loyalty and dedication. And when after 1976 these changes also involved a modest relaxation of political controls, so that people could more openly voice their grievances and see that their doubts were widely shared, and also learn about how much more advanced other countries are than China, then it became especially difficult to check the spread of skepticism and cynicism.

Even many people who think the current "four modernizations" program (see Glossary) is an improvement may still be skeptical of the statements and motivations of China's leaders and doubt their ability to fulfill the promises made for the program. In this kind of setting it is not surprising to see some young people chasing after personal gratification and enjoyment and dropping out into a world of Western jeans, music, and ideas. Nor is it surprising that authorities are having a hard time getting people to attend political lectures arranged for their benefit or take the criticisms of their small groups seriously. When you let the population know that what they suffered and sacrificed for in the past was really a cruel hoax, it is not an easy matter to develop enthusiasm for new sacrifices.

In a sense, then, China's leaders see their most serious social problems as producing a political problem. The events of the last fifteen years disrupted people's lives and careers and produced large numbers of unemployed and frustrated young people, and as a consequence they fueled increases in crime and other deviant activity. These specific problems are manifestations of a spreading wave of alienation, and China's leaders are clearly having some difficulty stopping this spread. They realize that without dedicated and loyal younger generations coming up, it will be very difficult to mobilize popular energies to deal with any of China's pressing problems. Their denunciations of the abuses of the Gang of Four were designed to clear the air to permit popular rededication to official goals, but as the target of attacks has veered closer and closer to Mao himself, the legitimacy of the Chinese revolution has been increasingly called into question. In the years ahead one can expect China's leaders to use the impressive organizational resources they have at their command to try to "put Humpty Dumpty back together again," but as the nursery rhyme king learned long ago, this is no easy task.

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General works describing the social structure of contemporary China do not exist. However, *Mao's People*, by M. Bernard Frolic, contains vignettes from the lives of sixteen people in different walks of life in China, and Martin K. Whyte's *Small Groups and Political Rituals in China* presents case studies of five different kinds of organizations: offices, factories, schools, communes, and forced labor camps. The classic by Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, presents a detailed discussion of the organizational transformation of different sectors of Chinese society after 1949. The best single source on the value system of contemporary China and its relationship with China's traditions is *The Concept of Man in Contemporary China*, by Donald Munro. The most comprehensive work on China's minorities is June Teufel Dreyer's *China's Forty Millions*. However, this book deals mainly with trends in official policy toward minorities, and there are no good studies of current patterns of social life in China's minority areas. Overview treatments of the social structure of rural and urban China are presented in companion studies, *Village and Family in Contemporary China*, by William L. Parish and Martin White, and *Urban Life in Contemporary China*, by White and Parish. A number of other useful discussions of commune organization exist: Gordon Bennett's *Huadong: The Story of a Chinese People's Commune*; Benedict Stavis' *People's Communes and Rural Development in China*; and Frederick W. Crook's article "The Commune System in the People's Republic of China, 1963–1974" (in the volume *China: A Reassessment of the Economy*). On cities, one may also wish to consult the conference volume edited by John Lewis, *The City in Communist China*, as well as specialized monographs on three of China's largest cities: *Canton under Communism*, by Ezra F. Vogel; *Careers in Shanghai*, by Lynn T. White; and *Revolution and Tradition in Tientsin, 1949–52*, by Kenneth Lieberthal. There are a number of useful studies of official policy toward the family and women, including M. J. Meijer's *Marriage Law and Policy in the Chinese People's Republic*; C. K. Yang's *Chinese Communist Society: The Family and the Village*; and Delia Davin's *Woman-Work: Women and the Party in Revolutionary China*. However, as with Dreyer's work, these studies are not very informative about the actual patterns of family life and women's roles that have developed, and for that one has to turn to other sources, particularly the works by Parish and Whyte cited previously. Several useful works describe changing policies toward religion in China: *Religion in Communist China*, by Richard C. Bush; *Religious Policy and Practice in Communist China*, edited by Donald E. MacInnis; and *Buddhism under Mao*, by Holmes Welch. In-depth studies of social problems in contemporary China are practically nonexistent. This is largely a result of the fact that China has long been closed to direct social observation and that its press has customarily painted a rosy picture of social orderliness. However, a certain amount of detail about the problems of urban youth is contained in *Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages: The Transfer of Youth from Urban to Rural China*, by Thomas Bernstein. With the increasing frankness of the Chinese press in recent years about social problems and the admission of the first Western social scientists in a generation to carry out field studies in China, there should be a number of studies of social problems and current patterns of social life appearing in coming years. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 4. Education and Culture



Artist's rendition of ceremonial vessel in bronze, dating from the Western Zhou Dynasty (ca. eleventh century–770 B.C.).

IN 1980 EDUCATION POLICY of the People's Republic of China was designed primarily to facilitate the economic modernization of the country. It gave highest priority to the training of skilled manpower and the expansion of scientific and technical knowledge. At the same time emphasis was placed on enhancement of the quality of the educational experience, particularly for the minority of students who, as the educated elite of the coming decades, would carry on the modernization effort. In short, education was seen by the pragmatically oriented Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership in 1980 as the main pillar of the "four modernizations" (see Glossary) campaign.

The stress on improving educational quality was a clear shift away from policies that had prevailed during the Cultural Revolution (1966–68) and its aftermath and still earlier during the Great Leap Forward (1958–60) (see Glossary). From 1966 to 1976 the overall priority was on universalization of education in the interest of fostering social equality. The socialist education campaign was to have redistributed educational opportunity within the society and ended the academic elitism that was deeply rooted in the national tradition. It was intended as well to have lessened the differences between workers and peasants, and between the urban and rural populations, and to have moderated the long-standing tendency of the country's scholars and intellectuals to look down on manual labor (see The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, ch. 1).

Because the choice of one strategy for educational development over another results in strikingly different patterns of access for various segments of the population, the issue of educational development had been highly controversial in China since 1949. Advocates of the approach that stressed mass education, enrollment expansion, and labor and political study requirements argued that the policy of the early 1980s tended to benefit the urban more than the rural areas and youth from educated families more than those from worker and peasant households. Supporters of the approach that stressed the relation between education and national development pointed to the detrimental effects of earlier policies on the supply of skilled and professional manpower and on scientific research and technological achievement (see ch. 9, Science and Technology).

Since 1949 educational policy has shifted between the redistributive approach and an approach focusing on qualitative improvements to facilitate national development. The late 1950s and the Cultural Revolution (see Glossary) decade were periods of radical reform, whereas the early 1950s, the early 1960s, and the late 1970s have been characterized by more moderate goals. These pendulum swings have resulted from the major political realignments taking place at the national centers of power. Over the long

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term the country's leadership has been faced with some awesome policy choices. The goals of modernization and equality often have been incompatible and nowhere has this been more apparent than with respect to education.

Despite the presumably high cost of the constant shift in basic educational policy, the Chinese educational picture reveals important elements of success. Near universal adult literacy, near universal primary schooling for children, steady increases in secondary education, and some growth even in the conflict-ridden higher education field are impressive achievements.

Education Policy

One aspect of policy in 1980 that stood out clearly and represented a major change since 1976 was the central importance assigned to academic education. School was a place where people went primarily to study and to gain academic skills. Anything else, including the development of commonly approved political attitudes, was of secondary concern. Political activism, once an important measure of individual performance, was not so any longer. The emphasis on academic achievement derived in large part from the crucial role scientific and technical knowledge and professional skills played in the "four modernizations."

A second aspect of policy was to continue to promote the expansion of educational enrollments. The long-term policy objective was to achieve universal primary and secondary education. When the training of highly skilled manpower received priority attention, these goals receded somewhat in importance; nevertheless, the growth and expansion of higher education enrollments to meet manpower needs was an important goal. The high cost of supporting college and university education prohibited any commitment to major growth of university enrollments.

A third fundamental policy aspect was the acceptance of achievement criteria as the basis for admission and promotion. Academic performance, without regard to political background or political attitude, was the yardstick against which students and teachers were both measured. The use of achievement criteria reinforced the existing pattern of social organization and the principal line of social cleavage—that between the rural and urban components of the population (see Social Groups and Social Cleavages, ch. 3). Another dimension of the use of achievement criteria was the tracking system which involved, among other elements, dividing students into ability groups.

In addition, the country had turned once again to heavy reliance on the keypoint system, whose purpose was to funnel the best students into the best schools, largely on the basis of entrance scores. With educational resources scarce, selected institutions—usually those with past records of educational accomplishment—were given priority assignment of teachers, equipment, and funds. Those

Geography class, Shanghai Number One Middle School
Courtesy Harvey Epstein

schools recruited the best students who were given special training to prepare them for the competition to enter the best schools at the next higher level. Key schools, shut down during the Cultural Revolution, reappeared in the late 1970s and quickly became an integral feature of the education system.

The importance of science and technology in education was another basic aspect of policy in the early 1980s. Scientific and technological accomplishment was of potential value not only to national development and modernization but also to the enhancement of the international prestige of the Chinese scientific community. The aspiration to pursue the frontiers of scientific knowledge often came at the expense of pursuing solutions to applied problems. For the education system it meant a major redirection of resources to higher education and to theoretical research activities within that sector.

In the context of its emphasis on modern science and technology, China has recognized the relative scientific advancment of the West, and since 1976 has adopted an outward-looking policy of learning and borrowing from abroad. Students have been sent abroad for advanced training in a wide range of scientific fields. Again this represents a departure from an extreme policy of self-reliance that was in effect during the Cultural Revolution, when local communities and institutions were urged to deal with problems on the basis of available technology and not seek outside assistance. The party leadership in 1980 believed that the stress on self-reliance had retarded the country's development. A bold policy of borrowing the most advanced theoretical scientific knowledge from abroad is viewed as a means of catching up, at the same time avoiding dependence that might result from purchasing only finished goods or applied technology.

The contrast with policies in effect during the Cultural Revolution is evident: education in the classroom, an emphasis on academic achievement and a commitment to higher education—particularly in the scientific fields—has replaced a belief that the workers and peasants armed with rudimentary knowledge and with "politics in command" can conquer China's development obstacles. The fact that the policies were reaffirmed after 1976 reflects a shift in power in the top echelons of the CCP at that time and the conviction of the post-Mao Zedong leadership of the importance of qualitative educational improvements in achieving the modernization objectives of the regime.

The Education System

Organization

China has established an immense school system to provide for its population, a major accomplishment, particularly in a still very poor and in many respects undeveloped nation.

In 1978 the country had 949,000 primary schools, enrolling 146.2 million students. Initiatives had been undertaken to lower the age of school entrance from seven to six years. Education reports in late 1980 indicated that "over 90 percent" of school age children attended primary school. The usual period of primary schooling was five years, except in key schools where it was six. Some rural areas had a three-year lower primary school, but an effort was being made to provide them a full five years so that their students would be eligible to enter secondary school and have some chance of retaining hard-earned literacy skills.

Primary students attended classes for nine and one-half months each year. Emphasis was on learning to read and write Chinese. Because of the difficulty of mastering it, students had to devote a greater portion of their study time to acquiring basic literacy skills than do students in cultures with phonetic alphabets. Other subjects included arithmetic, science, physical education, music, drawing, and political studies. At this early age, the latter included a general knowledge of politics, as well as moral training which among other points stressed love of the motherland, love of the Party, love of

Chairman Mao, and love of the people. In a limited number of schools, primarily in urban areas, foreign language, chiefly English, was introduced in the third grade. Two weeks of manual labor in place of classroom study was required in all schools in the fourth and fifth grades.

In rural areas, collective agricultural units at the team and brigade levels (see Glossary) operated the primary schools. These schools are called community run or *minban* schools. In urban areas they were administered by factories and neighborhood committees or by local government authorities at the county level or above. The latter were larger, better equipped, and staffed by more highly qualified teachers than schools operated by collective units. Access to the better schools was an important benefit tied to residential patterns.

Schools at the secondary level were known as middle schools. They were divided between junior and senior stages. In 1980 the former was a three-year course of study, the latter a two-year course, although here again key schools offered a six-year program. Elsewhere consideration was being given to resumption of the full six-year secondary level program of the early 1960s. Some 162,000 middle schools, concentrated at the junior middle level, had an estimated 65.5 million students.

Development of secondary education during the early 1960s had followed the policy of "walking on two legs": offering an academic program in regular schools but at the same time organizing separate technical schools for vocational training. The technical schools came to be seen during the Cultural Revolution as evidence of intent to provide only inferior education to children of worker and peasant families, and radical elements had attacked and closed them. Since 1976, with the emphasis on technical training, the schools have been reopened. In the early 1980s approximately 1,700 secondary technical schools with 530,000 students were in operation, providing vocational training at the senior middle level in a wide range of specialties.

The middle school curriculum introduced a number of new subjects, including physics, chemistry, and biology, and their students devoted more time to both political education and manual labor. The program called for one month of manual labor and nine months of classroom study each year. Political education was allotted two class hours per week. Many schools divided their classes between "quick," "medium," and "slow" students. With teachers and more able students devoting time to helping weaker students, in theory this tracking system would eventually disappear. The tracking system facilitated the early identification of the most talented students and their preparation for secondary and university education.

China operated 633 colleges and universities for approximately 1 million students. The best and most prestigious institutions were the so-called key universities, of which in 1980 there were eighty-eight, including such respected centers of learning as Beijing (formerly Peking National) University, Fudan University, Najing University, and Qinghua University. The pressure to expand higher education facilities included proposals to operate flexible universities, such as providing higher education on television, short-term colleges, and to open as many as 169 additional institutions of higher education.

College and university programs generally covered five years, a few requiring a sixth year of study. The three-year programs, tested during the Cultural Revolution, were found to have had serious academic deficiencies.

Colleges and universities were the primary training ground for the technical personnel who were to carry out the "four modernizations" and created opportunities for development of future leaders. Higher education remained a highly unlikely prospect for most students because of a shortage of places. Only 5 percent of China's annual 7 million senior middle-school graduates enter a university. In fact, since 1949 a total of only about 3 million students have received degrees from institutions of higher learning.

In terms of access at various stages, the education system was a steep pyramid; prospects decreased sharply as one advanced. The country has achieved dramatic results in developing primary education since 1949 but much less in developing secondary and tertiary education, a reflection of choices in the distribution of scarce resources.

Administration

A variety of institutions in China played a role in managing education. The CCP established the broad policies; the post-Mao leadership, for example, set the course of improving educational quality in order to facilitate modernization. The Party also monitors the implementation of its policies at the local level and within educational institutions through its network and system of party committees. Party members within educational institutions, who often play a leading role in these organizations, have responsibility to steer their schools in the direction mandated by party policy.

In the early 1980s the State Planning Commission made the most important decisions on overall policy and allocation of resources (see The Government, ch. 10). It also played a crucial role in centralizing the administration of education. The commission assembled manpower estimates from the different ministries and provinces, adjusted them as necessary, and then instructed the Ministry of Education to establish programs in response to requirements. The Ministry of Education and its constituent bureaus and offices then structured programs and admissions policies accordingly. Details on internal workings of the commission in its attempts to rationalize investment in both people and the economy were sketchy.

The ministry could confer with the commission on its directives but was ultimately bound by its decisions. The ministry then prepared a series of budgets that were handed down to bureaus of education in each province. In addition to allocating financial resources to the provinces to meet national educational needs and quotas, the ministry had direct responsibility for the administration of a number of universities—generally the better and most comprehensive.

The bureaus of education in each province were the main link between local education authorities and the national government. The bureaus screened and forwarded requests and reports and transmitted information to schools and local offices from the ministry. Provincial-level authorities were actively involved in both the planning process with the State Planning Commission, the State Council, and the Ministry of Education, and with the direct administration of every government-run primary and secondary school, university, and college in the province. One of the most important responsibilities of the provincial bureau was the assignment of teachers to schools based on the comprehensive plans for manpower development. They also allocated resources for building educational facilities within the province. The bureau had major responsibility for putting national policy into actual operation of the country's thousands of educational institutions.

The county-level education authorities are actively involved in the day-to-day administration of schools but have little opportunity to make or shape policy. They mainly serve as communication links between the provincial authorities and schools.

Various industrial ministries at the national and provincial levels operate their own secondary technical schools and technical colleges. These schools are, of course, subject to the constraints of the State Planning Commission. They also are subject to some vaguely defined "administrative coordination" by the Ministry of Education and the provincial bureau of education. The effectiveness of this coordination is open to question. Industrial ministries have been accused of converting schools into workshops and ignoring the academic training objectives of industry sponsored education.

Administration of schools in the countryside is in the hands of the education committees of the communes (see Glossary) and brigades. Schools are not run by professional educators or persons with full-time responsibility for educational matters. These schools often suffer from "amateur" management. Rural cadres (see Glossary) in charge of schools primarily are local leaders whose qualifications have most often been demonstrated in leading agricultural production. They usually lack expertise in educational matters as well as the time and interest to manage them effectively. The same problem exists to some extent in urban primary schools operated by factories and neighborhood committees.

In recent years the Party has given educational institutions greater

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independence. This is particularly true in higher education where, for example, colleges and universities select individuals for admissions from lists of qualifying applicants. This type of discretionary authority is designed to win the support and enthusiasm of China's intellectuals. These concessions have come slowly and have been made reluctantly, because of the party's long-standing distrust of intellectuals as well as the strong centralizing tendencies of both the party and the bureaucratic apparatus.

Primary Education

The development of primary education represented a formidable accomplishment. Primary schooling was available for most children. About 95 percent of school age children were enrolled in primary school in 1980, slightly less than the record enrollment of the late 1960s and early 1970s. This compared with primary school enrollments of 20 percent of the school age population before 1949.

Students attended primary schools in their neighborhoods or villages, particularly in rural areas. Key primary schools, mainly in urban areas, attempted to recruit the best students, and many have restored entrance examinations as a part of the selection process.

Students were expected to cover a portion of the costs for their schooling. Tuition fees were modest and supplementary levees for books, transportation, food, and heating often were collected. Fees had no readily apparent deterrent effect. In fact it was often suggested that modest fees encouraged parents to treat schooling seriously and to be certain that their children attended. A continuing problem, especially in rural areas, and one common to all developing, agricultural countries, was the tendency of parents to take their young children out of school when their labor was needed at home or in the fields for short or long periods of time. Only about 60 percent of students actually complete the five years of study to graduate, and only about 30 percent are regarded as having genuine primary-level competence.

The curriculum for both primary and secondary schools has been unified on a nationwide basis along with teaching plans, textbooks, and the school calendar.

The part-work, part-study schools, both at the primary and secondary level, were no new phenomena in China. For the most part they were community run, or *minban* schools, operated by a local institution, such as a village, brigade, factory, or neighborhood committee. *Minban* schools had existed in some form and have been used to meet some education objectives since the party's guerrilla warfare days in Yan'an (Yen-an). Whereas government schools were supported by public funds channeled through the education bureaucracy, community-run schools depended on some combination of student tuition, self-generated funds, i.e., student labor or support from the sponsoring institution.

Even though they often were self-supporting, *minban* schools were subject to the administrative control of the education authorities. The qualifications of their teachers were certified by the county-level education bureau. The strictness of standards for certifying *minban* teachers has been a good indicator of official attitudes toward these schools. Relaxed standards encourage *minban* schools to open; stricter standards produce fewer teachers so these schools cannot be left open.

Throughout China the number of qualified teachers was seriously inadequate. Primary schools, particularly community-run schools, were the last to be allocated teachers. Retaining teachers has been the greatest difficulty in operating these schools. For a number of years senior-middle school graduates, who had been sent down to the countryside to perform agricultural labor, were employed as *minban* teachers. As the number of sent-down youths declines, these schools may find it increasingly difficult to find teachers.

Minban schools have been operated for widely different purposes at different times. A list of such goals would include: satisfying popular demand for culture and education; satisfying demand for education without admitting additional students to regular schools and thereby of necessity lowering their standards; absorbing children with behavior problems or graduates of the regular school system who are not admitted to the next level of regular schools and cannot find jobs; saving resources for economic development; developing a curriculum and educational structure responsive to local needs; developing interest in education in rural areas by operating schools that are responsible to the local community; developing political efficacy in ordinary citizens by giving them some of the responsibility for managing schools; and decentralizing the administration of education in order to fight the growth of a stifling national bureaucracy.

In 1980 the state seemed to be interested in conserving scarce resources and in expanding educational enrollments without weakening the better schools. The attitude towards community-run schools was ambivalent; though they allowed enrollments to expand at a very low cost, their existence was a challenge to the overriding concern for educational quality. They probably will continue to operate, even expand, because they are the only means through which China will be able to universalize education. Moreover the quality imbalance between community-run and regular schools lent support to the "streaming" policies in effect. The education system was evolving a fairly clear policy of placing a young child on one of several education tracks, each with a different length and quality of schooling and different vocational objectives.

The inequity of this situation, particularly for the rural population, was apparent. The leadership, however, maintained that the arrangement was the only means to improve rural living standards, arguing that the benefits of modernization eventually would "trickle down" to the peasants. Whether the gap between urban and rural educational opportunities would continue to expand along with the more general difference in urban and rural living conditions and what significance this had for peasant attitudes remained an unanswered question in 1980.

Secondary Education and the Fate of Educated Youth

The main thrust of secondary education policy has been the expansion of enrollments toward the long-term goal of achieving universal secondary education. In recent years this effort has been slowed by the desire to consolidate and improve the quality of key middle schools. The rapid growth of secondary enrollments between 1966 and 1976 was made possible largely through the addition of junior-middle classes to the rural primary schools. Primary schooling was cut from six years to five and two years of junior-middle schooling were added. In 1980 junior-middle school enrollments accounted for the greatest number of secondary school pupils. According to the *Renmin Ribao* (*People's Daily*), 12 percent of those who leave primary school do not go on to junior-middle school, and more than 50 percent of those who complete junior-middle school do not enter senior-middle school.

The rapid expansion of secondary education gave rise to some critical concerns after the early 1960s. This was particularly true during the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath. Resources were spread too thin, and the quality of secondary education declined sharply. In retrospect government and party representatives in the late 1970s criticized what they termed the "unitary" approach of the past decade, arguing that it had ignored the need for graduates with a higher quality education (college preparatory) and others with specialized technical education (vocational). Their solution was the reduction of ordinary secondary enrollments and an increase in specialized secondary enrollments, including key school and secondary technical school enrollments. Even more worrisome to party leaders was the excess of young people being graduated from urban schools for whom there were no jobs available and who had to be assigned by the millions to settle down in the countryside, their hopes and aspirations unfulfilled (see Social Problems, ch. 3).

Another emerging program was the reorganization of rural secondary schools. County-level administrative units were taking over the administration of some of the poorer commune-operated schools, and others were being eliminated. Within the communes themselves, brigade-run junior-middle schools were being detached from primary schools and their operation assumed at the commune level. Brigades would be authorized only to operate primary schools. There was also discussion of converting some junior-middle schools in the communes and primary schools operated by brigades into part-work, part-study schools to reduce the operating costs. It is reasonable to expect that taking secondary schooling further away from the village level would cause enrollment growth to slow down or even taper off.



Campus of Beijing University
Courtesy China Pictorial

Prospective middle school students must take an entrance exam to gain admission. In less densely populated areas these examinations are tests that are used to place students in more and less advanced classes. Once, however, the number of students seeking admission exceeds the number of places, the entrance exam serves a screening purpose. This is particularly true in urban areas and most true for the outstanding key schools in the leading cities. Rural areas were less likely to be served by middle schools (especially senior-middle schools) but, where they exist, competition for admission was less intense.

In China a graduate of a senior-middle school is considered an educated person. Of course, with the renewed emphasis on higher education, there has been some attempt to view middle school as a transition belt to colleges and universities and to evaluate middle schools in terms of their success in sending their graduates on for higher education. Jiang Nanxiang, minister of education in 1980, called attention to this problem and suggested that middle schools must be evaluated according to their ability to educate young people to take a place in the work force. Even though greater resources were targeted for the key schools that would produce most of the college entrants, there was also serious thought given to improving the educational level of the slow and average students.

This concern notwithstanding, there is great pressure from students and their families for entry to a college or university. Some 5.7 million students sat for the entry examination when it was first offered in December 1977; seven months later an additional 6 million students competed against the greatest odds.

Government officials give middle school students contradictory messages. On the one hand, the government offers the prospect of increasing opportunities for higher education. New universities, new formats for higher education, and more efficient use of existing facilities are all considered. At the same time, senior-middle school students are urged to "make two preparations with one Red heart." In other words, students should study hard for the examinations—but be prepared not to be admitted to a university and to accept another role in society.

Higher Education and Economic Development

Higher education exemplifies the pendulum swings of policy that have occurred since 1949. China's serious commitment at the start of the 1980s to the "four modernizations" policy required great advances in science and technology. Higher education in particular was supposed to be the cornerstone for training and research to make the needed breakthroughs. Modernization was dependent upon a vastly increased and improved capability to train scientists and engineers.

The exact scope of manpower needs have not been precisely defined. China has expressed the hope of increasing university enrollments to 3 million over the next several years and to 4 million by 1985. A somewhat more specific figure was "to increase the number of scientific researchers to 800,000 by 1985." In any case the renewed concern for higher education, scientific research and training, and academic quality can be traced to critical manpower shortages and deficiencies of quality in the sciences resulting from the unproductive years of the Cultural Revolution and the central role that the sciences were expected to play in the realization of the "four modernizations."

Broadly speaking, when universities were reopened in the early 1970s, the size of higher education enrollments was reduced, and admission was restricted to individuals with good political credentials who had distinguished themselves in manual labor and who came with the recommendation of their work unit. In the absence of stringent and reasonably objective entrance exams, political connections became increasingly important in securing the recommendations and political dossier necessary to qualify for university admission. The decline in the quality of education was profound. Deng Xiaoping reportedly wrote Mao in 1975 that university graduates were "not even capable of reading a book" in their own fields when they left the university. University faculty and administrators were left demoralized by what they confronted.

Their efforts in 1975 under Minister of Education Zhou Rongxin to improve educational quality, however, were not successful. Not only did academic quality suffer, but in 1980 it appeared doubtful that politically oriented admission criteria had even accomplished their purpose of increasing the enrollment of worker and peasant children. The children of cadres and officials were those best able to secure a place in a university by using personal connections enabling them to "enter through a back door." Children of cadres would accept a work assignment in the countryside, often in a suburban location that allowed them to remain close to their families. Village cadres, anxious to please the parent-official, gladly recommended the youth for a place in a university. So, after the minimum of two years of labor the child of an official family was on his or her way to a university without regard to academic ability, political activism, or a distinguished work record.

After 1976 initial steps taken to improve educational quality were: first, to establish order and stability and call for an end to political struggle on university campuses; second, to select eighty-eight institutions as key universities and provide them special funding, top students and faculty members, and other support; third, to recruit the most academically qualified students for universities without regard to family background or political activism; and fourth, to expand the size of university enrollments.

The examination system for admission to colleges and universities is the basis for recruiting more academically able students. The use of national examinations as a means of selecting people for positions of leadership is an important part of China's cultural legacy. In December 1977 uniform national examinations were reinstated; 5.7 million students sat for this examination; a place in a university was available only for the 278,000 applicants who scored the highest. The examination was offered again in 1978 and 1979. Formal regulations, presumably the result of three attempts at administering the examinations, were promulgated by the Ministry of Education in May 1980.

Candidates for the entrance examinations had to be senior-middle school graduates, or the equivalent, and generally below twenty-six years of age. Work experience requirements were eliminated, and in fact workers and staff members required permission from their enterprise to sit for the examination. Provincial-level administrative units were assigned to select students with outstanding records to take the examination. A preselection examination was given to reduce the number of national examination takers to three to five times the number of places allotted. Ironically, the first several times around, young people were actively encouraged to take the exam to insure that a sufficient number of good applicants would be available.

Each province was assigned a quota of students who would be admitted to key universities, a second quota of students who would attend normal universities within the province, and a third quota of students from other provinces that would be admitted to provincially operated institutions. The Ministry of Education established the minimum national examination score for admission to specific departments at key colleges and universities. The minimum score for admission to other universities was set by province-level authorities. Students from minority groups and disadvantaged areas with lower test scores were admitted. Key universities had established separate classes for minority students.

When several applicants attained the minimum test score the school had the option of making the selection. This provided important discretion to university faculty and administrators but still protected the priority of admission according to academic ability. In addition to the written examination, applicants had to pass a physical examination and a political screening. Less than 2 percent of the students who passed the written examination were eliminated for reasons of poor health. The number disqualified for political reasons was unclear; publicly the Party maintained that the number was very small because it sought to insure that the most able students actually got into colleges and universities.

Pressure to maintain high quality, minimize expenditures, and still expand enrollments led to efforts to run existing institutions more efficiently and to develop other college and university programs. This was a renewed version of the effort to "walk on two legs." There were labor colleges for training agro-technicians, factory-run colleges to provide technical education for workers, and renewed interest in television, radio, and correspondence classes. Some of these courses, particularly colleges run by factories, were serious, full-time enterprises with a two- to three-year curriculum.

The party leadership was ambivalent about the competing priorities of growth and quality. Any proposal that would sacrifice quality, particularly in the key universities, however, was not likely to be accepted. The interest in increasing enrollments, protecting quality, and limiting expenditures would almost certainly lead to the reinstitution of a two-track higher education system. The higher track would produce the next generation of research scientists; the lower track would increase the technical qualifications of middle school graduates.

Another means of raising educational quality, particularly in the scientific arena, has been the policy of sending students abroad to study. Large numbers of Chinese students studied in the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Educational links were severed along with other cooperative programs in the late 1950s. China continued to send a small number of students abroad primarily to European universities in the 1960s and 1970s. Shortly before normalization of relations with the United States in December 1978, China announced its interest in sending large numbers of students to the United States, and students began to arrive in October 1978. The number has grown steadily. By late 1980 approximately 2,300 Chinese government-sponsored students came to the United States to study in 200 universities. During the same time period at least as many as 2,200 more

Beijing students taking the national college entrance examinations, December 1977
Courtesy China Pictorial

came under private auspices, whether supported by the host American institution or by overseas relatives.

The students coming to the United States were generally not undergraduates or graduate students in the ordinary age groups at that level. Most were mid-career scientists, often thirty-five to forty-five years of age, seeking advanced training in their areas of specialization. Often they were individuals of exceptional ability, already occupying responsible positions in Chinese universities and research institutions. Fewer than 15 percent of the earliest arrivals were degree candidates. Nearly all the visiting scholars were in scientific fields.

Educational Investment

In planning for higher educational development, many of the same problems that had plagued the leadership in earlier decades continued to manifest themselves. One critical issue was a capital shortage. In the early 1980s China faced a serious capital shortage, and resources committed to education were not available for investment elsewhere. Policies emphasizing higher education, the study of science and technology, basic research, and study abroad were of course the most expensive policy choices that could be made.

A related problem was whether China had the economic capability to utilize efficiently these more highly trained technical personnel. A policy of training a literate work force and low-level technicians, rather than research scientists, might in some ways be better suited to China's economic realities. Moreover in relying on an examination system to recruit the most able students, there was the possibility that the education system would train people to pass examinations rather than to solve China's developmental problems. The pursuit of educational quality did not necessarily translate into solutions to China's immediate economic or educational problems.

The expansion of college and university enrollments and the higher priority assigned to it have paved the way for the creation of an insatiable demand for higher education. China could not afford to satisfy the demand for higher education, and many able youths could not be accommodated.

Finally, a policy of investing heavily in the education of a few may perpetuate elitism or even create a new elite. Although designed to facilitate the modernization of the nation, these same policies conflict directly with the egalitarian aspirations of the Party which still are meaningful. These policies not only produce an educated elite but also siphon off resources that might be used to universalize primary and secondary education more speedily and to equalize educational opportunity in the city and the countryside.

Adult Education

Also to be considered under basic education were spare-time education for workers and peasants and education in literacy for the entire adult population. Spare-time education included a very broad range of educational activities, at the primary, secondary, or even tertiary level. Most of these schools were sponsored by factories and run for their own workers. About 65 million workers participated in these programs in 1980. Most of them provided fairly elementary education, as well as courses to upgrade the technical skills of workers. In large measure they were on-the-job training and retraining courses that are a normal part of any industrial system. They intermittently receive a good deal of attention in the Chinese media as a symbol of social justice. It was not clear whether significant resources were reserved for these schools or even whether they were a particularly important aspect of workers' lives.

The continuing campaigns to eradicate illiteracy also were part of the basic education picture. Government statistics indicated that since 1949 126.8 million adults had become literate. As noted earlier the difficulty of mastering Chinese in its written form makes it particularly hard to raise the literacy rate. Language reform has been a goal of some importance from time to time. Broadly speaking, three basic approaches have been initiated. The first goal is universalizing the use of Mandarin, by far the most extensively used form of Chinese and now called common speech—*putonghua*—to ease the interregional communication problem A common spoken language can be used as a foundation for a simpler written language.

A second reform well underway is the simplification of ideographic characters. In 1964 the Committee for Reforming the Chinese Written Language released an official list of a simplified version of 2,238 characters most basic to the language. The simplification process should make it easier to acquire and retain literacy.

A third area of change involves the proposal to use the Pinyin romanization system more widely. The Pinyin system was first approved by the National People's Congress (NPC) in 1958. Theoretically, this reform would fundamentally simplify matters and make the written language a much easier tool to use. Abandoning the ideographic script for a romanized script is a highly emotional and politically charged issue. Whatever the actual merits of the proposal, it clearly offends the nationalistic instincts of many Chinese. Moreover it discounts an important skill in the possession of those who are already literate.

Retaining literacy is as much a problem as acquiring it in the first place. The rural population is particuarly affected in this context. Literacy rates declined between 1966 and 1976. Political disorder may have indirectly contributed; the basic problem, however, is that the many Chinese characters can only be mastered through rote learning, and once acquired they are often forgotten because life conditions provide little opportunity to use the painfully acquired skills.

Culture and the Arts

The two most critical dates in the development of modern Chinese culture may be May 4, 1919, and April 5, 1976. The first took on

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importance as the source of a national intellectual awakening deriving from student protests over the agreement to surrender Shandong (Shantung) Province to Japan. The proliferation of new periodicals, discussions of public issues, and other intellectual and scholarly activity that ensued was termed the May Fourth Movement, which in turn gave rise to the New Culture Movement (see Emergence of Modern China, ch. 1; Pre-1949 Traditions, ch. 9). The second was the occasion when violent rioting broke out among the crowd gathered in historic Tiananmen Square in Beijing to honor the memory of Zhou Enlai, and public security and militia units had been required to get the mobs under control. The disorders revealed the boiling cauldron of discontent in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, and many in the crowd expressed their disapproval of the increasing domination of the government by the left wing of the Party.

Since the purge of the left on October 1976, the country has witnessed a process of liberalization in the cultural world that by late 1980 probably already had exceeded the importance of the movement launched under the classical slogan "Let a hundred flowers bloom" in the mid 1950s. Gradual at first, the cultural thaw seemed already to have left an indelible mark on the artistic and intellectual patterns of China's developing socialist culture. Since 1976 there has been both an enormous flourishing of the arts and a soul searching about the underlying causes of the repressive and anti-intellectual policies of the Cultural Revolution.

Party leaders have stressed freedom to create. Deng Xiaoping, speaking before the Fourth National Congress of Writers and Artists in Beijing in late 1979, said that "art and literature must follow their own special characteristics and principles of development. The promotion of artistic standards must have priority over party control in order to realize a second blooming of the hundred flowers."

This new freedom and relaxation of party control stood in stark contrast to the repressive climate of the late 1960s and early 1970s when Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, led a campaign against any art not the work of self-appointed cultural purists or approved by the Party. Using the struggle to produce a purified proletarian culture to build her own political fortunes, Jiang Qing presided over bitter struggles in the art world. After her arrest with other members of the Gang of Four (see Glossary), she was widely depicted as a cultural fascist and condemned for her brutality toward noncomplying artists.

The combination of repression and intimidation had led to a drying up of cultural activity. Most of China's creative artists of note were suppressed during the high tide of the Cultural Revolution and remained silent for the next ten years. Many died, either through suicide or direct persecution; virtually all suffered considerably from constant political criticism and physical privation.

The excesses of the Cultural Revolution were best judged in the context of the party's struggle against artistic independence that dates back to Mao's famous "Yan'an Talks on Art and Literature" in 1942. The Party steadily criticized the "critical realism" of China's left-leaning artists and urged them to create a "socialist realist" art in its place. In the mid-1950s, after the disaster of the "hundred flowers" movement, the emphasis on party control increased. The party's efforts to purge artists of their individualism and "bourgeois values" reached its culmination during the Cultural Revolution.

In 1980 cultural activity was not simply subject to less political control but also was flourishing. Tremendous pent up energies had been released and had led to a great outpouring of creative activities and new works. In the late 1970s alone, 3,000 literary journals reappeared. Art exhibitions, new dramas and movies, new novels and short stories, as well as old ones previously banned, appeared.

Artists in the big cities were particularly hungry for foreign contacts and information about new styles. China had become a virtual cultural desert in the previous decade, and there were few sources of information, stimulation, or inspiration from domestic quarters. Chinese artists have been especially active in establishing ties with their counterparts in Hong Kong and Japan. Even a few short stories from Taiwan were republished.

A limited number of distinguished senior artists and authors began to tour the Western world. The distinguished novelist Ba Jin and the poet Ai Qing toured Europe, and the well-known playwright Cao Yu toured the United States. Translations of Western literature were planned, and Western plays in Chinese translation were performed on the stage in China. Guest performances by Western musical companies were becoming quite common.

Whether China could sustain the recent emphasis on artistic freedom was an open question. The country had a long historical legacy of orthodoxy in the cultural realm. Moreover the value system afforded little room in either the past or contemporary setting for individualism. Another consideration was the importance of the state as an employer. Private sources of funding to sustain avant-garde and dissenting art forms were lacking, and it is difficult to imagine the Party tolerating artistic activities that conflict with its goals or philosophy.

Of course the Party might shift lines again and renew its struggle to stamp out individualism. By late 1980 counter reactions had already emerged. Literary journals contained debates about the wisdom of exposing past wrongs and the need to protect Maoist orthodoxy. Perhaps the most serious charge leveled against the new freedom was that portraying the flaws and evils of present society undermined the unity needed to continue the revolution.

The Party had already stated that artistic expression must help consolidate the people's dictatorship, strengthen the leadership of the Party, and be beneficial to socialist international unity. What these criteria did was to establish the right of the Party to intervene, either broadly or selectively, to repress unacceptable artistic activity. The

Party has been sympathetic to artistic freedom: in this respect it has won praise from abroad and, more importantly, enthusiasm from China's intellectuals. Film, theater, literature, drawings, and so forth that portray the horrors of the Cultural Revolution are acceptable. Still the Party, while tolerating mildly unflattering views in respected journals, would in general not permit the use of artistic freedom to criticize those presently in power.

Artists, Intellectuals, and the Party

Since the late 1970s the Party has offered important benefits and support to win back the loyalty and enthusiasm of artists, intellectuals, and scientists. Much abused during the Cultural Revolution, many have been reluctant to return to jobs that might leave them politically vulnerable in the future. The party program has been a two-fold one of "reversing the verdicts" of those criticized in the past and of improving the circumstances under which the group worked in the early 1980s (see Winds of Political Change, ch. 9). A major reversal has been removal of the stigma formerly attached to being an intellectual. Intellectuals, who were almost always called "bourgeois intellectuals," or the "stinking ninth category" during the Cultural Revolution days were now praised as "the engineers of the human soul" and "gardeners tending the successor to the revolution." Verdicts labeling people as "rightists," going back to the 1950s, were being reviewed and overturned.

Additionally, teachers, research workers, scientists, and technicians were guaranteed that at least five-sixths of their time could be devoted to professional activities. Intellectuals were guaranteed work assignments that corresponded to their field of study, and efforts were made to provide them with adequate equipment and facilities. Professional titles were restored, and promotions and salary increases—barred during the Cultural Revolution—reinstituted on a selective basis. (Since this process can create substantial conflict within institutions, it has been conducted with great care and a certain degree of reluctance.)

Intellectuals were eligible for honors and were commended publicly for their efforts. The media took great pains to cite the accomplishments of intellectuals even in highly theoretical, abstract and specialized fields. Also, discrimination against intellectuals or their offspring in admissions to the CCP, the Communist Youth League (CYL), the People's Liberation Army (PLA), or universities was expressly forbidden.

Another important benefit for intellectuals was to return to them some degree of control over their own institutions. The revolutionary committee form of management was replaced by the "division of labor and responsibility system" that prevailed before 1966. This in effect eliminated workers from the management of the institutions in which intellectuals worked. In universities this meant that the chancellor was directly responsible for academic matters, under the

Beijing Opera performs "Meeting of Heroes"
Courtesy China Pictorial

supervision, of course, of the school party committee. This was considered an important step to getting intellectuals back to work and allowing their special skills and abilities to come into full play.

Intellectuals responded to their newfound freedom and importance with some ambivalence. Political tides had shifted many times, and it was hard to predict with any certainty when the next turn might come. Also some intellectuals, particularly writers, exhibited residual bitterness over their recent persecution and suffering.

Much contemporary literature discussed the serious abuses of power that took place at both the national and local level during the Cultural Revolution. These writers decried the waste of time and talent during that decade and bemoaned the abuses that held China back in her efforts to catch up to the Western world. At the same time they wrote of eagerness to make a contribution to building the society.

This literature, often called "new wave" or "the literature of the wounded," contains some disquieting views of the Party and the political system. While in one sense intensely patriotic and enthusiastic, these writers also tend to be cynical and suspicious of a political leadership that could give rise to a period of extreme chaos and disorder such as the Cultural Revolution. Party cadres often were pictured in most uncomplimentary terms. Such judgments were not reserved for Lin Biao and the Gang of Four; the whole leadership generation, even the political system, was sometimes painted as bearing some of the responsibility for the abuse of intellectuals who stood their ground during the Cultural Revolution and continued to fight to pursue their research and studies in an independent fashion.

This "new wave" literature provides a good summary of the dilemma for the Party: how to stimulate intellectuals to maximize their contribution while still maintaining party control. Party efforts to reform education and culture and to curry favor with the intellectuals are based on the belief that intellectuals have an indispensable role to play in the modernization of China and that China cannot ever hope to catch up with the rest of the world if it denies the importance of people of skill and specialized talent. Having gone that far, it is not clear just how much the Party is willing to trust intellectuals. Intellectuals are not free to challenge the Party's right to rule or even to compete with the Party for influence. They are, in short, free to pursue their specialized studies and skills but not to examine the system itself. Moreover such freedom as they enjoy is a gift of the Party, and that is the sort of freedom that can be withdrawn as quickly and easily as it is granted.

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There is no single study of the Chinese education system that adequately treats the subject. A recent volume, edited by Ronald Montaperto and Jay Henderson, *China's Schools in Flux*, gives a good overview of the system and provides useful information for the nonspecialist reader.

On the educational reforms of the Cultural Revolution the best single essay is Donald Munro's "Egalitarian Ideal and Educational Fact in Communist China." Other good studies are Marianne Bastid's "Educational Necessity and Political Ideals in Educational Reform During the Cultural Revolution," and John Gardner's and Wilt Idema's "China's Educational Revolution." Peter Seybolt, in "The Yenan Revolution and Mass Education," has traced Cultural Revolution educational reforms back to pre-Liberation days. Seybolt also has put together an excellent documentary compilation on this subject, *Revolutionary Education in China, Documents and Commentary*.

On contemporary education policy, Leo A. Orleans' *Manpower for Science and Engineering in China* is a good source on technical education. Two excellent general studies are Suzanne Pepper's "Chinese Education After Mao: Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Back and Begin Again?" and Susan L. Shirk's "Educational Reform and Political Backlash: Recent Changes in Chinese Educational Policy." *Beijing Review*, published weekly in English, in China, regularly carries informative articles on educational and cultural developments.

Other useful studies on the education system include Theodore Chen's *The Maoist Educational Revolution*; Joel Glassman's

"Educational Reform and Manpower Policy in China, 1955–58"; Leo A. Orleans' *Professional Manpower and Education in Communist China*; and Jonathan Unger's "The Chinese Controversy Over Higher Education."

Roxanne Wilke's biography of Mao's wife, *Comrade Chiang Ch'ing*, is an indispensable study of the evolution of cultural policies during the Cultural Revolution. Chow Tse-tsung's *The May Fourth Movement* remains the most important work on this significant period. Mao's own thoughts on this subject in "Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art" are also important. Interested readers may wish to consult the classic novels and fictional work of Lao She, Lu Hsun, and Mao Dun.

On contemporary arts and literature, Michael Sullivan's *The Arts of China* and Kai-yu Hsu's *Literature of the People's Republic of China* are authoritative texts. Recent Chinese fiction in translation, including Chen Jo-Hsi's *The Execution of Mayor Yin and Other Stories from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution*, reflects the alienation and discontent of intellectuals with the Cultural Revolution. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 5. Economic Context

Ink and sponge drawing of small figure, found along with several hundred others and 30,000 coins, in an Eastern Han Dynasty (A.D. 25–220) tomb. The original evidences the skillful workmanship in bronze casting and sculpturing of Chinese art of the period.

IN 1980 THE CHINESE economy shared a number of basic characteristics with the economies of many other developing countries. Gross national product (GNP) per capita in 1979 was estimated to be about the equivalent of US$460, near the lower end of the range for nations categorized by the World Bank as "middle income developing countries," but much larger than the levels for many "low-income" countries such as India, Egypt, and Pakistan, while less than half the average for the Latin American and Caribbean countries.

Labor productivity was low. As in many countries that did not begin sustained industrialization efforts until the middle of the twentieth century, the majority of the Chinese labor force was still employed in agriculture, in spite of the fact that the industrial sector produced over half of the value of national output. Agricultural activities were still primarily carried out by hand. In industry modern equipment was in general use but was largely typified by outdated designs and low levels of efficiency.

In other respects China's economy was quite different from those of the majority of developing nations. The most important difference was that the Chinese economy was organized as a socialist system, controlled by a centralized planning structure. There was little private ownership of productive assets. Most factories and other modern enterprises were owned by the state and operated under state plans, although a significant proportion of enterprises were collectively owned. Nearly all agricultural property belonged to collective units in the rural commune system, having small plots of land set aside for supplemental private cultivation by individual families.

The predominance of state and collective ownership, along with firm central control over the financial system, redistribution of resources among regions, and rationing of many important consumer goods, resulted in a pattern of income distribution that was much narrower than those in almost all other developing countries. Many Chinese were still poor, but none starved and none were excessively wealthy, a remarkable achievement for a land that had been haunted by famine throughout most of its history and now supported nearly a fourth of the world's population.

Despite the significant economic gains accomplished by China's socialist system in the years since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, serious imbalances and deficiencies existed in the 1970s, resulting largely from insufficient flexibility in the planning process and from the political turmoil that disrupted the economy during the Cultural Revolution in 1966–68 (see Glossary) and the mid-1970s. In the 1970s the amount of food and cotton cloth available per person only slightly exceeded that in the late 1950s, and urban housing space per capita had declined. Mechanization of agriculture was advancing very slowly, installation and utilization of modern industrial equipment was hindered by power shortages and inadequate transportation networks, and procurement of advanced technology from other countries was limited by scarce foreign exchange and a lack of legal and administrative provisions for expanding foreign trade.

Following the death of Mao Zedong and the fall of the Gang of Four (see Glossary) in late 1976, leadership passed to a pragmatic reform group dominated by Deng Xiaoping, who in late 1980 remained as the leader of the reform group and held the post of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) vice chairman. New policies intended to rectify the most pressing economic problems were quickly put into effect, then revised in succeeding years. In 1979 and 1980 China was in the midst of a major change in basic economic policy, consisting primarily of extensive decentralization of decisionmaking authority, and greater use of market mechanisms, including profit incentives, bonuses, and material rewards for increased production. Key elements of the policy shift included increased autonomy for agricultural units in production decisions, allocation of more resources to agriculture and consumer goods production, reduced investment in heavy industry, the right of factories to retain some profits, the right of the state to close enterprises that did not cover costs, and dramatic growth of foreign trade and use of advanced foreign technology. A major goal of the modernization drive was to substantially improve the standard of living of Chinese peasants and workers; to increase the quantity, quality, and variety of goods and services available to consumers. This was not only sought as an improvement in general welfare, but also as an important means of eliciting the enthusiastic participation of workers in the modernization effort.

As new facilities were planned and constructed in 1977 and 1978, it became evident that progress was being restrained by a number of crucial deficiencies. The economic infrastructure—particularly the electric power generation and transmission facilities and the transportation network—was already overburdened and could not support a major expansion of economic activity. Building materials, especially finished steel, were in critically short supply. The numbers of engineers, scientists, and technicians were not adequate even for the needs of 1977 (see Scientific and Technical Manpower, ch. 9).

Recognizing these problms, the leadership designated the years from 1979 through 1981 as a period of readjustment, during which resources would be concentrated on relieving basic constraints, evaluating the potential of the economy, and designing practicable long-term plans. In 1980 the readjustment process was well under way. A new, coordinated energy policy had been formulated and construction of new facilities was in progress. Transportation links were energetically improved. Key technological bottlenecks were eliminated by importing foreign equipment and designs. The educational system was revived and reorganized.

An important result of these new policies was a great increase in the amount of information available to foreign observers of the Chinese economy published in the Chinese press. Basic national economic data had been collected and published during the 1950s, but the central statistical system largely broke down at the end of the 1950s, and very little statistical information about the Chinese economy was available during the 1960s and early 1970s. In 1979 this "statistical blackout" came to an end with the publication of a communiqué by the State Statistical Bureau (SSB), providing figures for major products and economic activities in 1977 and 1978. In the summer of 1980 a similar communiqué was published for 1979, and in 1979 and 1980 a growing stream of information became available in other articles and reports in the official Chinese press (see table A). Compared with the volumes of economic data routinely published by most countries, information on the Chinese economy was still extremely scanty, but at least a firm foundation for analysis was available.

General Nature of the Economy

Throughout most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as during much of its earlier history, China's economy was only barely able to meet the basic needs of the country's huge population—the largest in the world. In normal years the economy produced just about the amount of food required to meet the minimum nutritional requirements of the populace. In times of drought, flood, warfare, or civil disorder, there was not enough food, and before 1949 such conditions often led to starvation on a vast scale. Under the government of the People's Republic serious food shortages occurred a few times, but famine was avoided by importing grain from abroad, notably after the very bad harvests of 1959, 1960, and 1961. The economy was by no means stagnant. Production grew substantially between 1800 and 1949 and increased fairly rapidly after 1949. Production gains, however, were largely offset by population growth, so that productive capacity was never able to significantly outdistance essential consumption needs, particularly in agriculture. Grain output in 1979 was about twice as large as in 1952, but so was the population.

As a result of this pattern, in which little surplus was produced even in good years, very few resources could be spared for investment in capital goods—machinery, factories, mines, railways, and other productive assets. The relatively small amount of capital available caused productivity per worker to remain low, which in turn perpetuated the inability of the economy to generate a substantial surplus.

The socialist system of China featuring state ownership of most industry and central control over planning and the financial system, enabled the government to mobilize whatever surplus was available and greatly increase the proportion of national product devoted to

Table A. Economic Indicators

	1952	1957	1965	1970	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
GNP (in billions)[1]	99	138	185	263	368	368	398	444	466
Population (in millions)[2]	570	640	753	848	952	971	987	1,002	1,018
Per capita GNP[1]	174	216	246	310	387	379	403	439	460
Grain (million metric tons)	161	191	194	243	284	285	283	305	315
Cotton (million metric tons)	1.3	1.6	1.6	2.0	2.4	2.9	2.0	2.2	2.2
Crude steel (million metric tons)	1.3	5.4	12.2	17.8	24.0	20.5	23.7	31.8	34.0
Crude oil (million barrels per day)	0.01	0.03	0.23	0.60	1.54	1.74	1.87	2.08	2.12
Coal (million metric tons)	66.5	130.7	232.2	327.4	478	483	550	618	625
Agricultural production index[3]	84	100	101	126	148	148	144	156	160
Industrial production index[3]	48	100	199	316	502	502	574	651	703
Foreign trade									
Exports f.o.b.[4] (in billions)[5]	0.9	1.6	2.0	2.2	7.1	7.3	8.1	9.9	13.0
Imports c.i.f.[6] (in billions)[5]	1.0	1.4	1.8	2.2	7.4	6.0	7.1	11.2	14.7

[1] In 1978 United States dollars.

[2] As of July 1.

[3] 1957 = 100.

[4] Free on board.

[5] In United States dollar values current for each year.

[6] Cost, insurance, and freight.

Source: Based on information from U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, *China: The Continuing Search for a Modernization Strategy*, Washington, 1980, p. 1.

investment. Western analysts estimated that investment accounted for about 25 percent of GNP in many of the thirty years after 1949, a rate surpassed by few other countries. Owing to the comparatively low level of GNP, however, even this high rate of investment secured only a small amount of resources relative to the size of the country and the population. In 1978, for instance, only 16 percent of the GNP of the United States went into gross investment, but this amounted to US$345.6 billion, while the approximately 25 percent of China's GNP which was invested came to about the equivalent of US$111 billion and had to serve a population four-and-one-half times the size of that in the United States (see fig. 7).

The limited resources available for investment prevented China from rapidly producing or importing advanced equipment. Technological development proceeded gradually, and outdated equipment continued to be used as long as possible. Consequently, a wide range of technological levels was in use simultaneously. Most industries included a few plants which were comparable to modern Western facilities, generally based on equipment and designs imported from developed countries. Most of the equipment produced by Chinese factories, however, was ten to thirty years behind current standard Western designs.

Agriculture received a smaller share of investment than industry and remained at a much lower average level of technology and productivity. Despite a significant increase in the availability of tractors, trucks, electric pumps, and mechanical threshers, most agricultural activities were still performed by human muscle power.



Source: Based on information from U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, *China: A Statistical Compendium*, Washington, July 1979; China, State Statistical Bureau, "Communique on Fulfillment of China's 1978 National Economic Plan," *Beijing Review* [Beijing], No. 27, 1979; and China, State Statistical Bureau, "Communique on Fulfillment of China's 1979 National Economic Plan," *Bejing Review* [Beijing], Nos. 19 and 20, May 12 and 19, 1980.

Figure 7. GNP and Major Sectors

The economy was further characterized by limited interregional economic integration. The scarcity of investment funds and advanced technology resulted in communications and transportation networks which—as of 1980—could not carry the large volume of economic interaction that characterized most developed economies. Consequently, although the central administration coordinated the entire economy and redistributed resources between regions when necessary, in practice most economic activity was very decentralized, and there was relatively little flow of goods and services between areas. Perhaps as much as 75 percent of all food grown in China, for instance, was consumed by the members of the production team that produced it.

The economy was one of great diversity and complexity. Because of limited interaction between regions, the great variety of geographic zones in China, and the broad spectrum of technologies in use, there were wide differences between areas in economic activities, organizational forms, and prosperity. Even within a given city, enterprises could range from tiny, collectively owned handicraft units, earning marginal incomes for their members, to modern state-owned steel mills and other high-technology facilities, whose workers received steady wages plus free medical care, bonuses, and an assortment of other benefits. The agricultural sector included units as diverse as prosperous suburban communes, specializing in vegetables, pork, poultry and eggs to supply a nearby city, fishing collectives on the seacoast, herding collectives on the grasslands of Nei Monggol Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolia), and poor, struggling grain-producing brigades in the arid mountains of Shaanxi Province.

Economic Policies, 1949–80

When the CCP came to power in 1949 its leaders held the fundamental long-range goals of transforming China into a modern, powerful socialist nation. In economic terms these objectives meant industrialization, improvement of living standards, narrowing income differences, and production of modern military equipment. As the years passed the leadership continued to subscribe to these goals, but the economic policies intended to achieve them were dramatically altered on several occasions in response to major changes in the Chinese economy, the international political and economic arena, and the internal realm of Chinese politics.

An important distinction emerged between leaders who felt that the socialist goals of income equalization and heightened political consciousness should take priority over material progress and those who believed that industrialization and general economic modernization were prerequisites for the attainment of a successful socialist order and therefore should receive the greater emphasis. Among the prominent leaders who considered politics the prime consideration were Mao, the members of the Gang of Four, and, many analysts believed, Hua Guofeng; leaders who more often stressed practical economic matters included Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping. For the most part, important policy shifts were based on changing emphasis between political and economic goals and were accompanied by major changes in the positions of individuals in the political power structure (see Pragmatism and the Politics of Modernization, ch. 11).

An important characteristic in the development of economic policies and the underlying economic model was that each new policy period, while differing significantly from that which preceeded it, nonetheless retained most of the existing economic organization. Thus the form of the economic model and the policies which expressed it at any given point in Chinese history reflected both the current policy emphasis and a structural foundation built up during the earlier periods.

Recovery from War (1949–52)

In 1949 China's economy suffered from the debilitating effects of twelve years of warfare. Many mines and factories had been damaged or destroyed, and about half of the machinery in the major industrial areas of the Northeast had been dismantled and shipped to the Soviet Union by Soviet troops at the end of the war with Japan in 1945. Transportation, communication, and power systems had deteriorated because of lack of maintenance and outright destruction.

Agriculture was disrupted, and food production was some 30 percent below its previous peak level. Finally, the ills of the economy were compounded by one of the most virulent inflations ever known.

The chief goal of the government for the 1949–52 period was simply to restore the economy to normal working order. The administration moved quickly to repair transportation and communication links and revive the flow of economic activity. The banking system was nationalized and centralized under the People's Bank of China, and effective measures were taken to bring inflation under control by 1951. The monetary system was unified, credit was tightened, government budgets at all levels were restricted and put under central control, and the value of the currency was guaranteed by the government. Commerce was stimulated and partially regulated by the establishment of state trading companies (commercial departments), which competed with private traders in purchasing goods from producers and selling them to consumers or enterprises.

Transformation of ownership in industry proceeded slowly in this period. About a third of the country's enterprises had been under state control while the Nationalist government was in power, as was much of the modern transport sector. These units immediately became state-owned enterprises in 1949. The remaining privately owned enterprises were gradually brought under government control, but 17 percent of industrial units were still completely outside the state system in 1952.

In agriculture a major change in land ownership patterns was carried out in this period. Under a nationwide land reform program, titles to about 45 percent of the arable land were redistributed from landlords and more prosperous peasants to the 60 or 70 percent of peasant families that previously owned little or no land. Once land reform was completed in an area, peasants were encouraged to cooperate in some phases of production through the formation of small "mutual aid teams" of six or seven households each. Thirty-nine percent of all peasant households belonged to mutual aid teams in 1952.

By 1952 price stability had been established, commerce had been restored, and industry and agriculture had regained their previous peak levels of production. The period of recovery had achieved its goals.

The First Five-Year Plan (1953–57)

Having restored a viable economic base, the leadership of China was prepared to embark on an intensive program of industrial growth and socialization. For this purpose the administration adopted the Soviet economic model, based on state ownership in the modern sector, large collective units in agriculture, and centralized economic planning. The Soviet approach to economic development was manifested in the contents and operation of the First Five-Year

Plan (1953–57). As in the Soviet economy, the main objective was a high rate of economic growth, having primary emphasis on industrial development at the expense of agriculture and particular concentration on heavy industry and capital-intensive technology. Soviet planners helped their Chinese counterparts formulate the plan. Large numbers of Soviet engineers, technicians, and scientists assisted in developing and installing new heavy industrial facilities, including many entire plants and pieces of equipment purchased from the Soviet Union.

Government control over industry was increased during this period by applying financial pressures and inducements to convince owners of private modern firms to sell them to the state or convert them into joint public-private enterprises under state control. By 1956 of all modern industrial enterprises 67.5 percent were state-owned, 32.5 percent were under joint public-private ownership, and no privately owned firms remained. During the same period the handicraft industries were organized into cooperatives, which included 91.7 percent of all handicraft workers by 1956.

Agriculture also underwent extensive organizational changes during this period. In order to facilitate the mobilization of agricultural resources, improve the efficiency of farming, and increase government access to agricultural products peasants were encouraged to organize increasingly large and socialized collective units. From the loosely structured, tiny mutual aid teams, villages were to advance to lower stage agricultural producer cooperatives, in which families still received some income on the basis of the amount of land they contributed, and eventually to advanced cooperatives, or collectives. In the advanced producers' cooperatives income shares were based only on the amount of labor contributed. In addition, each family was allowed to retain a small private plot on which to grow vegetables, fruit, and livestock for its own use. The collectivization process began slowly but accelerated in 1955 and 1956. In 1957, 93.5 percent of all peasant households had joined advanced producer cooperatives (see The 1950s Period, ch. 6).

In terms of economic growth the First Five-Year Plan was quite successful, especially in those areas emphasized by the Soviet-style development strategy. A very solid foundation was created in heavy industry. Key industries, including iron and steel manufacturing, coal mining, cement production, electricity generation, and machine building were greatly expanded and were put on a firm modern technological footing. Thousands of industrial and mining units were constructed, of which 156 were major facilities. Industrial production increased at an average annual rate of 16 percent between 1952 and 1957, and GNP grew at a rate of 7 percent.

Despite the lack of state investment in agriculture during this period, agricultural output increased substantially, averaging increases of about 5 percent a year. This growth primarily resulted from gains in efficiency brought about by the reorganization and cooperation achieved through collectivization. As the First Five-Year Plan wore on, however, Chinese leaders became increasingly concerned over the relatively sluggish performance of agriculture and the inability of commercial departments to significantly increase the amount of grain procured from rural units for urban consumption.

The Great Leap Forward (1958–60)

Before the end of the First Five-Year Plan the growing imbalance between growth in industry and agriculture and dissatisfaction with inefficiency and lack of flexibility in the decisionmaking process convinced the nation's leaders—particularly Mao—that the highly centralized, industry-biased Soviet model was not appropriate for China's conditions. In 1957 the government adopted measures to decentralize a great deal of the authority for economic decisionmaking to the provincial, county, and local administrations. In 1958 the Second Five-Year Plan, which was intended to continue the policies of the first plan for the 1958–62 period, was abandoned in favor of an approach that relied on spontaneous heroic efforts to produce an explosive "great leap" in production for all sectors of the economy at once.

Further reorganization of agriculture was regarded as the key to the endeavor to suddenly leap to a higher stage of productivity. To overcome the fundamental problem that the economy did not have sufficient capital to invest heavily in both industry and agriculture at the same time, it was decided to attempt to create capital in the agricultural sector by building vast irrigation and water control works with huge teams of peasants whose labor was not being fully utilized otherwise. Surplus rural labor was also to be employed to support the industrial sector by setting up thousands of small-scale, low technology "backyard" industrial projects in farm units, which would produce both the machinery required for agricultural development and components for urban industries.

Mobilization of surplus rural labor and further improvements in agricultural efficiency were to be accomplished by a sudden move to the final stage of agricultural collectivization—the formation of people's communes. Communes were created by combining some twenty or thirty advanced producer cooperatives and had an average of 20,000 to 30,000 members in this period, although numbers of members varied from as few as 6,000 to over 40,000 in some cases. When first instituted, the communes were envisaged as combining in one body the functions of the lowest level of local government and the highest level of organization in agricultural production. Communes comprised three organizational levels: the central commune administration, the production brigade—roughly equivalent to the advanced producer cooperatives, or a traditional rural village—and the production team, which generally consisted of around thirty families.

At the inception of the Great Leap Forward, the communes were intended to acquire all ownership rights over the productive assets of their subordinate units and take over most of the planning and decisionmaking for farm activities. Ideally communes were to improve efficiency by moving peasants into dormitories, feeding them in communal mess halls, and moving whole teams of laborers from task to task so as to maximize their effectiveness. In practice the extremely centralized form of commune was not instituted in most areas.

Ninety-eight percent of the peasant population was organized into communes between April and September of 1958. Very soon after their formation it became evident that in most cases the commune was too unwieldy an organization to successfully carry out all the managing and administrative functions that were assigned to it. In 1959 and 1960 most production decisions reverted to the brigade and team levels, and eventually most governmental responsibilities were returned to county and township administrations. Nonetheless, the commune system was retained and continued to be the basic form of organization in the agricultural sector into 1980 (see Rural Social Organization, ch. 3; Planning and Organization, ch. 6).

The industrial sector was also expected to discover and use slack labor and productive capacity in order to increase output beyond the levels previously considered feasible. Political zeal was considered to be the motive force that would elicit the desired efforts, and in order to "put politics in command," enterprising party branches took over the direction of many factories. In addition, central planning was relegated to a minor role in favor of spontaneous, politically inspired production decisions from individual units.

The result of the Great Leap Forward was a severe economic crisis. In 1958 industrial output did in fact "leap" by 42 percent, and the agricultural sector gathered in a bumper harvest. In 1959, 1960, and 1961, however, adverse weather conditions, improperly constructed water control projects, and other misallocations of resources that occurred during the over-centralized communization movement, resulted in disastrous declines in agricultural output. In 1960, output was only 74 percent of the year 1957. In 1960, 1961, and 1962, some areas of China tottered on the brink of famine, and starvation was only averted by using the country's foreign exchange reserves to import grain.

Mines and factories continued to expand output through 1960, partly by overworking men and machines and largely because many new plants constructed during the First Five-Year Plan went into full production in these years. By 1961, however, the excessive strain on equipment and workers, the effects of the agricultural crisis, the lack of economic coordination, and the withdrawal of Soviet assistance in 1960 caused industrial output to plummet to a level just 5 percent above the 1957 level.

Readjustment and Recovery: "Agriculture First" (1961–65)

Faced with economic collapse in the early 1960s, the government sharply revised the immediate goals of the economy and devised a

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new set of economic policies to replace those of the Great Leap Forward. Top priority was given to restoring agricultural output and expanding it at a rate that would meet the needs of the growing population. Planning and economic coordination were to be revived—although in a less centralized form than before the Great Leap Forward—so as to bring order and efficient allocation of resources back to the economy. The rate of investment was to be reduced and investment priorities reversed—agriculture receiving first consideration, light industry second, and heavy industry third. In a further departure from the emphasis on heavy industrial development that persisted during the Great Leap Forward, the government undertook to mobilize the nation's resources to bring about technological advancement in agriculture.

Organizational changes in agriculture involved mainly decentralization of production decisionmaking and income distribution within the commune structure. The role of the central commune administration was greatly reduced, although it remained the link between local government and agricultural producers and was important in carrying out activities that were too large in scale for the production brigades. Production teams were designated the basic accounting units and were responsible for making nearly all decisions concerning production and the distribution of income to their members. Private plots, which had disappeared on some communes during the Great Leap Forward, were officially restored to peasant families.

Economic support for agriculture took several forms. Agricultural taxes were reduced, and the prices paid for agricultural products were raised relative to the prices of industrial supplies for agriculture. There were substantial increases in supplies of chemical fertilizer and various kinds of agricultural machinery, notably small electric pumps for irrigation. Most of the modern supplies were concentrated in areas that were known to produce "high and stable yields," in order to insure the best possible results.

In industry a few key enterprises were returned to central state control, but for the most part the decentralization of control over most enterprises down to province and local level governments, which had taken place in 1957 and 1958, was reaffirmed and strengthened. Planning rather than politics once again guided production decisions, and material rewards rather than revolutionary enthusiasm became the leading incentive for efficient production. Major imports of advanced foreign machinery, which had come to an abrupt halt with the withdrawal of Soviet assistance in 1960, were initiated with Japan and West European countries.

During the 1961–65 readjustment and recovery period economic stability was restored, and by 1966 production in both agriculture and industry surpassed the Great Leap peak levels. Between 1961 and 1965 agricultural output grew at an average annual rate of 6.6 percent a year. Industrial output increased an average 17.33 percent a year, largely by reviving plants that were not operated to full capacity after the economic collapse in 1961. Another important source of growth in this period was the spread of viable rural small-scale industries, particularly coal mines, hydroelectric plants, chemical fertilizer plants, and agricultural machinery plants.

The economic model that emerged in this period combined elements of the highly centralized, industrially oriented Soviet-style system of the First Five-Year Plan, with aspects of the decentralization of ownership and decisionmaking that characterized the Great Leap Forward and the strong emphasis on agricultural development and balanced growth of the "agriculture first" policy. Important changes in economic policy occurred in later years, but the basic ownership and decisionmaking structure and development strategy that were forged in the early 1960s were not significantly altered.

The Cultural Revolution (1966–68)

The Cultural Revolution, unlike the Great Leap Forward, was primarily a political upheaval and did not involve major changes in official economic policies or the basic economic model (see The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 1966–68, ch.1). Nonetheless its influence was felt throughout urban Chinese society, and it profoundly affected the economy. Throughout the Cultural Revolution, the country's leaders were determined to prevent the turmoil from disrupting the rural areas, and agricultural production does not seem to have been directly affected.

Reductions in production in the modern sector of the economy came about in several ways. The most direct cause of production halts was political activity involving students and workers in the mines and factories themselves. A second cause was the extensive disruption of transportation resulting from the requisitioning of trains and trucks to carry Red Guards (see Glossary) around the country. Output at many factories suffered from shortages of raw materials and other supplies. A third disruptive influence was that direction of factories was placed in the hands of Revolutionary Committees, made up of representatives from the Party, the workers, and the People's Liberation Army (PLA), which often had little knowledge of management or the enterprise they were supposed to run. In addition, many of the engineers, managers, scientists, technicians, and other white-collar personnel were "criticized," demoted, "sent down" to the countryside to "participate in labor," or even jailed, all of which resulted in their skills and knowledge being lost to the enterprise.

The result of these influences was a decline of 10 to 15 percent in industrial production in 1967. Some degree of order was restored by the army in late 1967 and 1968, and the sector returned to a fairly high rate of growth by 1968.

Other aspects of the Cultural Revolution had more far-reaching effects on the economy. Imports of foreign equipment, required for technological advancement, were curtailed by violent antiforeign

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outbreaks. Probably the most serious and long-lasting effect on the economy was the dire shortage of highly educated personnel caused by the closing of the universities. China's ability to develop new technology and absorb imported technology would be severely limited for years to come by the hiatus in higher education.

Resumption of Systematic Growth (1970–74)

With the return of political and economic stability, a renewed drive for coordinated, balanced development was set in motion under the leadership of Premier Zhou Enlai. To revive efficiency in industry, party committees were returned to positions of leadership over the revolutionary committees, and a campaign was carried out to return skilled and highly educated personnel to the jobs from which they had been displaced during the Cultural Revolution. The universities began to reopen and foreign contacts were expanded.

Once again the economy suffered from imbalances in the capacities of different industrial sectors, and an urgent need for increased modern agricultural supplies. In response to these problems there was a significant increase in investment during this period, including the signing of contracts with foreign firms for the construction of major facilities for chemical fertilizer production, steel finishing, and oil extraction and refining. The most notable of these contracts was for thirteen of the world's largest and most modern chemical fertilizer plants.

During this period industrial output grew steadily at an average rate of 10 percent a year. Agricultural production declined somewhat in 1972 due to poor weather but increased at an average annual rate of 3 percent for the period as a whole. A general reevalution of the nation's development needs took place in this period, and the conclusions were expressed in a report by Zhou Enlai to the National People's Congress (NPC) in early 1975. The report called for the mechanization of agriculture and a comprehensive two-stage program for the modernization of the entire economy by the end of the century.

The Gang of Four (1974–76)

This was not a period of new official policy, but one of efforts by the radical group known as the Gang of Four to dominate the power center through their network of supporters and most importantly through their control of the media (see China in Transition, ch. 1). While the central government was developing and promulgating a pragmatic program for rapid modernization of the economy, a contradictory set of policies was expressed in the media. Zhou Enlai and his protege, Deng Xiaoping, were virulently attacked in the press and in political campaigns, and the modernization plans were denounced as "poisonous weeds." Through the official news organs the Gang of Four advocated the primacy of nonmaterial, political incentives, radical reduction of income differences, elimination of private plots, and shifting of the basic unit of account to the brigade level in agriculture. They opposed the strengthening of central planning and denounced the use of foreign technology.

In the face of such contradictory policy pronouncements and uncertain political currents, administrators and economic decisionmakers at all levels were virtually paralyzed. Economic activity slowed, and the modernization program almost ground to a halt. The uncertainty and instability were exacerbated by the death of Zhou Enlai in January 1976 and the subsequent second purge of Deng Xiaoping in April.

The interlude of uncertainty finally came to an end when the Gang of Four was arrested one month after the death of Mao in September 1976. The effects of the power struggle and policy disputes were compounded by the destruction resulting from the Tangshan earthquake in July 1976, and output in both industry and agriculture showed no growth over 1975.

Pragmatic Development: The "Four Modernizations" (1976–78)

Directly after the fall of the Gang of Four, the leadership under Hua Guofeng--and by July 1977, the rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping—reaffirmed the modernization program espoused by Zhou Enlai in 1975, under the slogan of the "four modernizations" (modernization of industry, agriculture, science and technology, defense). Once again the mechanization of agriculture by 1980 was advocated, along with proposals to correct the key imbalances in industry, primarily in supplies of iron and steel, coal, oil, and electricity, to expand the transportation network and to achieve the status of a modern country by the year 2000.

A battery of new policies was set forth for the purpose of accomplishing the "four modernizations." The authority of managers and economic decisionmakers at all levels was strengthened at the expense of party officials. A campaign was instituted to reorient cadres, managers, and workers to emphasize productivity over politics. Material rewards—bonuses, wage increases—were given the central role in the incentive system. In order to make income increases meaningful, production of consumer goods was to be expanded, and a generally improved standard of living was to be attained. Research was to be expanded, the educational system revived, and the effort to draw skilled and highly educated victims of the Cultural Revolution back into productive activity was to be renewed.

Interaction with foreign countries was to play a major part in the modernization drive. Foreign equipment, plants, and designs were to be imported in large numbers, along with the foreign technicians to install them, in order to resolve key technological problems. Chinese students were to study abroad and "foreign experts" were to be hired to teach in China. Funding for the new wave of imports was to be generated by a great expansion of exports.

At the Fifth National People's Congress in February 1978, Hua



A huge poster in the Bund area along Shanghai's waterfront calls attention to the "four modernizations," the slogan under which China seeks to reach its goal of ranking among the technologically advanced nations of the world by the year 2000.
Courtesy Joan Lebold Cohen/Photo Researchers Inc.

Guofeng presented the draft of a ten-year plan for the 1976–85 period. The plan embodied the goals of the "four modernizations" and sketched out specific policies and objectives for bringing them about. Most of the objectives were very ambitious. The goal of accomplishing the "basic" mechanization of agriculture was reiterated. Grain output was to grow to 400 million tons by 1985, necessitating an average annual increase of 4.3 percent, considerably greater than the 3.2 percent average growth rate for 1965–77. Industrial output was to increase by over 10 percent a year, and production of both steel and coal was to double by the late 1980s. Construction for this drive was to involve 120 major projects, including iron and steel complexes, coal mines, new trunk railways, and harbor improvements. The plan formalized the new openness to foreign contact and implied technology imports worth billions of dollars.

Between 1976 and 1978 the economy quickly recovered from the stagnation of a few years earlier. Agriculture declined in 1977 due to a third consecutive year of adverse weather conditions but rebounded with a record harvest in 1978. Industrial output jumped 14 percent in 1977 and increased by 13 percent in 1978, although growth slowed significantly as the year wore on.

The Period of Readjustment (1979–81)

Throughout 1978 the Chinese government carried out surveys of its resources, evaluations of economic programs, and appraisals of the country's capabilities. A series of conferences was held in the fall of the year, and at the Third Plenum of the party's Central Committee in December 1978, a shift in economic plans was announced. The schedule of the ten-year plan was abandoned—although many of its elements were retained—and the three years from 1979 through 1981 were designated as a period of readjustment, during which the crucial imbalances in the economy would be corrected and the foundation would be constructed for a well-planned modernization program. This future program was not specified, and government leaders stated that it would be gradually developed during the readjustment period.

The readjustment process had several major goals. Consumer incomes were to be improved significantly and quickly. Exports were to be rapidly expanded. Key weaknesses in transportation, communications, coal, iron, steel, and electric power were to be overcome as soon as possible.

In addition to the measures which were begun between 1976 and 1978, several important new policies were instituted. Investment was to be reduced, as were the number of construction projects. More resources were to be allocated to production of consumer goods, and capital construction projects were to be limited to those that were well-planned and could be completed quickly. Light industry was to be expanded more rapidly than heavy industry, because growth in light industry required less investment than heavy industry and new facilities could go into production much more quickly. Furthermore, light industry created consumer goods which would be used as exports and to increase the quantity and variety of goods available to Chinese wage earners.

The foreign trade procedure was greatly eased, allowing many administrative departments outside the Ministry of Foreign Trade and individual corporations and enterprises to engage in negotiations with foreign firms. A host of cooperation, trading, and credit arrangements with foreign firms was legalized so that China could enter the mainstream of international trade.

In order to increase agricultural output, procurement prices for agricultural goods were raised, and farm units were guaranteed autonomy in production decisionmaking. Agricultural units were strongly encouraged to establish sideline activities to increase their incomes. Free peasant markets were officially encouraged not only in the countryside but also in urban areas.

Profits were to become an important incentive in the industrial sector. Enterprises would be allowed to retain a portion of their profits for reinvestment and distribution to workers as bonuses.

A general decentralization of many aspects of decisionmaking was gradually implemented. Provincial governments, local governments, and individual firms were all given greater latitude for independent initiative.

Many of the new practices of the readjustment period were still in the experimental stage in 1980, but the initial results were promising. Supplies of agricultural products soared beyond all previous levels as a result of an excellent harvest in 1979 and in response to higher procurement prices. Urban and rural incomes rose substantially in 1979. The variety and quantity of goods available to consumers grew considerably. Foreign trade increased impressively as Chinese businesspeople adapted to the international market. Urban housing and other construction projects made notable progress.

Serious economic imbalances persisted, however, and some of them would not be overcome by the end of the readjustment period. New power supplies, improved transportation, increased coal production, and adequate development of the iron and steel industry were among the important problems that would have to receive continued special emphasis throughout the 1980s.

Structure and Operation of the Economy

Roles of the Government and the Party

Under China's socialist political and economic system the government was explicitly responsible for planning and managing the national economy. The State Constitution of 1978 specified that the state was to guide the economic development of the country and that the State Council was to direct its subordinate bodies in drawing up and carrying out the national economic plan and the state budget. A major portion of the governmental apparatus was devoted to managing the economy; all but nine of the thirty-seven ministries and eight commissions under the State Council in 1979 were concerned with economic matters.

Each significant economic sector was under the supervision and control of one or more of these organizations, which included the People's Bank of China, the State Planning Commission, the State Economic Commission, and the ministries of agriculture, machine-building, food, metallurgical industry, coal industry, petroleum, electric power, textiles, light industry, finance, commerce, railways, and communication. Several aspects of the economy were administered by specialized departments under the State Council, including the State Statistical Bureau, State Bureau of Labor, General Administration of Civil Aviation of China (CAAC), China Travel and Tourism Administrative Bureau, and the State General Administration of Foreign Exchange Control. Each of the economic organizations under the State Council controlled the units under its jurisdiction through subordinate offices at the province and local levels.

Economic policies and decisions adopted by the NPC and the State Council were passed on to the economic organizations under the State Council, which incorporated them into the plans for the various sectors of the economy (see Planning, this ch.). Economic plans and policies were implemented by means of a variety of direct and indirect control mechanisms. Direct control was exercised by designating specific physical output quotas and supply allocations for some goods and services. Indirect instruments included taxes, prices set for products and supplies, central allocation of investment funds, monitoring and control of financial transactions by the banking system, and control over the allocation of scarce key resources, such as skilled labor, electric power, transportation, steel, and chemical fertilizer.

The mix of control mechanisms used to regulate the activities of a particular unit depended on the kind of unit, its size, and its relative importance. In the case of major state-owned enterprises under the direct authority of central, provincial, or municipal governments, physical quantities of inputs and products were detailed in the plans formulated by the appropriate ministries and offices. The various indirect instruments were applied to such enterprises but were not the principal means of achieving compliance with the plan (see Internal Trade and Distribution, ch. 8).

The great majority of industrial enterprises, which were owned by the state but managed by the provincial level or below, were regulated by a combination of specific allocations and indirect controls. Important scarce resources, like finished steel or engineering personnel, might be assigned to this kind of unit in exact quantities. Less important inputs would be authorized in a general way by the plan, but with procurement arrangements left up to the enterprise management or the local administration. Many enterprises had considerable discretion over the quantities of inputs purchased, the sources of inputs, the variety of products manufactured, and the production process. Limits on the activities of such units were enforced by officially set prices, which determined revenues and procurement possibilities, monitoring of financial transactions by the banking system, and government control over investment funds and scarce resources. An important basic control over all state-owned enterprises was that most profits were turned in to the government.

Collectively owned units, including the agricultural communes with their constituent brigades and teams (see Glossary) and collectively owned industrial and service enterprises, were regulated primarily by indirect instruments. While the expenditures and revenues of state-owned enterprises were included in the state budget, each collective unit was explicitly "responsible for its own profit and loss." Quotas and output targets for these units were set out in economic plans, but relatively little effort was made to control their operations, and prices provided the major incentive to comply with state procurement goals (see Prices, this ch.).

Consumer behavior was also subject to both direct and indirect government influence. Necessities of life and other important goods were rationed when they were in short supply (see Retail Sales, ch. 8). Consumption of most goods was restricted or encouraged by government price regulations. Foreign trade was directly controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, its subordinate units, and by the Bank of China, the foreign exchange arm of the Chinese banking system (see Foreign Trade, ch. 8).

The role of the government in the economy was buttressed by the pervasive influence of the Party. The structure of the party organization paralleled that of the government but also extended below the lowest level of the government into the individual economic and social units. Important economic decisionmakers at all levels, from the members of the State Council down to the managers of factories, either were party members themselves or worked closely with colleagues who were party members. The Party, therefore, constituted a powerful supplementary network for transmitting and implementing the economic goals and policies of the government. At the Eleventh National Party Congress of August 1977, the main emphasis of the party's work was officially shifted to leading the economic modernization program.

Although the government thoroughly dominated the economy, there were serious limitations to its control. In the first place the sheer immensity of the economy made it impossible to monitor and regulate all economic activity, a problem which was multiplied by the insufficiently developed communications system. Secondly, production in agriculture, involving about three-quarters of the Chinese labor force, was always contingent on the weather situation, regardless of official policy changes. Finally, dissemination of new policies was often impeded by the inertia or actual opposition of some party functionaries and government officials at many levels. This was considered by the Chinese leadership to be a fundamental problem in the late 1970s and was a leading reason for a drive in 1979 and 1980 to replace aged or incompetent cadres (see Glossary) with younger, more "expert" decisionmakers.

The Two Major Sectors: Agriculture and Industry

The two most important sectors of the economy were agriculture and industry, which together employed about 85 percent of the labor force and produced roughly 80 percent of GNP. The two sectors differed in nearly all aspects. Technology, labor productivity, and incomes advanced much more rapidly in industry than in agriculture; agricultural output was vulnerable to the effects of weather, while industry was more directly influenced by political upheavals; the organization of industry was based on state ownership, planning, and wage labor, while that of agriculture was built around collective ownership, self-reliance, and the use of price incentives to elicit the production patterns desired by government planners. The disparities between the two sectors combined to form an economic-cultural-social gap between the rural and urban areas that was the major division in Chinese society (see Social Groups and Social Cleavages, ch. 3).

Agriculture

In 1980 China remained a predominantly agricultural country. According to Chinese statements, about 80 percent of the population lived in rural areas, and approximately 75 percent of the total labor force was engaged in agriculture. Modern technology had spread slowly in the vast farm areas, and the flow of modern supplies was far from adequate, causing agricultural output to grow much more slowly than the rest of the economy. The proportion of GNP produced by agriculture declined steadily from over 45 percent in the early 1950s, to less than 30 percent in 1979. The low growth rate of agriculture compared to other sectors of the economy reflected the fact that the average Chinese peasant had to work with far less machinery, electric power, and other modern benefits than were available to the average worker in industry.

The agricultural sector was organized primarily on the basis of collective ownership of productive assets: collective units owned over 90 percent of the arable land. The collective sector was characterized by a three-tier system of organization, consisting of people's communes, production brigades, and production teams. The basic agricultural unit was the production team, which usually included about thirty households and 100 to 250 members. Production teams held the rights of ownership and control over the land they farmed and most of the tools, machinery, and draft animals they used. The team was the basic accounting unit and was responsible for its own expenses, revenues, and profits. After all expenses and taxes were paid, net team income was distributed to members according to the amount of work each had contributed to the collective effort (see Planning and Organization, ch. 6).

The level of organization immediately above the team was the production brigade, which typically consisted of about seven production teams. Brigades supervised the activities of the teams below them, provided a number of social services, including primary schools and basic health care, and operated credit cooperatives, outlets of the supply and marketing cooperatives, and small rural industries.

The people's commune was the highest level of the rural collective system. In 1980 there were more than 50,000 communes, having an average of sixteen production brigades in each. The commune coordinated and directed the work of its brigades and carried out activities which were too large in scale for the brigades, such as mobilization of large numbers of peasants for construction projects and the operation of fairly big industrial enterprises. In addition to their role as the leading bodies in the agricultural collective organization, the communes also functioned as the link between government and agriculture. Production plans, procurement quotas, resource allocations, and tax assessments were passed from the county—the lowest level of formal government administration—to the commune for implementation.

Although collective ownership was the predominant form in agriculture, private and state ownership also existed. The constitution of China guaranteed the right of peasant households to farm small private plots in their spare time, and about 5 percent of all arable land was devoted to this purpose. Peasants were allowed to sell or consume the products of their private plots, which accounted for a disproportionately large share of the vegetables, pigs, and poultry grown in the country. Most peasant families also owned their own houses.

The 4 percent of farmland which was neither collectively nor privately owned was cultivated by state farms, which were owned and operated by the government on a basis similar to that of an industrial enterprise. Management of a state farm was the responsibility of a director, and workers were paid set wages regardless of the unit's level of income. State farms were generally established in frontier or remote areas like Heilongjiang Province or the Northwest and were often staffed by the military or recent middle school graduates. During the 1960s and 1970s most of the 2,000 state farms

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operated at a loss and required state subsidies. Reorganizations were undertaken in the late 1970s, and in 1979 the state farm system produced a surplus.

Industry

The industrial sector employed only about 10 percent of the labor force in 1980 but due to much higher worker productivity than the agricultural sector accounted for over 50 percent of GNP. Industry was both the fastest growing major component of the economy and the producer of the modern goods required to speed development and modernize the other economic sectors. Industrial units were very diverse in size and technological sophistication, ranging from tiny handicraft manufacturing enterprises to giant modern complexes producing goods like steel, chemical fertilizer, or synthetic fibers. The majority of the country's large industrial units were clustered in the major industrial centers in the Northeast, the Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan area, the Yangtze River valley, and above all, the city of Shanghai. Small and medium size units were found throughout the country, and a number of first rank plants were located far from the leading cities.

Ownership of industrial enterprises fell into three general categories: state ownership, urban collective ownership, and rural collective ownership. Industry was dominated by the state-owned sector, which included all of the largest, most technically advanced, and most important enterprises.

In 1978 state-owned enterprises produced 80.7 percent of national industrial output by value, held 91.8 percent of fixed industrial assets, and employed 71.5 percent of the industrial labor force. Whereas all of these units were owned by "the state" in the abstract sense, operational control and effective ownership of specific enterprises were divided among the different levels of government. A few of the very largest enterprises were under the direct authority of their respective ministries in the central government. Most major enterprises were either owned and controlled by the province or municipality where they were located or were subject to shared control by the central ministry and the provincial or municipal government. Medium and small size units were usually owned by municipal, prefecture, county, or town governments. Control of some enterprises was shared with higher administrative levels.

An organizational form which seemed to have very substantial and growing influence in the state industrial sector in the late 1970s was the industrial "corporation"—an administrative body subordinate to one of the industrial ministries. A corporation directed and coordinated the operations of a group of related enterprises—in some cases a very large group—and represented their interests in foreign trade and dealings with the central government (see ch. 7, Industry).

Workers in state-owned enterprises were paid regular wages according to an established pay scale. In addition they received a number of important benefits, including free health care and access to housing. In 1980 an increasing number of enterprises were experimenting with the use of bonuses to stimulate worker productivity. The average income of industrial workers was considerably higher than that of most peasants and was much more stable.

Urban collectively owned enterprises (owned by the workers), for the most part were small units equipped with little machinery, producing goods of relatively low value. Many of these units were engaged in handicraft production or such other labor-intensive activities, as furniture manufacturing or assembling simple electrical items. They were promoted by the government in the late 1970s as a means of using surplus labor to increase supplies of consumer and export goods. Collectively owned units were only loosely supervised by local governments. Workers' incomes depended on the unit's profits, which were divided on the basis of the amount of labor by each person.

Rural collectively owned industrial enterprises were managed by collective agricultural units. Most rural communes and production brigades operated some industrial facilities. Brigades generally ran small grain mills, farm equipment repair shops, and other comparatively simple types of industry, mainly to supply some of the needs of their production teams. Larger scale operations, like brick kilns, hydroelectric plants, and small agricultural machinery factories were to be found at the commune level. In addition to industries that primarily supplied goods to members of the collective, many brigades and communes engaged in production of items for sale to other units or to state commercial departments. Handicrafts, paper, bricks, and textiles were among the many goods produced by rural industrial enterprises to increase the incomes of their collective units.

Other Important Sectors

It was estimated that nearly 9 million people were employed in transportation, posts, and communication in the mid-1970s. Most long-distance transportation was done by railway and inland waterway (see Transportation, ch. 8). Railways were the backbone of the system, and by 1980 rail lines extended to nearly all parts of China. In most areas, however, the rail system had few feeder lines and was poorly integrated. Furthermore, many important lines were not double tracked and lacked modern equipment. Finally, most locomotives in use were outdated steam engines, which were limited in their own capabilities and restricted the speed of newer diesel models operating on the same tracks. Within these limitations the railways functioned efficiently and made intensive use of the rail network; nonetheless the ability of the Chinese economy to move goods between cities and regions was severely restricted by deficiencies in the system. Substantial improvement of the railways was a key priority of the three-year "period of readjustment" that began in 1979. The railways were owned and operated by the Ministry of Railways.

Inland navigation was the fastest growing component of the freight transportaion system and was rapidly approaching the share of freight traffic carried by the railways. The principal inland waterway was the

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Yangtze River and its tributaries, which constituted the major artery linking the industrial and agricultural areas of central China and the Southwest to the great port and industrial center of Shanghai. Improvements to the water routes enabled larger and faster modern vessels to make use of them, extended their navigable length, and reduced the amount of time they were closed each year. In addition to modern vessels, the lakes, rivers, and canals were plied by thousands of motorized and nonmotorized traditional craft of all sizes.

Local transportation networks consisted primarily of roads and were generally very extensive. Most roads were narrow and unpaved, however, except in large cities. Trucks, jeeps, buses, and tractors pulling carts were widely used and increasingly common, but motor vehicles were far outnumbered by animal-drawn carts and bicycles. Nonmotorized vehicles probably carried as much local freight as modern conveyances but caused serious traffic congestion in urban areas. Some highway freight was hauled by state transport units, but much of it was carried in vehicles owned by the producing units themselves. Most agricultural units had tractors and animal carts, while many industrial and commercial enterprises had their own trucks.

Civil aviation provided important links to isolated areas of the country and to foreign nations. Only a tiny fraction of total freight and passenger traffic, however, was carried by plane.

Services was another important sector. Internal commerce was carried out primarily by state commercial departments (state trading companies), within the context of the economic plans. The commercial departments played the intermediary role of purchasing goods from producers and selling them to users. In the case of intermediate producer goods, the efforts of the commercial departments were increasingly supplemented by exhibitions, telephone conferences, and even advertising by industrial enterprises. Consumer retail outlets, including department stores, food markets, service establishments, and a wide array of specialty shops and restaurants, were nearly all owned and operated by commercial departments.

In the rural areas much of the exchange of goods and services between commercial departments and agricultural units was carried on through supply and marketing cooperatives. A small but significant proportion of rural produce was exchanged at free rural markets, where peasants sold vegetables, poultry, pork, and other produce grown on their private plots at freely determined prices. Similar markets were established in some cities in 1979. In 1980 growing numbers of collectively owned service enterprises, such as repair shops and restaurants, emerged in the cities. A limited amount of street vending and repair or personal services, such as haircutting, were performed by individual workers. Banking was entirely handled by the People's Bank of China (see The Banking System, this ch.). Trade, banking, commercial services, food service, and personal services were believed to employ a total of around 19 million people in 1975.

Other service sectors that employed significant quantities of labor and were important to the national economy included health care, education and culture, government administration, and the military. Taken together these sectors probably employed over 30 million people.

Government administration was believed to occupy over 6 million workers as of 1975. United States military analysts estimated that in 1979 the Chinese armed forces consisted of between 7.3 million and 8.3 million men (see Organization and Equipment, ch. 14). In addition to affecting the economy through its demand for manpower, equipment, and other resources, the Chinese armed forces—particularly the army—engaged in a variety of economic activities. PLA troops were used as labor on state farms and construction projects. They were employed as relief workers in the event of natural disasters, and occasionally supplemented the rural labor force at harvest time. At the end of the Cultural Revolution the army was called upon to restore order to the nation's factories and transportation system, and many military men were assigned to duties as directors of economic units and members of managing "revolutionary committees" (see The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution [1966–68], ch. 1; Party-Army Relations, ch. 11).

Education and culture employed approximately 7.6 million people in 1975. This number grew substantially in the late 1970s and early 1980s as the educational system was urgently revived and expanded (see ch. 4, Education and Culture). The educational sector profoundly influenced the economy by providing trained workers, technicians, scientists, engineers, and managers.

The Chinese press reported that in 1979 some 7.86 million people worked in the health care field. Of these, approximately 2.46 million were doctors, pharmacists, nurses, or technicians, 1.6 million were rural paramedics—the famous "barefoot doctors"—and 3.8 million were part-time public health workers and midwives (see Health, ch. 2).

China produced nearly all of its own medicines and medical equipment in 1980, but there were few up-to-date medical appliances, and most hospitals were poorly equipped by Western standards. Much more serious than the shortage of advanced equipment was the severe lack of doctors and other highly trained medical personnel, largely a result of the suspension of higher education during the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath.

Only around 10 percent of all Chinese received free medical care. Free care was provided to government workers, military personnel, teachers, college students, and workers in state-owned enterprises. A portion of the medical expenses incurred by dependent family members of these people were covered by the work units. Nearly all agricultural communes and brigades operated voluntary cooperative medical systems.

Planning

The economy was directed and coordinated by means of economic plans that were formulated at all levels of administration. The purpose of the planning system was to allocate goods and resources in such a way as to meet the needs of the population, promote economic efficiency, and proceed with modernization as rapidly as possible.

When the planning apparatus was originally established in the early 1950s, it was patterned after the highly centralized Soviet planning system. The Soviet method involved the calculation and balancing of quantities demanded and supplied for major goods by a central planning bureaucracy. This approach was substantially modified in China during the Great Leap Forward when economic management was extensively decentralized. During the 1960s and 1970s the degree of centralization in the planning system fluctuated with the political currents, waxing in times of pragmatic growth and waning under the influence of the Cultural Revolution and the Gang of Four. In 1980 the system mixed overall central direction and firm central control over finances and key goods and resources with decentralized planning of the details of most economic activity. It was reported in 1979 that out of the hundreds of thousands of different goods produced in the Chinese economy, only several hundred were directly controlled by the State Planning Commission but that they accounted for over half of the value of all products.

At the national level, planning began in the highest bodies of the central government. National economic goals and priorities were determined by the Central Committee of the CCP, the NPC, and the State Council (see ch. 10, Party and Government). These decisions were then communicated to the ministries and commissions under the State Council, to be put into effect through national economic plans.

The State Planning Commission worked with the State Economic Commission, the State Statistical Bureau, the State Capital Construction Commission, the People's Bank of China, the economic ministries and other organs subordinate to the State Council to formulate national plans of varying duration and import. Long-range plans as protracted as ten and twelve years were announced at various times in the history of the People's Republic. These were essentially statements of future goals and intended general direction of the economy, having little direct impact on economic activity. In February 1978 a draft ten-year plan for 1976–85 was discussed at the Fifth National People's Congress; many of its objectives were overly ambitious, and although some of its elements were retained in planning for individual sectors, the plan as a whole was apparently abandoned at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978.

The primary form of medium-range plan was the five-year plan, another feature adopted from the Soviet system. As of 1980 Chinese accounts listed five five-year plan periods: 1953–57, 1958–62, 1966–70, 1971–75, 1976–80. A sixth five-year plan was projected for 1981–85. The purpose of the five-year plans was to guide and integrate the annual plans in order to achieve balanced growth and progress toward national goals. In practice, this role was only fulfilled by the First Five-Year Plan, which very effectively served as a blueprint for industrialization. The second, third, fourth, and fifth five-year plans were all interrupted by political upheavals and had little influence.

A second form of medium-range planning appeared in the readjustment and recovery periods of 1949–52, 1963–65, and 1979–81. Each of these followed a period of chaos (the civil war, the Great Leap Forward, the Gang of Four) and was designated as a time when normal long- and medium-range planning would be suspended while basic imbalances in the economy were targeted and corrected. In each case objectives were more limited and clearly defined than in the five-year plans and were successfully achieved in the first two periods, while the first year-and-a-half of the third showed very considerable progress.

The activities of economic units were actually controlled by annual plans. Formulation of the plans began in the autumn before the year being planned, so that agricultural output for the current year would be known. The foundation of an annual plan was a "material balance table." At the national level the first step in the preparation of a material balance table was to estimate—for each province, autonomous region, subcentral municipality, and enterprise under direct central control—the demand and supply for each centrally controlled good. Transfers of goods between provinces were planned so as to bring quantitites supplied and demanded into balance. As a last resort, a serious overall deficit in a good could be made up by means of imports.

The initial targets were sent down to the province-level administrations and the centrally controlled enterprises. The provincial counterparts to the State Planning Commission, Economic Commission, and economic ministeries broke the targets down among their subordinate counties, districts, and cities, and the enterprises under direct provincial control. Counties, in their turn, disaggregated their assigned quantities among subordinate towns, communes, and county-owned enterprises, whereas cities divided their targets into objectives for the enterprises under their jurisdiction. Finally, towns allotted goals to the enterprises they owned, while agricultural targets were distributed by communes among their brigades, and ultimately resulted in the quantities brigades sent down to their production teams.

At each level, individual units received their target input allocations and output quantities. Managers, engineers, and accountants compared the targets with their own projections, and if they concluded that the planned output quotas exceeded their capabilities, they consulted with representatives of the administrative body superior to them. Each administrative level adjusted its targets on the basis of the discussions with subordinate units, and sent the revised figures back up the planning chain. The central ministries and commissions evaluated the revised sums, repeated the material balance procedure, and used the results as the final plan, which was then officially approved by the State Council.

Annual plans formulated at the province level included the quantities for centrally controlled goods, specified in the national plan as described above, and in addition established targets for goods that were not included in the national plan but were important to the province, region, or municipality. These figures went through the same process of disaggregation, review, discussion, and reaggregation as the centrally planned targets and eventually became part of the province annual plan. Many goods which were not treated at the province level were similarly added to county and city plans, and so on.

The final stage of the planning process occurred in the individual producing units. Having received their output quotas and the figures for their allocations of capital, labor, and other supplies, enterprises generally organized their production schedules into ten-day, one-month, quarterly, and six-month plans. An important characteristic of the planning system was that it usually allowed enterprises a certain amount of leeway; production quotas were customarily set around 5 percent below the quantity a plant could actually produce. This helped to ensure that enterprises would achieve their goals and reduced pressures on plant managers to sacrifice quality and efficiency in attempting to meet overly tight targets.

In spite of its flexibility and extensively decentralized structure, the planning system encountered some of the problems common to other centrally planned economies. The basic difficulty was that it was impossible for planners to foresee all the needs of the economy and to adequately specify the characteristics of planned inputs and products. In 1979 and 1980 government leaders and prominent economists vigorously urged that the scope of the planning system be reduced and that enterprises be allowed more decisionmaking authority in conducting their own operations. In July 1979 the State Council issued official guidelines for "expanding the right of self-management of state-owned enterprises." Using these regulations, 2,600 state-owned enterprises around the country were given increased powers on an experimental basis. They were allowed to retain a percentage of their profits, hire their own workers, use any capacity beyond that required to meet plan commitments to produce additional goods in response to market demands, and carry out some of their own marketing. Initial results of the experiment were favorable, and further gradual increases in unit decisionmaking powers and the use of market incentives were anticipated.

The Budget

The state budget was the financial component of the national economic plan. In the words of *China: A General Survey*, a 1979 Chinese publication, "The state budget is the fundamental scheme

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of public finance. It is an important instrument through which the state pools and allocates financial resources. . . . It is formulated upon the economic plan, and all fiscal operations based on the budget are carried out with the purpose of realizing the economic plan."

The state budget was made up of the budgets of both the central government and the local governments, including the provincial and county levels. Preparation of the budget was highly centralized under the Ministry of Finance. The financial departments of the local governments turned over to the Ministry of Finance most of their receipts from taxes and the profits of the enterprises under their control. The ministry then worked in coordination with the provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions in drawing up budgets for their expenditures.

Revenue sources included taxes, customs receipts, and the incomes from state-owned enterprises. In 1978 total state budgetary revenues were reported to be ¥112,111 million (for value of the yuan—¥—see Glossary), of which industrial and commercial taxes accounted for 40.2 percent and the incomes of state-owned enterprises supplied 39.3 percent. Agricultural taxes made up only 6.5 percent of the total. There was no personal income tax.

Taxes on goods differed primarily according to their importance to the well-being of the consumers and the economy in general. Basic consumer necessities, like grain and cotton cloth, were usually not taxed at all and at times were directly or indirectly subsidized by the government. Producer goods, such as coal, iron, and fertilizer were taxed at low levels. Such nonessential consumer goods as radios and bicycles were taxed heavily, and the highest taxes—60 percent and higher—were for items like tobacco and liquor. Many "luxury" items, including watches and television sets, were sold at prices that were already much higher than the cost of production. Since the profits from these sales accrued to the state budget, they were also effectively a form of taxation.

Revenues collected directly by the central government constituted about 10 percent of the total. These receipts came from customs duties and the incomes of centrally owned economic units, including industrial enterprises, the railways, the CAAC, the merchant fleet, and so forth. During the 1950s the government raised money by six public bond issues, but these loans were all repaid in 1968, and there were no subsequent bond issues.

Major categories of budget expenditures included economic construction, defense, health, education, cultural affairs, administration, and credit and loan repayments. Chief among these were defense and economic construction, which accounted for about 20 percent and 50 percent of total expenditures, respectively, in the late 1950s. In 1978 reported state expenditures on capital construction amounted to ¥39.5 billion, or 35.2 percent of the state budget, while United States government estimates of Chinese defense spending indicated that it may have amounted for as much as 40 percent of the budget.

The pattern of expenditures varied according to the level of government. In the 1950s defense spending made up over a quarter of central budget expenditures but did not figure in provincial budgets at all. Health, education, and culture, which amounted to only 6 percent of central budget expenditures, constituted over a third of provincial spending. Similarly, administrative costs took up only about 2 percent of central funds but were a quarter of provincial expenditures.

An important function of the state budget was to transfer resources from prosperous regions to poor regions. The budgets which were finally approved by the Ministry of Finance for the provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions, included surplus revenues over planned expenditures for the affluent areas and deficits on the part of the poor regions. Funds were transferred in such a way as to cover planned expenditures in the deficit areas, while bringing the budget for the entire country into balance. Nicholas Lardy, an American economist, has found that the resulting pattern of revenue sharing between provincial-level administrations and the central government was one in which the most industrialized regions paid a much higher rate of net taxation than most areas, while the least developed regions were heavily subsidized. Shanghai, the national industrial leader, consistently remitted over 80 percent of municipal revenues to the central government, and in the early 1970s the figure reached 90 percent. Liaoning Province, which was second to Shanghai in industrial output, turned over 82 percent of its revenues to the Ministry of Finance in 1972, while Jiangsu Province, which ranked third, sent in 70 percent of its revenues. At the other extreme, Xizang Autonomous Region (Tibet) and the Ningxia-Hui Autonomous Region paid no net taxes to the center, and generally received over half of the funds required for their budgetary expenses from the Ministry of Finance. The Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region was subsidized for about a third of its expenses, and Yunnan Province for about 15 percent.

In the late 1970s and in 1980 there was a movement among leaders and economists to improve the flexibility of the planning system by allowing province-level and local administrations greater control over their budgetary expenditures. Changes were urged that would elicit local initiative, encourage local leaders to maximize revenues while minimizing costs, and reduce the burden of planning on the central government. In 1976 an experimental revenue-sharing system was put into effect for Jiangsu Province, which allowed the provincial administration to retain and dispose of a set proportion of its revenues, regardless of the amount. Under this provision, Jiangsu reportedly increased its revenues substantially, and the new system was scheduled to be widely applied on a trial basis. Nonetheless, the central government was to continue to finance all major construction projects and retain firm control over most financial planning, in order to ensure coordination and cooperation between regions and sectors.

The Banking System

The Banking system was thoroughly centralized and exercised firm control over all credit and the money supply. The People's Bank of China was the central bank and the foundation of the banking system. In 1980 its subordinate or associated organs were the Bank of China, which handled foreign exchange matters, the Agricultural Bank of China, the People's Bank of Capital Construction, and rural credit cooperatives.

The history of the banking system was somewhat checkered. Nationalization and consolidation of the country's banks received the highest priority in the earliest years of the People's Republic and banking was the first sector to be completely socialized. In the period of recovery from the civil war (1949–52), the People's Bank moved very effectively to halt the raging inflation and bring the nation's finances under central control. Over the course of time the banking organization was repeatedly modified to suit changing conditions and new policies. Specialized divisions were created to support emphasis on particular sectors and faded when policies changed. The Agricultural Bank, for instance, was first created in the 1950s to facilitate financial operations in the rural areas; it flourished in the late 1950s and mid-1960s, but languished in other periods and was undergoing its third major restructuring in 1979. The People's Bank itself overlapped in function with the Ministry of Finance and lost much of its role during the Cultural Revolution. In the late 1970s it was restored to its leading position, and the banking system was strengthened and expanded. The roles of the specialized organs were substantially augmented in the general drive to improve economic flexibility and efficiency through decentralization and delegation of decisionmaking authority.

The People's Bank of China

The People's Bank of China completely dominated the banking system and combined under its jurisdiction a number of functions that in many countries are handled by separate institutions. In addition to its role as the central bank, having sole responsibility for issuing currency and controlling the money supply, the People's Bank served as the government treasury, the main source of credit for economic units, the clearing center for financial transactions, the holder of enterprise deposits, the national savings bank, and an ubiquitous monitor of economic activities. The bank had thousands of branches throughout the country and further thousands of lower level offices convenient to most residential and working areas.

The People's Bank supplied all short- and medium-term credit to industrial, transport, and commercial enterprises and much of the credit of all durations to agricultural units. The amount of working capital needed by each enterprise was calculated in the annual state plan and allocated as a grant from the state budget. When enterprises required additional funds to meet unforeseen expenses they could receive loans from the People's Bank for periods of up to one year. In 1979 the annual rate of interest for such loans was 5.04 percent.

Agricultural units received several different types of loans. Collectively owned units (communes, production brigades, production teams) could obtain short-term loans of up to one year for production expenses at 4.32 percent annual interest. Capital for production facilities could be borrowed for one to five years at 2.16 percent annual interest. Both types of loans could be obtained for enterprises owned by a collective unit. Interest-free loans with maturities of up to fifteen years were available for purchasing farm machinery. Personal loans of one-year maturity were granted at 4.32 percent interest. State farms, like state-owned enterprises, received working capital and long-term investment capital directly from the state budget. They were only eligible for several types of short-term loans of up to one year. In the late 1970s credit for agricultural units was increasingly handled by the Agricultural Bank.

All government departments, social, political, military, and educational organizations, and publicly and collectively owned economic units were legally required to hold their financial balances as deposits in the People's Bank. Only enough cash to meet daily expenses was to be in the possession of a unit. Deposits of economic units earned interest at an annual rate of 1.8 percent. Those of noneconomic bodies received no interest.

All major financial transactions were to be made through the bank. Payment for goods and services exchanged by units was accomplished by debiting the account of the purchasing unit and crediting that of the selling unit by the appropriate amount. This practice very effectively minimized the need for currency, which was used for little except wage payments and retail sales.

Ever since 1949 Chinese workers and peasants were strongly urged to build up personal savings accounts with the bank, in order to reduce the demand for consumer goods and increase the amount of capital available for investment. Small branch offices that only handled savings accounts were conveniently located throughout the urban areas. In the countryside savings were deposited with the rural credit cooperatives, which existed in most communes and brigades. Annual interest rates for savings deposits were increased in both 1979 and 1980, when they reached 2.88 percent for current deposits, 4.32 percent for six-month deposits, 5.4 percent for one-year deposits, 6.12 percent for three-year deposits, and 6.84 percent for five-year deposits. In early 1980 savings deposits for the entire country totaled over ¥30 billion; about 80 percent of all deposits were fixed term. Deposits of urban residents averaged around ¥200 each. Like Western banks, the People's Bank held only a fraction of the deposits in reserve to pay withdrawals and made the rest available for loans.

The bank played a very important role in monitoring and supervising economic activities. With direct control over credit, cash balances, and financial transactions, it was able to closely follow the operations of economic units and was explicitly charged with governing the use of loans and other funds.

Other Banking Organs

The Bank of China handled all dealings in foreign exchange. It was responsible for allocating the country's foreign exchange reserves, arranging foreign loans, setting exchange rates for China's currency, issuing letters of credit, and generally carrying out all financial transactions with foreign firms and individuals. The Bank of China had offices in Beijing and other cities engaged in foreign trade. Overseas offices were located in Hong Kong, London, Singapore, and Luxembourg. During the 1970s the role of the Bank of China grew rapidly with the expansion of foreign trade. In 1979 it became an independent entity, separate from the People's Bank, in order to increase its control of foreign exchange transactions.

The Agricultural Bank of China was responsible for providing financial support to agricultural units. It issued loans to agricultural units, handled state appropriations for agriculture, directed the operations of the rural credit cooperatives, and carried out overall supervision of rural financial affairs. The Agricultural Bank was headquartered in Beijing and had a vast network of branches throughout the countryside. In the late 1970s the functions and autonomy of the Agricultural Bank were substantially increased to help promote higher agricultural production. In 1979 the government decided to double agricultural loans in 1980 and each following year through 1985.

The People's Bank of Capital Construction managed state appropriations and loans to units for capital construction. It had some 2,500 offices around the country in regions where large construction projects took place. It checked the activities of units engaged in construction to ensure that the funds were used for their designated purpose and disbursed the money in stages as a project progressed. In late 1979 the government decided to gradually shift from the use of state appropriations for capital construction to providing funds in the form of loans from the Construction Bank. Borrowing units would be required to repay principal and interest within five to ten years, depending on the kind of enterprise. Enterprises that paid off loans before the due date would be allowed to retain their profits for the duration of the repayment period, while those that were late would be financially penalized. This policy was intended to improve the planning and speed completion of construction projects.

Rural credit cooperatives were small collectively owned saving and lending organizations that were established in communes and production brigades. They handled deposits and short-term loans for individual peasants, communes, brigades, and teams. They were subject to the direction of the Agricultural Bank and followed uniform state banking policies but acted as independent units for accounting purposes.

Prices

Determination of Prices

Prices of goods and services were determined by a variety of methods and administrative levels, which generally correlated with the planning system. Prices of most goods that were controlled in detail by the central economic plan were set at the national level. These included rationed consumer staples and centrally controlled industrial products. Centrally determined prices changed infrequently. Prices of goods that were specifically allocated by plans drawn up at lower administrative levels were usually set by planning and commercial agencies at those levels. Such prices changed more often than centrally determined ones and were somewhat more flexible. Goods which were covered by plans in only a general way were exchanged between units at prices that were mutually agreed upon within limits established by commercial departments. All prices in rural and urban free peasant markets were determined by supply and demand, as were prices for goods and services supplied by individual laborers.

Prices of industrial products went through several stages. Producing units—factories—were paid a price by commercial departments that was intended to cover all current producing costs, depreciation, and taxes, and leave a profit. To minimize the need for subsidies, these prices were usually set high enough so that even inefficient producers would realize a profit. Commercial departments then sold the goods to retail outlets or other producers at a wholesale price that covered the price paid to the factory, plus transportation and other handling costs, and allowed the wholesale agency to earn a profit. The final price of the goods covered the wholesale price and the costs and profit of the retail establishment.

Agricultural consumer goods that were not rationed were purchased from rural supply-and-marketing cooperatives by commercial departments at locally determined prices. They were sold to state-owned retail shops at wholesale prices, which included the original purchase price and the expenses of the commercial department. The shops then were allowed to vary the retail prices of products, particularly perishables, within limits set by the commercial departments, according to market conditions. Agricultural commodities that were rationed, including grain and edible oils, were purchased and retailed at prices fixed by the central government. In some instances, when purchase prices were raised to encourage production while retail prices were held constant, the price paid by consumers did not cover total cost, necessitating state subsidies to the commercial departments.

The Role of Prices

Prices had little or no effect on the production and distribution of goods which were thoroughly allocated in physical terms by plans. Enterprises were assigned fixed quantities of such goods, and their working capital, supplied by the state budget, was adjusted to cover the cost, whatever it might be. The price of such a good did not affect the amount used by an enterprise. In the case of those goods treated only in general or value terms by the plan, however, prices did influence allocation. Enterprises purchased these goods out of working capital funds that were already set or with short-term loans that had to be repaid. In this situation enterprises would have to carefully weigh the contribution of the good to unit production against its cost and adjust their purchases accordingly.

Allocation of nonrationed goods to consumers was carried out by the price mechanism. Families decided what commodities to buy on the basis of their prices in relation to household income. Local commercial departments adjusted retail prices of consumer goods when necessary to balance supply and demand. Prices for some nonrationed luxury goods, such as television sets, watches, tobacco, and liquor could be set much higher than their costs because demand was very strong and supplies were limited.

The agricultural sector presented several special problems for price policy. In the first place, prices received for farm products were much lower than those for industrial goods, causing farm incomes to be smaller than those of industrial workers. Secondly, the costs of increasing agricultural output rose steadily. From the early 1950s nearly all of China's arable land was under intense cultivation, meaning that growth in output could only be accomplished by increasing current inputs, such as water, organic fertilizer, labor, and more recently, chemical fertilizer and insecticides. Finally, price incentives were the basic means of controlling agricultural production, due to the collective form of ownership that prevailed in the agricultural sector.

For all these reasons the government repeatedly found it necessary to increase the procurement prices paid for agricultural goods and decrease the prices of industrial goods used in farming. At the same time, however, commercial departments were reluctant to increase the prices paid for food by urban consumers. As a result, by the late 1970s urban prices for some food items were lower than the purchase prices paid to farming units. This imbalance led to illegal speculation and required government subsidies to urban retail shops, which in 1979 amounted to around Y6.8 billion to cover losses in grain and oils alone. In November 1979 the government finally moved to redress the disparity by raising the retail prices of pork, beef, mutton, eggs, and aquatic products by a third and instituted small increases in the prices of milk, poultry, and vegetables.

Problems and Changes in Price Policy

The most fundamental problem with the price structure was that many of the administratively determined prices did not accurately reflect the real value of the products they were applied to, either in terms of their production costs or their usefulness to society and the economy. This resulted in misallocation of resources and prevented accurate analysis of economic activities. Furthermore, it hampered the efforts to increase the role of market mechanisms and profit incentives that began in the late 1970s. In 1979 a national review of prices was set in motion, and in early 1980 a national price conference was held. At the same time, government planners and economists urged that prices be revised on the basis of the real values of commodities.

Inflation

One of the most striking manifestations of economic instability in China in the 1930s and 1940s was a runaway inflation that peaked during the civil war, when wholesale prices in Shanghai increased 7.5 million times in the space of three years. A major objective of the government in the first several years of the People's Republic was to stop inflation, which it did by means of currency reform, unification and nationalization of the banks, and tight control over prices and the money supply. In the thirty years after 1949 these measures were continued, and China achieved a remarkable record of price stability. Between 1952 and 1978 retail prices for consumer goods grew at an average rate of only 0.6 percent a year.

As the economy developed, however, basic economic forces generated inflationary pressures which became increasingly evident in the late 1970s and 1980. The generally high rate of investment and concentration on producer goods since 1949 resulted in insufficient supplies of consumer commodities, causing a gradual accumulation of excess demand, as evidenced by the relatively large holdings of personal savings, and the booming market for such expensive consumer durables as watches and television sets in the late 1970s. In addition, the real values of many items changed over time, as some resources became more scarce and as technology altered both manufacturing processes and products. Agricultural goods, as described above, became more costly to produce in real terms. Industrial products became available to the consumer that were more advanced technologically and more expensive than those previously on the market, such as washing machines and color television sets.

Finally, government policy in the late 1970s actively sought to raise consumer incomes through a wide range of mechanisms, including wage hikes, bonus plans, expanded collective and individual products, increased procurement prices for agricultural goods, and expanded sideline and rural industrial activities. All of these developments increased the expenditures of consumers and expanded the amount of money circulating through the economy. In its communiqué on China's economic performance in 1979, the State Statistical Bureau reported that overall retail prices rose by 5.8 percent, primarily due to the higher prices for agricultural goods.

Living Standards

Progress since 1949

In 1980 living standards remained low in comparison with those of the developed countries, but desperate poverty, extreme income inequalities, and endemic insecurity of livelihood—all of which characterized China before 1949—had been virtually eliminated. By doing away with private ownership of productive assets and establishing a system of centralized economic planning, the state acquired the ability to assure most adults a job and to redistribute national output so as to provide the entire population with at least the minimal necessities. In addition, the People's Republic consistently invested a much larger proportion of national product than pre-1949 China, steadily developing the economic base and gradually supplying a wider and more modern range of goods and services to the Chinese people.

Perhaps as important to the quality of life as increased availability of material goods were the results of the mass public health and sanitation campaigns, which rid the country of most of the conditions that had bred epidemics and lingering disease in the past. The most concrete evidence of improved living standards was that average national life expectancy more than doubled, rising from around thirty-two years in 1949, to 68.2 years in 1980, as the rate of mortality fell from twenty-eight per thousand to 6.29 per thousand.

While China achieved an extremely important advance in the basic living standard of the population, further improvements beyond the basic level came slowly and were unevenly distributed, both between sectors—especially between agriculture and industry—and between individual units and families. The primary consumer necessities—housing, food, and clothing, were provided in sufficient amounts to accommodate the growing population and gradually improved in quality and variety, but for the most part quantities available in 1980 were still only slightly above basic needs.

Housing construction in towns and cities lagged behind urban population growth. A Chinese survey of housing conditions in 192 cities found that their combined population had increased by 83 percent between 1949 and 1978, but housing floor space had only grown by 46.7 percent. In 1978 there were only 3.6 square meters of living space per inhabitant in these cities, a reduction of 0.9 square meters since 1949. To remedy this problem, construction of modern urban housing was a priority item in the late 1970s, and new apartment blocks became increasingly evident in large cities (see Housing Construction, ch. 7). Some apartments in the new buildings had their own lavatories, kitchens, and balconies, but others shared communal facilities. Nearly all were of much higher quality than the older houses, many of which were built of mud bricks and lacked plumbing.

Housing conditions in rural areas varied widely. During the 1960s and 1970s thousands of production brigades built sturdy, sanitary houses and apartments and in many cases entire new villages. The majority of the new houses were privately owned and provided considerably more living space per person than urban housing. Even new peasant houses usually did not have running water but shared communal pumps or spigots. Less prosperous areas had little new housing and many peasants still lived in traditional dwellings, such as mud-brick and thatch huts or, in some regions, cave houses. Many of the nomadic herdsmen in Inner Mongolia and the Northwest had established winter villages, but some still lived year-round in tents or felt yurts. Similarly villages were built for some of the families of fishermen and boatmen, but many continued to live on their vessels.

Food production rose substantially after 1949, but population increases prevented significant gains in the amount available per person in many categories. Production of grain, the source of about 75 percent of the calories in the average Chinese diet, grew at an average rate of about 2.7 percent a year between 1952 and 1979, only slightly faster than population growth during much of the period. Total grain available per capita grew to 308 kilograms (kgs) per year in 1958, but dropped in the early 1960s and did not exceed 300 kgs again until the mid-1970s. In 1979 under exceptionally good harvest conditions, over 330 kgs of grain per capita were produced. During the 1970s adult grain rations averaged fifteen to twenty kgs each month.

Other important food items whose supply grew slowly or stagnated included edible oil, sugar, and aquatic products. Production of oil-bearing crops increased at an average rate of around 2 percent a year between 1952 and 1979. The monthly ration of oil was set at 0.25 kgs per person and was reportedly considered seriously deficient by Chinese consumers in the late 1970s. Production of raw sugar showed little growth over the 1970s, and imports were required to maintain the monthly sugar ration about 0.25 kgs per person. Output of aquatic products rose at an average rate of only 2 percent a year between 1957 and 1978 and declined slightly in 1979. Average consumption of fish was estimated to be about 0.5 kgs each month.

Foods which increased relatively rapidly in availability included pork, eggs, and vegetables. The stock of pigs grew at a rate of 4.7 percent a year between 1952 and 1979. United States government analysts estimated that monthly pork consumption averaged around .35 kgs per person in the 1970s. This was very low compared to meat consumption in most developed countries, but unlike grain rations, it was two or three times the level of the 1950s. Sharply increased procurement prices for pork in 1979 brought about a 25 percent surge in supply, and an article in the Chinese press reported that meat consumption in Beijing averaged 1.07 kgs per person each month in that year.

Procurement prices for eggs also rose in 1979, resulting in a 54 percent jump in quantities supplied. Visitors found eggs to be the most common form of protein in Chinese meals, and monthly consumption in Beijing was reported to be 0.7 kgs per capita.

Vegetables were the major supplement to grain in the Chinese diet and were extremely important nutritionally. Vegetable production, a great deal of which took place on private plots, was believed to have grown more rapidly than grain output. In 1979 vegetables were said to be in short supply in some cities, but Beijing residents reportedly each consumed an average of 5.3 kgs a month.

Accounts of foreign visitors in the 1970s confirmed Chinese reports that famine and malnutrition were no longer problems among the population. The average diet, however, provided only a little more than the basic nutritional requirements and had little variety. Protein, in particular, was barely adequate for health maintenance in the diets of most Chinese. Government leaders were well aware of these problems, and the higher procurement prices for agricultural goods and rapid expansion of free peasant markets in 1979 and 1980 were instituted to quickly increase the quantities and variety of food items available to consumers.

Clothing purchases were restricted by rationed limits on consumption of cotton cloth. Rations fluctuated between four and six meters of cotton cloth a year per person in the 1970s, about enough for two or three sets of clothing. Cotton was increasingly supplemented by plastic and synthetic fibers, which were not rationed. Foreign visitors reported that nearly all Chinese appeared to be quite adequately dressed at all seasons of the year.

Nonessential consumer commodities became more varied and were available in greater quantities as the years passed. Simple, inexpensive housewares, like thermoses, pans, clocks, and so on were carried in department stores and other retail outlets all over China from the 1950s on. Relatively expensive consumer durables became available more gradually. In the 1960s production and sales of bicycles, sewing machines, wristwatches, and transistor radios grew to the point where they became common household possessions. In the late 1970s the distribution of television sets and cameras was multiplying very quickly, followed somewhat more slowly by washing machines, electric fans, and tape recorders.

Income Distribution

Although extreme poverty and wealth were essentially eradicated in China, there remained a very wide range of income levels. Over two-thirds of all urban workers were employed in state-owned enterprises, which used an eight-grade wage system. The pay for each grade differed among enterprises, but generally wages ranged from about Y40 a month for unskilled workers to Y120 a month for skilled or very senior workers. Factory managers and administrators earned between Y40 and Y180 a month, while engineers could earn monthly salaries of up to Y230 a month. It was reported that in 1979 the average annual income of people employed in state-owned units was Y705, or Y58.75 a month.

The 29 percent of the urban labor force that was employed in collectively owned enterprises earned substantially less on the average than workers in state-owned units. The income of such a worker consisted of a share of the profit earned by the enterprise. Most collectively owned enterprises were small, had little capital, and did not earn large profits. Many were engaged in traditional services, handicrafts, or small-scale, part-time assembly work. Some workers

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in these units earned as little as Y15 a month, while the majority probably made between Y20 and Y40 a month. The highest urban incomes were earned by the most senior professors, who received up to Y350 a month; mayors, who made up to Y360 a month; ministers, who received up to Y400 a month; and the prime minister, who was believed to be paid Y500 a month.

In addition to their regular wages, most urban workers received various kinds of subsidies, bonuses, and benefits. In November 1979 all urban wage earners were allotted a monthly Y5 food subsidy to make up for increased food costs. Some workers received transportation subsidies, and many lived in housing provided by the work unit. In the late 1970s increasing use was made of bonuses to stimulate workers' enthusiasm. All told, fringe benefits could constitute up to 20 percent of a worker's income.

The most important determinant of the affluence of a household was the number of its members who were employed. In 1979 the average cost of living for one person in Beijing was reported to be Y36.95 per month. The average state-enterprise worker, even with food allowance and other benefits added to his basic wage, would only barely be able to support himself and one other person. Two average wage earners, however, could easily support one dependent. Families with several workers and few or no dependents had substantial surplus earnings, which they saved or used to buy nonessential goods. A significant indication that urban consumer affluence had risen over the years was the reported decline in the number of dependents per worker in Beijing from 2.36 in 1965 to 0.8 in 1979, due to successful family-planning programs.

Incomes in the agricultural sector were difficult to compare with those of urban workers because most peasants received only a minor portion of their total income in cash. Most Western scholars believed that average peasant incomes were considerably lower than those of urban workers, perhaps by as much as 66 percent (see Inequality, Stratification, and Social Mobility, ch. 3). There was, however, great diversity in rural income levels between regions, provinces, counties, communes, brigades, teams, and individual families.

The most basic influence on rural prosperity was geography. Soil type and quality, rainfall, temperature range, drainage, and availability of water determined the kinds and quantities of crops that a unit could grow. Equally important geographic factors were access to transportation routes and proximity to urban areas. The highest agricultural incomes were earned by suburban units that were able to sell vegetables, eggs, meat, dairy products, fish, and sideline products in the nearby cities. Within any given agricultural unit, incomes varied between households—as among urban families—primarily according to the number of workers in each household.

Most of the income of peasants was received in kind rather than money. Grain, the primary necessity, was allocated directly to households out of team production in most agricultural units. In 1979 an average of 232.5 kgs of grain for each person was distributed to peasants. Most of the vegetables and eggs consumed by peasant households were grown on private plots. Peasant families usually owned their houses and did not have to pay rent.

The annual money incomes received by peasants were shares of the profits earned by their production teams and income from household sideline activities. Shares were calculated according to the proportion of total team labor contributed by the individual over the course of the year. A Chinese report stated that in 1979 average per capita money income from team shares was ¥83.4, an increase of 12.7 percent over 1978 and 28.1 percent larger than in 1977. Average income per person from household sidelines in 1979 was given as ¥30 to ¥40. Peasant money incomes in 1979—not counting income from household sideline activities—ranged from deficits on the part of families which had no able-bodied workers or belonged to very poor units, to a fishing brigade in Shanghai, which earned an average of ¥1,055 for each of its members. Out of the nation's 690,000 production brigades, 1,622 earned average per capita incomes of over ¥300.

Peasant families that had several working members, belonged to a prosperous unit, and engaged in profitable sideline activities reportedly were as well clothed as average urban residents and enjoyed a somewhat better diet, as well as more comfortable housing. The great majority of rural households, however, consumed less meat and poorer quality grain than average city families. Consumer durables, like bicycles, watches, and radios were much less readily available in the countryside than in the cities, as were television sets, which in 1980 could not be used in many rural areas anyway, since they were not yet served by television relay stations.

Perhaps the most serious gaps in living standards between rural and urban areas were in education and health care. Although primary schools existed in most brigades, and middle schools were located in most commune headquarters towns, they were less well equipped, and their staffs were less adequately trained than their urban counterparts. Health care had been greatly improved in rural areas by means of sanitation campaigns and the introduction of large numbers of "barefoot doctors" (paramedics), midwives, and health workers, but modern hospitals, fully trained doctors, and modern medical equipment were almost all located in urban areas and were not easily accessible to most peasants.

Potential of the Economy for Achieving National Goals

In 1980 the Chinese economy possessed great potential for improving efficiency, accelerating growth, and advancing toward the nation's objectives of modernization and improved living standards. None of the country's resources and assets had been used to their fullest, most productive capacity in the preceding years, and the policies and programs emerging in the late 1970s and 1980 seemed accurately aimed at correcting this problem. Nonetheless, the modernization drive faced immense difficulties in attempting to redress serious imbalances on the vast scale of the Chinese economy, while the shadow of a possible resurgence of political conflict inhibited many decisionmakers and posed an ever present threat to effective planning.

The country's most important resource was its labor force, the largest in the world. Chinese workers tended to be diligent, hardworking, commercially adept, and highly receptive to education—cultural traits that were fostered in Chinese society over centuries of economic adaptation to an environment that was occasionally harsh and always densely crowded. The revival of higher education and overall improvement of the educational system that began in the late 1970s and continued into the 1980s would develop a more skilled and more productive labor force for the years to come. In addition, the wide-reaching trend toward decentralization of decisionmaking was a means of eliciting participation in planning and coordination by a much broader group of local and enterprise-level managers, planners, administrators, and scientists, while at the same time training future economic leaders for the higher administrative levels.

In terms of material resources China was adequately endowed to meet the needs of modernization in all but a few respects (see Supplies of Industrial Resources, ch. 7). Large deposits of iron ore and most other important minerals had only been superficially exploited, while vast coal and petroleum reserves and the largest hydroelectric potential in the world promised long-run sufficiency in energy supplies. Government plans for the 1979–81 period of readjustment and later years included top priority coordinated programs to modernize the extraction of resources, multiply energy production, and substantially strengthen heretofore inadequate infrastructure.

The most serious material constraint was the limited amount of arable land, which had remained constant since 1949 and probably could not be significantly increased in the future. Even in this area, however, increased production was possible. Chinese agriculture succeeded in meeting the needs of the population in the 1970s, utilizing technology that was considerably less advanced than that of the developed countries. Larger applications of chemical fertilizer, increased mechanization of agriculture, improved and expanded modern agricultural research and development, along with other improvements, could raise yields and enable China not only to maintain basic self-sufficiency but also to increase the quantity and variety of food available to Chinese consumers. Government policies of the late 1970s gave greater flexibility to farm units and provided strong incentives and greater opportunities to expand investment and increase production.

The industrial sector, while much less advanced than those of the developed countries, constituted a solid base for modernization. Industrial enterprises were dispersed throughout the country and included units capable of producing all major kinds of machinery, equipment, chemicals, building materials, and light industrial goods. Chinese enterprises could make most of the products required for modernization, and the substantial pool of increasingly sophisticated industrial technicians and managers was capable of effectively integrating advanced foreign technology into Chinese production processes. In the late 1970s and 1980 key industries were being technologically strengthened by the purchase of advanced foreign equipment, and the entire industrial sector was given greater flexibility in decisionmaking and encouraged to adopt modern management techniques.

An important factor in the ability of the economy to achieve the nation's goals was the new involvement in international trade which provided China with ready access to the most advanced technology in the world. The willingness of foreign banks and governments to extend long-term credit to China assured Chinese leaders of being able to purchase key equipment and production processes in order to speed development. In addition, the existence of long-range grain-purchasing contracts made it possible to feed the major coastal cities with wheat from Canada, Australia, and the United States, and allow peasants to shift some resources to vegetables, fruits, and livestock in order to improve the Chinese diet.

In the final analysis, the most important factor in the nation's potential for economic modernization was the open, constructive, problem-solving approach of the post-Mao leadership. The willingness of the administration to publicly analyze economic problems, alter overly ambitious goals, and apply eclectic, basically nonpolitical methods was new to the People's Republic and augured well for the resolution of current and future economic difficulties. This attitude allowed planners to benefit from the experiences of Hungary and Yugoslavia in economic reorganization, to pattern foreign trade activities after some of those successfully employed by other Asian nations, and to introduce some American industrial management techniques.

The powerful potential of the economy did not, however, negate the fact that the obstacles facing the modernization effort remained formidable. In spite of the country's remarkable success in reducing birthrates, growing numbers of young adults entering childbearing age threatened a continuation of population growth of a magnitude that could prevent the significant advance in per capita incomes, which the government intended as the primary incentive for workers to increase output. The sheer size of the economy, in terms of population and numbers of economic activities, relative to the comparatively scant capital resources and modern facilities available, presented a daunting challenge to plans for pervasive

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mechanization and modernization. The acute shortage of educated personnel was a fundamental problem that could not be quickly ameliorated and was a critical hinderance to the adoption and development of modern technology.

Finally, the most serious concern of government leaders was the possibility of future political upheavals and a return to the economic chaos of the Cultural Revolution years. An article in the March 24, 1980, issue of *Beijing Review* stated, "We must maintain a political situation of stability and unity for a long time to come. This is a prerequisite for the four modernizations."

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Among the most interesting of the many works on economic development in China prior to 1949 are Mark Elvin's *The Pattern of the Chinese Past* and Dwight H. Perkins' *Agricultural Development in China, 1368–1968*. Both works examine the fundamental relationships between technology, population, society, and economic growth in China. A very useful brief integration of much of the scholarship on the Chinese economy in the modern period may be found in *The Chinese Economy Past and Present*, by Ramon H. Myers. *China's Modern Economy in Historical Perspective*, edited by Perkins, is a valuable collection of articles by leading scholars dealing with various aspects of China's modern economic development. A concise description of the Chinese economy in the eighty years before 1949 is presented in two brief works by Albert Feuerwerker, *The Chinese Economy, ca. 1870–1911* and *Economic Trends in the Republic of China, 1912–1949*.

There are few general treatments of the Chinese economy. Two of the most important are *China's Economic Revolution*, by Alexander Eckstein and *China's Economy: A Basic Guide*, by Christopher Howe. Eckstein treats the development of the Chinese economy from the viewpoint of comparative economic systems theory, while Howe's work is mainly descriptive. Some of the earlier classic works on the post-1949 economy are *China's Economic System*, by Audrey Donnithorne; *The Economy of the Chinese Mainland*, by Ta-Chung Liu and Kung-Chia Yeh; and *The Chinese Economy Under Communism*, by Nai-Ruenn Chen and Walter Galenson. A collection of studies by noted economists dealing with China's modern economic development experience is presented in *China's Development Experience in Comparative Perspective*, edited by Robert F. Dernberger. A good description of the Maoist economic model is presented in *China's Economy and the Maoist Strategy*, by John G. Gurley. China's official Foreign Languages Press has published a number of short books in English that deal with the economy. As of 1980 one of the most recent was *China: A General Survey*, by Qi Wen, which included a brief general description of the economy and particularly helpful information on the budget and the banking system. The Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress has compiled a series of very valuable volumes on the Chinese economy. The first, titled *An Economic Profile of Mainland China*, was published in 1967; the second, *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment*, in 1972; the third, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy*, in 1975; and the fourth, *Chinese Economy Post-Mao*, in 1978. Each volume is intended to present the current state of American knowledge of the Chinese economy and consists of articles by leading analysts from government and the academic community.

A number of significant monographs deal with specific aspects of the Chinese economy. Economic planning is analyzed by Perkins in *Market Control and Planning in Communist China* and more recently by Nicholas R. Lardy in *Economic Growth and Distribution in China*. Katherin H. Hsiao's *Money and Monetary Policy in Communist China* is one of the most complete studies of the Chinese banking system. Urban and white-collar labor are treated by Christopher Howe in *Employment and Economic Growth in Urban China, 1949–1957* and by J. P. Emerson in *Administrative and Technical Manpower in the People's Republic of China*. The most comprehensive study of the size, composition, growth, and distribution of the labor force is *Economic Growth and Employment in China*, by Thomas G. Rawski.

Official Chinese statistical data for the 1950s are presented in *Ten Great Years*, compiled by China's State Statistical Bureau. Additional statistics for this period, gleaned from other Chinese sources, are assembled in Nai-Ruenn Chen's *Chinese Economic Statistics*. Scanty bits of data for the 1960s and early 1970s may be found along with estimated figures in the articles of the Joint Economic Committee volumes mentioned previously and in a particularly useful series of unclassified research papers, including *China: A Statistical Compendium*, published by the National Foreign Assessment Center of the United States Central Intelligence Agency. A compilation and expert evaluation of the data available for this period is presented in the collection of articles *Quantitative Measures of China's Economic Output*, edited by Alexander Eckstein. National economic data began to be compiled and published again in the late 1970s. The years 1977 and 1978 are covered by the "Communique on Fulfillment of China's 1978 National Economic Plan," issued by the State Statistical Bureau and published in *Beijing Review* in 1979. This was followed by the "Communique on Fulfillment of China's 1979 National Economic Plan," *Beijing Review* in 1980.

In the late 1970s and 1980 a flood of economic articles, data, and policy statements appeared in official, English-language periodicals, of which the most useful are *Beijing Review* (a weekly) and *China Reconstructs* (a monthly). Valuable periodicals published outside China include the *China Quarterly* and the *Far Eastern Economic Review*. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 6. Agriculture

The Hall of Annual Prayers, in the southern quarter of the Forbidden City, in Beijing, exemplifying the architecture of the late Qing Dynasty (1644–1911).

IN LATE 1980 the period of experimentation in agricultural policy that began after the death of Chairman Mao Zedong was continuing. The new leadership had begun innovative approaches in planning and managing agriculture, as it had with respect to other sectors of the economy. Agriculture had, moreover, been given special attention as a part of the "four modernizations" (see Glossary) together with industry, national defense, and science and technology. Investment in agriculture was being increased and its place as the foundation of the national economy and a key sector for economic planning was being given new emphasis.

The policies of the post-Mao leadership were aimed at increasing the rate of growth of production by means of technical modernization and improved economic incentives for the peasantry. In the long run the hope was to build an independent agricultural sector capable of supporting a modern industrial economy. Success of the policies would mean increased per capita output, relatively stable growth, and more diversified and commercialized production by the end of the century.

Agricultural development efforts were a necessary response to the enormous task the country faced in feeding nearly 25 percent of the world's population on the products of only 7 percent of its arable land. The agricultural sector provided average consumers with little more than the minimum necessary for subsistence. Since the 1950s increases in output had only barely kept pace with population growth, and agriculture as throughout past centuries had been vulnerable to natural disasters and to fluctuations attributable to the weather. Because of agriculture's critical importance in the national economy and the fact of intense population pressure, the relatively low growth of production and frequent fluctuations in output in that sector had restrained the growth of the economy as a whole.

Population growth over time had resulted in intensified land use. Even before 1949 the People's Republic of China was a relatively densely populated country; since then the population had increased by an average of about 2 percent annually, while migration into the cities had been tightly controlled (see Migration, ch. 2). With a finite amount of arable land—the cultivated area has not increased since the 1950s—and an increasing population, yields per unit of land were extremely important. Total output had to rise, if only to maintain per capita output at the subsistence level; if the target were higher, yields per unit of land had to increase substantially. By 1980 yields in some developed areas actually had reached high levels and in some cases multiple cropping produced extremely high annual yields. Average yields, nevertheless, were still not high by world standards, mainly because of the shortage of modern inputs.

In the future both population growth and higher living standards would require further increases.

Agriculture is labor intensive. Three-fourths of the labor force is employed in agriculture, working with technology suited to intensive production. Cultivation techniques are mainly those on which East Asian peasants have traditionally relied, although in recent years more chemical fertilizer, improved seed varieties, and other modern refinements have been adopted.

In the early 1980s agricultural products accounted for about one-fourth of the gross national product (GNP). In addition to food, agriculture provided many inputs to light industry—the raw materials for fabrics such as cotton and wool; tobacco for cigarette production; and sugar crops, for example. Agriculture was also an important source of foreign exchange. Agricultural exports had grown at an average annual rate of 9.1 percent since 1975. In 1979 they amounted to the equivalent of US$4.04 billion, or 29.9 percent of total exports. Agriculture also provided the government with some resources, e.g., in taxes, although most direct state revenues came from the industrial sector (see ch. 7, Industry).

Nutritional standards on average in 1980 were low but adequate. The diets of the majority of the people provided basic nutrients in sufficient quantities; lack of variety was the main problem. Many basic food items were rationed. Grain products were the staple with average consumption at about fifteen kilograms per month per person, providing thirty-seven grams per day of protein. Meat consumption averaged under one kilogram per month. Consumption of dairy products and fish was relatively low, and there was great demand among consumers for more edible oil and soybean products (see Retail Sales, ch. 8).

Agriculture's low per capita output and low growth rate create demands on the rest of the economy. A poor harvest means that scarce resources have to be shifted from other uses to aid agriculture and foreign exchange has to be spent to import food. In the post-Mao era economic planners felt that the problem of agriculture had to be solved—the sector's efficiency and production level had to be considerably increased—in order to provide a secure base for the growth of the rest of the economy and to increase the standard of living of the population.

Resource Endowment

Arable land is scarce. Only a little over 10 percent of the total land area, most of it in the eastern third of the country, can be cultivated. This compares with more than 20 percent for the continental United States, which is slightly smaller. Further expansion would be relatively difficult because almost no land that could be profitably cultivated remains unused. Despite intensive cultivation, yields from some marginal lands were low. Some possibility for expansion existed in thinly populated parts of the country, especially in the Northeast region (see fig. 4). The growing season there is short however, and the process of reclamation prolonged and costly.

North and South China (as defined within China Proper—see Glossary) divided approximately by the Qin Ling range are highly dissimilar agricultural areas. In semitropical South China rainfall is relatively abundant and the growing season is long. Rice is the predominant grain crop. The paddies can generally be irrigated with water from rivers or other sources. Although much of the soil is acid red clay, the heavy use of fertilizer (at one time organic but now also including a large proportion of chemical nutrients) supports high yields. Frequently two or even three crops a year are cultivated on the same land. Food crops other than rice are also grown, most frequently in hilly areas or during the winter. These include potatoes and winter wheat. The highest grain yields in the country were generally found in Szechwan Basin, and the lower Yangtze River valley, and Guangdong and Fujian provinces, where multiple cropping of rice and other crops were the typical pattern. Cotton, tea, and industrial crops are also produced here.

In North China, which is considerably drier than South China, wheat has traditionally been the main crop. Winter wheat accounts for nearly 90 percent of production, and spring wheat is grown mainly in the eastern portion of Nei Monggol Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolia) and the northeastern provinces. Other important grain crops include corn, which in some recent years has surpassed wheat in total output, and sorghum and millet. These are usually dryland crops. Since the late 1960s irrigation has been greatly expanded, but water still remains an important limiting factor. By comparison with South China, soils are generally better; but because of the shorter growing season and colder, drier climate, yields per cultivated hectare tend to be lower, and irrigation is less extensive. Labor is not quite as abundant but cropping patterns tend to require less labor, and mechanization (especially of plowing) is more advanced.

The North China Plain the most important growing area in North China, extends over several provinces. Winter wheat and corn are the leading grain crops; cotton is also grown, and the Shandong peninsula produces peanuts. The North China Plain while fertile, was traditionally subject to frequent floods and droughts, but water conservation measures have ameliorated the problem (see Physical Environment, ch. 2). In the mountainous areas west of this plain, winter wheat is still grown, but the climate is more severe and the danger of natural disasters is even greater. In the Northeast the fertile soils of the plains have been used to plant corn, spring wheat, and even rice. Soybeans grown in the Northeast are of high quality and are exported to Japan. Although Inner Mongolia produces some spring wheat and other grain, it is best known as a pastoral area.

Much of China's vast and generally inhospitable Northwest and Southwest regions are unsuitable for cultivation. Xinjiang-Uygur

Autonomous Region in the Northwest, like Inner Mongolia, is also best known as a pastoral area. In Xizang Autonomous Region (Tibet) in the Southwest most of the cultivated area has been irrigated and special strains of wheat and barley suitable for the climate of that high altitude region have been developed.

China's agricultural labor force in 1980 consisted of at least 300 million people and possibly substantially more. In view of the scarcity of cultivable land, this abundance of manpower has meant the development of labor-intensive production in most parts of the country. And although agriculture is still less labor intensive than in some neighboring countries, it is characterized by meticulous tending of the land and other techniques employed in East Asia over past centuries.

The rural labor force is also employed in rural capital construction projects and small-scale industries. During the winter months a large proportion of commune members work on construction and maintenance of irrigation or land-leveling projects intended to add to the "high and stable yield" areas. Where rural industrial plants exist, they usually employ a small proportion of the rural labor force, and many peasants also engage in sideline activities such as handicrafts. The government tightly limits migration from rural to urban areas by various controls including the rationing of food and other necessities in cities.

The country's agricultural capital stock had been built up in large part by land modification. Fields were leveled and consolidated, and substantial investments were made in building and modernizing irrigation facilities. The production of mechanical agricultural equipment was a major industry. Many observers still noted a shortage of transportation facilities needed to take crops to market and bring modern inputs to users (see Transportation, ch. 8). In addition to capital, China had available a supply of skilled labor and a stock of technical information on seed varieties, fertilizer use and, despite the damage done by the Cultural Revolution (see Glossary), other components of modern agricultural production as well.

Agricultural Policies

Agricultural policies were developed and implemented in the context of the socialist economic system and the semimodern condition of agriculture; their goal was the amelioration of the problem of feeding 1 billion persons with only a meager resource endowment.

The experiences of other East Asian countries—such as Japan where (as in China) traditional peasant agriculture involved intensive use of the land and of the Soviet Union, whose socialist ideology and goal of rapid industrialization China shared—influenced planners especially during the 1950s. The Soviet model was unsuited to China, however, in certain respects. The population to land ratio in the Soviet Union is lower and the growing season usually shorter than that of China.

Agricultural policy has gone through three broad phases: the 1950s period, when agriculture was collectivized, ending with the Great Leap Forward of 1958–60 (see Glossary); the period from 1961 to the death of Chairman Mao in 1976 when more agricultural progress came to depend on the supply of capital and modern inputs; the period under the post-Mao leadership characterized by greater reliance on economic incentives for production and more diversity in output.

The 1950s Period

Before the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, the distribution of land had been unequal—although many peasants owned part or all of the small holdings they farmed—and tenancy was common, especially in South China. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) made land reform a policy in areas under its control even before 1949, and subsequently landlords and wealthy peasants became targets of party attack. Their elimination as a class was a major aim of the land reform movement begun under the Agrarian Reform Law of June 28, 1950, (see The People's Republic of China [1949–   ], ch. 1). Collectivization of agriculture, which was accomplished in several stages, began about 1952.

The first stage was characterized by mutual aid teams. These were kept simple, involving only the temporary sharing of labor and some capital; individual households remained the basic unit of ownership and production. In 1954 mutual aid teams were organized with increasing rapidity into agricultural producers' cooperatives, which differed from the mutual aid teams in that tools, draft animals, and labor were shared on a permanent basis. Cooperative members retained ownership of their land but secured a share in the cooperative by staking their plots along with those of other members in the common land pool. By 1956 the transformation of mutual aid teams into agricultural cooperatives was nearly complete. By the end of that year, moreover, the great majority of cooperatives had moved to a still higher stage of collectivization, having become advanced producers' cooperatives. These cooperatives contrasted with those of the earlier stage in that members no longer retained their individual landholdings; although small private plots were permitted, most of the land was collectively owned by the cooperative. Earlier in this period another development was the establishment of state farms in which land became the property of the state (see Planning and Organization, this ch.).

This degree of collectivization was achieved with much less turmoil than had occurred during collectivization in the Soviet Union. As in the Soviet Union, however, investment in the agricultural sector was kept low relative to industrial investment because of planners' desires to achieve more rapid growth of basic industries. But collectivization also did not prevent the growth of output; grain production, for example, increased by 3.5 percent per year under the

First Five-Year Plan (1953–57). Growth was achieved mainly through the intensified use of traditional agricultural techniques, together with some technical improvements and the addition of some modern inputs.

Once collectivization had been achieved and agricultural output per capita had begun to increase, the leadership embarked on the extremely ambitious programs of the Great Leap Forward. In agriculture this meant unrealistically high production goals and an even higher degree of collectivization than had already been achieved. The collectives were organized very rapidly into communes, which were much larger units. The production targets were not accompanied by a sufficient amount of capital and modern inputs; rather they were to be reached in large measure by heroic efforts on the part of peasants.

Substantial effort was expended on large-scale but often poorly planned capital construction projects, such as irrigation works. Because of the intense pressure for results, the rapidity of the change, and the inexperience and resistance of many cadres and peasants, the Great Leap soon ran into difficulties. The peasants became exhausted from the unremitting pressure to produce. Production statistics were consciously inflated, on the theory that accuracy mattered less than political effect, and resulted in extravagant claims. Disruption of agricultural activity and transport produced food shortages in the cities. In addition the weather in 1959–61 was unfavorable and agricultural production declined sharply. By the early 1960s, therefore, a severe agricultural depression had developed, and China was forced to import grain (during the 1950s it had been a net exporter) to supply urban areas. Otherwise, an excessive procurement burden would have fallen on the peasants.

"Agriculture First"

Faced with this depression the country retrenched in the early 1960s. Incentives for individual and collective production were increased, a certain amount of decentralization of management was undertaken, and the role of private plots and markets was expanded. Most importantly the leadership embarked on policies designed to put "agriculture first" in planning, at least in principle. This meant more modern inputs for the countryside. Production and imports of chemical fertilizer were increased. Modern high-yielding seed varieties began to be developed. Irrigation facilities—many of which had been washed out during disastrous floods in 1959–61—were repaired and expanded, and the government began to provide more mechanical pumps and irrigation equipment.

These improvements were not haphazard; most were focused on more advanced and productive areas. The intent was to build areas of modernized agriculture with high and stable yields that would be able to provide the state with increased surpluses and would form the basis for more secure agricultural production. In general the places designated as "high and stable yield" areas were those with adequate irrigation and drainage, so that the payoff to greater use of fertilizer and new seeds would be higher. As a result of the expansion of irrigation and drainage, by 1980 over one-third of all land in the country was designated "high and stable yield" area, much of it in the lower Yangtze delta. In the country as a whole these areas were most frequently found in suburban regions and in and near river valleys.

Recovery from the failures of the Great Leap Forward was essentially achieved by the mid-1960s, and grain output first surpassed previous peak levels in 1966. In addition small enterprises in the mid-1960s began to produce substantial quantities of chemical fertilizer. Government researchers developed fertilizer-responsive seeds. Focusing these inputs on "high and stable yield" areas meant that parts of China that were already advanced tended to be favored over backward or less developed regions, thus widening a gap that already had potentially serious implications (see Inequality, Stratification and Social Mobility, ch. 3).

At the same time the government urged poorer areas to rely mainly on their own efforts. This was symbolized, especially during the Cultural Revolution, by the campaign to "learn from Dazhai." Dazhai was a village in the Northwest that had overcome poverty and poor production conditions to become relatively wealthy by Chinese standards. It was claimed that this had been accomplished through self-reliance and struggle. Dazhai became a model of this type of development and was occasionally used as a model of political organization as well.

This set of policies—including "agriculture first" and emphasis on the supply of modern inputs and on the Dazhai model—formed the framework for agricultural development from the early 1960s until the post-Mao era. The Cultural Revolution caused some disruption but not nearly so much as in the industrial sector. Under these later policies agricultural output substantially increased; by the 1975–77 period, for example, grain output had risen by more than 40 percent over the level of 1965.

Post-Mao Policies

When the CCP leadership began to evaluate progress in agriculture in the light of its campaign to move the nation toward the ambitious targets of the "four modernizations," it noted disappointing failures along with some impressive gains. Furthermore, even though per capita grain production had increased from the depressed levels of the early 1960s, output had stagnated in the 1975–77 period, and per capita production was still not above average levels of the 1950s. Output of other major crops had grown even more slowly. It was decided to put even greater emphasis on agricultural planning, capital investment, and on providing more incentives to produce.

Peasant farmer tests new tractor at industrial trade fair, Sichuan Province. Courtesy William H. Young, Jr.

The leadership intends to raise the proportion of agricultural investment from 11 percent of the total in 1978 to 18 percent by the mid-1980s. This reflects current recognition that agricultural development will require a shift of resources and emphasis from other sectors. Planning of agricultural production is relying more on local management. In addition, specialization in production in areas suited to grain, industrial crops, or livestock is being encouraged.

The new policies reduced emphasis on the collective and on ideology that prevailed during the Cultural Revolution. They increased the role of private activities, and lower level units were to have more influence in decisions. The policies were designed to increase the incentives for individual and collective production efforts, and they potentially widened income differentials between producers.

The new policies quickly began to produce results. Higher prices for farm output, combined with tax and procurement adjustments, brought greater farm revenues in 1978 and 1979. Part of these and part of future increases in revenues were to be spent on consumption while part was to be retained for investment and the purchase of modern inputs. The role of free farm markets was being expanded, and the prices of many commodities were to be determined by market conditions. The prices of several important agricultural products, including major grain crops, were increased by an average of 25 percent in 1979. In late 1980 required procurement sales were based on average levels in the 1971–75 period, and future increases in state domestic procurement were likely to be determined increasingly through the price mechanism.

The responsibilities of production teams for decisionmaking power over the use of their resources was being increased (see Planning and Organization, this ch.). Within the production team, the link between effort and reward was being strengthened. In many areas small work groups were established that were given the use of team land and other resources under a contract which scaled remuneration to output. Individual and household production was also being stressed, and private plots and sideline activities were being encouraged. Free marketing and direct sales outside the state system were also helping to encourage private initiative.

To maximize efficiency in production and marketing of some important food crops and livestock, specialized production bases were being established. Twelve of the largest were to specialize in grain. Smaller bases would concentrate on other food crops and livestock for the national as well as local markets. Suburban communes were likely to reduce their efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in grain and to give more attention to items with higher value in city markets—meat and vegetables, for example. Specialization had not reached a high level in the past, because of the government's preference for local self-sufficiency. Other factors were the lack of transportation facilities and the fact that large areas were primarily noncommercial subsistance agriculture. In addition to production bases, the Chinese were experimenting with the vertical integration of production, processing, and marketing on some state farms. This system was intended to increase the productivity of the state farm sector and to increase the flow of marketed products from them.

The new policies were designed in part to secure a greater flow of goods from agriculture to support higher consumption levels and provide more inputs for industry. The encouragement of private activities and growing use of economic incentives, as well as increased government support for agriculture, were all likely to add to rural purchasing power. Incomes in the rural sector had not risen substantially since 1966. After 1977, however, collective incomes began to rise rapidly, reaching ¥83 (for value of the yuan—¥—see Glossary) per capita in 1979, and incomes from sideline and other activities were also increasing.

Average rural incomes should rise, and most households are likely to benefit from the new policies. In 1980 it was highly improbable that the gap between urban and rural incomes would be closed or that income inequalities within the rural sector would level off. In fact, given the concentration of investment in "high and stable yield" areas, the increased emphasis on marketing, and the continuing investment in technical modernization, the differential would probably widen. In general however, the prospects were good for an overall rise in rural prosperity.

Other Aspects of Agricultural Policy

As in other centrally planned economies, the state is responsible for organizing and directing a major part of the flow of resources between sectors. It can achieve this using a variety of instruments, including prices and markets as well as direct controls. It must balance the needs of various sectors for inputs (as well as the needs of consumers in both rural and urban areas) in trying to meet its goals (see ch. 5, Economic Context).

Accordingly, in addition to overall policies the government has undertaken specific programs encompassing state procurement, the use of private production and markets, and pricing of agricultural output and inputs. These policies have also varied over time depending on the political climate and the context of other agricultural programs.

The government must procure grain, certain crops, and other agricultural products from the peasants in order to supply urban areas and food-deficient regions with subsistence and to provide inputs for textile and other light industries. Part of the required amount is obtained simply as a direct tax. The proportion obtained from taxes had declined over time, however, and the tax in 1980 was worth less than 6 percent of the value of total production. The remainder has been obtained through purchases by state procurement agencies. Some of these sales are obligatory—sales quotas are imposed on certain units, and they are required to sell the quota amounts to the state. The quotas are usually fixed for a period of time so as not to reduce the incentive to increase production. Units that can sell more than their tax and quota amounts are encouraged to do so by the fact that above-quota sales are made at a premium price.

Private activities, including production on private plots and sales on free markets, play an increasingly important role. Privately produced and traded products are valuable in providing variety in the diet and responding to consumers' preferences for items that are not available through state channels. They are also important to households in supplementing the income of the collective. In 1980 private activities accounted for about one-third of the total of peasant income. The government's attitude toward private activity has varied with political changes, more "radical" leaders generally favoring stricter limits. These activities have nevertheless usually been tolerated to some degree as a way of using peasants' initiative to obtain a variety of high-value products.

Over recent decades, prices for agricultural products have generally been raised, while the prices of basic items used in agricultural production have been lowered. This has been necessary in order to promote the use of more inputs to obtain greater production and to provide incentives for the production and sale of agricultural commodities. Agriculture's terms of trade are not as favorable as those in some other East Asian countries, but China has avoided the severe problems faced by the Soviet Union in one major crisis in which the terms of trade turned drastically against agriculture.

Planning and Organization

The state is little involved in actual farm operation. Private plots and state farms together account for only 10 percent of arable land. Collectives own the other 90 percent and produce the bulk of China's agricultural output.

The role of the state lies chiefly in the areas of production planning and resource management. Among state institutions at the national level, the State Agricultural Commission bears most of the responsibility for coordination of agricultural programs. Other central bodies of importance in agricultural policy matters include the ministries of agriculture, food, forestry, agricultural machinery, and state farms and land reclamation; the Agricultural Bank; and various academies and institutes that conduct research on agricultural science, agricultural economics, and related subjects.

Between state institutions at the national level and the collective units at the base of the administrative hierarchy are various provincial and county-level government organs which also administer plans, including some programs for agricultural research and extension. Some 2,000 county-level units coordinate plans with the collectives in their jurisdictions. County-level units sometimes operate their own chemical fertilizer plants or other factories producing basic agricultural items, and they help direct the allocation of materials produced to peasant farmers.

People's communes, numbering about 50,000 and averaging about 15,000 members, are the largest collective units. They are divided into production brigades, generally corresponding to villages, and the brigades are further subdivided into production teams, each composed of a number of households. The teams are the basic accounting units in agriculture (see Rural Social Organization, ch. 3). They own the land and are generally responsible, within the limits of state plans, for production and the distribution of income. In some cases they may also form smaller work groups for specific purposes. In addition, some production is carried out by individuals on private plots. These account on average for 5 percent of total agricultural land, although there is wide geographical variation in the amount allocated to private plots. As the basis of rural social organization, communes and lower level units have a wide range of functions beyond their role in agricultural production.

In late 1980 collective incomes were allocated to individual team members on the basis of the number of "work points" each accumulated. Team members were awarded a certain number of points for each day's work—the number usually depending on the difficulty of the work. When the team received income from the sale of crops, for example, it was distributed to team members on the basis of the total number of points each had obtained in relation to the team's total. Peasant income was mostly in kind—in grain and other products—although higher income teams with more sales and more extensive subsidiary activities would receive more in cash. These food items were rationed out as necessary and then charged against households' work points. As a welfare measure, those unable to earn enough points to cover their basic rations might carry a debit balance. Expenses deducted before calculating the payment to households included taxes, quota deliveries and changes in the team's stocks of products, and funds for welfare and for purchasing capital equipment and other inputs.

In addition to output by the collective sector, some agricultural production occurred on state farms. On these farms the land was owned by the state and the farm workers received regular wages as in a factory. They were mostly found on the fringes of the main agricultural areas, especially on newly reclaimed land (many are in the Northeast), and they only accounted for about 4 percent of total cultivated land.

Operational Methods and Inputs

The Chinese have long used techniques that raise the productivity of their scarce land—fertilizers and irrigation, for example. Over time many of the inputs have been modernized—chemical fertilizers supplementing organics, and mechanical pumps coming into use in irrigation. In 1980 government planners were emphasizing increased use of fertilizer, improved irrigation, mechanization of agriculture, and the extension of improved seed varieties as leading features of the agricultural modernization program.

Cropping Patterns

All of these modern inputs are used in the context of the traditional intensive cropping patterns. To maximize year-round use of the land, two or more crops of rice are planted each year where possible, sometimes with a winter crop of wheat or oilseeds. Multiple cropping was emphasized to excess in some places, as in the Szechwan Basin for example, without adequate inputs to support yields, and in 1980 the extension of multiple cropping had slowed. To improve yields in North China, more rice acreage has been introduced where conditions permit, and the planting of hybrid corn has increased dramatically. Acreage of oilseeds, cotton, and other nongrain crops has been expanded as well. Cropping of vegetables has usually been highly intensive, especially near cities.

Fertilizer

Intensive use of the arable soil has made the use of fertilizer imperative to replace nutrients and to help improve yields. Organic fertilizers have long supplied the bulk of soil nutrients and have helped to maintain the structure of the soil. Chemical fertilizers have been used increasingly since the 1960s. Use of chemical fertilizers in 1979 was over 100 kilograms per hectare, measured in nutrient weight. Use of organic fertilizers has also increased with the growth in population and with the increased size of livestock herds. Peasants have traditionally used a large proportion of their labor in collecting organic materials for fertilizers. Use has been especially heavy in South China, where more intensive cropping has required more fertilizer and where the sources of fertilizer have been more abundant. The country's considerable future needs may have to be met by chemical fertilizer, however, because of the natural limits on rapid increases in production of organics.

Production and imports of chemical fertilizers were increased rapidly under the "agriculture first" programs of the early 1960s. The domestic industry was expanded, partly with the help of imported fertilizer factories, and production reached 7.6 million tons by 1965. Imports in 1965 were over 3 million tons. In the mid-1960s the government also began to emphasize the production of chemical fertilizer in small plants that yielded about 10,000 tons per year and were usually operated by counties. Output in these plants increased very rapidly, and in 1977 they produced a total of 22.8 million tons. Their products were used locally, which helped conserve transportation facilities. In 1980 there was more of a trend toward production in large-scale plants. In 1972 the government had contracted to import thirteen large-scale urea plants, each capable of producing over 1 million tons of standard nitrogen fertilizer per year. By 1980 these were all in operation. Total chemical fertilizer production in 1979 was 54.2 million tons, of which 44.1 million tons was nitrogen. Imports added another 8.6 million tons. This was still less per hectare than the Japanese average and less than in a number of other densely populated countries. Future production and imports were likely to emphasize phosphate content in order to balance the nutrients obtained from organics and from existing plants. "High and stable yield" areas have used a disproportionately large share of total fertilizer because of the complementarity between fertilizer and irrigation.

Mechanization

At the end of 1979 there were 667,000 large tractors and 1.67 million smaller garden tractors in use, and 42 percent of the land was mechanically plowed. Mechanical equipment was used on about half the irrigated acreage, and a large proportion of the processing of agricultural products was done mechanically.

Mechanization has been controversial among agricultural planners. Some favor it as a means of increasing labor productivity and yields; others oppose it on the grounds that alternative inputs would yield higher output at less cost. At one point shortly after Mao's death, a short-term national goal of mechanization of 70 percent of major agricultural tasks was announced and was well publicized in the press.

As of 1980 the leadership appeared to be proceeding more cautiously, taking into account the complexity of the issue. Despite the large stock and high rate of production of tractors, most tasks were performed manually, sometimes with the aid of draft animals. Because of the intensity of crop cultivation it was difficult to use machinery in many of the tasks that required the most labor. Rice was mostly transplanted by hand, for example; China had not succeeded in developing and producing rice transplanters in substantial quantities. About 30 percent of tractors in stock in 1980 needed repairs, and a large proportion of tractors were used for transportation instead of for agricultural production. Trained operators and spare parts were scarce. Success in mechanization could also create difficulties in absorbing new entrants to the agricultural labor force. For the time being China was likely to concentrate mechanization in areas of large-scale farming, as in the North China Plain and the Northeast.

Water Conservancy

Irrigation facilities covered nearly half the cultivated land; systems installed since the late 1960s extended over a considerable part of North China, especially on the North China Plain. Irrigation was important in traditional agriculture—some facilities existed as long as 2,000 years ago. The extension of water conservancy facilities by labor-intensive means was an important part of the agricultural development programs of the 1950s. During the Great Leap Forward a number of water conservancy projects were undertaken with insufficient planning and capital. During the turmoil and bad weather of 1959–61 many water conservancy works were washed out by floods or otherwise destroyed, reducing the irrigated acreage considerably. Facilities were rebuilt in the early 1960s. Since then both irrigation and drainage systems have been expanded to add to the stock of high and stable yielding land. The stock of mechanical pumps has also been greatly increased—powered irrigation equipment reaching 71.2 million horsepower in 1979. Planning of this expansion has not always been adequate. Many of the projects have been too expensive. Some have removed land from forestry and taken ponds previously used for fishing. Adding additional acreage was likely to be increasingly costly since the areas not irrigated included many areas more remote from water sources.

North China was chronically short of water and subject to frequent droughts. A considerable proportion of its irrigation came from wells. Some have proposed diverting water from the Yangtze River, but that was not likely to be done soon. Assuming the water supply was adequate, the use of sprinklers would help increase the efficiency of irrigation.

Pest Control

The main method of weed and insect control has been labor-intensive cultivation. Fields have been carefully tended, and a variety

Fish culture near Wuhan,
Hubei Province

Rice culture, Hunan Province



Growing taro and pole beans near Guangzhou,
Guangdong Province
Photos Courtesy Halsey L. Beemer, Jr.

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of biological means of control were used. In addition, production and use of chemical herbicides and pesticides have been increased. Resultant pollution has been reported, some damaging to fishing, but in 1980 use was still at a low level by international standards.

Seed Varieties

Improved seed varieties have been an important factor in improving crop yields. Modern, highly fertilizer-responsive varieties came into use beginning in the mid-1960s. These were comparable to those developed outside China but were adapted to the shorter growing season imposed by multiple cropping. Some observers have expressed concern over the possible loss of germ plasm and other potential problems created by weaknesses in China's agricultural science system, but the new seeds have nevertheless contributed substantially to increases in output. Their extension has complemented the large increases in fertilizer use and the increase in irrigated area. In the late 1970s China began to plant hybrid rice, claiming yield increases of over 20 percent. Hybrid rice is unknown elsewhere because of the amount of labor it requires, but over 5 million hectares of it were planted in China in 1979. The China Seed Company had been established in 1978 to help improve seed distribution, and two years later a number of specialized seed production bases were also being established.

Agricultural Science

State planners emphasized applied research in agricultural science. Agricultural science has suffered from changes in policy and emphasis since the 1950s. In 1980 the Chinese were attempting to rebuild their agricultural science training and research program after the disruption of the Cultural Revolution. They continued to emphasize practical, production-oriented scientific work. The extension system, which popularizes new techniques and new inputs, was relatively strong. Agricultural colleges and research institutes were being strengthened. There were thirty-two major research institutes throughout the country in 1980, most of them specialized. In addition, there were thirty-eight agricultural colleges whose staffs and facilities were being improved and expanded to accommodate an increased flow of students. Research was being strengthened by the construction of sixteen regionally distributed agricultural experiment stations. New agricultural journals and societies were being established to promote the dissemination of research results within the country. Technical information was being sought abroad as well through the import of technology and machinery and the international exchange of delegations.

Production

The results of China's agricultural policies in terms of output have been mixed. Food consumption has been maintained at subsistence level despite the catastrophic drop in production that followed the

Great Leap Forward but has failed to rise much beyond the subsistence-level range. Since the 1950s grain production has increased on average slightly faster than total population, and since the 1960s the rate of growth has been over 3 percent per year. The total value of agricultural output has increased even faster, characterized by rapid increases in the production of meat and subsidiary products. In part the gains have been due to the technical improvement of "high and stable yield" areas, but these improvements have not always been cost-effective. Production in many parts of the country was often markedly affected by the weather. Great income inequalities still existed in the countryside and a substantial gap continued between rural and urban living standards.

In recent years the government has begun to emphasize the need for more diversified production. In the past—especially since the 1960s—the output of grain, the basic subsistence food, has been heavily stressed, sometimes to the neglect of other important products. By 1980 previous levels of per capita grain production had been restored, however, and the demand for a variety of other agricultural goods—especially edible oils and meat—was apt to grow.

Grain

Grain is China's most important agricultural product—the source of most calories and protein in the average diet and accounting for a sizable proportion of the value of agricultural production. Grain crops are planted on about 80 percent of cultivated land. Grain production in 1979 was 332 million tons. (Chinese grain statistics include soybeans, pulses, and dried potatoes; they also include fresh potatoes at one-fifth their weight.)

Rice is the most important grain crop, making up a little under half of the country's total grain output. In 1979 output was 142.8 million tons, or 43 percent of the total. Although it grows in every province, the bulk of the country's production is the southern provinces where rice is the predominant grain crop and where in many localities conditions and resources permit the cultivation of two crops each year. Occasionally, in the most intensively cultivated areas three rice crops or alternatively two rice crops and one of winter wheat may be grown each year.

Rice cultivation is highly labor intensive. Rice is generally grown as a wetland crop in fields flooded to supply water during the growing season. Transplanting seedlings requires many hours of labor, as does harvesting. When rice is double cropped, one crop must be harvested and the next transplanted in as short a time as possible to provide each crop the longest possible growing season. Multiple cropping therefore increases the need for labor at peak periods; fortunately, with respect to labor requirements, the rice-growing regions are also the more densely populated. Mechanization of rice cultivation is only minimally advanced. Rice cultivation also demands more of other inputs than other crops.

Wheat, the predominant crop in China's northern provinces, has long been the second most important grain crop, although in the 1980s its place was being challenged by corn. Winter wheat is generally the most important type, making up 85 to 90 percent of each year's crop. It is abundant on the North China Plain. To the north of the plain and in the Northeast spring wheat, however, is more common.

Corn is grown in most parts of the country but is most common in areas that produce wheat. Production has increased substantially over time, and in some years corn production is second only to rice. The Chinese have traditionally considered corn less desirable as human food than other types of grain. Nevertheless, it can frequently yield more per unit of land than other varieties of grain, making it useful for maintaining subsistence.

Millet and sorghum are both raised in the northern provinces. Potatoes are grown in most agricultural regions, usually as secondary crops. These are generally considered to be somewhat lower quality foods than rice and wheat.

Soybeans, a leguminous crop, are also included in China's grain statistics. The Northeast has traditionally been the most important producing area, but substantial amounts of soybeans are also produced in the North region and some in other parts of the country. (Production of soybeans declined after the Great Leap Forward, and output in the late 1970s had not regained the 10-million-ton level of the late 1950s.) Soybeans are a useful source of protein and fat—an important consideration given the limited amount of meat available and the grain and vegetable-based diet. Oilseed cakes, a by-product of soybean oil extraction, are used as animal feed and as fertilizer.

Industrial Crops

Nongrain crops include food such as sugar crops and oilseeds as well as some which are used for fibers and other purposes. Most of these require some processing.

China produces significant quantities of jute and hemp, but cotton is the most important fiber crop. Cotton is the main source of raw materials for the textile industry, although the petrochemical industry has been providing increasing amounts of synthetic fibers. With emphasis on the textile and other light industries increasing in 1980, both for exports and to satisfy the domestic market, the demand for cotton outstripped the domestic supply. (Domestic output had not increased significantly since the mid-1960s.)

To cover the deficit, cotton imports reached a record 600,000 tons in 1979 and were continuing at record levels in 1980. China had become one of the world's largest importers of cotton and was an important customer of United States cotton producers.

Sugarcane is the most important sugar crop. Sugarcane is grown in the southern provinces, especially in Guangdong, while sugar

Corn cultivation, Shandong Province
Courtesy Halsey L. Beemer, Jr.

beets are mainly produced in the Northeast. Although sugar production has increased substantially since the early 1950s, it has remained insufficient for the domestic market and must be imported.

The most important oilseeds are peanuts, rapeseed, and sesame. Output had stagnated at a low level until the late 1970s, when it finally surpassed the levels of the late 1950s. Per capita output remained very low in 1979, however, and increasing consumption of edible oils gave them high priority.

Tea and silk, produced mainly in the southern provinces, have traditionally been important commercial crops. The domestic market for these products has been substantial, but they are also important exports. Tobacco is produced mainly for domestic consumption; China is one of the world's biggest tobacco producers.

Animal Husbandry

In 1980 China was promoting animal husbandry to meet the demand for meat and had begun to set up large-scale hog and chicken farms near major cities, sometimes with foreign help. Some private households also raised hogs. The state procured hogs for urban consumption and export. Meat consumption was relatively low, averaging about eight kilograms per capita each year. The main source of meat was pork. Poultry was an important supplement. Further development would probably require more dependence on grain feeding and more modern production methods. The establishment of livestock bases and the development of grazing lands for meat production were being discussed, but the progress on these projects was likely to be slow. Nevertheless, there was considerable scope for increases in meat output through production specialization and increased efficiency.

Large animals are used mainly to provide draft power for crop cultivation and for transportation. They include water buffaloes—found mainly in the southern provinces—and oxen, cattle, horses, mules, and donkeys. As mechanization of agriculture increases, the need for draft animals may decline. If large animal herds are maintained, it is likely that they will be used increasingly for meat production. Some dairy cows are kept, but the level of consumption of dairy products is low (as it has traditionally been). Sheep and goats can be found in many parts of the country but are most common in herding regions, e.g., Inner Mongolia, outside the main agricultural areas. They are useful both for meat and as a source of wool for the textile industry. They may receive increasing emphasis under the new policies promoting herding bases.

Other Products

Production of fish and seafood products had stagnated since the mid-1950s, and fishing made up less than 2 percent of the value of agricultural output. Fishing had not developed rapidly because ponds had been filled in to provide land for crop production and because of overfishing and pollution. Fish continue to contribute protein and variety to the Chinese diet as well as revenue for the agricultural sector; consumer demand for aquatic products will likely increase rapidly. Hoping to increase output over time, the government had already begun a fisheries program with emphasis on conservation and the protection of resources such as breeding grounds. Investment in production bases and processing and transportation facilities was to follow.

In 1980 forestry accounted for 3 percent of the value of agricultural output. Trees are relatively scarce in the main agricultural areas because land has been cleared for crop production. Most timber therefore comes from the Northeast and the less densely populated parts of the Northwest and Southwest. Wood for construction, pulp, paper, and other uses is in short supply. The lack of forest cover in some places has led to soil erosion and to silting problems in rivers.

The area covered in forest amounted to some 13 percent of the total land area, which China hoped to increase over the long term to 30 percent. Afforestation campaigns have normally been carried out each year, but the survival rate has been low. From time to time there have also been campaigns to plant shelter belts and forests for soil stabilization and erosion control; however, these have not been very successful. The total area afforested has been increased since 1949; at the same time the value of timber cut has been greater than the value of total new growth. An increase in usable forest resources would require improved management and planning, an increase in investment in the forestry sector, and sustained effort over the long term.

Rural small-scale industries have played an important role in providing industrial products to the countryside. Small plants, generally run at the county level or lower, have been especially prominent in such industries as chemical fertilizer and cement. Many types exist—from brigade-level repair shops to county-size small fertilizer factories. Most have produced items for local use, although some contracted with higher level units for the sale of their output. To a certain extent they have helped to economize on the use of China's scarce transportation facilities, to use part of the rural labor force, and to supply products that the urban sector could not (see ch. 7, Industry). In addition to these industrial activities, peasants have engaged in some sideline occupations at the household or village level such as traditional handicrafts and the processing of agricultural goods.

Agricultural Trade

In 1980 China was importing grain at the rate of over ten million tons per year. Most of the imported grain was wheat; some was corn. It was consumed mainly in coastal cities, especially in the northern and northeastern provinces. China was a net exporter of agricultural products however. Such exports increased until 1980, a trend that was likely to continue. As a share of total exports, they had nevertheless declined over time although in 1979 they still accounted for about 30 percent of total exports. In 1979 agricultural imports were valued at US$3.1 billion.

China had become a net importer of grain after the failure of the Great Leap Forward; imports were designed to relieve the procurement pressure on the peasants. Some rice was still exported, partly because its price on world markets was relatively high. The average level of grain imports in the 1960s and 1970s was about five million tons annually; some fluctuations depended on needs and market conditions. The level was raised in the late 1970s, in part to help improve living standards and production incentives while the post-Mao economic policies were being implemented. Fluctuations in grain imports have been relatively small. The diversity of crops and climates has meant that domestic output is usually more reliable than in the Soviet Union, and there is less need to import large amounts of grain after poor harvests.

In addition to grain, China imports significant quantities of cotton, sugar, soybeans, and soybean oil. Cotton imports reached over 600,000 tons in 1979, a record level that has made it one of the world's largest importers; domestic production had stagnated, while the needs of the domestic textile industry were increasing rapidly. Synthetic fibers may substitute for cotton as their production increases. Soybean imports reflected stagnant domestic production. Higher quality soybeans were a useful foreign exchange earner, but the domestic market for both soybeans and edible oil had been tight in recent years. China imported 565,000 metric tons of soybeans and over 100,000 metric tons of soybean oil in 1979, while exporting 245,000 metric tons of soybeans. Over 1 million metric tons of sugar were imported in 1979 for the third year in a row.

China obtains more agricultural products from the United States than any other country. Imports of grain also come from Canada and Australia, with smaller amounts purchased from Argentina and other countries. Nearby Asian markets, especially Hong Kong and Japan, are outlets for China's agricultural exports. The most important export products are meat and live animals, fish, fruit, and vegetables.

China is likely to continue to import grain and other agricultural products for the foreseeable future. These imports would be used to maintain or improve living standards, especially in urban areas. In rural areas imports would help reduce the pressure for more procurement, freeing resources for increased consumption or investment in local agricultural programs.

In the long run China may wish to reduce the expenditure of foreign exchange needed to finance agricultural imports. These expenditures reduce the amount of imports that can be used for modernization and investment in other sectors of the economy. Success in reducing imports will eventually depend on the development of domestic sources of supply, for which China hopes to rely in part on

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new production bases for marketable crops. Pressure for increased consumption—whether from domestic or foreign sources—is likely to continue, owing to the increase in population and the need for more agricultural goods (including grain, industrial crops, and grain-consuming livestock) to support higher real incomes both in urban areas and in the new agricultural base areas. Development of base areas might also help increase agricultural exports—for example, soybean production bases in the Northeast might supply Japan.

* * *

Useful general works on the Chinese economy include Christopher Howe's *China's Economy: A Basic Guide*; Alexander Eckstein's *China's Economic Revolution;* and Chapter IV of Qi Wen's *China: A General Survey*. Works on agriculture include Dwight H. Perkin's *Agricultural Development in China 1368–1968*; Kang Chao's *Agricultural Production in Communist China*; and Benedict Stavis' *Making Green Revolution*. The Chinese press publishes a considerable amount of information on agricultural policies and production. The weekly journal *Beijing Review*, in English, has a semiannual index. The *China Quarterly*, published in London, frequently contains articles on Chinese agriculture by foreign observers. The National Academy of Sciences Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China has published several interesting trip reports by United States agricultural delegations. The United States government publishes information and analysis concerning China. The Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress has published a volume on China's economy every three years; the most recent volume (1978) is entitled *The Chinese Economy Post-Mao*. Many reports on a variety of agricultural topics are published by the United States Department of Agriculture and by the United States Central Intelligence Agency's National Foreign Assessment Center. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 7. Industry

The small pottery figurine of a dancing actor expresses the strong interest in theater that developed during the Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368).

IN THE THIRTY YEARS after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, industry was consistently the most dynamic part of the economy, the major source of economic growth, and the leading sector in modernization. From 1952 to 1978 industrial output grew at an average annual rate of 13 percent—over three times the rate for agriculture and nearly twice as fast as the gross national product (GNP). The share of GNP produced by industry increased from about 20 percent in the early 1950s to around 50 percent in 1979. The gross value of industrial production in 1979 was ¥459.1 billion (for value of the Yuan—¥—see Glossary), nearly three times the value of agricultural output, which was ¥158.4 billion.

In spite of its dominant position in the economy, industry employed a minor share of the labor force—approximately 10 percent of the total in 1978, or 42.6 million persons. The growth of output by industry was largely owed to steady improvements in labor productivity. In 1979 greater output per worker accounted for 62 percent of the increase in production by state-owned industrial enterprises; only 38 percent was brought about by increasing the number of workers. For the entire period after 1949 some 40 to 50 percent of industrial growth was attributed to gains in productivity.

In addition to raising its own productivity, industry provided the material means for the other sectors of the economy to move towards modernization. Growth in the rest of the economy depended on the rate at which industrial enterprises could supply machinery, chemicals, buildings, fuel, and other modern inputs. The agricultural sector in particular required vast quantities of tractors, pumps, electricity, gasoline, chemical fertilizer, and insecticide in order to achieve the growth rates planned for the 1980s (see Operational Methods and Inputs, ch. 6).

Another important function of industry was to supply the military with modern equipment. Defense spending lagged behind industrial growth after 1972 but still amounted to between 8 and 10 percent of GNP (see Military Expenditures, ch. 14). The higher technology sectors of the machine-building industry, such as the aircraft and electronics industries, were extensively engaged in military production.

A negative result of industrial growth was an increasingly serious pollution problem. Chinese industries had devoted little effort to pollution control, and by the 1970s the air in many cities was seriously contaminated, as were many rivers. In 1979 the country promulgated its first environmental protection law.

Technology and Organization

Industry as defined here consists of manufacturing, construction, mining, oil and natural gas production, and the electric power system. Manufacturing is the largest of these categories in terms of number of workers employed, value of output, and variety of products. The principal industries that make up the manufacturing sector are iron and steel, machine building, chemicals, building materials, textiles, paper, food processing, other consumer goods, and handicrafts.

Technology employed in industry in 1980 ranged from primitive handicraft methods, such as basket weaving, to ultramodern production facilities such as the recently installed steel-finishing lines at the Wuhan steel complex. For the most part, Western observers found the equipment and production processes of Chinese industries to be comparable to those in the United States in the 1950s or 1960s. The existence of a wide spectrum of technology levels was certain to continue since the economy could not provide advanced equipment and techniques in sufficient numbers to rapidly transform the entire sector, either by domestic production or by foreign trade. Government policy specifically advocated that outmoded equipment that was replaced by modern machinery should either continue to be used in the same enterprise or transferred to a lower level plant. Modernization of industry followed the policy of "walking on two legs": utilizing advanced technology, much of it imported, as extensively as possible, but at the same time making full use of older, less efficient, but more widely available techniques. As of 1979 small local plants using outdated technology accounted for significant portions of national output in several industries, notably farm machinery, chemical fertilizer, cement, coal, and hydroelectric power (see Agricultural Machinery, this ch.).

Industry was organized within the government administrative structure and by types and levels of ownership and control. Responsibility for its administration rested with various ministries under the State Council (see The State Council, ch. 10). In 1979 these were the ministries of agricultural machinery, metallurgical industry, coal industry, petroleum industry, chemical industry, electric power industry, building materials, textile industry, and light industry. There were also seven other machine-building ministries—the first controlled most production of machinery and equipment for civilian use; the others were respectively in charge of producing nuclear weapons, aircraft, electronics equipment, conventional armaments, ships, missiles, and aerospace systems.

There were two main types of ownership of economic enterprises: "ownership by the whole people" (or state ownership) and collective ownership. Under state ownership the productive assets of an enterprise were owned by the state, activities of the enterprise were determined by national economic plans, and profits or losses accrued to the state budget. Most of the largest modern enterprises were owned by the state and directly controlled by the central government. Many other enterprises were state owned as well but were jointly supervised by the central government and authorities at the

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province, prefecture, or county level. Profits from these enterprises were divided between the central and lower level government units.

Under collective ownership, productive assets were owned by the workers themselves—in the case of an urban enterprise—or by the members of a commune, brigade, or team (see Glossary) in enterprises established by rural units. Profits and losses belonged to the members of the collective, and the enterprise was only loosely directed by government authorities. As of the late 1970s collectively owned enterprises were generally small and labor intensive. In 1978 they employed 28.5 percent of the total industrial labor force but owned only 8.2 percent of industrial fixed assets and produced 19.3 percent of total industrial output.

Supplies of Industrial Resources

Capital

Throughout the thirty years after 1949, the proportion of the country's income that was devoted to investment was quite large, usually amounting to about a quarter of GNP. About half of all investment was normally allocated to industry. In absolute terms, however, because of China's disproportionately low level of national output, the amount of capital invested relative to the size of the country was very small in comparison with the industrialized nations. In 1960, for instance, gross investment in the United States was US$169.2 billion (in 1978 dollars), while China's entire GNP was estimated to be only US$151.8 billion. In 1978 gross investment in the United States was US$345.6 billion, in the Soviet Union about US$384.9 billion, while China invested only around US$111.1 billion. Investment within China in 1978 was slightly larger than that in France, which had a population less than 6 percent the size of China's. Under the policy of readjustment instituted in 1979, the proportion of national output devoted to investment was to be reduced, as was the share of investment assigned to industry.

In order to supplement domestic sources of capital, the Chinese leadership cleared the way for virtually all forms of foreign loans and credit arrangements by the end of 1979. By early 1980 the country had access to the equivalent of almost US$30 billion in foreign loans and credits through 1985. Foreign capital was also elicited by legalizing and encouraging joint venture projects between Chinese enterprises and foreign firms (see Foreign Trade, ch. 8).

Labor

During the late 1970s significant levels of unemployment appeared in Shanghai and other industrial cities, largely among young people. There were virtually unlimited supplies of unskilled and semiskilled labor available to industry.

At the same time, however, there were severe shortages of skilled workers, engineers, technicians, scientists, and managerial personnel. During the Cultural Revolution (see Glossary) many of the specialists in these fields had been forced to abandon their occupations, and most of the training and educational programs came to a halt during the ten-year hiatus in higher education from 1966 to 1976 (see ch. 4, Education and Culture). This shortage seriously hampered the ability of the industrial sector to absorb imported modern technology and to develop independently new forms of management and production.

Materials

China is well endowed with nearly all of the important industrial ores, fuels, and other minerals. Only a few raw materials are not present in deposits large enough to at least meet domestic needs. Nonetheless, the country was forced to import a number of materials, including aluminum, copper, and iron ore, owing to inadequate development of mining, processing, and transportation (see Iron Ore; Other Minerals, this ch.). Raw cotton was also in chronic short supply (see Textiles, this ch.). Most of these problems were addressed in the modernization program and should eventually be solved.

Energy

China possesses among the world's largest reserves of oil and coal and the largest hydroelectric potential. None of these energy sources had been extensively developed by 1980, and coal and electricity were in short supply. Massive modernization programs, including major inputs of foreign technology, were under way with the aim of multiplying energy production by the mid-1980s (see Coal; Oil and Natural Gas; Electric Power, this ch.).

Geographic Distribution of Industry

Before 1949 industry was concentrated in the large cities along the eastern seaboard and in the Northeast. Shanghai was the largest industrial center, followed by the cities of Liaoning Province, including Anshan, Fushun, and Shenyang. Qingdao on the Shandong peninsula and Tianjin in Hebei Province were also important industrial locations. Only a few cities in the interior had any modern industry; they included Wuhan, Chongqing, and Taiyuan.

During the First Five-Year Plan (1953–57) the government specifically emphasized the development of areas other than Shanghai, in particular the Northeast, and constructed industrial bases around the new steel mills at Baotou in the North and Wuhan in the Central region. Industrial development centers were also begun in the Southwest, mostly in Sichuan Province.

The extensive growth of small-scale industries and the development of mines and oil fields in remote areas have resulted in an ever-widening distribution of industry throughout China. In terms of relative distribution, however, the proximity of the early industrial centers to large deposits of raw materials and major transportation routes has caused them to grow at least as rapidly as the newer areas. In 1980, as in 1952, the leading industrial center of China was Shanghai, followed by the cities of the North and the Northeast. The North grew most in relative share of industrial output, while the remote, fuel deficient areas of the South and Southwest progressed relatively slowly (see fig. 8).

Trends in Industrial Production

Industrial production was strongly affected by the shifts in economic policy that punctuated the history of the People's Republic (see ch. 5, Economic Context). In the period of recovery from 1949 to 1952, industrial output more than doubled as plants were repaired and employment rose.

The First Five-Year Plan concentrated on the construction of plants and equipment for heavy industry, much of it carried out with Soviet assistance. The foundations of the country's machine-building, iron and steel, and mining industries were all laid in this period. The increases in productive capacity resulted in a second doubling of output.

The Great Leap Forward of 1958–60 (see Glossary) saw production surge by 45 percent in 1958 as new plants went into operation, facilities were pushed beyond their capacities, and great numbers of small local plants were created. As the overburdened economy began to collapse, growth fell to 22 percent in 1959 and 4 percent in 1960.

Output dropped precipitously in 1961 due to the withdrawal of Soviet technicians, the misallocation of resources in the preceding years, and the desperate food crisis (see The 1950s Period, ch. 6). In 1962, as planning and coordination were restored, production began to recover. Industrial priorities were transferred from production of investment goods to agricultural inputs and consumer goods. By 1965 most sectors of industry had regained their 1957 levels of output.

The Cultural Revolution, which began in late 1966, caused production to decline by disrupting factories, creating civil disturbances in the big industrial cities, and interrupting the transportation system. Output fell in 1967 and remained below the 1966 level in 1968. As order as restored, production recovered in 1969 and grew by 18 percent in 1970.

With the resumption of systematic growth and the inception of the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1971–75), output grew by over 10 percent in 1971 and 1972 and 13 percent in 1973. A wide-ranging program of investment in plant and equipment, including foreign imports, raised industrial capacity. Thousands of new small-scale plants added significantly to levels of production, especially in coal, chemical fertilizer, cement, and electricity throughout the 1970s.

In the mid-1970s the influence of the Gang of Four (see Glossary) and the disruptive effects of the mounting succession struggle once again dampened industrial activity. Political activities in factories and

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
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0 200 400 Miles
0 200 400 Kilometers

Source: Based on information from Robert Michael Field, "Civilian Industrial Production in the People's Republic of China: 1949–74," *China: A Reassessment of the Economy*, Washington, 1975, p. 155.

Figure 8. Percentage Distribution of Industrial Output by Region, 1970

uncertainty on the part of managers and planners caused growth to fall to 4.4 percent in 1974. Growth recovered to 10.3 percent in 1975 but went to zero in 1976 in the confusion surrounding the deaths of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the second fall of Deng Xiaoping, and the destruction caused by the Tangshan earthquake of July 1976.

In 1977 and 1978 the drive for the "four modernizations" (see Glossary) began in earnest, and growth reached 14 and 13 percent respectively as political stability was restored, existing plants returned to full activity, and new facilities that had been initiated in the early 1970s began to operate.

In 1979 output approached the limits of existing capacity, and the policies of readjustment instituted in that year restrained the rate of growth in the heavy industrial sector, particularly in the coal, oil, and machine-tool industries. Growth of industrial output as a whole declined to 8.5 percent; the rate for light industry was 9.6 percent, exceeding that for heavy industry, which was 7.7 percent.

Industrial Policy in 1980

The industrial policies in force in 1980, the second year of the period of readjustment, were designed to further the objectives of the readjustment program. Rapid development of textiles and light industry was a top priority. Textiles and the consumer goods produced by light industry would be used to improve the living standards of the Chinese people and to increase exports, two main government goals. In addition to increasing the share of investment allocated to these sectors, officials vigorously promoted the establishment of collectively owned and financed textile and light industrial enterprises by collective agricultural units in rural areas and by unemployed urban workers.

In heavy industry the basic goal was not immediate growth in output but creating the basis for a thorough transformation of the economy in later years. Emphasis was placed on strengthening the "weak links" in industry. Imbalances in the iron and steel sector and fluctuations in output were to be overcome, as were deficiencies in supplies of other building materials. Energy shortages were to be gradually eliminated by a far-reaching, integrated plan: conservation of fuel and electricity was to ease pressure on the energy sector in the present. Development of the petroleum industry was to continue but at a slower pace than previously. Coal was to continue to be the largest energy source, and coal production was to be quickly modernized and expanded. Hydroelectricity was to become a major source of power by the late 1980s, while new coal-fired plants were to meet growing electric power needs in the short run.

A key policy and an important departure from past practices was that capital construction was to be reduced. Furthermore, the share of construction activity devoted to industrial facilities was to decline, and a larger share was to be allocated to housing and other nonproductive projects, which would improve consumer welfare.

In all sectors of industry, enterprises were encouraged to make use of foreign equipment, techniques, and assistance to speed the modernization process.

Manufacturing

Iron and Steel

Before 1949 the iron and steel industry was small and dispersed; the only modern steel facility of any size was constructed at Anshan in the Northeast by the Japanese. Total output of steel by all plants reached a maximum of 900,000 tons in 1943.

Since the establishment of the People's Republic, the country has consistently allotted large amounts of investment to expanding steel output capacity. Annual steel production, however, has proved to be extremely sensitive to changes in economic policies and the political climate (see fig. 9). In the 1950s steel output rose steadily as Soviet advisers helped create the basis of the iron and steel industry,



Source: Based on information from U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, *China: The Steel Industry in the 1970s and 1980s*, May 1979, p. 2.

Figure 9. Steel Production and Capacity

installing numerous Soviet-designed blast furnaces and open-hearth furnaces. The Great Leap Forward saw a fantastic burgeoning of primitive backyard furnaces and small modern plants, overuse of large plants, and exaggerated production reports. In 1961 the industry broke down; nearly all the small plants were closed, and output fell to less than one-half the amount reported for 1960. During the first half of the 1960s output gradually recovered as damage was repaired and steel technology was advanced by the purchase of basic oxygen furnaces from Austria and electric furnaces from Japan. Production fell in 1967 and 1968 owing to the Cultural Revolution but resumed a rapid rate of growth in the relative political stability of 1969 and the early 1970s. During the mid-1970s output was retarded by political disruptions and also by the catastrophic results of the Tangshan earthquake in 1976, which severely damaged the Tangshan steel plant and the Kailuan coal mines, the North's main source of coking coal. After 1976 output climbed steadily and in 1979 reached 34.5 million tons, making China the fifth largest producer in the world.

In 1980 China's steel industry consisted of ten large facilities, which had annual capacities of 1 million tons or more and produced 80 to 90 percent of total output, and nearly 300 small and medium-sized plants, most of which produced small quantities of low-grade iron and steel to meet local needs. The fully integrated complex at Anshan was China's largest steel center, producing over 20 percent of total national output. The other large facilities were at Shanghai, Beijing (the Capital Iron and Steel Plant, formerly called the Shijingshan Plant), Baotou, Chongqing, Ma'anshan, Taiyuan, Benxi, and Banzhihua in southern Sichuan Province (see fig. 10).


N
Hulan Ergi
Shenyang
Fushun
Anshan
Benxi
Xuanhua
Hebei
Baotou
Capital
(Beijing)
Lüda (Dalian)
Tangshan
Tianjin
Taiyuan
Baoshan
Ma'anshan
Shanghai
Jiangyou
Wuhan
Daye
Chongqing
Xiangtan
Panzhihua
Kunming
Guangzhou
● Large plant
• Medium plant
☐ Facility to be modernized
New facility, or under construction
0 200 400 Miles
0 200 400 Kilometers

Source: Based on information from U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, *China: The Steel Industry in the 1970s and 1980s*, Washington, May 1979, p. vi.

Figure 10. Major Iron and Steel Facilities, 1980

China's steel plants used a wide range of technologies. As of the mid-1970s over 60 percent of production capacity was made up of open-hearth furnaces, which dominated world steel production in the 1950s. Basic oxygen furnaces, the most efficient and advanced technology for production of large quantities of high quality steel, accounted for up to 25 percent of capacity. Most of the new furnaces installed in the late 1970s were basic oxygen furnaces. Sideblown converters were used by most of the small and medium-sized plants and provided 10 to 15 percent of total capacity. This type of furnace is outdated and produces low-grade steel, but it can be built relatively quickly and inexpensively and is comparatively easy to operate. Electric furnaces, which are used to produce specialty steels, only produced 5 to 10 percent of China's steel and were generally small and inefficient.

By the 1970s unbalanced development resulted in weaknesses in two stages of the steel-making process: production of iron ore and pig iron, and the finishing of crude steel into final products. In 1978 China had to import 846,800 tons of pig iron and 2.4 million tons of iron ore in order to supply its steel furnaces. The production of finished steel reached nearly 25 million tons in 1979 yet remained nearly 10 million tons below the output of crude steel. In addition, finishing mills could not produce many of the steel components required for machine building and construction, such as thin sheet steel, alloy steel, and high quality pipe. In 1978 over 4.4 million tons of finished steel products were imported.

The modernization program under way in 1980 consisted of the construction of new plants and the expansion and modernization of existing facilities. At the end of 1978 work began on a giant complex at Baoshan, near Shanghai, to be built by the Japanese with the most modern equipment and designs. (There are also United States subcontractors and equipment.) An even larger plant, having an annual capacity of 10 million tons, was being planned for the Bo Hai coastal area of Hebei Province. The majority of increased capacity, however, was to come from modernization and expansion of the large plants at Wuhan, Ma'anshan, Baotou, Beijing, Anshan, and Benxi.

Machine Building

Development of machine building has been a leading priority since the founding of the People's Republic, and the industry has expanded from the few small assembly and repair facilities that existed before 1949 to a large, widely distributed sector, capable of producing most types of modern machinery. As of 1979 approximately 80 percent of the machinery in the country's basic industries was domestically manufactured. The technological level of the industry was very uneven, however, and many high-technology items were produced only on a trial or batch basis rather than by serial production.

In 1980 the machine-building industry was distributed throughout the country. Nearly all counties and towns had one factory or more engaged in some sort of machine production. Major machine-building centers were Shanghai, Tianjin, Shenyang, Beijing, Harbin, Changchun, Taiyuan, Luoyang, Wuhan, Chongqing, Chengdu, Xi'an, and Lanzhou.

Machine Tools

There were about 400 plants producing machine tools, forty of which were major facilities. Many of the large plants were located in the East, North, and Northeast, particularly in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenyang, Harbin, and Tianjin. This sector was able to meet domestic needs for most of the basic metalworking tools, such as lathes, boring machines, grinders, milling machines, gear cutters, thread-cutting machines and hydraulic presses. A growing number of these machines were exported each year.

Electric Power Equipment

Major generator production centers in Harbin, Shanghai, Beijing, and Deyang (in Sichuan) had constructed both hydro and thermal generators as large as 300 megawatts by the early 1970s. In addition

A workshop of the iron and steel producing facility at Tangshan
Courtesy China Pictorial



Skilled industrial worker operating a milling machine
Courtesy Pierre M. Perrolle

there were many small and medium-sized plants producing generators in the 3.2 to eighty megawatt range. In 1979 total output of generating equipment was 6.2 million kilowatts, an increase of 28 percent over the 4.8 million produced in 1978. Production of electric generators in China in 1978 was about 25 percent of the level of Soviet production and 17 percent as large as output in the United States.

Power transmission equipment produced was sufficient for the country's rather modest power system until the late 1970s. Transformers, insulators, high- and low-voltage switches, circuit breakers, wire, cable, and control and communications equipment were all manufactured in large quantities. In 1979, however, foreign equipment had to be imported for China's first 500-kilovolt transmission lines (see Electric Power, this ch.).

Internal Combustion Engines

In 1979 the country produced gasoline and diesel engines with a total of 29.1 million horsepower. The great majority of the units produced were diesel engines, which in 1976 were manufactured in 125 different plants for use in irrigation equipment, ships, industrial equipment, tractors, trucks, hand tractors, and locomotives. They ranged in size from one-cylinder pump engines to 18,000 horsepower marine engines. Gasoline engines were produced at fifteen plants, primarily for use in trucks, cars, and jeeps.

Transportation Equipment

China produces nearly all of its own railway locomotives and freight cars. Factories at Luda (locally known as Dalian), Qingdao, Zhuzhou, and Datong manufactured diesel electric, diesel hydraulic, electric, and steam locomotives. Five hundred seventy-three locomotives were produced in 1979. Since 1965 most types of modern freight cars of fifty- to sixty-five-ton capacity have been produced at Qiqihar, Luda, and Zhuzhou. In 1979 there were 16,042 freight cars produced.

The truck industry has grown substantially since 1949, but in the late 1970s production technology was backward and the quantity and variety of vehicles produced were limited. Major plants were located at Changchun, Jinan, Shanghai, Nanjing, and Guangzhou. Most of the trucks produced were variations on a Soviet-designed four-ton general purpose truck. In 1979 there were 186,000 trucks manufactured. China's level of truck production in 1978 was 149,000—about equal to that of Spain and only 4 percent of the number made in the United States.

Shipbuilding grew from an output of 73,100 deadweight tons in 1965 to 809,000 deadweight tons in 1979. Most of the large ships were freighters and tankers of 10,000 to 24,000 deadweight tons that were built at Shanghai or Luda. Ships as large as 50,000 deadweight tons had been built by 1976.

Metallurgical Equipment

China produced most of the iron and steel-making equipment which was in general use in the country. This included blast furnaces based on improved Soviet designs, ore beneficiation plants, open-hearth furnaces, sideblown converters, electric furnaces and a wide range of steel-finishing equipment. Much of the advanced equipment necessary for modernizing the steel industry was to be imported, however, particularly modern ore beneficiation and steel-finishing machinery.

Heavy Equipment

China has a fairly comprehensive heavy equipment manufacturing industry (construction, mining, materials handling). Major plants at Beijing, Shanghai, Taiyuan, Tianjin, and Chengdu make nearly all kinds of equipment—earthmoving, roadbuilding, lifting, and mining. Domestic output was supplemented by large imports of more advanced foreign machinery during the 1970s.

Electronics

As of 1977 over 2,000 electronics production facilities were located throughout the country, including some 200 large plants, about 500 smaller plants, and around 1,500 neighborhood workshops. Products ranged from computers, cardiac pacemakers, and military aircraft systems, through electronic instruments and communications equipment, to consumer goods, such as radios, televisions, and electric watches. In the 1970s the industry grew rapidly. Production of radios increased by 18.2 percent to 13.8 million in 1979, while output of television sets rose by 157.1 percent to 1,329,000. In 1978 China ranked third among the world's radio producers, behind Japan and the United States, which turned out 16 million and 48 million units respectively that year.

Agricultural Machinery

About 1,900 farm machinery plants were in operation in 1980, producing full-sized tractors, small tractors, plows, rakes, sowing machines, and a large variety of harvesters, threshers, rice transplanters, and irrigation equipment. In addition there were some 2,400 facilities for repairing and making farm machines at the county level. Most of these units were very small. In 1980 the plan for readjustment called for closing down many small plants that turned out low-quality products. The largest tractor plant was the Dongfanghong plant in Luoyang, which produced just under 20,000 tractors and 323 bulldozers in 1978. Other important tractor production centers were Tianjin, Changchun, Anshan, Shanghai, Nanchang and Yanzhou. In 1979 China produced 126,000 large tractors and 318,000 small tractors.

Chemicals

Starting from a negligible base in 1949, China's chemical industry grew substantially in the 1950s and early 1960s and received major emphasis in the late 1960s and 1970s. Three main areas comprise manufacturing: chemical fertilizers, basic chemicals, and organic synthesis. As a key to increased agricultural output, chemical fertilizer was consistently regarded as the most important. Output grew from 1.5 million tons of nutrient content in 1965 to 10.7 million tons in 1979, at an average annual rate of 15 percent; in the late 1970s China was the fourth largest producer of nitrogenous fertilizer in the world, behind the United States, Canada, and the Soviet Union. The strong growth shown by the sector resulted primarily from two programs that began in the early 1960s, one of which promoted the establishment of hundreds of small local nitrogenous fertilizer plants, while the other concentrated on the development of large facilities and the import of modern plant and equipment from foreign countries.

Small-scale plants could be built much more quickly and inexpensively than large modern plants and were designed to use low-quality local resources, such as small deposits of coal or natural gas. They also minimized demands on the overworked transportation system. In 1978 the 2,000 small plants in operation accounted for roughly 50 percent of total chemical fertilizer output.

Larger and more modern fertilizer plants were located in all municipalities, provinces, and autonomous regions. In the early 1970s China negotiated contracts with American and other foreign firms for the construction of thirteen large, nitrogenous fertilizer plants. By the end of 1979 all thirteen plants had been completed and ten were in full operation, contributing to the 23 percent increase in output for 1979.

Production of phosphate fertilizers grew much more slowly than that of nitrogenous fertilizers. In 1979 phosphates made up only 1.8 million tons of the total 10.7 million tons of chemical fertilizer produced. Potash amounted to only 16,000 tons.

The output of basic chemicals also grew extensively after 1949. In 1979 production of sulphuric acid was 7 million tons; major production centers were in Nanjing and Lüda, and there were large plants at many chemical fertilizer complexes. Soda ash output in 1979 was 1.5 million tons; production was concentrated near major sources of salt, including the big coastal cities and Sichuan Province, Qinghai Province, and Nei Monggol Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolia). Production of caustic soda was scattered at large facilities in Dalian, Tianjin, Shanghai, Taiyuan, Shenyang, and Chongqing. In 1979 output was 1.8 million tons. Nitric acid and hydrochloric acid were produced in the Northeast, Shanghai, and Tianjin.

The organic synthesis branch of the chemical industry manufactured products including plastics, synthetic rubber, synthetic fibers, dyes, pharmaceutical products, and paint products. Plastics, synthetic rubber, and synthetic fibers, such as nylon, were particularly important in the modernization drive because they were used in the production of such basic consumer goods as footwear and clothing. Production of plastics grew by over 50 percent between 1977 and 1979 to 793,000 tons, while chemical fiber output increased by over 70 percent to 326,000 tons. Shanghai is the leading center of organic synthesis, followed by Jilin, Beijing, Tianjin, Taiyuan, Jin Xi, and Guangzhou. The industry was augmented by large imports of foreign machinery in the 1970s.

Building Materials

Like the chemical fertilizer industry, cement production grew by simultaneous development of both small-scale plants and large modern facilities. Widespread construction of small-scale cement plants began in 1958. By the mid-1970s these plants existed in 80 percent of the counties in China; they produced 50 percent of national cement output in 1975 and 60 percent in 1978. The local plants included a wide range of size and technology levels. An American delegation which toured rural small-scale industries in China in 1975 observed three basic types of plant: small, primitive "egg-shaped" kilns; stationary vertical-shaft kilns; and relatively modern mechanized-shaft kilns. Like the local fertilizer plants, the small-scale cement plants used local supplies to make a low-quality product, but which was adequate for local needs.

Large modern rotary kilns having levels of production in excess of 150,000 tons a year were built near cities. By 1979 such modern units produced sixty-five different types of high-quality cement; 73.9 million tons of cement were produced in 1979. Only the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States surpassed China in cement production, having 1978 levels of 127 million tons, 84.9 million tons, and 80.8 million tons respectively.

Plate glass production increased by 16.3 percent in 1979 to 23.3 million standard cases. Over a dozen different kinds of glass were produced. Ceramics, such as glazed bricks and floor tiles, were produced in a wide and growing variety, as were new lightweight building materials, such as plasterboard, fiberboard, asbestos-cement board, and fiberglass. Bricks were produced in vast quantities by local plants, many of them operated by rural brigades or communes. In 1980 factories for making concrete structures and other prefabricated housing parts were under construction in Beijing, Shenyang, and Wuhan. The factories were scheduled to begin production by 1982.

Paper

The output of machine-made paper in 1979 was 5 million tons. Most of it was produced in Shanghai, an old paper-making center, and in producing centers located in the Northeast, near China's major source of wood pulp. China's papermaking technology was scheduled to be augmented by the purchase of an entire wood pulp plant from Japan, to be completed in 1982. Because China's supply of timber was very limited, various sources of pulp other than wood were increasingly being used in paper manufacture. These included reeds, bagasse, rice, wheat, cotton stalks, and wild fiber plants. In addition to machine-made paper, large quantities of paper were produced by hand in southern provinces including Guangdong, Anhui, Zhejiang, Hunan, Jiangxi, and Sichuan.

Textiles

In the late 1970s China's textile industry was one of the largest industrial employers of labor and the most important industrial producer of consumer and export goods. In 1978 textile products accounted for 24.5 percent of the value of all exports and over half the value of manufactures exported. Throughout the 1970s China was the world's largest producer of cotton fabrics.

China has a long and rich history of silk, linen, and cotton textile production. Cotton spinning and weaving was the largest domestic industry in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. After 1949 the production of cotton textiles was reorganized and expanded to meet the constantly growing clothing needs of the population. Cotton growing was increased in the areas around the established spinning centers in the port cities of Shanghai, Qingdao, Tianjin, and Guangzhou, while new spinning and weaving facilities were established near inland cotton-producing regions.

In spite of the emphasis that the industry received, cotton textile production grew at an average annual rate of only 4.4 percent between 1952 and 1979. The main problem was the even slower increase in the output of raw cotton (see Agricultural Trade, ch. 6), which necessitated large imports of foreign cotton. In 1979 imports made up about 20 percent of cotton supply.

In 1979 the silk industry was a major world supplier and an important source of foreign exchange. Most silk filatures were located in the areas where silk cocoons were produced. Major centers were Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Nanjing in the delta of the Yangtze River, Shunde County in the Zhu Jiang delta, and Chongqing, Chengdu, and Nanchong in Sichuan Province. Tussah silk, produced by undomesticated silkworms, is produced on the Shandong peninsula at Qingdao, Yantai, and Zhoucun and on the Liaodong peninsula in Liaoning Province. Output of silk textiles in 1979 was 663.5 million meters.

Woolen fabrics were produced in relatively small amounts in the late 1970s, but wool supplies from the increasing sheep and goat herds of China's Central Asian regions grew rapidly (see Animal Husbandry, ch. 6). In 1949 Shanghai was the center of the wool-spinning industry—73.5 percent of wool-spinning equipment was located there. In the succeeding years, however, the industry was promoted in the wool-producing areas of the northern and western portions of the country, and centers emerged in towns such as Lanzhou, Hailar, Baotou, and Ürümqi. The most advanced woolen technology was located in the major industrial centers of Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin, which specialized in high-quality cashmere fabrics.

Chemical fibers were very important to the textile industry because of the shortage of cotton. In addition, they were used in the blends of synthetic fibers with cotton or wool, which characterized much of the international fabric market in the 1970s. Production of chemical fibers increased dramatically in the late 1970s as foreign plant and equipment purchased in the mid-1970s went into operation. The amount of chemical fiber made in 1979 was 12.4 percent as large as the quantity of cotton yarn produced in the same year.

Development of the textile industry was actively encouraged by the government in the 1970s, and key technological weak points were strengthened by importing advanced foreign equipment. In addition, rural communes and brigades were encouraged to take up textile production as a sideline.

Food Processing

Food processing has advanced significantly in China since 1949. The most basic improvement was the almost universal establishment of mechanized grain-milling facilities in rural units. Higher level processing of food into finished and packaged products also grew extensively. An immense variety of baked goods and candies was produced for local consumption, and the beverage industry was very large and widespread. All regions had breweries and distilleries, which produced beer and an array of native and Western alcoholic beverages. Several brands of beer and liquor were successful export items. Carbonated soft drinks were widely produced and consumed. A growing number of food products were canned, bottled, or boxed for export. In 1980 it was reported that China exported 70,000 tons of canned fruit and fruit products a year.

Other Consumer Goods

Light industrial consumer goods that were particularly emphasized in the 1970s included bicycles, sewing machines, and wristwatches. Bicycles were the principal means of personal transportation. Starting from a very low level of production in the 1950s, bicycle output grew rapidly after 1965, and in 1979 over 10 million bicycles were made. Nonetheless, the ratio of bicycles to people was still one to twelve in 1980. The great majority of bicycles produced were a heavy, single-gear design. In 1979 factories were also producing a number of multigeared bicycles and minibikes. Production of sewing machines and wristwatches expanded very rapidly in 1979. Sewing machine output increased by 20.8 percent, to 5.9 million, while wristwatch output grew by 26.4 percent to 17.1 million.

Light industry also expanded the limited production of such items as cameras and washing machines, as well as increasing supplies of commonly used goods, such as synthetic detergents, perfumes, porcelain and other housewares. Porcelain was produced in large quantities, and many of the higher quality products were exported.

Handicrafts

The importance of handicraft production declined greatly after 1949, but the Chinese press reported that in 1979 the handicraft sector employed 6.8 million workers and accounted for over 10 percent of the value of industrial output. Handicrafts made up 17 percent of

Growing shipbuilding industry produces substantial numbers of freighters and tankers.
Courtesy Frederica M. Bunge

commodity retail sales and 14 percent of foreign trade. The government regarded handicraft production as an inexpensive way to utilize excess labor and increase supplies of consumer goods and export products, like furniture, artwork, basketry, and woven mats. In 1979 the government actively fostered the creation of collective handicraft units by unemployed young people in urban areas and increased the licensing of individual handicraft workers. Many rural units engaged in handicraft production as a sideline activity.

Construction

Housing Construction

A shortage of modern housing has been a chronic problem. Housing conditions in 1949 were primitive and crowded, and the massive growth of population over the following thirty years placed great strains on the nation's building capacity. In the period 1949–78 new housing with a total floor area of 531.5 million square meters had been constructed in urban areas. A study of 192 major cities, however, found that there was still only 3.6 square meters of actual living space per inhabitant. Beginning in 1977 the government adopted several measures to speed urban housing construction. Average annual investment by the state was three times as large in the 1977–79 period as it was for the previous ten years. Completed floor space increased from 28 million square meters in 1977 to 56 million square meters in 1979. Most of the new urban housing consisted of modern-style apartment blocks, including some high-rise buildings.

In rural areas most new housing was built by local production brigades but paid for and owned by individual families. Many brigades built entire new villages so as to concentrate housing, improve sanitation and organization, and minimize the amount of farmland taken up. Generally, new peasant dwellings were single-story houses made with locally produced materials and few modern components.

Capital Construction

A vast assortment of industrial and transportation facilities were constructed in the 1970s. Major projects included dams, hydroelectric plants, modern chemical fertilizer plants, steel mills, coal mines, highways, railways, seaports, and airports (see Transportation, ch. 8).

An important construction project in the late 1970s was rebuilding the earthquake-damaged city of Tangshan. Full-scale work was begun by 100,000 workers in 1978 to build an entirely new, planned city by 1982.

Concerted urban construction programs were under way in several large Chinese cities, including Beijing, which China's leaders intended to develop into an efficient, attractive, modern city. City planners directed the building of modern apartment blocks, satellite cities, a network of new high-speed roads, and the nation's first subway.

Mining

Coal

In 1979 China produced 635 million tons of coal, the third largest national output in the world. Proven reserves were over 600 billion tons. Coal supplies were considered adequate for any foreseeable level of economic activity, and the Chinese leadership intended to continue to rely on coal as the main source of energy in the years to come. As of 1978 coal provided 73.3 percent of China's primary energy; it was the major fuel for industry, electric power generation, residential heating, and the railways. Coal was also an important raw material in the chemical industry.

Coal deposits exist in most areas but about 65 percent of known reserves are concentrated in Shanxi Province and Inner Mongolia. Some regions—the North and the Northeast—are well supplied with coal. Others—the South, Southwest and Central regions—however, have inadequate coal supplies (see fig. 11).

Coal mining was developed more than most industries in the first half of the twentieth century; mines, including Fushun, Datong, and Kailuan, produced substantial quantities of coal for the railways, shipping, and industry. Expansion of the coal mining industry was a major goal of the First Five-Year Plan. The state invested heavily in modern mining equipment and in the development of large, mechanized mines. A special technique referred to as long-wall mining was widely adopted and output reached 130 million tons in 1957. During the 1960s and 1970s, however, investment in large mines and modern equipment lagged, and production failed to keep pace with the growth of industry.


N
Hegang
Jixi
Huolinhe
Fuxin
Fushun
Kailuan
Datong
Yangquan
Fengfeng
Yanzhou
Xuzhou
Pingdingshan
Huainan-Huaibei
Liupanshui
Major coal deposit
Major coal mining area
Major developing base
0 200 400 Miles
0 200 400 Kilometers

Source: Based on information from U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, *Chinese Coal Industry: Prospects Over the Next Decade*, Washington, February 1979; and "Eight Coal Bases Under Construction," *Beijing Review* [Beijing], No. 26, June 30, 1980, pp. 4–5.

Figure 11. Coal Reserves and Major Mining Areas

Much of the growth in output of this period came from increased production by small local mines. A temporary but serious setback followed the Tangshan earthquake, which severely damaged China's most important coal center, the Kailuan mines. Production at Kailuan did not return to the 1975 level until 1978. As of 1979 China's coal mining industry consisted of about thirty large mines, each producing over 300,000 tons a year, a large number of medium-sized mines, and over 20,000 small mines. The small mines were operated by local units at the county level or below, and their annual production capacities ranged from below 10,000 tons to several hundred thousand tons. They accounted for one-third of the coal mined in China.

Although China had a few big open-pit mines, such as the old Fushun West mine in Liaoning Province, the majority of the large mines were underground shafts. Most of the coal was mined by conventional blasting and hauling techniques. In 1980 the ministry of coal industry spokesmen stated that only 6.3 percent of all coal mining work was comprehensively mechanized.

The program to modernize and expand coal mining in the 1980s emphasized the development of large, fully mechanized facilities. Most of the machinery was to be produced domestically, but key modern technology and equipment would be imported. The core of the program was the construction of eight major coal bases, each encompassing an entire complex of facilities for coal production. Of the eight bases, Huolinhe, in Inner Mongolia, would be the only completely new mine. It would be a highly automated open-pit mine, built with West German technical assistance, and would produce 20 million tons a year by 1985. The other seven bases would be developed at existing coalfields: Datong in Shaanxi Province, Huainan-Huaibei in Anhui, Yanzhou in Shandong, Xuzhou in Jiangsu, Liupanshui in Guizhou, Pindingshan in Henan, and Kailuan in Hebei. Capacity would be expanded at these bases by constructing new shafts and installing modern equipment. Plans called for the bases to be completed by 1987 and to add 50 million tons to annual output.

Development plans for the 1980s also called for significant structural changes and modernization of coal processing and transportation. Expansion of coal washing capacity from 17 percent of output in 1980 to about 30 percent in 1985 was the first goal. Coal chemistry and methods of gasification and liquefaction were to be developed to simplify transportation. Officials projected construction of liquefaction plants by the late 1980s.

Iron Ore

China has huge reserves of iron ore; by the end of 1979 known reserves totaled 44 billion tons. Large deposits were widely distributed in eighteen provinces and autonomous regions. Most of the important mining areas were located north of the Yangtze River and supplied nearby major iron and steel complexes. There was relatively little exploitation of rich deposits in Gansu, Guizhou, southern Sichuan, and Guangdong provinces.

As of 1978 the iron mining sector was unable to meet the supply requirements of the iron and steel industry. Most iron mines were lacking in modern excavating, transportation, and ore beneficiation equipment. Most of the ore mined had an iron content of only about 30 percent and required substantial refining, or beneficiation, before being fed into blast furnaces for smelting. Modern plants for converting low-grade iron ore into highly concentrated pellets did not exist at most mines.

The program for development of the iron mining sector after 1978 emphasized expansion and modernization of mines that could best support planned growth in the iron and steel sector. These included the mines at Shuicheng and Shijiaying, north of Tangshan, both in eastern Hebei Province, the Jidashan, Dong Anshan, Xi Anshan, and Dagushan mines near the Anshan Iron and Steel Company, the Nanfen Mine near the Benxi steelworks, the Paiyuan mine near the

Baotou steel mill, the Egou mine near the Taiyuan steelworks, Daye at the Wuhan steel mill, and the Jiangshan and Yanbei mines in Shanxi Province. Preliminary contracts with Western firms indicated that part of the equipment for the program, including pelletizing plants, would be imported.

Other Minerals

Since 1949 the country has devoted considerable energy to geological exploration and has been rewarded with discoveries of deposits of 132 useful minerals.

China is among the world leaders in proven deposits of tin, tungsten, molybdenum, antimony, mercury, zinc, and lead, as well as coal and iron. Of these, antimony, tin, and tungsten were exported in the 1970s. In general, however, deficiencies in modern mining and smelting or refining equipment prevented production of most minerals from exceeding domestic needs. A number of important mineral products had to be imported in spite of the existence of large deposits, including aluminum, copper, lead, and zinc.

Among the rare earth metals and ferroalloys, berylium, tungsten, molybdenum, barium, manganese, mercury, niobium, zirconium, and titanium were present in large reserves and were produced in adequate quantities. Gold supplies were not large by world standards, but production was sufficient for needs. China is seriously deficient in supplies of chrome and nickel.

China produced adequate quantities of most nonmetallic minerals. Barite, fluorspar, salt, and talc were all available in massive reserves and were exported in large quantities. Asbestos, graphite, magnesite, phosphates, and pyrite were less abundant but generally met domestic needs. Sulphur deposits were large, but quality was low and imports were necessary. Industrial diamonds were produced by the Zhangde diamond mine in western Hunan Province after 1971, and in 1973 the first of about a dozen synthetic diamond plants went into operation.

In 1956 a large uranium deposit was discovered in the South and was subsequently mined. A smaller deposit was found by an army engineering unit in 1979.

Oil and Natural Gas

Before 1949 most of the oil consumed was imported. During the First Five-Year Plan, the country invested heavily in exploration for new oil fields and development of new and existing wells. In 1959 the vast reserves of the Songhua Jiang-Liao He basin were discovered and the Daqing oil field went into operation in 1960 (see fig. 12). Daqing produced about 2.3 million tons of oil by 1963 and continued to lead the industry through the 1970s. Further important discoveries, including the major fields of Shengli, Dagang, and Huabei, enabled China to meet domestic needs and eliminate nearly all imports by the mid-1960s. In 1973, despite steadily growing internal demand for petroleum products, output was large enough to


N
Liaoho
III
Dagan
Hua
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Bo Hai
Yellow Sea
Len hu
(Laojun)
Maoming (shale oil plant)
Gulf of Tonkin
South China Sea
0 200 400 Miles
0 200 400 Kilometers
● Major oil field
Oil basin
I Song-Liao
II North China
III Renqiu Region
IV North Shaanxi
V Sichuan (Szechwan)
VI Jinchuan
VII Qaidam (Tsaidam)
VIII Junggar (Dzungarian)
IX Tarim

Source: Based on information from U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *People's Republic of China Atlas*, Washington, 1971; Bobby A. Williams, "The Chinese Petroleum Industry: Growth and Prospects," *China: A Reassessment of the Economy*, Washington, 1975, pp. 250–60; and Qi Wen, *China: A General Survey*, Beijing, 1979, pp. 116–19.

Figure 12. Major Oil Basins and Oil Fields

export a million tons of crude oil to Japan. Exports increased to 6.6 million tons in 1974 and reached 13.5 million tons in 1978. From 1957 to 1975 oil production grew at an average rate of 24.7 percent a year. Due to a lower priority assigned to oil production investment and rapidly increasing costs of finding and exploiting new deposits, annual increases averaged only 8.3 percent between 1975 and 1979, when output reached 106.2 million tons. Oil supplies were about 23 percent of primary energy in 1978.

Oil reserves are very large and are widely dispersed. In general, development was concentrated on deposits that were readily accessible to major industrial and population centers. Deposits in remote areas like the Tarim, Dzungarian, and Tsaidam basins remained largely unexplored and untapped. The quality of oil from the major deposits varied considerably. A few deposits, like the Shengli field, produced generally low-quality oil suitable mainly for burning as fuel. Most of the oil produced in China from the big fields in the North and Northeast was low in sulphur but was heavy and had a very high paraffin content, making it difficult and expensive to refine. In 1980 light oil was being produced at the Dongpu field, a new oil field which was in the process of development in the North along the border between Shandong and Henan provinces. Exploratory drilling in the late 1970s found potentially large deposits of high-quality, light oil in some of the less accessible oil basins, including the Zhu Jiang estuary of the South China Sea and the Tsaidam Basin in Qinghai Province.

Offshore exploration and drilling were first undertaken in the early 1970s and became more widespread and technologically advanced as the decade progressed. Chinese and foreign oil experts believed that offshore deposits were extensive and could equal onshore reserves. Offshore operations relied heavily on foreign technology. By 1979 China had produced at least one jack-up drilling rig and one catamaran drill ship. Most of the rest of its drilling rigs and support vessels, including two geophysical survey ships, were purchased from Japanese and European companies, but by late 1980 China was also producing some of its own rigs. Exploration contracts for areas in the South China Sea, the Yellow Sea, and the Gulf of Tonkin were signed with various Western oil companies in 1979. In December of that year an agreement for joint exploration and development of oil deposits in the shallow waters of the Bo Hai was reached with the Japanese National Oil Company.

As of the end of 1979 exploration and drilling had been concentrated in the relatively shallow Bo Hai gulf where some finds were recorded and production was begun. Other efforts had mainly been in the South China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin. The future of oil development in several promising offshore locations was complicated by disputes between China and several neighboring countries.

Production of natural gas grew rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s, but it was a relatively minor source of energy in China. Output in 1979 was 14.5 billion cubic meters, which constituted roughly 3 percent of China's primary energy supply. The largest deposits of natural gas are in the Szechwan Basin.

A rudimentary petroleum refining industry was established with Soviet aid in the 1950s. In the 1960s and 1970s this base was modernized and expanded, partially with imported European and Japanese equipment. In 1979 Chinese refineries produced some 640 different petroleum products and were capable of processing about 1.8 million barrels a day, roughly the same as the capacity of the Netherlands.

In the 1970s China constructed oil pipelines and improved the ports that handled oil tankers. The first oil pipeline was laid from Daqing to the port of Qinhuangdao; it was 1,152 kilometers long and went into operation in 1974. The following year it was extended to Beijing; a second line connected Daqing to the port of Luda and branched off to North Korea. A pipeline from Linyi in Shandong Province to Nanjing was completed in 1978, linking the oil fields of Shengli and Huabei to ports and refineries of the lower Yangtze region.

Electric Power

Electric power production grew from 7,300 million kilowatt-hours in 1952 to 281,950 million in 1979, at an average annual rate of 14.5 percent. Annual output per capita increased from thirteen to 256 kilowatt-hours. Nonetheless in the 1970s the electric power system could not meet the rapidly growing demands of the economy, and power shortages were common, seriously limiting the ability of economic units to carry out plans for modernization. In order to remedy this situation a broad program to multiply the capacity of the electric power system was under way in the late 1970s, relying on simultaneous development of large hydroelectric plants, coal-fired plants, and small local hydroelectric plants.

In 1979 China's generating facilities consisted of nearly 90,000 power plants. About 88,000 of these were small hydroelectric plants, which supplied a total of 10,000 million kilowatt-hours in 1978. Several hundred large plants of over twenty-four megawatts generating capacity produced most of the electricity. Sixty-one of the large power stations exceeded 250-megawatt capacity. Thermal generation was used by about 75 percent of the large plants, with coal as the predominant fuel. Most of the coal-fired plants were located near the big coalfields in the North, Northeast, and Central parts of the country. Hydropower was dominant in the mountainous regions of the South, Southwest and Northwest and accounted for about 30 percent of total generating capacity.

Transmission grids were small by Western standards, and there were few linkages between local systems. Transmission voltage was relatively low and lines were often overloaded. The major grids were the northeast grid in Liaoning and Jilin provinces, the Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan grid, the eastern China grid centered on Shanghai, the Shanxi-Henan-Shaanxi grid, and the Gansu-Qinghai-Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region grid.

The program for expansion of the electric power system was intended to make optimal use of the various power generating options. China's most important potential source of power growth is hydroelectricity. Geographical surveys have estimated its hydro potential as some 571,000 megawatts of generating capacity, the largest in the world. Only about 3 percent of this potential was in use as of 1979. Construction of large hydroelectric stations, therefore, played an important part in the power program. In 1979 eleven major hydroelectric projects of at least 250 megawatt capacity each were under construction and additional projects were scheduled to begin in the 1980s. Construction of hydroelectric projects required seven to fourteen years, however, so expansion of thermal plants, which could be built in eighteen months, was also an important part of the plan. Existing thermal plants would be enlarged and new ones would be built. Emphasis was placed on construction of plants close to coalfields so as to reduce transportation requirements.

A unique aspect of the program was continued reliance on small hydroelectric stations to meet much of the rural demand for electricity. In 1978 three-fourths of the counties in China had their own small hydroelectric stations and 12,000 more were under construction. About one-third of the electricity used on farms came from small hydroelectric plants.

Improvement of the transmission network had been undertaken by 1979. The country's first three 500-kilowatt lines were under construction to link new power plants to major industrial centers.

* * *

Each of the general works on the economy cited in the bibliography for Chapter 5 includes a substantial description of the industrial sector.

Industrial growth prior to 1949 is outlined by John K. Chang in *Industrial Development in Pre-Communist China*. Thomas G. Rawski describes the development of the producer goods industries both before and after the founding of the People's Republic in *China's Transition to Industrialism*. Rawski also provides a detailed analysis of the Chinese industrial system in his article "China's Industrial System," which appears in the United States Congress Joint Economic Committee's *China: A Reassessment of the Economy*. In the same volume Robert Michael Field traces industrial production trends in "Civilian Industrial Production in the People's Republic of China: 1949–74." A useful general study of Chinese industry is *China's Industrial Revolution* by Stephen Andors. An excellent detailed description and analysis of rural industry is presented in *Rural Small-Scale Industry in the People's Republic of China*, written by a delegation of American economists and industrial experts who toured small-scale industrial facilities in 1975.

Individual industrial sectors are treated by a host of monographs and articles, of which some of the more useful will be mentioned here. The establishment of China's modern iron and steel industry is described by M. Gardner Clark in *Development of China's Steel Industry and Soviet Technical Aid*. Thorough descriptions of the industry in more recent years are given in "China's Iron and Steel Industry," by Alfred H. Usack, Jr., and James D. Egan, and in *China: The Steel Industry in the 1970s and 1980s*, by the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC) of the United States Central Intelligence Agency. The machine-building industry is treated by Chu-yuan Cheng in *The Machine-Building Industry in Communist China* and in "A Survey of China's Modern Machine-Building Industry," by Jack Craig, Jim Lewek, and Gordon Cole, published in *Chinese Economy Post-Mao*. Construction activity is estimated by Ian H. MacFarlane in "Construction Trends in China, 1949–74." A detailed evaluation of mineral resources in China is presented in "China's Mineral Economy," by K. P. Wang. The coal industry is described in the NFAC's *Chinese Coal Industry: Prospects Over the Next Decade*. Bobby A. Williams evaluates the oil sector in "The Chinese Petroleum Industry: Growth and Prospects." The electric power industry is thoroughly analyzed in "China's Electric Power Industry," by William Clarke and in *Electric Power for China's Modernization: The Hydroelectric Option*, by the NFAC.

The official People's Republic English-language periodicals, *Beijing Review* (weekly) and *China Reconstructs* (monthly), publish numerous valuable articles describing particular industrial sectors, individual enterprises, and government policies pertaining to industry. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 8. Trade and Transportation

Ink and sponge drawing of one of more than 200 figurines cast in bronze, unearthed from a tomb in Gansu Province. The objects date from the Eastern Han period (A.D. 25–220).

TRADE AND TRANSPORTATION are the lifeblood of an economy. In the twenty-five years after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, China's trade institutions and transportation and communications networks were built into a well-integrated, partially modern system, which effectively exchanged goods and services throughout the country. The drive to modernize the economy that began in 1977, however, required a sharp acceleration in commodity flows and greatly improved efficiency in economic transactions. In the late 1970s policies were adopted by the government that were intended to significantly speed the process of exchange in the economy. The institutions for carrying out domestic and foreign trade were to be broadened and made more flexible by extensive decentralization of decisionmaking authority, reduced reliance on centralized planning, and expanded use of market mechanisms. Transportation and communication were designated key "weak links" in the economy and were assigned top priority for investment and development during the three-year period of adjustment that began in 1979.

Transportation, postal services, communications, and trade, including services, were estimated to employ about 6 percent of the entire national labor force in the mid-1970s—over a quarter of the nonagricultural labor force. China did not publish separate data on the share of national output produced by this sector, but United States government analysts calculated it to be around 20 percent of estimated gross national product (GNP).

Internal Trade and Distribution

Agriculture

Agricultural products were distributed in three major ways in China during the 1970s. They were either retained by the producing unit for distribution among its members, procured by the state, or sold in free rural markets.

Approximately 80 percent of the population was located in rural areas where the majority of people lived and worked on agricultural communes (see Glossary). Most food and agricultural goods consumed by members of an agricultural unit were produced by the unit—normally a production team—and distributed directly to members on the basis of need and as payment for work performed. Much of the produce from private plots was also consumed by the peasant households that cultivated the plots (see Planning and Organization, ch. 6).

Distribution of food and other agricultural goods to urban consumers, industry, and food-deficit rural areas was carried out by the state. State procurement was accomplished by means of taxes and

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purchases by state commercial departments (state trading companies) under the Ministry of Commerce. The agricultural tax was not large; it declined from 12 percent of the total value of agricultural output in 1952 to 5 percent in 1979. State purchases of some major products fell into the categories of "prescribed purchases," "unified purchases," and "quota purchases." The "prescribed purchase" system was used for grain. Each agricultural unit was assigned a fixed amount of grain to sell to the state on the basis of national, province, county, and commune economic plans. If excess grain was produced, it could be sold to the state at a considerably higher price or sold at a free rural market. If output was inadequate, the prescribed quantity could be reduced. "Unified purchase" was used for cotton. All cotton beyond the personal needs of the producers was sold to the state. The "procurement quota" system applied to pigs and eggs, a set proportion of which had to be sold to the state, while the remainder was retained for consumption or private sale by the producer. The system was not used when pork and eggs were plentiful. In 1977 and 1978 commercial departments purchased about 31 percent of all agricultural output; in 1979 the proportion rose to 37 percent. The controlled purchasing systems were under severe attack in 1979 and 1980. Government officials advocated reliance on prices rather than quotas to induce production of sufficient quantities of goods for the state.

After procurement and transportation to urban areas, food items were sold to consumers by state-owned stores and restaurants. Prices for important items in short supply, such as grain and edible oil, were fixed by the state. Such goods were also subject to rationing. The prices of other goods could be varied somewhat by the operators of the shops. Industrial crops, like cotton and tobacco, were sold by the commercial departments at set prices to appropriate industrial units in accordance with the requirements of their production plans.

Free rural markets, often referred to in Chinese publications as "rural fairs," enabled peasants to come together and exchange surplus agricultural products at freely determined prices. Prices in the markets were generally somewhat higher than those in the state-owned stores. Many of the markets were suppressed during the Cultural Revolution and the first half of the 1970s, but they were encouraged in the latter part of the decade as an important means of increasing peasant incomes. Over 33,000 rural fairs were in existence at the end of 1978. In 1979 similar markets were officially established in a number of cities, including Beijing, to improve the supply of farm products to the urban areas.

Industrial products were distributed to agricultural units primarily by means of prices. Most agricultural producer goods, like chemical fertilizer and insecticides, were allocated to communes and brigades (see Glossary) by county and commune-level plans but then were simply offered for sale by the supply and marketing cooperatives. Production teams decided for themselves how much to buy on

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Ships on the Huangpu Jiang at Shanghai, seen from the bank along the Bund. Courtesy William H. Young, Jr.

the basis of set prices. Scarce, important items like tractors were rationed by the commune or county in some instances. In order to ensure that rural units could cover the costs of the increasing quantities of industrial inputs required for higher yields, the government periodically reduced the prices of the industrial goods sold to farmers, while raising the procurement prices for agricultural products (see Prices, ch. 5).

Industry

The distribution of industrial products was based on the economic planning system but also made some use of prices as a rationing device (see ch. 5, The Economic Context). All industrial products and the operations of all industrial enterprises were covered by plans, but the administrative level of the origin of the plan and the degree of detail in allocations and production quotas varied greatly, depending on the nature and importance of the enterprise. The influence of the plans varied—some consisted of very specific statements of the commodities that would be supplied to an enterprise and the products it would deliver; others were loose limits or guidelines, which did little more than direct the enterprise manager in dealings with other units.

At one extreme were the largest and most important enterprises in the country—such as some of the major steel mills—which required massive supplies of materials with specific technical characteristics. Units like these were included in the national plan, their finances were covered by the national budget, suppliers of raw materials were specifically designated and committed to delivery schedules, and products were distributed long before they emerged from the plant on the basis of strict priority ratings. Only a few dozen products were this closely regulated.

The great majority of enterprises were controlled and planned by provincial or municipal government organs. Most of their supplies were readily obtainable, and most of their products appealed to a wide market. For this sort of enterprise the plan constituted an authorization to purchase certain quantities of materials and indicated general production goals but in most cases did not specify suppliers of materials or purchasers of the final product. The actual procurement of supplies and marketing of products was the responsibility of the individual enterprises working with state commercial departments, provincial and local government agencies, and coordinating organizations such as industrial "corporations," which supervised large groups of enterprises in a particular industry or geographic area. Supplying and purchasing units were brought together by a variety of mechanisms, including supply and sales order conferences, telephone conferences, and exhibitions. In situations where a product, such as a specially designed machine tool, was manufactured by one enterprise specifically for use by another or if one unit was the predominate user of the product of another, supply arrangements and contracts might be made directly between the two units. Goods with more general applications, e.g., cotton cloth or rolled steel, were purchased from producers and sold to users by intermediary state commercial departments. All final consumer goods were sold by producing enterprises to commercial departments for marketing.

In the late 1970s government planners and leaders adopted policies designed to improve the flexibility and efficiency of industrial allocation and distribution by supplementing the planning system with market exchange mechanisms. Enterprises were strongly encouraged to adjust designs and production in accordance with market demand for their goods. Factories were allowed to advertise their products to bring them to the attention of potential buyers. Urban industrial and commercial departments sharply increased the size and number of exhibitions and conferences for the same purpose. Even some producers of heavy industrial commodities were allowed to open retail stores to sell output that was in excess of the state plan.

Allocation of Labor

In the industrial sector, labor was distributed according to the various economic plans. As part of its production plan, each enterprise received a wage bill which indicated the amount of money that could be spent for wages and bonuses. Engineers, technicians, and other skilled workers who were required to operate the enterprise were specifically allocated. The allocation of labor was supervised at the national level by the State Planning Commission and the State

Bureau of Labor. Provincial and municipal labor bureaus worked directly with enterprises to enforce labor regulations and ensure that adequate numbers of jobs were available. Individual workers were assigned to their jobs.

Agricultural units were responsible for the allocation of their own members to the jobs in the unit. Migration from rural areas to urban areas was prohibited unless a rural worker was assigned to an urban job.

Retail Sales

Chinese urban residents were served by a wide variety of shops and stores operated by state commercial departments in the 1970s. Most retail and service establishments were located either in major downtown commercial districts or in small neighborhood shopping areas. The neighborhood shopping areas were numerous and situated so that at least one was within easy walking distance of almost every urban household. They were able to supply nearly all the daily needs of their customers. A typical neighborhood shopping area in Beijing would contain a one-story department store, a bookstore, hardware store, bicycle repair shop, a combined tea shop and bakery, a restaurant, theater, laundry, bank, post office, barber shop, photography studio, and electrical appliance repair shop. The department stores had small pharmacies and carried a substantial range of housewares, appliances, bicycles, toys, sporting goods, fabrics, and clothing.

Major shopping districts in big cities contained larger versions of the stores in the neighborhood areas and numerous specialty shops, such as music stores, sporting goods stores, hat shops, stationary shops, handicraft shops, camera shops, clock shops, and so on. Western visitors to China in the late 1970s reported that shopping areas were usually bustling, stores were well stocked, and sales were brisk.

In addition to formal retail establishments, certain goods and services were also provided by street vendors and individual repairpeople, photographers, and handicraft workers. These small, private enterprises were discouraged until 1976 but were officially promoted in the late 1970s as a way to create jobs and improve the availability of consumer commodities and services.

In rural areas supply and marketing cooperatives operated general stores and small shopping complexes at brigade and commune headquarters. Generally speaking a smaller variety of consumer goods was available in the countryside than in the cities. Many handicraft products were exchanged among peasants at the free rural markets.

A number of important consumer goods were rationed during the 1960s and 1970s including grain, cotton cloth, meat, eggs, edible oil, sugar, and bicycles. Coupons were issued to workers by their work units and had to be presented in order to make a purchase. When supplies of a good increased, the ration was raised. In 1979

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eggs and pork were in good supply and were only loosely rationed. Edible oil and cotton cloth, on the other hand, were very limited in supply and were strictly controlled.

Foreign Trade

Foreign trade has not accounted for a large sector of the Chinese economy. As in most large, continental countries, the amount of commerce with other nations was small relative to domestic economic activity. During the 1950s and 1960s the total value of foreign trade was only about 2 percent of GNP. In the 1970s trade grew rapidly but in 1979 still amounted to only about 6 percent of GNP. China's foreign trade volume was also very small in international terms, accounting for only about .7 percent of total world trade in 1979.

The importance of China's foreign trade, however, has far exceeded its volume. In the thirty years after 1949, foreign imports allieviated temporary but critical shortages of food, cotton, and other agricultural products, and long-term deficiencies in a number of essential items, including raw materials, such as chrome, and manufactured goods, such as chemical fertilizer and finished steel products. Foreign trade also played a key role in the acquisition of foreign plants and equipment, which enabled China to utilize the more advanced technology of developed countries to speed its own technological growth and economic development.

Historical Development of Trade

Chinese foreign trade began as early as the Western Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–A.D. 24) when the famous "silk route" through Central Asia was pioneered by Chinese envoys (see The Imperial Era, ch. 1). During later dynasties Chinese ships traded throughout the Far East, Southeast Asia, and South Asia, reaching as far as the African coast, while caravans extended trade contacts in Central Asia and into the Middle East. Foreign trade was never a major economic activity, however, and Chinese emperors considered the country to be entirely self-sufficient. During the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) trade was officially discouraged.

Western European nations first initiated sustained trade with China by means of military force in the mid-nineteenth century. From the time of the Opium War (1839–42) until the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, various Western countries and, later, Japan compelled China to agree to a series of unequal treaties, which enabled foreigners to establish essentially autonomous economic bases in China and operate in a privileged status. Foreign privileges were abolished when the People's Republic came into being (see ch. 1, Historical Setting).

During the 1950s foreign trade grew rapidly as China imported Soviet plants and equipment for the development program of the First Five-Year Plan (1953–57) while expanding exports of agricultural products in order to pay off the loans that financed the imports

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(see ch. 5, Economic Context). Total trade peaked at the equivalent of US$4.29 billion in 1959. The sudden decline in agricultural production in 1959–61 required China's leaders to suspend further imports of machinery and to purchase foreign grain instead. Total trade declined to US$2.7 billion in 1962 under a policy of "self-reliance." As the economy revived in the mid-1960s, plants and equipment again were ordered from foreign suppliers, and substantial growth in foreign trade was planned. Total trade reached US$4.2 billion in 1966. But chaos and antiforeign activities of the Cultural Revolution caused trade to decline in the late 1960s.

In the early 1970s the pragmatic modernization drive led by party leaders Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, and China's growing contacts with the Western nations resulted in a sharp acceleration of trade growth. Imports of modern plants and equipment were particularly emphasized, and Chinese oil became an increasingly important export item after 1973. In current dollar terms, trade more than tripled between 1970 and 1975, when it amounted to the equivalent of US$14.3 billion. In constant dollar terms growth in this period was about 9 percent a year. As a proportion of GNP, trade grew from 1.7 percent in 1970 to 3.9 percent in 1975. In 1976 trade declined in the atmosphere of uncertainty resulting from the death of Mao and under pressure from the Gang of Four (see Glossary), whose members opposed reliance on foreign technology.

The economic policies that emerged in the late 1970s called for a greatly expanded role for foreign trade in the economy. Maximum feasible use was to be made of imported equipment and technology to boost China's technological level. Imports were to be financed by a corresponding growth in Chinese exports, together with an array of foreign credit forms and cooperative arrangements that had previously been considered politically unacceptable. A sudden leap in contracts signed for plant and equipment in 1977 and 1978 was halted following the comprehensive reappraisal of China's long-run plans at the Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee in December 1978. Negotiations with foreign firms resumed in mid-1979 on the basis of reordered priorities and trade growth resumed, although in a more deliberate and coordinated fashion. In 1979 the current dollar value of trade reached US$27.7 billion and amounted to about 6 percent of China's GNP. Trade continued to grow rapidly during the first half of 1980.

Trade Policy in the Late 1970s

Important changes in trade policy in the late 1970s included a need for foreign trade now explicitly stated. (Repeated official statements in the late 1970s concerning the necessity of foreign trade for economic development reversed the autarkic policies of the Cultural Revolution and the Gang of Four.) Another aspect of change involved acceptance of long-term credit from foreign banks and governments. (Refusal to participate in long-term loan arrangements had been an obstacle to large-scale purchases until 1978. In

1979 China alleviated foreign exchange problems by arranging lines of credit with foreign banks totaling the equivalent of US$27 billion.) Still other departures from the earlier policy included the acceptance of barter and compensation deals for plant purchases, which could mean, for example, that a foreign company supplying a plant might agree to accept a portion of future production in lieu of cash payment; willingness to import raw materials to be reprocessed for export; and compliance with international standards on patents, trademarks, and copyrights. Joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements with foreign firms and foreign investment in some Chinese enterprises were also to be legalized.

Organization of Trade

The basic function of the foreign trade system is to design and implement import and export plans based on the requirements of the national economic plan. As China's involvements in foreign trade multiplied in the late 1970s, the system was expanded and decentralized. In 1980 organizational changes were still taking place.

Ministry of Foreign Trade

Directly subordinate to the Staff Office of Finance and Trade of the State Council, the Ministry of Foreign Trade is responsible for the trade system. This ministry is composed of import, export, and planning bureaus; five regional bureaus responsible for trade with major geographic areas; and administrative offices. The ministry also directs customs, operates a foreign trade training school, a market research institute and a publishing office, and supervises the nine Foreign Trade Corporations and other organizations involved in trade.

Foreign Trade Corporations

Basic responsibility for actually carrying out foreign trade rests with the foreign trade corporations. Under the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Trade they draw up specific, detailed import and export plans, carry out negotiations, and draft and sign contracts. The corporations specialize by product area; as of the late 1970s there were nine China National Import and Export Corporations. These were: Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs; Native Produce and Animal By-Products; Textiles; Light Industrial Products; Chemicals; Machinery; Metals and Minerals; the China National Export Packaging Corporation; and the Chinese National Technical Import Corporation. The Technical Import Corporation handled the purchase of complete plants and advanced technology.

The China Council for the Promotion of International Trade

This organization assisted the Ministry of Foreign Trade in foreign trade relations. It handled trade delegations to and from China, organized trade exhibitions by foreigners in China and Chinese exhibitions in other countries, and published periodicals promoting Chinese trade. The Legal Affairs Department of the Council dealt with matters of international law and supervised the Foreign Trade

Arbitration Commission and the Maritime Arbitration Commission.

The Bank of China

International financial transactions are all carried out by the Bank of China, the foreign exchange arm of China's banking system. The Bank of China monitors all foreign exchange receipts and expenditures, issues letters of credit and guarantee, and arranges foreign currency loans to finance expensive import items.

Other Organizations Involved in Trade

The State Planning Commission and the State Economic Commission set overall trade goals and determine priorities. The various economic ministries under the State Council were involved in determining export supplies and selecting equipment to be imported. Industrial corporations, such as the China Steel Corporation, were subordinate to the industrial ministries and represented the interests of groups of enterprises that received technology imports. Industrial corporations and professional organizations like the China Civil Engineering Society played an increasingly important role in evaluating and selecting foreign technology. In 1979 the China International Trust and Investment Corporation was established directly under the State Council to act as a vehicle for investment of foreign funds and to engage in the creation of joint ventures with foreign firms. China had several insurance companies, one of which, the Chinese People's Insurance Company, expanded its operations in 1980 for the purpose of encouraging foreign trade. New categories of coverage offered to foreign firms included compensatory trade insurance, insurance against contract failure, and insurance against political risk.

Decentralization

In the late 1970s increasing decisionmaking authority was delegated from the main foreign trade agencies to organizations at the provincial and municipal levels. Individual factories and local corporations became involved in surveying foreign machinery and negotiating export transactions.

Composition of Trade

The dominant pattern of foreign trade after 1949 was that industrial producer goods were imported from developed countries and were paid for with exports of food, crude materials, and light manufactures, especially textiles and handicrafts. The pattern was altered as circumstances demanded; in the period of economic collapse following the Great Leap Forward of 1958–60 (see Glossary) food imports increased from a negligible amount in 1959 to 39 percent of all imports in 1962. At the same time imports of machinery and equipment dropped from 41 percent to 5 percent of the total. From this time on, foodstuffs remained a significant, although declining share of imports, still amounting to 12.8 percent of the total in 1978. The pattern also shifted over time as China's industrial sector expanded, gradually increasing the share of exports accounted for by manufactured goods. Manufactures provided only 30 percent of all exports in 1959 and 37 percent in 1975 but grew to 46.7 percent in 1978.

Important changes occurred in several specific trade categories in the 1970s. The value of imported textile fibers grew from about 5 percent of total import value in 1970 to over 8 percent in 1977 and 1978, as the Chinese textile industry grew faster than domestic cotton supplies. Imports of iron and steel accounted for over 20 percent of import value from 1974 through 1978, as China's steel industry was plagued by persistent shortages of iron ore and finished steel products (see ch. 7, Industry). On the export side, the share of foodstuffs fell to 22.5 percent by 1978, while exports of manufactured goods provided nearly half the total. The fastest growing export item in the 1970s was oil, which was first exported in 1973. By 1977 and 1978 oil accounted for over 12 percent of total export earnings. Exports of modern industrial products, such as machinery and electrical equipment, also grew rapidly in quantity, variety, and sophistication, although their relative share of total export value remained only about 3 percent in 1978.

In spite of significant changes the trade situation in 1978, as in most of the preceding years, was one in which about 60 percent of imports consisted of heavy industrial goods, while over 70 percent of export earnings derived from foodstuffs, crude materials, and textiles.

Trading Partners

During the 1950s China's primary foreign trading partner was the Soviet Union, which accounted for nearly 48 percent of China's trade in 1959. As relations between the two countries deteriorated in the early 1960s, the volume of trade fell to only 7.5 percent of the total in 1966. During the 1970s trade with the Soviet Union averaged about 2 percent of China's total trade, while trade with all communist countries made up about 15 percent.

By the mid-1960s Japan had become China's leading trade partner, accounting for 14.9 percent of trade in 1966. Japan is China's most natural trade partner; it is closer to China than any other industrial country and has the best transportation links to it. The Japanese economy is highly advanced in those areas where China is weakest, especially heavy industry and modern technology, while China is well supplied with some of the important natural resources which Japan lacks, notably coal and oil. In the late 1970s Japan accounted for over 20 percent of China's trade, far more than any other country. Japan was particularly important as a supplier of imports. Nearly 30 percent of all China's imports came from Japan in 1977 and 1978. In addition Japan received nearly 20 percent of China's exports in the late 1970s, second only to Hong Hong. In 1978 and 1979 Japan negotiated several massive long-term trade

Carts of all types are common means of light freight transportation. In towns and outlying areas, some pulled by people are to be seen.
Courtesy Audrey Hochberg

In urban areas, bicycles and buses are common means of transport. This is downtown Hangzhou on a rainy day.
Courtesy William H. Young, Jr.

agreements with China, primarily exchanging Japanese equipment, steel, and technical assistance for Chinese oil and coal.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s Hong Kong was consistently the leading market for China's exports and China's second largest partner in overall trade. In the late 1970s Hong Kong received about 22 percent of Chinese goods sold abroad but only supplied about 7 percent of imports. Hong Kong was the major market for Chinese foodstuffs and served as China's trade link with much of the world; many of the goods sent to Hong Kong were reexported to other countries.

Chinese trade with the United States was virtually nonexistent until the renewal of relations between the two countries in the early 1970s. Thereafter trade grew rapidly, though erratically, throughout the decade. With the full normalization of diplomatic and commercial relationships in 1979, the United States became China's second leading supplier of imports and third largest partner in overall trade. Most American goods imported to China were either high-technology industrial products, including Boeing jetliners, or agricultural products, primarily grain and cotton. In 1979 the United States was the leading supplier of agricultural products to China (see Agricultural Trade, ch. 6).

Western Europe has been important in Chinese foreign trade since the mid-1960s. The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), in particular, was second only to Japan in supplying industrial goods to China during most of this period. China has followed a policy of shopping widely for its industrial purchases and has concluded deals of various sizes with nearly all of the West European nations. In 1975 Western Europe accounted for 19 percent of China's foreign trade, the majority consisting of industrial imports to China.

The role of the less developed countries in China's foreign trade has generally been that of a market for Chinese food and light manufactures. In the late 1970s the less developed countries purchased over 40 percent of Chinese exports but supplied less than 20 percent of China's imports.

Tourism

For the first twenty-five years of its existence the People's Republic was closed to all but a few selected foreign visitors. In the late 1970s, however, the Chinese leadership decided to vigorously promote tourism as a means of earning foreign exchange. Hotel and tourist transportation facilities were quickly expanded, guides were hurriedly trained, and over 100 sites were opened to tours by 1980. In 1979 nearly a million tourists visited China, and plans projected 1.5 million to 2 million annually by 1985. Tourism was firmly controlled and planned by the General Administration of Travel and Tourism.

Transportation

In the late 1970s China's transportation system consisted of a relatively sparse set of long-distance arteries, utilized by fairly modern vehicles, and dense networks of small local roads and waterways, where limited numbers of modern vehicles mixed with a vast array of nonmotorized conveyances. The great majority of long-distance hauling was carried out on railways and inland waterways. Waterborne transportation dominated freight traffic in East, Central, and Southwest China, along the Yangtze River and its tributaries, and in Guangdong and Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region, which were served by the Zhu Jiang system. North, Northeast, and Northwest China relied primarily on railways, which also formed the north-south linkages for the entire country. Significant international links consisted of rail lines to Hong Kong, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Vietnam), the Soviet Union, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea); a rapidly growing and increasingly sophisticated oceangoing merchant fleet and port system; and expanding airline routes. Local transportation was increasingly mechanized as motor vehicles, such as trucks, tractors, and motorized small boats became more numerous and widespread. Most vehicles in local use, however, were still nonmotorized. Bicycles were the primary means of personal transportation in most of China; animal-drawn carts were the most numerous vehicles in the countryside; small craft propelled by sails or oars were the most common vessels on rivers, canals, and lakes. Civil aviation grew rapidly in the 1970s but still played a very minor role in domestic transportation.

Transportation was regarded as a key weak link in the economy by the Chinese leaders. One of the goals of the three-year period of readjustment that began in 1979 was to increase the capacity and efficiency of the transportation network. Extensive projects were undertaken to modernize and expand the railways, ports, highways, and inland waterways.

Ownership and control of the different elements of the transportation system varied according to their roles and their importance in the national economy. The railways were directly owned by the central government and were controlled by the Ministry of Railways. The oceangoing merchant fleet was operated by the China Ocean Shipping Company, a government-owned enterprise. Civil aviation was also under central government control; China's airline was run by the General Administration of Civil Aviation of China (generally known as CAAC), which was a specialized organ directly under the State Council. Highways and inland waterways were generally the responsibility of the Ministry of Communication. Some trucking and inland navigation was handled by government-owned transport departments, but many trucks and cargo vessels were owned by enterprises engaged in other types of activities. In 1979 the volume of freight carried by government transport departments declined by 2.2 percent because industrial and commercial enterprises increased the amount of freight moved by their own trucks and other vehicles. Most rural units owned some motorized vehicles, mainly trucks and tractors, and many nonmotorized carts. Bicycles were privately owned.

Railways

Railways are the core of China's long-distance transportation system. In 1979 railways handled 53.6 percent of total freight transportation and 61.7 percent of total passenger traffic. All large cities, provinces, and autonomous regions except Xizang Autonomous Region (Tibet) were linked by the rail network.

Railway development began in China in the late nineteenth century when British concerns constructed a railway from Tangshan (T'angshan) to Tianjin (T'ien-chin, or Tientsin). In the early decades of the twentieth century there was a boom in railway building, most of it accomplished by foreigners. By 1949 some 22,000 kilometers of rail had been laid, primarily in the Northeast and between the big cities of North, East, and Central China. About half the system was destroyed in the war years prior to 1949.

After 1949 damaged tracks were repaired or rebuilt, and the construction of new lines was initiated. Most of the new railroads were built to service areas that had no rail links at all, rather than to intensify the existing network. Construction of new trunk lines to Chengdu, Chongqing, Guiyang, and Kunming in the 1950s and 1960s opened the mountainous southwestern provinces of Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan to rail traffic. The remote expanses of Northwest China were tied to the main rail system by lines connecting Ürümqi in the Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region, to Lanzhou in Gansu Province, and connecting Lanzhou to the Longhai Railway, the principal east-west artery for the northern half of China. Other new railroads provided access to the Ningxia-Hui Autonomous Region and the Nei Monggol Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolia) through Baotou and Lanzhou to Fujian Province, Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region and the Vietnam border in the South and to the port of Yantai in northeastern Shandong Province. The only important trunk railway built to connect places that were already served by main rail lines was an 870-kilometer stretch between Beijing and Tongliao, located on the well-integrated rail system in the Northeast.

Nearly 30,000 kilometers of new track was operating by 1979, giving China a rail network of 51.3 thousand kilometers, but track extension had averaged less than 3 percent a year since 1952. A more important problem was that renovation and basic improvements had not been made on some of China's most heavily used rail lines. The crucial line between Shanghai and Tianjin, which connected the lower Yangtze region to Beijing and the great industrial complex in the Northeast, was only partially double tracked, as were the Longhai Railway and the lines to Qingdao, a major port in Shangdong, and Guangzhou. Railway traffic was increased about three times as rapidly as track construction by steadily adding to the stock of locomotives and railway cars. The speed and efficiency of trains were limited, however, by the inadequate track system.

As part of the program to readjust the economy that began in 1979, emphasis in railway work was shifted from construction of new lines to improving the older routes. In 1979 investment for renovation was three times as large as the amount spent for new construction. Among the primary projects were double tracking of six important lines, including the four heavily used lines noted above, installation of automatic block equipment on part of the Longhai line, and electrification of the lines connecting Baoji to Lanzhou and Chengdu to Xiangfan (see fig. 13). Work continued on ten new railways, including a line through southern Xinjiang and the Qinghai-Tibet line, the latter to be the first railway to penetrate Tibet, the highest landmass in the world.

Nearly all of the rolling stock in the rail system was domestically produced (see Transportation Equipment, ch. 7). About 90 percent of the locomotives in use in 1979 were steam locomotives, although the numbers of diesel and electric locomotives were increasing rapidly. Locomotive plants were expected to convert entirely to production of diesel and electric models by the early 1980s. Freight cars were estimated to total 251,000 in 1976; about 60 percent of them were relatively modern in design and were built since 1965. The majority of freight cars were general-use gondolas and hopper cars, about 25 percent were tank cars, and the remainder were boxcars, flatcars, stockcars, and refrigerator cars.

Rail Passenger Traffic

In 1979 the volume of passenger traffic was 121,400 million passenger-kilometers. Passenger accommodations ranged from inexpensive "hard seat" cars, which made up the majority of passenger cars, to luxurious "soft sleeper" cars, which were about four times as expensive as the hard seat cars and carried only a small fraction of all passengers, including most foreigners who traveled by rail. Passenger trains had dining cars and were reported to be comfortable and punctual.

Subways

China's first subway opened in Beijing during the 1970s. In 1980 the first five-kilometer stretch of subway was completed in Tianjin. Subways were also planned for Harbin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.

Roads

In 1949 only about 75,000 kilometers of serviceable roads existed, about 75 percent of them located in the East, North, and Northeast. In the 1950s new roads were built to areas including Tibet and the Indian border, western Xinjiang, Qinghai, and the areas of Guangxi and Yunnan near the Indochina border. The locations of these roads were influenced by interest in securing the political allegiance of minority groups, like the Tibetans, and by military needs. Tibet previously was not accessible by roads suitable for wheeled vehicles of any kind. After 1960 emphasis was placed on construction of roads in rural areas to support agricultural units. By 1979 roads extended to all the counties in the country—except for one in Tibet and one in Sichuan—and to


N
Ürümqi
Harbin
Shenyang
Beijing
Qinhuangdao
Lüda (Dalian)
Tianjin
Yantai
Taiyuan
Jinan
Qingdao
Lanzhou
Zhengzhou
Lianyungang
Baoji
Xi'an
Nanjing
Shanghai
Xiangfan
Wuhan
Chengdu
Chongqing
Changsha
Guiyang
Fuzhou
Kunming
Nanning
HONG KONG (U.K.)
Guangzhou
Zhanjiang
Major port
Railroad
0 200 400 Miles
0 200 400 Kilometers

Source: Based on information from U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *People's Republic of China Atlas*, Washington, 1971; and U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, *China: Demand for Foreign Grain*, Washington, January 1979, map p. 6.

Figure 13. Railroads and Major Ports

over 91 percent of the rural communes. Between 1952 and 1978 the road network grew at an average annual rate of 7.8 percent and totaled 890,000 kilometers by the end of 1979. Highway freight traffic handled by state transport departments accounted for only about 3 percent of China's total freight traffic in 1979 but grew at an average rate of nearly 14 percent a year between 1952 and 1979. Highway freight carried in vehicles owned by industrial enterprises, commercial enterprises, and agricultural units was substantial and growing. Over 30 percent of total passenger traffic was carried on the highways in 1979.

The great majority of the roads had dirt or gravel surfaces and were used only for local traffic. The few roads that were important routes between different regions carried little freight traffic, mainly because of the scarcity of large modern trucks. Most roads in urban areas were paved. In the 1970s Beijing and other big cities suffered severe traffic congestion but were building well-planned, new road networks, featuring high-speed circle routes, complete with on- and off-ramps and wide roads with dividing strips between bicycle lanes and motor lanes.

There were a variety of vehicles in use on roads. Trucks were common, particularly a four-ton general purpose model that was the main product of the domestic truck manufacturing industry (see ch. 7, Industry). Many rural units and industrial enterprises owned trucks, but total numbers were small relative to the size of the country, and few were used for long-haul transportation.

Full-sized tractors and the ubiquitous small "walking tractors" and "garden tractors" were both owned by most agricultural units and were used extensively to pull carts and for transporting farm materials, produce, and people around the unit and the local area.

Cars and jeeps existed in all urban areas but in relatively small numbers. They were used as taxis and as transportation for high-ranking individuals. As of 1979 there were no privately owned cars. Bus systems were widely used in towns and cities and also provided public transportation to many rural areas. Three-wheeled motor carts and bicycle carts were common means of light-freight transportation in urban areas. Bicycles were the principal form of personal transportation in both urban and rural areas. In 1979 there were over 80 million bicycles in China.

Animal-drawn carts were the most common vehicles in rural areas. Two-wheeled and four-wheeled carts pulled by all conceivable combinations of horses, mules, donkeys, cows, oxen, and camels probably accounted for the majority of freight moved by farm units. By the 1970s virtually all carts were equipped with truck-type, rubber-tired wheels. Carts pulled by people were to be seen in some towns and in rural areas.

Waterways

Inland Navigation

Inland navigation was historically the most important form of transportation in China and has been the fastest growing sector of freight traffic since the founding of the People's Republic. Between 1952 and 1979 the volume of waterborne freight increased at an average annual rate of nearly 15 percent, speeding up to an average 28.5 percent for the 1977–79 period. The proportion of freight carried by water has also risen substantially—from 14.8 percent in 1952 to 43.8 percent in 1979—when the volume of freight carried on inland waterways was 456.4 billion ton-kilometers. Inland navigation was a relatively minor means of passenger transit, accounting for only 5.8 percent of all passenger-kilometers in 1979.

In 1979 the inland waterway system consisted of approximately 136,000 kilometers of navigable rivers, streams, lakes, and canals. The greater part of the system was located in the southern half of China, where the Yangtze River and the Zhu Jiang and their tributaries had 92,000 kilometers open to navigation, about two-thirds of the country's total. The Yangtze is China's longest river and most important inland water route. Together with its major tributaries, the Jialing Jiang, Chuan Jiang, Wu Jiang, and Han Jiang, it had 80,000 kilometers of navigable length in 1979, about 59 percent of the national system. The Yangtze is the main transportation artery connecting Southwest and Central China to East China. Among the many ports and industrial cities it serves are Chongqing, Wuhan, Wuhu, Ma'anshan, Nanjing, and Shanghai. The Zhu Jiang system links Guangzhou to the important cities of Guangzhou Province and Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region, notably Nanning, the capital of Guangxi, and Liuzhou, an industrial center. The Zhu Jiang system has 12,000 kilometers open to navigation, mostly on the Xi Jiang, the main branch of the Zhu Jiang which runs west through Guangxi. Other rivers with navigable stretches include the Huang He, the Huai He, the Hai He, and the Min Jiang. The Amur River and Sungari River provide access to much of the Heilongjiang Province, but they are closed by ice in the winter and the Amur is used by the Soviet Union as well as China. The ancient Grand Canal, originally constructed to carry tribute grain from Hangzhou in the Yangtze valley to the imperial court in North China, is some 1800 kilometers long. In 1949 it was mostly unusable, but repairs and improvements restored some 1,100 kilometers for seasonal shipping, and 400 kilometers were open for year-round use in the 1970s.

The growth in the volume of freight carried by the inland waterways resulted primarily from improvements in existing water routes and increases in the number, size, and speed of vessels. Channels were dredged and widened, locks were constructed, navigational aids were installed, and ports were improved, opening the system to use by bigger and faster boats for more days of the year. Vessels employed in inland shipping were as varied as the wheeled vehicles in use on China's roads. Ships as large as 10,000 tons could ascend the lower Yangtze to Wuhan in the high-water season. Smaller modern vessels plied the shallower stretches of the rivers. Barges and tugs up to 600 tons were used on parts of the Grand Canal. Huge numbers of traditional Chinese vessels—junks and sampans—were employed. Many were motorized, others were equipped with both motors and sails, and many still relied solely on sails or oars. Large areas in the Central, South, and East regions, particularly the deltas of the Yangtze and Zhu Jiang, were webbed with small streams and canals on which sampans rowed by one or two people provided most local transportation (see fig. 14).

Maritime Shipping

During the 1970s China made significant strides in maritime shipping capabilities, both in port development and in expansion of the oceangoing merchant fleet. In 1979 the country's merchant fleet, operated by the state-owned China Ocean Shipping Company, consisted of 400 vessels, including bulk freighters, tankers, container ships, and passenger liners. The total cargo capacity of the fleet was


Heilong Jiang (Amur River)
Songhua Jiang (Sungari River)
Harbin
Ürümqi
N
Shenyang
Beijing
Lüda (Dalian)
Grand Canal
Tianjin
Yantai
Huang He
Taiyuan
Jinan
Qingdao
Lianyungang
Lanzhou
Xi'an
Zhengzhou
Nanjing
Shanghai
Wuhan
Chang Jiang (Yangtze River)
Chengdu
Chongqing
Changsha
Guiyang
Fuzhou
Kunming
Zhu Jiang
Nanning
Guangzhou
Zhanjiang
improved waterway
0 200 400 Miles
0 200 400 Kilometers

Source: Based on information from U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *People's Republic of China Atlas*, Washington, 1971, p. 49.

Figure 14. Principal Improved Inland Waterways

over 7 million tons. During the 1970s China supplemented its own shipbuilding program with substantial purchases of large secondhand vessels on the international market, particularly in the latter years of the decade as a worldwide shipping slump depressed ship prices. In 1979 China bought forty-eight freighters averaging eleven years in age and 22,600 deadweight tons. In 1979 Chinese ships visited 416 ports in 100 countries and carried over 40 million tons of cargo. In addition to international trade, Chinese vessels were active in coastal shipping between domestic ports. Much of the coastal traffic consisted of domestically produced ships of 10,000 to 25,000 tons.

China's ports were very active in the 1970s as foreign trade blossomed, increasing the volume of traffic and demands on port facilities; cargo handled increased from 160 million tons in 1977 to 212.5 million tons in 1979. Chinese ports were not well equipped by Western standards but were vigorously expanded and modernized during the 1970s. Between 1973 and 1979 special facilities for handling grain, oil, coal, ore, and container vessels were installed at major

Chinese ports, and forty-four new deep-water berths were constructed. Eighty percent of the cargo handling at Chinese ports was mechanized by 1979. Continuing projects included construction of fifty-eight additional deep-water berths—some for ships as large as 10,000 tons—dredging, and further construction of wharves for special cargoes.

Among China's important ports Lüda, locally known as Dalian, located at the southern tip of the Liaotung Peninsula, is the major port of the Northeast; it is one of the largest and most modern ports in the country and has advanced oil-loading equipment. Qinhuangdao, in eastern Hebei Province, serves the Tianjin-Tangshan-Beijing industrial area and is scheduled for substantial technical improvement. Tianjin is located on the Hai He and is the main port for Beijing; it is an important intersection for coastal, inland, and international shipping. Qingdao is the largest port in Shandong Province and an excellent natural harbor. Lianyungang is the eastern terminus of the Longhai Railway and an increasingly important port for exporting coal; it is also scheduled for extensive modernization. Shanghai is China's biggest port and most important transportation center; extensive construction and modernization of port facilities had taken place and were continuing in 1980. Huangpu is the harbor of Guangzhou and is the largest port south of Shanghai; it is located at the mouth of the Zhu Jiang and is linked to Hong Kong by rail; it is also the subject of a modernization project.

Civil Aviation

China's civil aviation system, which is operated by the General Administration of Civil Aviation (CAAC), grew from 26,000 kilometers of air routes in 1957 to 168,000 kilometers of domestic routes and 67,800 kilometers of international routes in 1979. Freight volume was negligible in the 1950s but reached 123 million ton-kilometers in 1979, while passenger traffic increased to 3,500 million passenger-kilometers. In spite of this rapid growth, in 1979 civil aviation remained a tiny part of the total transportation system in terms of volume. Air freight made up about one-tenth of one percent of total freight turnover and passenger traffic was only 1.8 percent of the national total. On the other hand, the 160 domestic routes flown by CAAC provided valuable quick access to all China's provinces and constituted the first practical modern transportation to some of the remote desert and mountainous areas such as vast regions of Xinjiang (see Physical Environment, ch. 2). Furthermore, CAAC's eleven international routes and many of its domestic routes grew in importance in the late 1970s as tourist itineraries. CAAC also provided special services including aerial spraying, aerial photography, surveying, and cloud seeding.

Through the 1960s CAAC relied on a small fleet consisting mainly of aging British and Soviet aircraft. With the relaxing of restrictions

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on foreign imports in the 1970s, more modern aircraft were purchased from Western countries, notably ten Boeing 707 jetliners in 1974, and three Boeing 747 jumbo jets in 1978. In 1980 CAAC announced that routes between Beijing and Tokyo, Paris, Shanghai, and Guangzhou would be flown by 747s starting in April. Service to New York commenced in January 1981.

Air travel was also improved in early 1980 by the opening of the new Beijing International Airport, replacing the outdated structure that had been built in 1958. The new airport is highly automated and comparable in layout and capabilities to a modern Western airport.

Telecommunications

In 1980 China possessed a diversified telecommunications system, which effectively linked all parts of the country by telephone, telegraph, radio, and television. None of the telecommunications forms were as widespread or as advanced as those in modern Western countries, but the system included some of the most sophisticated technology in the world and constituted a firm foundation for the eventual development of a modern network.

Historical Development

When the People's Republic was founded in 1949 the telecommunications facilities in China were outdated, and many had been damaged or destroyed in the years of war. During the 1950s existing facilities were repaired, and with Soviet assistance considerable progress was made toward establishing a long-distance telephone wire network connecting Beijing to the provincial capitals. In addition conference telephone service was initiated, radio communications were improved, and the production of telecommunications equipment was accelerated. Growth in telecommunications halted with the general economic collapse after the Great Leap Forward (1958–60) but revived in the 1960s as the telephone network was expanded and improved equipment was introduced, including the products of new plants purchased from the West. An important component of the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1971–75) was a major development program for the telecommunications system. The program was allotted top priority for scarce electronics and construction resources and dramatically improved all aspects of China's telecommunications capabilities. Microwave radio relay lines and buried cable lines were constructed to create a network of wideband carrier trunk lines which covered the entire country. China was linked to the international telecommunications network by the installation of communications satellite ground stations and construction of a coaxial cable line between Guangzhou and Hong Kong. Provinces and municipalities rapidly expanded local telephone and wire broadcasting networks. Following the economic slump of the mid-1970s, expansion and modernization of the telecommunications system continued. During the period of economic readjustment that

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began at the end of the decade, particular emphasis was given to increased production of radio and television sets and expanded broadcasting capabilities.

Organization

Most of China's telecommunications network is the responsibility of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. Smaller specialized networks are operated independently by government agencies including the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications has subordinate branches at each geographic administrative level, which actually operate the telecommunications system.

Telecommunications Services

As of 1980 there was considerable variety in the quality of telecommunications services in China. Local telephone service was very poor in many cities, but long-distance and international services were generally good.

Telephone

The primary form of telecommunications was local and long-distance telephone service. Telephones were sparse by Western standards, and there were almost no private home telephones, but almost all economic and social units, including rural communes, were equipped with at least one telephone. The main weakness of the system was the poor quality and obsolete technology of many local switching systems. International telephone traffic was increasingly heavy as China expanded international activity in the 1970s. International telephone links, augmented by satellite service in 1973, were of high quality.

Telegraph, Facsimile, Telex

Telegraph development received lower priority than the telephone network largely because of difficulties involved in transmitting the written Chinese language. In the early 1970s this problem was generally overcome by the development of a computer-controlled electrostatic telegraph printer. Facsimile telegraph service, which transmits images, was developed during the First Five-Year Plan as a means to overcome the language transmission problem. Beginning in the late 1950s facsimile transceivers were domestically designed and produced, and by the 1970s they were used to transmit complete pages of newsprint to remote areas. Facsimile facilities also relied heavily on foreign equipment. Telex, a telegraph form that produces messages directly on a teleprinter, did not become a significant part of the communications system until the 1970s, when it was increasingly in demand by foreign businesspeople to facilitate contact with their home offices. In the latter half of the decade telex facilities were expanded and were used by some Chinese government and press agencies as well as by foreign businesspeople. Telex was used only for international communication.



An enterprising photographer in Beijing caters to customers eager to purchase photos of themselves with an automobile.
Courtesy Rinn-Sup Shinn

Radio

By the mid-1970s China's radiobroadcasting system consisted of over 150 stations. The number and power of stations increased steadily after 1949 as the domestic electronics industry improved and as foreign transmitting equipment was imported. In 1975 only two FM (frequency modulation) stations existed in China, one each in Beijing and Shanghai; all other stations were AM (amplitude modulation). Transistorized radio receivers were common by 1980, especially in the cities. Domestic production had increased from about 1 million sets a year in the 1960s to over 13.81 million in 1979. Western visitors reported that radio stations in Beijing tended to specialize their program content, some concentrating on Beijing opera, others on Western classical music, news, comedy skits, or educational programs.

Television

China's television system developed slowly in the 1950s and 1960s due mainly to inadequate broadcasting and receiving equipment. In the late 1960s and early 1970s domestic production of television equipment was substantially improved and expanded as were China's television stations. By 1975 live programs from stations in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Tianjin were transmitted to broadcasting stations in all major cities by microwave radio relay and coaxial cable lines. In the late 1970s there was a sudden acceleration in the growth of the television system as new broadcasting equipment was installed and new factories increased the supply of television receivers. In 1974 there were practically no privately owned television sets in China, and only about 300,000 existed in the entire country. Production of television sets increased to 1.3 million in 1979 and was planned to reach 2 million in 1980. In 1980 one-third of the families in Beijing owned televisions as did a significant proportion of families in other cities, while growing numbers of rural units purchased them collectively. Major Chinese stations broadcast in color by the late 1970s and China's first color picture-tube factory, imported from Japan, was under construction in 1980. Television programming steadily grew more varied, including news, movies, comedy, sports, and educational programs (see Mass Media, ch. 10).

Wired Broadcasting

By the mid-1970s China had installed a vast, nationwide network of wire lines and loudspeakers that directly transmitted radio programs into virtually all rural units and many urban ones. Western analysts estimated that over 140 million loudspeakers were in place in 1974. A primary function of the system was to extend radio transmissions to rural areas that were not within the range of regular broadcasting stations.

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Good general descriptions of internal commerce, foreign trade, and transportation may be found in *China's Economic Revolution*, by Alexander Eckstein; *China's Economy: A Basic Guide*, by Christopher Howe; and *China: A General Survey*, by Qi Wen. Quite a bit of information on these topics appears in articles in *Beijing Review* (weekly) and *China Reconstructs* (monthly).

Foreign trade through the mid-1960s is analyzed in detail by Alexander Eckstein in *Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade*. Another leading work on the topic is *The Foreign Trade of Mainland China*, by Feng-hwa Mah. Particularly useful articles in the 1975 United States Congress Joint Economic Committee's *China: A Reassessment of the Economy* are "China's Foreign Trade, 1950–74," by Nai-Ruenn Chen, and "Legal and Practical Problems in the China Trade," by Eugene A. Theroux. "China's International Trade and Finance," by Richard E. Batsavage and John L. Davie, is found in *Chinese Economy Post-Mao*. Excellent description and analysis of current trade appear in a series of research papers entitled *China: International Trade Quarterly Review*, by the National Foreign Assessment Center of the United States Central Intelligence Agency. Good coverage of current trade is also provided by the *US-China Business Review*, the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, and China's official publication, *China's Foreign Trade*.

A brief but very informative description of transportation networks is given in *People's Republic of China Atlas*, a 1971 publication of the

United States Central Intelligence Agency. Transportation is covered in greater detail in "The Transportation Sector, 1950–1971," by Philip W. Vetterling and James J. Wagg, in *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment*.

Communications systems are described in detail by Jack Craig in "China: Domestic and International Telecommunications, 1949–74." (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 9. Science and Technology

Ink and sponge drawing of miniature chariot, consigned to a Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–220 A.D.) tomb as a votive offering. The eyes were inset with turquoise.

AT THE BEGINNING of the 1980s science and technology policy in China, like other major policy areas, was closely intertwined with the broad national goal of the post-Mao era, the "four modernizations" (see Glossary). Indeed, of the "four modernizations," modernization in science and technology was identified by China's leaders in 1978 as the key to development in the other three areas: industry and agriculture, where scientific and technological applications can increase productivity; and national defense, which can be enhanced by modern weapons and communication technology. This overall priority marked a sharp turn away from the policies that had prevailed since the onset of the Cultural Revolution (see Glossary) in 1966. During that period and its aftermath, basic anti-intellectual policies had severely undermined scientific research and to a certain extent technological development as well.

Giving priority to modernization in science and technology does not, of course, resolve the great number of specific issues pertaining to research and development. Even if China remains for a decade or more on the same general course that was set in the late 1970s, scientific planners will continue to grapple with such questions as the optimal mix of basic versus applied research, the relative priorities assigned to various research fields, the definition of and limits on the role and status of scientists and technical personnel in society, the optimal organizational and incentive mechanisms for promoting research results, and the most desirable level of scientific and technical involvement with foreign countries.

Research and development in China has, since 1949 and to a certain extent earlier, been organized in a relatively centralized fashion and according to a national plan. There may be advantages to such a system since it has the potential of setting down clear priorities and making optimal use of relatively scarce human and material resources. In practice, however, these benefits appear to be more potential than actual. Plans in China appear to be more a series of political compromises reached within a framework of intense bureaucratic competition than a set of rational decisions based on a careful overall assessment of available resources. Furthermore, in a planned and centralized system, broad political changes and shifts in overall economic policy have a fairly immediate impact on research and development plans. The resulting discontinuities can seriously disrupt research work that generally requires long-term stability in order to achieve results. Finally, the basic research sector, by its very nature, defies excessive planning. Output in this area requires a degree of risk taking and flexibility—a difficult choice when resources are scarce. China's success in promoting modernization in science and technology will depend largely on the ability of planners to circumvent the negative effect of bureaucratic politics in the research sector and to provide both the long-term policy stability required for effective research and the flexibility required to promote scientific innovation.

In 1980, while technological development continued to take precedence over science, basic scientific research, which had been all but completely suspended in the late 1960s and in the 1970s, was assigned unprecedented importance. Basic research was recognized as the foundation of a modern research and development capability and was undoubtedly seen as having an important potential for prestige achievements.

In a complete reversal of Cultural Revolution policy, China's intellectuals, its most prominent scientists in particular, were "liberated" in the late 1970s. They were politically rehabilitated and elevated to high social status, recognized for their past and potential future contributions to China's modernization, and returned to a relatively well-funded research environment. Yet this thaw, reminiscent of the "hundred flowers" period of the mid-1950s, may be as fragile as its antecedent. Status and prestige are highly sensitive issues in China's political system, and the intellectual freedom granted at the beginning of the 1980s carried a price tag—research achievements that translate directly into economic modernization by the end of the century. The difficulty inherent in making such an assessment of research achievements places the research system in jeopardy, particularly in the area of the basic sciences.

As to the matter of foreign relations in science and technology, there is also certain fragility in China's unprecedented efforts initiated in 1977 to link itself with the scientific community of advanced industrial nations. The slogan of "self-reliance," first enunciated in the 1960s, has been reinterpreted but not altogether repudiated; and international scientific ties do not occur in a political vacuum. Here, too, the historical precedent of brittle relations with the Soviet Union and the deleterious short-term impact of the political rupture on China's science and technology can be presumed to have left China's policymakers cautious.

Historical Development of Science and Technology Policy

Pre-1949 Traditions

China is well known for its early scientific activities and technological achievements, such as the development of block printing, the navigational compass, and gunpowder in the seventh century A.D. during the Tang Dynasty. Early work in mathematics and astronomical observation and in plant taxonomy and pharmacology are also part of China's rich historical record. While there may not be a necessary connection between such early discoveries and the work of modern science, ancient Chinese scientific achievements are a source of great national pride and continue to be the subject of active historical research in China.

Although sporadic scientific contacts had occurred between China and the West in earlier centuries, notably through the presence in China of Jesuit missionaries beginning with Matteo Ricci in the late sixteenth century and for over a century thereafter, it was only in the nineteenth century that western technology made significant inroads in China. After China had suffered repeated defeats at the hands of foreign troops armed with technologically superior weaponry, some of China's more progressive imperial officials began in the 1860s to advocate a policy of adopting western technology and western learning in order to develop national strength. Under this policy of "self-strengthening," the imperial government established foreign language and technical schools, shipyards, and arsenals, and began to translate and disseminate foreign scientific and technological literature. Very early in China there was a strong connection between the acquisition of foreign technology and the development of national defense. By and large, however, the link between technology and economic production was not widely perceived until the twentieth century.

Perhaps sensing the interconnection between technology, science, broader questions of philosophy and values, and of social organizations and mores, China's leaders in the nineteenth century sought to isolate the process of technological borrowing from the undesirable possibility of adopting more than technology from abroad. A careful delineation was embodied in the expression of the time—*zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong*—Chinese learning for essential matters, western learning for utilitarian ones. In the century that followed the adoption of this policy of self-strengthening, China's leaders were not able, of course, to uphold this cautious principle as foreign values and sociopolitical structures were gradually amalgamated into Chinese society. Yet the distinction between "essential" matters and "utilitarian" ones has left recognizable vestiges to this day. China seeks, in the remainder of the twentieth century, to join the front ranks of world scientific achievement and to modernize industrial and agricultural production (including management systems) without adopting the political forms and values of the world's leading industrial nations.

As the imperial system began to collapse after the turn of the twentieth century, China's progressive political leaders and thinkers engaged in increasingly thoroughgoing and critical analyses first of the political system then, by the late teens, of the traditional philosophies and cultural values. The pressures of the industrialized nations (including Japan) for economic concessions in China in the late nineteenth century had resulted in the inexorable introduction of modern economic production in China along with its technological infrastructure. In a last ditch effort to reassert political and economic control in the final decade before its collapse in 1911, the imperial government underwent substantial reforms and reorganization. Two areas of reform had crucial long-term implications for the future of China's scientific and technological development: the development of state economic administration and the introduction of modern, i.e., western, education in China. In that final decade the establishment of ministries of agriculture, industry, and commerce, for instance, symbolized the assertion of the principle that the overall management of China's economy and its development is the basic responsibility of the government—a principle from which no Chinese government has deviated in the twentieth century. In the education sector, the ancient imperial examination system, the keystone of the traditional educational system, was first modified then abolished altogether in 1905. This opened the way for the large-scale introduction and strengthening of new schools and westernized curricula that had originated with the earlier efforts of western missionaries. These new schools included Christian colleges (such as St. John's College in Shanghai, dating back to 1879; Yenching University; and Aurora University, which later was to become Fudan University); private schools (such as Nankai Middle School, which became Nankai University in 1919); and governmental schools such as Peking National University (first established as the Imperial University in 1898). Related to these developments was the beginning of large-scale efforts to send Chinese students abroad, dozens at first, then hundreds annually (some were the beneficiaries of the American decision in 1908 to remit indemnities paid by China after the Boxer Rebellion—see The Republican Revolution of 1911, ch. 1).

While technology remained China's primary concern over the years, science took on a special importance during the May Fourth Movement, a national intellectual awakening set in motion by student protests over revelations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 that the government had secretly accepted Japan's claim to Shandong (see Nationalism and Communism, ch. 1). The total collapse of the imperial dynasty in 1911 and the persistent inability of any political force in China to create political unity provided the context for a number of leading Chinese intellectuals, many of whom had studied abroad or had received extensive exposure to western thought, to raise in heated academic debates some fundamental questions about both Chinese and western culture and the strengths and weaknesses of each. One of the most prominent of these debates was the series on science and the philosophy of life in 1923 in which the omnipotence of science was staunchly defended by the noted geologist Ding Wenjiang.

Intellectual debate on the significance of science and the growth of scientific thinking in China was coupled with a gradual building up of scientific institutions. The Science Society of China, first established by Chinese students at Cornell University in 1914 and later moved to China, was dedicated to "the diffusion of the scientific spirit and knowledge for scientific growth and industrial prosperity." The society published an important philosophical journal,

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Kexue (*Science*), and in 1922 established a major biological laboratory in Nanjing (Nan-ching). In 1916 the nominal Republican government's Ministry of Industry and Mines assumed the administration of the National Geological Survey, founded in 1912 and patterned after the United States Geological Survey. A major turning point in the institutionalization of science was the establishment of the Nationalist government in 1928, which provided a modicum of political stability and unity at least over central-coastal China during the decade that preceded the Japanese invasion in 1937. The Academia Sinica, one of the predecessors of today's Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and of the Academia Sinica in Taiwan, was established in 1928 with about a dozen research institutes under its administration. That same year the Fan Memorial Biological Institute was established on the basis of Boxer Indemnity Funds, and in 1929 what was then known as the Peking Academy was established encompassing a number of research institutes in the basic sciences.

Soviet Influence in the Early 1950s

The global political events that surrounded and followed the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 led China to a foreign policy of "leaning to one side"—that of the Soviet Union. Although the two countries began to drift away from their close alliance less than a decade after it began, the pattern of organization for scientific research and technological development that China borrowed from the Soviet Union in the 1950s remained largely in evidence in 1980.

The Soviet Union was not an unreasonable model for China to follow in the 1950s. Within four decades after its October revolution the Soviet Union had become a significant industrial power and a nation capable of achievements in two highly symbolic areas of research: nuclear science and space technology. Since China was patterning its political and economic institutions on the Soviet model, it was only logical that its scientific research and policymaking institutions would also be ordered along Soviet lines. The organizational model for science and technology, which will be discussed in greater detail below, was based on the following assumptions: that scientific work could and should be planned in a rather centralized fashion; that scientists should work within a bureaucratic framework led by political administrators; that research is best carried out within relatively specialized mission-oriented institutes and to a much lesser extent in universities; and that applied science and technology should be given high priority and be closely integrated with the structure of industry.

In addition to providing a model for the organization of scientific work, the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent the socialist countries of Eastern Europe established in the 1950s a two-way flow of scientific and technical personnel with China. The Soviet Union, for instance, dispatched about 11,000 scientific and technical aid personnel to

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China between 1950 and 1960. The bulk of these provided technical advice, training, and project supervision in industry and other areas of the economy. About 1,000 served in the education and public health sectors, and an estimated 850 were involved in all major areas of China's scientific research sector. Virtually all Soviet advisers were withdrawn abruptly and unilaterally by the Soviet Union in the summer of 1960 as political relations between the two countries deteriorated.

In the decade of the 1950s China dispatched to the Soviet Union about 38,000 individuals for training and study. The bulk of these (28,000) were workers and technicians from key industrial enterprises receiving substantial Soviet guidance. About 7,500 students were sent to the Soviet Union, about one quarter of whom were graduate students. (After 1957 all students sent to the Soviet Union were at the graduate level.) In addition, about 2,500 teachers and scientists received advanced training in the Soviet Union. The number of Chinese going to the Soviet Union tapered off rapidly after 1960, but by the mid-1960s an estimated 16,000 Chinese had received some type of education overseas, about 90 percent of these in the Soviet Union.

Whereas industrial cooperation between the Soviet Union and China began in the early 1950s, formal relations in science and technology did not begin until October 1954, when a Joint Commission for Cooperation in Science and Technology was established. The commission met on a more or less annual basis until 1963 and oversaw collaboration on over 100 major scientific projects including cooperation in the nuclear sciences (and the beginnings of cooperation in nuclear weaponry in 1957–58). The Chinese were major participants in the Joint Institute for Nuclear Cooperation at Dubna, where China's noted nuclear physicist (and as of 1980, director of the Institute of Atomic Energy in Beijing), Wang Ganchang, served as deputy director.

A particularly interesting facet of the cooperative relationship between China and the Soviet Union was the role played by Soviet scientists in the formulation of China's Twelve-Year Plan for Scientific Development (1956–67). Initial work on the plan began in China in the fall of 1955 when individual research institutes were called on to submit long-term plans for their work. In early 1956 a comprehensive plan was formulated by the CAS with the active participation of several hundred Chinese scientists and over a dozen advisers from the Soviet Union. After formal presentation to the Eighth National Party Congress in the fall of 1956, the draft plan was referred to the Soviet Academy of Sciences for review by several hundred Soviet scientists. In October 1957 a high-level delegation of Chinese scientists went to Moscow to discuss the plan and negotiate Soviet assistance with about 100 of the 582 projects outlined in the Twelve-Year Plan. The outline, intended to cover China's economic planning periods through the Third Five-Year Plan, was a flexible

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one that ultimately underwent considerable alteration as a result of major political and economic movements in China. Although details were never made public, the twelve major areas covered in the draft plan were: peaceful uses of atomic energy; radio electronics; jet propulsion; automation; prospecting for petroleum and rare minerals; metallurgy; fuels; heavy machinery; harnessing the Huang He and the Yangtze river; mechanization, electrification, and chemical fertilizers for agriculture; eradication of prevalent diseases; and achievements in the basic sciences. The overall aim of the plan to bring China on a par with world scientific frontiers was never reached and that basic goal constitutes China's agenda for scientific and technological development for the remainder of the twentieth century.

Winds of Political Change

A major aspect of science and technology policy concerns scientific and technical personnel. One of the greatest paradoxes that has faced China's political leaders since 1949 has been the simultaneous desire to modernize and to build a socialist society. The development of socialism requires the phasing out (be it gradual or abrupt) of the bourgeois class (which includes intellectuals), whereas modernization, particularly in science and technology, requires the maintenance of an intellectual elite. In the short-run at least, owing to historical circumstances, the intellectual elite harbors values that include the maintenance of special privileges and of unfettered expression of beliefs—values usually associated with the bourgeoisie. The dilemma of China's political leadership has been to strike a balance between the need to maintain an active and productive group of intellectuals while maintaining political direction over them as part of an undesirable social class.

This issue became very prominent in 1956 when major transformations in China's social structure were taking place, such as the collectivization of agriculture and the socialist transformation of industry and commerce (thus raising the issue of transforming the intellectuals as well), while there was a desire to push ahead with modernization goals, particularly in science and technology. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held a major conference on the matter of intellectuals in January 1956, where the late Premier Zhou Enlai made an important address. Zhou Enlai called for the "winning over" of China's nearly 4 million intellectuals, especially an estimated 100,000 "higher" intellectuals, i.e., scientists, engineers, and professors, to the cause of the Party and the state by giving greater recognition to their contributions to modernization and by giving them more latitude in their activities including a greater voice in policymaking. In addition, he called for better working conditions for researchers and for certain material privileges to encourage them in their work. Zhou Enlai's speech remained of fundamental importance in the early 1980s when it

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continued to be cited frequently. The dilemma remained essentially the same as it had been in the 1950s, and China's policies toward scientists and technical personnel in the early 1980s constitute an attempt to fulfill the goals that were advocated by Zhou Enlai almost three decades earlier.

During those decades China's intellectuals, including scientists and technical personnel, had been subjected to the overall vagaries of the regime's policies toward intellectuals and to the broader issues of "class struggle"—specifically the role of various social classes of society, the political latitude accorded to them, and the privileges to which they were entitled (see Inequality, Stratification, and Social Mobility, ch. 3.). Until the late 1970s the period in which China's intellectuals were given the greatest latitude was the period of the "hundred flowers" from mid-1956 to mid-1957, named after Party Chairman Mao Zedong's call to "Let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend" (see The "Transition to Socialism" (1953–57), ch. 1). The "hundred flowers" period reflected both the need to mobilize intellectuals in support of national unity and modernization goals and the confidence held by Mao that most intellectuals were in fact basically supportive of the regime and an important political counterbalance to the rapid entrenchment of state bureaucrats. It is also widely believed, in and out of China, that the "hundred flowers" movement may also have been used to ferret out the opponents of the regime. Be that as it may, the movement was abruptly brought to a close in June 1957 with the onset of the "antirightist" campaign.

Targeted largely at members of the CCP, the "antirightist" campaign also had major implications for China's intellectual community. Hardest hit were artists, writers, social scientists, and humanists, whose values were most evident in their work, hence most vulnerable to criticism. Many were removed from their jobs, some not to be fully rehabilitated politically until the late 1970s.

By 1958 the "antirightist" campaign had evolved into the broader movement known as the Great Leap Forward (see Glossary). The "leap" is best known for the establishment of communes (see Glossary) in the countryside and the related mass mobilization of peasants and workers to boost production—exemplified by the "backyard furnace" approach to small-scale production of steel on a nationwide scale (see The 1950s Period, ch. 6). The movement was frenetic and pervasive and its effect on scientific and technological development was substantial. For one, political activity (meetings, rallies, and the like) were so frequent that research and development work was severely affected. Secondly, as with the economic sectors, scientific and technical work was "massified," that is, the work was no longer seen as the specialized domain of specially trained personnel. According to the ethos of the Great Leap, everyone was capable of doing research work, and achievements were viewed as being less a function of specialized knowledge and more an innate creativity possessed by all members of society, especially its workers and peasants. The work of scientists and technicians was essentially devalued, and their activities were confined by the need to accept the presence in the laboratories of inadequately trained personnel. Finally, educational training itself was affected. Again, education was "massified" as norms of educational achievement were devalued to the lowest common denominator. The number of higher education "graduates" was greatly increased but quality control was largely ignored. Not only are statistics on educational and scientific achievements almost meaningless for this period, but even the work carried out at high-caliber institutions suffered some degree of disruption.

The Great Leap Forward was, in its most intense phase, shortlived. As a mass mobilization movement it could not be sustained for very long. In the economic spheres, the rapid changes and most of the new policies instituted proved to have unsatisfactory results or undesirable consequences. Several factors contributed to an economic downturn and to a general demoralization of Chinese society by the early 1960s. The activities during the Great Leap Forward disrupted normal economic activities, and the failed experiments had long-term effects on productivity (especially in the area of agricultural production). Three successive years of poor harvests in 1959, 1960, and 1961 led to an overall worsening of the economy, and the rather abrupt withdrawal of the Soviet technicians in 1960 interrupted the process of industrial and scientific modernization on a number of key projects. China entered several lean years of gradual readjustment (see ch. 5, Economic Context).

In 1963 and 1964 there were signs that efforts were being made to restore some planning in scientific research by salvaging some aspects of the Twelve-Year Plan of the 1950s and adapting them to China's new conditions of economic adjustment and a policy of self-reliance in science and technology imposed by the break with the Soviet Union. While scientific activity picked up in intensity in those years, a clear definition of direction and priorities in research and development failed to crystallize by the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 (see Glossary).

In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution there were signs that scientists might be exempted from the movement. But, while it is known that certain sectors of research were guarded from civil unrest, the Cultural Revolution ultimately represented a decade of disaster with respect to science and especially to advanced education and also to technological development and higher education in general. In 1980 during a period of policy reversal and backlash against the Cultural Revolution, it was difficult to obtain a precise assessment of the damage to scientific and technical modernization caused by the movement. What was certain, however, was that funding in this area had been severely limited, and the political atmosphere with respect to scientists and technical personnel had been so charged as to be demoralizing if not totally debilitating to the scientists. Whatever research work was carried out during that decade had been done in spite of the prevailing atmosphere and under very unfavorable intellectual and material conditions. At a time when science and technology were advancing at a very rapid pace in the rest of the world, a decade of stagnation in China would inevitably carry with it long-term consequences.

The broad lines of the deleterious effects of the Cultural Revolution on science and technology activities in China are well known. Most scientists appear to have been absent from their laboratories or inactive within them, spending much time on political meetings and study. Much of the laboratory instrumentation went into disuse often resulting in damage; and while some equipment was wantonly damaged and destroyed during the most intense phases of the movement, other equipment was removed from the laboratories and moved to factories where it was sometimes misused. On the whole, little in the way of new equipment or materials was accessible. China's academic community was cut off from foreign contacts, scientific journals and books ceased to be imported from abroad or never reached their intended destinations, and existing library collections either were made inaccessible, were damaged or destroyed.

Even more disruptive in the long term was the impact of the Cultural Revolution on China's system of higher education (see Higher Education and Economic Development, ch. 4). In the late 1960s colleges were closed, and those who were in the midst of their undergraduate or graduate education were forced to interrupt it. While many were ultimately given graduation certificates, those credentials represented incomplete higher education. When colleges and universities were reopened in 1971, their curriculum was abridged to three years and further limited by a large allocation of time to political activities (meetings, study, and community work) and to "production" (industrial or agricultural). Students were recruited on the basis of political recommendations (which did not necessarily take into account their academic and intellectual qualifications). Education in science (in contrast to engineering, for instance) was particularly hard-hit as emphasis was largely placed on immediate applications to economic production. Finally, attitudes that valued higher education were strongly discouraged, causing a widespread disinterest in study on the part of students or potential students.

While the overall record of the Cultural Revolution in science and education is clear, there is also considerable evidence of pockets of low-level research activity and of a considerable amount of "closet scholarship," which attests to the dedication of China's intellectuals to their professions. As became evident in the late 1970s, there was a dedicated core of intellectuals prepared to reassume leadership and activity in research and development as soon as the political opportunity presented itself.



Radio telescope apparatus, Beijing astronomical observatory
Courtesy China Pictorial

An official of the Systematical Science Research Institute in discussion with a group of scholars
Courtesy China Pictorial

Policy Under the New Leadership: Science and Technology Returns to Preeminence

The Spring of Science: 1978

The death of Mao Zedong and the overthrow of the so-called Gang of Four (see Glossary) in 1976 constituted a major political watershed, and some of the most immediate policy reversals occurred in the areas of science and technology and in higher education. Within about a year of this watershed, concrete steps were taken to lay down the broad lines of a new science and technology policy. Given the experience of the past three decades of political development in China, it would be foolhardy to predict that the country will remain on the course that has been set for the remainder of the twentieth century. But there was no question as the 1980s began that China's scientific and political leaders were exuding an unprecedented degree of confidence that the renewed priority given to scientific and technological work would be sustained for many years to come.

In 1977 and 1978 several major steps were taken in regard to science and technology policy. First, there was a rather thorough reshuffling of political and administrative personnel ranging from the highest levels of government to individual research and academic institutions and economic enterprises. Followers of the Gang of Four were, by and large, removed from positions of authority, leaving individuals who would support an emphasis on scientific work. Secondly, a massive publicity effort was launched to promote the importance of scientists and technical personnel and their work. For instance a major national newspaper, *Guangming Ribao*, began in May 1978 to focus exclusively on science and education matters. In the Chinese press in general there was, at the close of the 1970s, extensive coverage of scientific achievements and activities, both domestic and international; denunciation of the repressive influence exerted in the past by the Gang of Four and theoretical discussions of the role of science. Particularly important in these discussions was the characterization of scientists and technicians as part of the "productive forces" of society, which means that their work must be valued rather than viewed as counterproductive to the revolutionary transformation of the class structure of society.

The role of scientific personnel in Chinese society was redefined. In the more "radical" policy phases, such as most of the 1966–76 decade, there had been a deliberate attempt to minimize the differences and potential conflict between "red" and "expert" and between those who perform manual and mental labor by merging those roles. The "experts," i.e., intellectuals in general, were subjected to political education and required to engage in productive labor, while workers and peasants were deemed capable of making scientific achievements equal to those of the "experts," and political cadres were placed fully in charge of science policy. Starting in 1977 it was argued that modern society requires a division of labor between "red" and "expert" and between manual laborer and intellectual, each making a unique contribution to the advancement of the society. Scientists and technicians were thus promoted to a position of respect rather than denigrated as in the recent past. Their roles as researchers, creators of new technology leading to modernization, and as teachers and diffusers of technical knowledge were expanded to include a degree of policymaking. This trend, for instance, manifested itself in the establishment of academic councils in research institutes and universities, made up of scientists whose function is to advise these institutions' administrations on policy matters. There was also a movement to bring more intellectuals into the ranks of the Party. It is worthy of note that 75 percent of the "scientific workers" present at the 1978 National Science Conference were already party members.

The institutional structure of scientific activity was strengthened. Administrative and research units that had been phased out during the Cultural Revolution were reinstated, and new institutions were created in response to expanding needs. And there is every indication that scientific research budgets have been increased substantially over the levels of the Cultural Revolution decade.

Many of the policy decisions that were made after Mao's death in 1976 were widely publicized in a national conference on science of unprecedented scale. More than 6,000 delegates attended the meeting, which was held in Beijing, March 18–31, 1978. The convening of the conference was first called for in a September 18, 1977, circular by Premier Hua Guofeng, which led to an intensive preparatory meeting of 1,200 scientists in October to discuss science policy. In the months that followed, a draft eight-year national plan for scientific work covering the period 1978 to 1985 was put together for discussion at the March conference. A more general twenty-three-year plan (up to the year 2000) was apparently also formulated.

The main purpose of the science conference was to announce formally the new governmental commitment to science and to mobilize national resources on behalf of the scientific and technological work, which would launch China on a new "long march" toward becoming a "modern socialist state" by the year 2000. While the draft eight-year plan was not made public, major speeches by China's top leaders, Hua Guofeng, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping (the driving figure behind the modernization policy), and Vice Premier Fang Yi (China's leading science and technology administrator), stressed the following points: China's scientists would be given free rein in carrying out research according to national priorities; priority sectors would receive funding and logistical support commensurate with national goals; research priorities would include basic research that had been neglected in the past, while applied research would continue to play an important part; priority areas would include both those in which China is currently approaching "advanced world levels" and areas in which China is currently weak; China's scientists would be given wide access to foreign technology through international scientific exchange and purchases of foreign technology. Additionally, the number of research institutions would increase in key areas via establishment of new centers and development of centers where research had lapsed during the Cultural Revolution; China's scientific and technical manpower would be substantially increased (the initial target figure: 800,000); scientific learning would be encouraged through recognition and material rewards; nonscientific activities would not intrude substantially on research activities. Scientists and other professionals would be assured that at least five-sixths of their time would be devoted to their professional work; administrative and political leadership would encourage rather than hinder the activities of scientists.

While research funding was to be allocated to a variety of sectors beyond key areas specifically cited—such as transportation and communication, oceanography, and environmental protection—eight major areas were given first priority in the eight-year plan for the development of science. Among these areas was agricultural science and technology—soil improvement and erosion control, irrigation, improvement of seed strains, fertilizers, forestry, animal science, fisheries, sideline production, agricultural biology and mechanization. Also assigned priority was energy research—petroleum geology and exploration and exploitation techniques, mechanization of coal extraction, atomic power generation, and solar, geothermal, wind, tidal, and controlled thermonuclear energy production. A third area singled out was materials science and technology—including iron ore mining and beneficiation, copper and aluminum production, cement and building materials, mining and dressing of nonmetallic ores, catalysts, and plastics and synthetic rubber and fibers.

Computer science and technology, a fourth priority area, was to focus on large-scale and ultralarge-scale integrated circuits, large-scale computers, computer software, and applied mathematics. Also specifically cited was laser science and technology—for use in isotope separation, catalysis, information processing, controlled thermonuclear reaction, laser physics, laser spectroscopy, and nonlinear optics.

The remaining priority research areas included space science and technology—remote sensing, building and launching of skylabs and skyprobes—and high-energy physics keyed to the building of a large proton accelerator and developing its applications. The eighth special area cited for science development was genetic engineering—basic research in molecular biology, molecular genetics and cell biology, pharmaceutical applications, and nitrogen fixation.

Realism Takes Hold as the 1980s Begin

The euphoric high point of 1978, marked especially by the National Science Conference, was followed by some fundamental readjustments the following year and as China entered the 1980s a considerable degree of realism and cautiousness began to characterize science and technology policy (as it did in overall economic policy).

The optimistic and enthusiastic mood of 1978 appears to have generated great budgetary demands by research and academic institutions seeking rapid growth in human and material resources in order to carry out ambitious modernization plans: laboratories needed to be reequipped and staffed and major new projects required the construction of new buildings; similarly, colleges and universities, projecting large enrollment increases, needed more dormitory space for additional students and teaching staff, while also hoping to build and supply with new equipment both teaching and research laboratories. Furthermore, both the acquisition of foreign-made equipment and the advanced training of younger researchers overseas put a financial strain on very limited foreign currency resources.

As a result China's economic planners announced at the Fifth National People's Congress (NPC) in June 1979, that, on the basis of a careful reassessment of China's economic capabilities, economic targets would have to be lowered and priorities in goals carefully laid down. This is not to say that plans for scientific and technological modernization suffered a major setback. The commitment to the major developmental goals in these areas was not changed; it is only individual projects that were delayed or postponed indefinitely in favor of higher priority projects and pending the availability of greater economic resources. In the field of high-energy physics, for instance, China proceeded with plans for the construction of its 50 Gev proton accelerator, albeit on a somewhat slower schedule. In general the recommendations of Vice Premier Yu Qiuli, minister-in-charge of the State Planning Commission, to the Fifth Congress suggested that applied science and technology would take precedence over basic scientific research so that "the results of scientific research can be applied to production as quickly as possible."

Aside from a possible reordering of priorities within science and technology, the overall picture outlined in the mid-1979 session of the Fifth Congress was far from a discouraging one. Yu Qiuli called for the continued reopening of research institutes that had been closed or merged with others during the Cultural Revolution and the establishment of new ones. He stated furthermore that the state budget for science in 1979 would be 10 percent higher than 1978 expenditures. Yu Qiuli cited figures (the likes of which have not been reported in China for almost two decades) of 5.87 billion yuan (for value of the yuan—¥—see Glossary) budgeted for science and technology in 1979 of which ¥619 million was earmarked for the work of the CAS, the State Scientific and Technological Commission (SSTC), and their affiliated organizations. The remainder includes capital construction funds for the research organizations and probably for research and development conducted under the auspices of various ministries (industrial, agricultural, and health) and of universities.

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A few figures released during the 1980 NPC session held in August–September continued to show a positive trend in the budgeting for science. The state budget for science, education, and public health (combined) was increased by 12.2 percent from 1979 to 1980 (to a total of ¥14.83 billion) and was projected to increase again by 14.3 percent from 1980 to 1981 (to a total of ¥16.95 billion). Not only do these figures reflect a steady increase in state allocations, they represent a slight increase in the proportion of the entire state budget for those areas (from about 13 percent in 1980 to about 14 percent in 1981). Although these figures are for a broad combined category, there were no indications that science lagged behind education and public health in the incremental trend. Comparison of the two sets of figures for the 1979 budget shows that science accounted for about 45 percent of the combined budget category in that year. Chinese sources further indicated in 1980 that expenditures for research in the basic sciences constituted about 10 percent of overall expenditures on scientific activities.

At the beginning of the 1980s there was a definite downturn in the discussion of science policy issues in the Chinese press suggesting that at least the broad guidelines have been set. There is no question, however, that much fine tuning remains to be done on a number of issues. Some of these were suggested by comments made by representatives to the Fifth NPC in 1979. Several delegates, for instance, demanded a "unified national program for scientific development" fifteen months after the National Science Conference in March 1978 drew up an eight-year plan for that purpose. Liu Dagan, director of the Institute of Chemistry of the CAS, noted that, while progress had been made since the conference (which included a massive national scientific and technical manpower survey in mid-1978), a plan had yet to be worked out for the efficient use of China's limited number of scientific workers.

Further proposals for better coordination included a call for the creation of an energy commission under the State Council to coordinate the development of hydropower, coal, oil, gas, uranium, and other sources of energy (such a commission was ultimately established in August 1980), and a suggestion that a national computer center be set up to maximize China's existing computer base. Several deputies also urged more extensive links among research units working in similar areas.

The broad issues that are likely to persist over the 1980s and possibly beyond are those of research priorities, organization, and international ties. These issues are not unique to China nor are they new issues. It may not be any easier in the near future for China's science and technology planners to reach a stable consensus on them than it has been in the past.

On the matter of research priorities, the major issue is the balance between applied and basic research. In the early 1980s China was placing more emphasis on basic research than ever before, although the balance continued to be very much in favor of applied work. The opponents of basic research view that work as a luxury that China cannot yet afford. However, a strong case seems to have been made successfully that research in the basic sciences is an investment for the future, a building of the human and physical infrastructure for a wider range of work in applied science and technology. Also, the potential prestige to be derived from breakthroughs in basic scientific research, such as high-energy physics or genetic engineering, has not been overlooked by China's scientific planners.

On the other hand the basic measure of success or failure of national goals is that of economic achievement. If these achievements are not made, the post-Mao leadership becomes vulnerable and, if the past is any indication, political downfalls of individuals or groups of individuals also result in the wholesale abandonment of a wide range of policies. Yu Qiuli's 1979 call for closer ties between research and production was not lost on the heads of research organizations who for the sake of ultimate preservation tend to ensure that a sound proportion of production-related applied research is carried out within their institutions.

Beyond the fundamental tension between basic and applied research, the relative priority assigned to different fields of science and technology research is likely to remain in constant flux. Competition among research institutions is intense, and decisions about research priorities tend to be greatly influenced by delicate and unstable balances in bureaucratic politics. The assignment of research contracts on the basis of relatively neutral assessments of an institution's research capabilities seems to remain the exception rather than the rule. Again, if the past is any indication, plans will continue to shift, and research that requires long-term, stable efforts will suffer.

The Organization of Scientific Research and Technological Development

Policymaking and Administration

Scientific research and technological development fall entirely within the purview of government administration and planning. Policies toward research and development, such as setting priorities, planning, and financing, as well as the administration of research are all carried out by governmental units at the national level (and in some cases at the provincial level). Research and development activities take place within several major and rather distinct areas of China's state bureaucratic structure. Civilian research and development is roughly divided into four major sectors: the CAS, the industrial sector, other ministerial sectors (such as agriculture and public health), and the university sector. To some extent these activities are all coordinated by the SSTC. In addition, military research is managed rather separately from civilian work. Finally, insofar as some social science research is related to the development and administration of scientific research and technological innovation, the operation of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) deserves passing mention.

State Scientific and Technological Commission (SSTC)

As of 1980 the most important national bureau involved in the formulation of (civilian) science policy in China was the SSTC. Nominally subordinate to the State Council, it was a fairly powerful policymaking and coordinating body, which worked in conjunction with the State Planning Commission (which, in turn, both initiated and ultimately approved broad long-range economic policies), especially since science policy was identified as a key to the overall policy of modernization. Through a merger of two separate commissions for science and for technology the SSTC was originally established in 1958 to perform this policy function, but ceased to operate during the Cultural Revolution (see Chinese Academy of Sciences [CAS], this ch.). It was restored in late 1977, headed by Fang Yi, whose earlier career had been in the area of foreign economic and technical aid. Fang Yi's elevation to Politburo status in the CCP in August 1977 was a further reflection of the importance of science policy and of the SSTC.

Even though all the research units of the CAS and of the universities, as well as the various bureaus and ministries, are governmental, because the peculiarities of bureaucratic politics in China are such that various functional "systems" or bureaucratic hierarchies are extremely compartmentalized, there is a strong need for coordination among their activities. This task of coordination of scientific research and technological development (but not social science or military-related research), on a broad national scale at least, is the main function of the SSTC.

While all the institutes and universities have discretionary funds for normal operations, all major administrative units concerned with research submit to the commission for approval research plans and requests for funding of major new research projects. The SSTC then "balances" these requests in accordance with annual or longer range plans.

The commission has a staff of around 500 administrators, very few of whom have backgrounds in science, engineering, or economics. In making their important priority decisions, they hold informal consultations with certain scientists but use no formal peer review process. The commission also generally monitors the implementation of research by requesting reports, holding meetings, or carrying out onsite inspection tours.

The SSTC is organized into bureaus reflecting various important areas of science, but not all. The Second Bureau, for instance, deals with energy research, marine and earth sciences, natural resource development, and materials sciences. The Third Bureau is in charge of research in communications, space, and new technologies, and the Fourth Bureau manages agriculture and forestry. The Fifth Bureau is primarily concerned with nuclear science research. The SSTC does not oversee any defense-related research; such research is coordinated by the National Defense Science and Technology Commission.

Little is known about the process or criteria by which priority decisions are made by the SSTC. It appears that decisionmaking principles are not very explicit but rather each decision is made on an ad hoc basis, depending on the particular political circumstances and short-run constraints of each case. While the SSTC is mandated to strike a balance between pure and applied research among various fields and among demands from various geographical areas of China by adopting "national perspective," SSTC officials have admitted to short-term expediencies, such as taking advantage of the well-established infrastructure of such areas as Shanghai.

SSTC officials have acknowledged the problem of the inherent conflict between planning and the basic nature of scientific research, which includes unanticipated discoveries and developments, but have noted that planning in science is a necessary consequence of economic planning.

Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)

The CAS is the most prestigious and influential agency in China in charge of scientific research. It has quasi-ministerial status and administers about 120 major research institutes scattered around China, the majority of which are located in Beijing and Shanghai. While its activities are nominally coordinated with those of other research organizations by the SSTC, as of 1980, because of its long institutional history and its prestige, it was, for all intents and purposes, accountable directly to the State Council.

The academy was founded in November 1949 on the basis of its two predecessors, the Peking Academy and the Academia Sinica, both founded in the late 1920s. The CAS initially administered seventeen research institutes (including some in the social sciences) with a total research staff of about 200. By 1955 the CAS encompassed more than forty institutes with a total staff of about 2,000. The total staff of CAS institutes in 1980 was about ten times that number. Until the predecessors of the SSTC were formed in 1956 (State Technological Commission and Science Planning Commission), the CAS held the important responsibility for overall science policy planning for China, derived at the time from the model of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. While the overall planning and policy coordination role has formally been shifted to the reestablished SSTC, it is clear that historical antecedents have left the CAS with a high degree of policy influence. Interlocking directorates, of course, provide an additional dimension to the institutional relationships. A prime example is that of Fang Yi, who in 1980 was concurrently vice premier (hence in the top leadership of the State Council), minister-in-charge of the SSTC, and president of the CAS.

In 1980 the CAS had five major academic departments: mathematics and physical sciences, chemical sciences, biological sciences, earth sciences, and technology. There were strong hints at that time that the technology department might split off to form an Academy of Engineering Sciences (just as the former Philosophy and Social Sciences Department of the CAS became a separate Academy of Social Sciences in 1977).

The major substantive responsibilities of the CAS in the development of science in China lie in the three areas of basic research, new technology development, and multidisciplinary research. This counterbalances the second organizational sector for research in China, that of the industrial ministries. Research sponsored by the ministries is, understandably, closely related to production goals. The specific and immediate need of serving production in industry probably tends to preclude research that does not have immediate applications; furthermore, the extreme compartmentalization of the industrial sectors probably causes difficulties in much interdisciplinary work.

The CAS also manages some important educational institutions. In 1958 the Chinese University of Science and Technology (CUST) was established in Beijing for the purpose of training research scientists for the various institutes of the CAS. During the Cultural Revolution the CUST was relocated to the town of Hefei in Anhui Province, a move now alleged to have been an act of banishment by the Gang of Four. The CUST reopened its graduate school in Beijing in 1978, although its undergraduate campus will remain in Hefei as part of a decentralization policy under which Hefei will become a major center of scientific research. In the late 1970s the CAS additionally assumed the administration of three other educational institutions. These were the Harbin University of Science and Technology in Heilongjiang Province, the Chengdu University of Science and Technology in Sichuan, and Zhejiang University in Hangzhou, an old and prestigious engineering school charged with the training of engineers for the CAS institutes.

The Industrial Sector

Every industrial ministry in China runs a series (perhaps a dozen or more) of research institutions whose concerns are production oriented and therefore, generally of an "applied" nature. In 1980 the major industrial ministries were those of coal, petroleum, electric power, geology, metallurgical industry, chemical industry, light industry, textile industry, water conservancy, post and telecommunications, railways, communications (highways and waterways), agricultural machinery, and machine building. The eight machine-building ministries, referred to by their numbers (First, Second, and so forth), covered such areas as heavy machinery, atomic energy, and aspects of military technology (see Technology and Organization, ch. 7). In addition China has a series of state bureaus that are of quasi-ministerial level and that included, in 1980, the bureaus of seismology, oceanography, meteorology, and standardization and metrology. These bureaus also oversee research organizations. The activities of research institutes are often coordinated under each ministry by a research academy, e.g., electric power sciences, geological sciences, and the like.

Other Research Academies

In 1980, China's best-known research academies, other than the CAS, were the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, which was under the purview of the Ministry of Public Health, and the academies of agricultural sciences and of forestry sciences, under the jurisdiction of the ministries of agriculture and forestry, respectively. (Until 1979 there was only one Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the related academies were also combined.) In addition, the Ministry of Public Health ran an Academy of Chinese Traditional Medicine. Like the CAS, these academies oversaw a large network of research institutes and organizations.

University-Based Research

Besides research promoted and administered by the CAS and various ministries, there began in the late 1970s a resurgence of university-based research, and it appears that this sector will assume an importance that exceeds past levels of activity, even those of the mid-1950s. While some research at the universities appears to be generated from within the faculty (and accordingly funded out of the university budget), the bulk of research is contracted out to the universities by outside agencies, such as ministries.

Since research at the universities seems, on the basis of visitors' reports, to have suffered a great deal more during the decade of the Cultural Revolution than research at the institutes, university work had to be completely rebuilt and was still mostly at a preparatory stage in 1980. It is therefore difficult in late 1980 to clearly discern research patterns and directions. Universities engage in both applied and basic research, and it appears that those universities with close ties to ministries focus on the applied problems of industry and that the broader comprehensive or polytechnic universities devote relatively more time and resources to fundamental research. The 100 or so institutions of higher learning that had been designated (as was the custom prior to the Cultural Revolution) as "key" universities by 1980 were evidently the ones to place the greatest emphasis on research (on the basis of more generous funding and perhaps a generally more advanced caliber of faculty and students than at other institutions).

The Military Sector

Research and development for military applications was as of 1980 coordinated by the National Defense Science and Technology Commission. For obvious reasons relatively little was known to outsiders about the detailed structure of military-related work. Most of the ministries of machine building, as noted above, were responsible for military work as well as civilian research and development and production. Some institutes of the CAS also had dual functions (in nuclear sciences, for instance), and some universities were known to carry out a small amount of defense-related research. While no hard data were available, discussions in the Chinese press in the late 1970s suggested that strong tensions existed between the military and the civilian research sectors over resource allocations, with the civilian sector arguing for a much greater share of resources than in the past, for a greater interchange of scientific data between the two sectors, and for a closer integration between certain research projects in the two areas in order to minimize the duplication of effort.

Social Science Research

Scholarly research in China, while overwhelmingly emphasizing natural scientific research and technological development, is not confined to those areas alone. In late 1977 the CASS was established, marking the resumption of scholarly work in the social sciences and the humanities in China after a virtually complete halt that began in 1966. This research had been coordinated prior to 1966 by one of the philosophy and social science departments of the CAS. The establishment of an academy of social sciences in its own right suggests an unprecedented concern for research in those fields. Because of the immediate political implications of social research, the CASS is believed to be rather closely tied to CCP organs.

While the CASS is concerned with building up research in most major areas of the humanities and the social sciences (these two areas being subsumed under the term "social sciences" in China), the major emphasis of the CASS in the early 1980s was in the areas of economics, management, and law. Within these fields research was being planned or carried out on the relationship between technological development and economic production. In addition, philosophers and historians of science began to address questions of the social and economic parameters of scientific development and technological modernization.

Implementation and Promotion of Scientific Research and Technological Development

Research Institutes

The basic organizational mode for the implementation of research in China is the research institute: a set of laboratories whose scope of research is relatively narrowly defined, e.g., organic chemistry, electric power transmission. This structure was adopted from the Soviet Union in the 1950s and is now a well-established feature of the organization of research in China. The size of China's research institutes, in terms of total personnel, varies widely from under 100 to well over 1,000, the more typical institutes employing around 500 persons. The technical staff, including researchers and technical support personnel, generally constitutes about half the total staff, while senior

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

China is a space-exploring nation. Here scientists complete a rocket-fueling procedure.

researchers might number only a few dozen, illustrating China's critical shortage of senior scientific and technical personnel.

The administration of research institutes in China has historically involved a degree of tension between administrators who are not scientists and the research staff. While this may be a universal phenomenon, the tumultuous political history of intellectuals in contemporary China has exacerbated potential conflicts. Furthermore, the fact that research is guided by a state plan in which most of the direction of research is set from the top down, rather than from the research upward, has also constrained the initiative of the researchers.

China's scientific planners and policymakers seemed quite aware in the late 1970s of the dilemmas imposed by the nature of policymaking and by the administrative structure for research. In late 1979 the CAS, for instance, sought to overcome some of the impediments to research by launching several experimental policies. One of these was to grant individual research institutes greater autonomy in research planning and management, financing, and personnel policy, and to allow the institutes to retain a greater proportion of funds earned from contract research and to use these funds at their own discretion. A second major experiment was to grant the scientists a greater voice in the making of academy policy. Finally, the rewarding of researchers on the basis of performance (without respect to seniority) was encouraged. If these moves are retained and become widely applied to other sectors of research, some unprecedented changes may become evident in China's scientific achievements in the 1980s.

It would seem a priori that the system of narrowly mission-oriented research institutes could provide economies for China's scarce resources for research and development. Unfortunately, other factors in the organization of scientific work seem to have precluded such potential benefits. China suffers greatly from frequent duplication of efforts, particularly as a result of the intense competitiveness that exists between major bureaucratic sectors, among whom evidence of collaborative efforts or effective division of labor is quite rare. Although some areas of science and technology seem more greatly afflicted than others, the problem is widespread. Furthermore, there are often cases of duplication of effort and inadequate communication and coordination between research institutes under the same administrative umbrella.

Fortunately, in this area as well, China's policymakers seem quite aware of the shortcomings and were beginning in 1980 to take active steps to improve communication among research groups and to counterbalance bureaucratic competitiveness with a strong measure of professional collegiality. This corrective task was placed largely in the hands of the China Association for Science and Technology.

China Association for Science and Technology (CAST)

The CAST was established in 1958 by a merger of the All-China Federation of Scientific Societies and the All-China Society for the

Dissemination of Scientific and Technical Knowledge (which had been formed in 1950). As the names of the parent organizations imply, the CAST acts both as an umbrella organization for learned societies and as a vehicle for promoting the exchange of scientific ideas and information.

The CAST is a "mass," i.e., nongovernmental, organization, as are the 100 or more learned societies under it as of 1980. The organization's autonomy is quite relative, given China's controlled political framework, but in the current atmosphere of intellectual liberation, CAST appears to be enjoying more autonomy and assuming a more important role in 1980 than at any other period in its history. Its funds come from government allocations, and its leaders (along with the leaders of the learned societies) are noted scientists and senior governmental administrators (vice ministers, bureau directors, college presidents, and the like).

In March 1980 the CAST held its second national congress (the first since 1958) and adopted a constitution that outlined its broad goals: to popularize science, to promote scholarly interchange (both domestically and internationally), and to promote the role of scientists and learned societies as advisers to government on science and technology policy. Professor Zhou Peiyuan, president of Beijing University, and a vice president of the CAS, was elected chairman of the CAST. In his address to the congress, Zhou Peiyuan stressed the potential of CAST and its constituent learned societies to transcend barriers between professions, specialties, bureaucratic units, and localities in achieving a free exchange of scholarly ideas. He urged the CAST and its societies to provide a forum for academic debate unfettered by any implicit or explicit threats of administrative authority. Only time can tell if the CAST and its constituent societies will be able to fulfill a greatly needed function in China's science and technology circles.

Scientific and Technical Manpower

Estimating China's current and future capacity for research and development depends critically on an assessment of the present scientific and technical manpower and its growth trends. Unfortunately, such an assessment in China's case is fraught with considerable difficulty owing to: the scarcity and frequently unreliable nature of statistics announced or published in China (especially between 1960 and 1978); the lack of clarity and consistency in definitions from one set of statistics to another; and the great discontinuities in educational and manpower training policies that make statistical inferences difficult. The discussion that follows is therefore quite tentative.

In August 1980 two important comprehensive figures were cited by Chinese sources. First, 5.4 million persons were reported to be employed in over 2,000 research institutions in China; 700 of these institutions operated at the national level of administration (such as the 120 or so research institutes of the CAS). This figure is believed to include all personnel such as nontechnical support and administrative personnel. The second and more interesting figure is that China currently has about 270,000 scientific and technical personnel engaged in research work. Half of those are reported to be college graduates, the rest graduates of technical middle schools. These figures are generally consistent with estimates based on a variety of approaches made by United States analysts in the 1960s and 1970s.

A more refined overview of China's manpower situation can be derived by looking at educational statistics of college graduates between 1950 and 1980. These statistics also suggest a range of possibilities for manpower growth in the next decade or two. A 1980 estimate of the cumulative graduates by general area of study is that since 1949 China has graduated about 2.7 million students from colleges and universities, of which about 1.6 million were in science or engineering fields. The major areas are as follows: about 937,000 students in engineering (roughly 35 percent of the total and 59 percent of science and engineering graduates); about 155,000 students in the natural sciences (roughly 6 percent of the total and 10 percent of the science and engineering graduates); 235,000 students in the agricultural sciences (about 9 percent of the total and 15 percent of the science and engineering graduates); and about 281,000 students in the medical sciences (roughly 10 percent of the total or 18 percent of the science and engineering graduates). The remainder are in fields other than science and technology.

If it is assumed that of the 135,000 college graduate research personnel, 25,000 were trained in China or overseas before 1949, the remaining 110,000 represent about 7 percent of post-1949 graduates in science and engineering. Looking to the decade ahead, the following assumptions can be made about manpower training: first, that the number of college graduates per annum can be sustained at a level of at least 300,000 and postgraduates at 8,000 per annum; the ratio of graduates of science and engineering remains constant at 60 percent; third, the proportion of graduates going into research work can be raised to 10 percent; fourth, graduate education and overseas advanced training will continue at its present rate. On the basis of these assumptions, the research manpower pool could increase at the rate of 18,000 graduates per year, plus an estimated 4,000 postgraduates if it is assumed that about half the annual number completing postgraduate studies in science and technology will engage in research, and about 1,000 will receive advance training overseas for a total of about 23,000 researchers per year.

In 1978 Fang Yi proposed the goal of building up China's research manpower to 800,000 (or, on the basis of current proportions, 400,000 college-graduated researchers) by 1985. This overambitious goal has since been withdrawn, but it is of interest to note, on the basis of the assumptions made above, how long it would take China to meet Fang Yi's target, i.e., an increment of 265,000 over the present figure for college graduate researchers. The figures suggest that it would take somewhat over ten years. Given the fact that the assumptions are rather conservative when projected over a decade, Fang Yi's goal can probably be met comfortably by the early 1990s.

Scientific Achievements and Expectations

Assessing the scientific achievements and expectations of future accomplishments in science and technology should be approached with extreme caution for a number of reasons.

First, China's scientific infrastructure was in late 1980 at a major turning point. The country's science and technology work has suffered a major decade-long trauma that would require considerable basic recovery work before substantive research could proceed in all fields at full speed. Whatever low level of research activity might have been taking place in the mid-1970s might have come to a complete halt by 1980 as laboratories were being built or rebuilt, equipment was upgraded or new equipment purchased, research personnel were catching up on scientific and technical knowledge by traveling overseas, receiving foreign scholars, learning foreign languages, and catching up on literature in their fields, The early 1980s will be characterized by investment in a considerable amount of start-up time, planning and preparing for long-term activities. On the other hand, some of the losses of the Cultural Revolution can be made up in the long run. Some of the physical destruction provided a blessing in disguise—the opportunity to acquire a new physical plant for research. Furthermore, much of the time lost may be regained by the possibility of "leapfrogging" science and technology and connecting with current world frontiers in various fields.

Second, few scientists and technical personnel from outside China had ever had an opportunity as of late 1980 for a long and close look at China's research and development activities. Reports from these visitors tended to be strikingly descriptive but short on evaluations. This was to the credit of the observers who recognize that they had only gleaned rough impressions.

Third, whatever impressions were gained could be deceptive and confusing. From the perspective of observers from advanced industrial countries, China was fraught with paradoxes. It was still largely an agrarian society but at the same time a nuclear nation and a space-exploring nation. Its research facilities seemed drab but the thinking that goes on within those facilities was often strikingly keen. China's manpower infrastructure was small (especially relative to its population) and its administrative ranks perhaps more aged than Westerners might be accustomed to. Yet that manpower was sophisticated in its senior ranks and very promising in its lower ones. The high selectivity in training new manpower further suggested great potential for the future.

Fourth, the success or failure of scientific and technological development in China depended on a number of major factors already alluded to in this chapter: policy stability, a wise choice of research priorities, and major reforms in organization and in administrative attitudes. It was too soon to predict whether the best course would be followed in each of these respects, let alone to try to predict the success of the whole enterprise.

In terms of fields of science that seem to show the greatest short-term promise, they are by and large fields in which activity could best be sustained during the decade of the Cultural Revolution. Because of the priority attached in those years to agricultural production, to earthquake studies, to oil exploration, to public health based on China's indigenous medical tradition—certain areas of research seem to stand out at the present: plant genetics, animal genetics, insect control, cancer studies, pharmacology, contraceptive chemistry, earthquake prediction and engineering, and paleontology are examples.

As to technology, very favorable assessments have been made concerning *laboratory* state of the art in very basic areas such as laser technology and computer technology. What seems much more problematic is the matter of diffusing widely the use of such technology in production and in research—problems of mass production, marketing, and quality control—although by 1980 China's leaders were showing healthy initial signs of attention to those problems.

International Activities

One of the most dramatic features of science and technology policy under China's post-Mao leadership has been the extensive set of international relationships rapidly entered into with advanced industrial countries, especially the United States, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), France, and Great Britain. The cornerstone of these relationships has usually been a governmental agreement on cooperation in education, science and technology.

In the case of relations with the United States, for instance, the establishment of a joint Commission in Scientific and Technological Cooperation occurred roughly in tandem with the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in January 1979. Under the agreement, over a dozen separate government agency-to-government agency accords have been signed. In addition, the governmental agreement has provided the momentum and a general framework for relations with nongovernmental organizations and institutions: numerous universities, the United States National Academy of Sciences, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and various professional societies such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, each with an appropriate counterpart unit in China.

The scholarly interchanges between China and the industrial countries range widely from exchanges of study groups to longer term survey and research visits, lecturer exchanges, exchanges of data and research materials, and as of 1980 the beginnings of collaborative research projects. On the whole, given the general imbalance in levels of technology and science between China and the other countries, the relationships tend to favor China's scientific and technological development in the short run. To the extent that reciprocity is reached in the various exchange agreements, China's exchange partners receive or expect to receive benefits in certain fields in which China has made particular achievements or trade-off benefits in unrelated fields (such as China studies); they expect to enjoy long-term interpersonal relationships (including teacher-student relationships), trade derived from technological relations, or more broadly, the benefits in implementing abstract principles of internationalization of science or building political relationships.

In these exchanges, China's research personnel and students began to flow overseas in substantial numbers in 1979. Until late 1978 China was reluctant to attend international scientific meetings due to the presence of delegates representing Taiwan. This attitude has softened considerably, and by 1980 the Chinese were members of about 100 international scientific unions and other international scholarly bodies, as verbal and political compromises were reached regarding Taiwan-related issues. The attendance at international meetings by delegates from China had by 1980 become rather commonplace. As to students (mostly at the graduate level) from China, the number studying overseas probably reached about 5,000 altogether by late 1980, the bulk of whom were in the United States where the educational opportunities are perhaps most numerous and flexible.

While these new policies are still surrounded with long-standing controversy in China and are unquestionably related to potential problems of severe value change, defections, inappropriate training, and even brain drain, the new and extensive contact with the receptive countries of the West seemed in late 1980 to be paying off at a rapid rate by injecting new ideas, knowledge, and enthusiasm in science and technology circles in China.

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Since 1978 there has been an explosion in the amount and quality of information that has become available concerning science, technology, and related policy in China. The Chinese press is reporting more openly on this and other subjects than at any other time since the mid-1950s. Because of the special role played by the United States National Academy of Sciences' Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China in scholarly exchanges from 1972 onward, the committee has been able to provide an important resource of both collected and published materials. As of 1980 the committee had published about thirty substantial reports by study delegations in a wide range of fields. In addition, the committee carried out a broad assessment of the state of science in China entitled *Science in Contemporary China*. The committee maintains vertical files and a basic reference collection on scholarly developments in China (including clippings from the Chinese press in translation), which are open to public use. The committee's bimonthly publication, *China Exchange News*, provides extensive and up-to-date coverage of scholarly developments in China and includes a very useful bibliography of recent publications on contemporary China.

Stanford University's United States-China Relations Program published a series of ten extremely useful detailed analytical summaries, *Developments in PRC Science and Technology Policy*, during the critical policy transition period from 1977 to 1980. Richard P. Suttmeier's *Science, Technology and China's Drive for Modernization* and Jon Sigurdson's *Technology and Science in the People's Republic of China* provide the most recent and succinct comprehensive treatment on contemporary science and technology policy in China; the former updates Suttmeier's earlier work, *Research and Revolution*, and the 1977 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development study on *Science and Technology in the People's Republic of China*. Genevieve Dean's *Science and Technology for Development* and Richard Baum's *China's Four Modernizations* are also important recent contributions.

Because of the ten-year hiatus in scholarly and educational activities in China, many of the studies carried out in the early 1960s are still more useful than they might have been otherwise. Among these are Yuan-Li Wu's and Robert B. Sheeks' *The Organization and Support of Scientific Research and Development in Mainland China*; Chu-yuän Cheng's "Scientific and Engineering Manpower in Communist China, 1949–1963"; Sidney Gould's *Sciences in Communist China* (the first major assessment of the state of the sciences in China); and Leo A. Orleans' *Professional Manpower and Education in Communist China*. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 10. Party and Government



Gatehouse to the Forbidden City in Beijing. Ming (1368–1644 A.D.) and Qing (1644–1911 A.D.) dynasties.

IN THE YEARS after the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in September 1976 and the purge of the ultraleftist Gang of Four in the following month, the political tide in the People's Republic of China swung steadily toward the right of center, a phase in the pattern of alternation between leftist and rightist policy lines in the preceding decades. In practical terms this shift was reflected in a concerted campaign by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to move the world's most populous and admittedly still backward nation of one billion people toward the ambitious targets of the "four modernizations" (see Glossary). The modernization program was being directed by a pragmatic reform group headed by CCP Vice Chairman and Senior Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping. Although the leader of the reform group, Deng was technically outranked by Hua Guofeng, Mao's hand-picked successor, who, until the National People's Congress (NPC) meeting in August–September 1980, was party chairman and premier concurrently. Both Hua Guofeng and Deng resigned from their government posts during the 1980 NPC session. Earlier in 1980, however, Deng had succeeded in putting two close protégés in important party and state leadership positions.

In 1980 Chinese leaders were firmly committed to fostering a stable political environment and—equally important—a responsive party and governmental structure. This was viewed as essential in light of the party's long-range plan to join the ranks of powerful industrial nations within this century. The framework for political transformation under Deng began to emerge in 1977 when the CCP held its Eleventh National Party Congress, and it was spelled out in the decisions adopted by the Third and Fifth Plenums of the Eleventh Central Committee held, respectively, in December 1978 and February 1980 (see ch. 11, The Political Process). For the purpose of understanding political change both in form and in process, the Party Constitution of 1977 and the State Constitution of 1978 can be also considered basic documents. These constitutions stipulated the powers and functions, respectively, of the party and government organs.

In rhetoric, the doctrinal foundation of the Party and government remained basically unchanged, but the use of ideology for political purposes was no longer based on the presumed sanctity of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. There was now an unmistakably new emphasis on the question of right and wrong or "truth" that the party center insisted should be verified through "practice" and with reference to concrete reality. This was a departure from the previous pattern of invoking Mao's pronouncements as the only criteria of truth in all and every facet of public life. Party and government cadres were being continually urged to "emancipate the mind" from

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the shackles of old habits. Policies were to be formulated and actions taken, not in deference to any ossified dogma, but on the basis of specific needs and situations. In 1980 nothing was being spared from the ongoing process of self-questioning and self-rectification within the CCP. A sweeping reevaluation of the party's history, its leadership, and its policies was under way. Mao was being "de-Maoized," for example; he was no longer held as infallible, and his achievements and failures were being put in perspective.

Despite the appearance of continuity, the political structure in 1980 was still undergoing a test of accommodation, a process of trial and error, in a spirit of innovation and adaptation to solve old problems and meet new challenges. This experiment was embedded in the official recognition that the Party and government must be responsive and self-correcting if they were to fulfill the expectations the party leaders had raised especially since 1978.

Responsiveness became a key word for the CCP in its unrelenting effort to improve its rapport with the rest of society and to enlist broad popular support for varied policies and programs. Central authorities were in fact facing a test of credibility, the outcome of which might well hinge on the pace of progress toward satisfying the short-term needs of the masses and for telescoping the painful process of nation building by the year 2000.

In a narrow sense the test of performance depended on the effectiveness of the party and governmental bureaucracies, or the cadre system, as it is better known in China. Manned by eighteen million cadres, the system was officially acknowledged to be overstaffed and sluggish. For years it was more noted for its timidity than temerity because of ingrained bureaucratic habits that sounded very familiar to the bureaucracies of many noncommunist societies. Under the Deng leadership an intensive drive was under way to weed out tens of thousands of aged, inactive, and incompetent cadres down to the county level. This was given top priority if only because the deadwood was considered a drag on the economy and an impediment to the party's effort to improve morale and promote results. There was a problem, however, of how to goad reluctant old revolutionary cadres into retirement; moreover, millions of inadequately trained officials would have to be reeducated within the shortest possible time. The well-intentioned effort to bring in more energetic, capable, and "middle-aged and young cadres" into the political structure might well pose a challenge of major magnitude for years to come.

Whatever the innovations instituted by the national leadership, there remains one indisputable and unchanging fact of political life—that of the primacy of the CCP over all other sociopolitical institutions of the nation. As in other communist states, the CCP continues to dictate the tone, direction, and specifics of policies to be carried out by its administrative arm, the government. Its monitoring and control are ensured at all levels of the party and governmental hierarchies through a select group of party cadres placed in sensitive and interlocked positions. In 1980 there was evidence to suggest that the Party wanted to give more leeway to the senior officials or cadres placed in government posts—central and provincial—but it was still unclear how much autonomy these officials were allowed to exercise independently of the Party. In any case the CCP was and continued to function as a state within the state—an unquestioned and unchallenged nerve center of the Chinese polity. It had permeated completely, aided by a far-flung network of cadres in the government organs, the mass organizations, in all social and economic institutions, not to mention the military and security establishment. Indications were that the party leaders were more determined than ever to strengthen their control over the political process. How this centralism would square with the party leadership's increasing pronouncements of interest in fostering "democracy" remained in 1980 an intriguing question—a major test of credibility for Deng and his reformist associates.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)

In late 1980 the principles, structure, and operation of the CCP were based on precedents as well as on the Party Constitution of 1977, which was adopted at the Eleventh National Party Congress held in August 1977. (The Twelfth was scheduled to be held in 1981, a year ahead of the five-year cycle.) Generally the Party remained the pivot of the Chinese political system and appeared to be even more firmly established than any time since the early 1960s. Its role as the vanguard or custodian and protector of the interests of working people was not questioned by any other social or political group.

From the standpoint of actual functioning, however, there were some potentially significant changes in emphasis in the years after the Gang of Four (see Glossary) was removed from the center of power in 1976 and especially after Deng Xiaoping's rehabilitation (see Glossary)—for the second time in four years—in July 1977. Confirmed at the Eleventh National Party Congress, these shifts stressed among other priorities: stability and unity, the need for balance between ideology and technical skill, collective rather than the simple leadership of one man, the training of successors at all levels of party positions, party discipline, more relaxed climate for intraparty debate on major national issues, and growth-oriented economic policies. These priorities were designed not only to improve the organizational cohesion and morale of the Party and government but also to hasten prosperity and foster national power.

The highest organ of the CCP is in theory the National Party Congress, which under normal circumstances is to meet every five years. Since its ascension to power in 1949, the CCP has held four congresses—the Eighth (since its founding in 1921) in 1956, the Ninth in 1969, the Tenth in 1973, and the Eleventh in August 1977. The National Party Congress reviews reports on party activities since the last session, revises the party constitution, ratifies the party line and program for a specified period, and elects the Central Committee that serves as the highest organ of the CCP when the National Congress is not in session. It has, however, no independence to generate legislative bills nor effective power to check and balance the party and government bureaucracies. Although limited in its role—in effect it is a rubber stamp—the National Party Congress performs a useful function as a participatory forum for rising party cadres who represent all regions, ethnic groups, and functional groups. As delegates (there were 1,510 for the Eleventh National Party Congress) they can observe firsthand the working of the party machine at the national level, gain a better perspective on the direction and mode of political transformation already decided on for them by the leadership, and serve as communicators of party messages and policies to the grass roots.

Political power is formally vested in the Central Committee and other central organs answerable directly to this committee. Although the Central Committee is technically the top policymaking body and the locus of power, because of its size and infrequent meetings, it is represented on a current basis by the Political Bureau (Politburo) and by an even more select Standing Committee of this bureau, both of which are elected by the Central Committee as are the party's chairman and vice chairmen. In October 1980 the Central Committee—formally called the Eleventh Central Committee because it was elected at the Eleventh National Party Congress in 1977—consisted of 213 full and 131 alternate members. The Politburo had twenty-four full and two alternate members. The Standing Committee—the innermost circle of power—had seven members who were placed in the most important party and government posts. These seven were: Party Chairman Hua Guofeng; four party vice chairmen—Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, and Chen Yun; Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang; and Premier Zhao Ziyang. The last two were added at the Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in February 1980 as part of the official effort to bring new and younger men into the top echelons of the Party.

The day-to-day work of the CCP is carried out by the Central Secretariat and its various departments—all placed under the direction of the Politburo and its Standing Committee (see fig. 15). Headed by Hu Yaobang, the Secretariat (suspended in 1966) had been reestablished in February 1980 as the administrative center of party apparatus, or more aptly, as the party's inner cabinet. Besides Hu Yaobang, it had eleven secretaries, elected in February 1980, each in charge of a range of functions, some purely party and some overlapping with State Council responsibilities. Apparently the revival of the Central Secretariat was intended to strengthen the party's capacity to promote what it called "the development and consolidation of the lively political situation of stability and unity

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
National Party Congress
Standing Committee
Central Committee
Chairman
Vice Chairman
Full Members
Alternates
Central Discipline Inspection Commission
Political Bureau (Politburo)
Standing Committee
Central Secretariat
General Secretary
Secretaries
General Office
Investigation Department
Military Commission
Cultural Department
Organization Department
International Liaison Department
United Front Work Department
Propaganda Department
Party School
Bureau for Translating the Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin
Information and Media Agencies
Central Broadcasting Administration
Guangming Ribao
Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)
Hongqi (Red Flag)
Provincial-level Party Congresses
Provincial-level Party Committees
County-level Party Congresses
County-level Party Committees
Primary Organizations
General Party Branches
Primary Party Committees
Party Branches
Election

Figure 15. Organization of the Chinese Communist Party

throughout the country and the smooth progress of socialist modernization." Evidently an equally important consideration was to use the Central Secretariat as a proving ground for successors to senior party leaders.

Thus in March 1980 the official organ of the CCP, *Hongqi (Red Flag)*, described Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and the eleven new secretaries as "long-tested, experienced, highly competent and very energetic." It went on: "Because they are much younger compared with revolutionaries of the older generation, they are capable of shouldering the arduous work required for modernization and can ensure the long-term continuity of the Party's line, principles, and policies, and the long-term stability of the collective leadership of the Party. This is a pioneering effort to train and bring up successors collectively, rather than individually, under the tutelage of revolutionaries of the older generation."

Below the central level, the party committees and congresses are formed in the twenty-one provinces, five autonomous regions for minorities, and three municipalities directly under the central government (see fig. 1). The Party was also present locally in various county subdivisions (which included the prefectures) as well as within the People's Liberation Army (PLA) from regional headquarters down to regimental level (see ch. 14, National Defense). At the bottom of the party hierarchy were three kinds of basic organizations: general party branches, primary party committees, and party branches. These were set up in factories, mines, people's communes (see Glossary), offices, schools, shops, neighborhoods, PLA companies, and other places depending on local situations and subject to approval by the appropriate party committees.

Party committees at the provincial and county levels and above the PLA regimental level are elected by the corresponding party congresses that usually convene every three years. These committees in turn elect their standing committees, secretaries, and deputy secretaries. Below the county and PLA regimental levels, the primary party committees and general party branches elect their committees every two years, and the party branches—the lowest rung in the party hierarchy—every year. All the elected party officials are subject to the approval of higher level party committees, which actually predetermine who is to be elected at various levels.

In early 1980 the CCP had 38 million members (3.8 percent of the national population). To qualify, applicants must be at least eighteen years of age and must go through a probationary period of up to two years. Indications in mid-1980 were that recently there was greater emphasis on the technical and educational qualifications of applicants and conversely de-emphasis on ideological criteria. Once admitted, all members—regardless of their positions in the party hierarchy—must enroll and participate in the activities of the party branches, a requirement that has not been scrupulously observed by—in the words of a party organ—"a member of leading cadres."

In mid-1980 this requirement was being stressed more than ever before for all party cadres. In the scheme of party life, the party branches and their members at the grass-roots level are in a real sense the backbone of the organization. They are expected to study Marxism-Leninism—Mao Zedong Thought seriously, especially with regard to the integration of theory and practice, lead party as well as nonparty personnel in their ideological and political endeavors, unite and mobilize the masses, propagate and carry out the party line and policies, cultivate close ties with the people, promote intraparty democracy, expose all forms of shortcomings, recruit new members, and enforce party discipline.

In 1980 it was clear that the CCP was intent on improving the quality of its membership and restoring the image and reputation of the Central Committee as command center of all socialist undertakings. This was occasioned by the fact that more than half the 38 million members had joined the Party in the years after the start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. During this period, especially from 1966 to 1968, recruitment took place in total disregard of the standard procedures for scrutiny, probation, education, supervision, and discipline. Thus in 1978 the Party decided to address the problem of quality with a sense of urgency and to tighten the standards of its members in general and of its cadres in particular (see The Cadre System, this ch.; see ch. 11, The Political Process). In these efforts emphasis was placed on reeducation, self-criticism, discipline, democratic centralism, the subordination of the individual to the Central Committee, the importance of being "red" and "expert" at the same time, and the need to make the party apparatus more responsive to the demands and wishes of the masses of the people.

A major corollary of these self-improvement and self-cleansing activities was a campaign designed to weed out—ideally by persuasion but if necessary by punishment—corrupt and dishonest party officials from all levels of the party organization. Significantly, an exploratory reform was also taking place selectively in the method of electing committee members. By contrast with previous years when the number of candidates in elections equaled the number of seats to be filled, the CCP began offering a larger number of candidates from which to choose. A CCP organ noted, "This will facilitate the supervision of the leadership by the rank and file and prevent undesirable people from worming their way into the leading bodies."

In 1980 the CCP's efforts to upgrade its organizational effectiveness, unity, and discipline was proceeding in accordance with a document adopted by the Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in February 1980. Entitled "Guiding Principles for Inner-Party Political Life," this lengthy document called on members to observe twelve guiding principles. These were to: adhere to the party's political and ideological line; uphold collective leadership and oppose arbitrary decisionmaking by a single person; safeguard unity and centralized leadership and strictly abide by

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party discipline; uphold party spirit and root out factionalism; speak the truth and match words with deeds; promote inner-party democracy and take a correct attitude toward dissenting views; protect the rights of party members against any encroachment; ensure that elections should fully reflect the popular wishes: struggle against erroneous tendencies, bad people, and bad actions; treat comrades who have made mistakes correctly; accept supervision by the CCP and the masses; and study hard and strive to be "red" and "expert."

In 1980 in its activities aimed at enlisting broad popular support and involvement, the CCP continued to rely on mass organizations and "democratic parties." Affiliated directly and indirectly with the CCP, these organizations were without exception headed by and permeated with party cadres and served as secondary or auxiliary vehicles for the party's "mass line" dating back to the early 1940s. Specifically these entities served as the so-called "transmission belts" of the party line and policies and also lent the impression desired by the Party that the broad strata of the population endorsed and was unified behind the communist leadership. Moreover, mass organizations were being used by the Party in its effort to penetrate the noncommunist segments of the society, to encourage popular participation, and to mobilize the masses and integrate them into the party-directed political life.

The activities of the mass organizations are technically represented by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) but are actually directed by the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee. The CPPCC is officially described as an advisory organ whose purpose is to "unite intellectuals and all others who live by their own labor, the patriotic democratic parties and personages, compatriots in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, and Overseas Chinese" (see Glossary). As of February 1978 when it held its fifth national conference, the CPPCC's 1,988 delegates included the representatives of the CCP (which is technically a member of the united front associated with the CPPCC), the "patriotic democratic parties" and the "people's organizations." The "patriots without party affiliation" and "specially invited delegates" also take part in the CPPCC's national sessions, usually in conjunction with the sessions of the National People's Congress (NPC), the equivalent of a national legislature (see National People's Congress (NPC), this ch.). The CPPCC appeared likely to continue in the future if only because of its symbolic value as a vehicle for a national united front.

As of 1979 there were eight "democratic parties," as there had been since 1950. Their actual status in terms of activity, membership, and objectives was, however, difficult to verify by other than what was reported in official publications. In any case the "democratic" entities included: the Revolutionary Committee of the Guomindang (Kuomintang or KMT) founded in 1948 by dissident members of the Guomindang then under control of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; the China Democratic League, begun in 1941 by intellectuals in the cultural and educational fields; the China Democratic National Construction Association, formed in 1945 by educators and national capitalists (industrialists and businesspeople); the China Association for Promoting Democracy, started in 1945 by intellectuals in the cultural, educational (primary and secondary schools) and publishing circles; the Chinese Peasants and Workers Democratic Party, originated in 1930 by intellectuals in health, medical, cultural, and educational circles; the China Zhi Gong Dang, founded in 1925 to attract Overseas Chinese; the Jiu San Society, founded in 1944 by a group of college professors and scientists to commemorate the victory of the "international war against Fascism"; and the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League, created in 1947 by "patriotic supporters of democracy who originated in Taiwan and now reside on the mainland."

In late 1980 among the better known mass organizations whose activities could be verified were: the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), which took an active part in helping workers become politically conscious of the CCP line and policies. The organization also aided its members in acquiring modern scientific knowledge and technological skill and in carrying out labor emulation drives. Additionally the ACFTU provided recreational, cultural, health and welfare services for its members. Under the 1978 State Constitution, the ACFTU members were allowed to strike; previously, they were only allowed to voice grievances. In addition the workers were being encouraged to take part in enterprise management, if only in a limited way. These changes were designed to improve workers' morale and to maximize their productivity.

The Communist Youth League (CYL) was second only in importance to the CCP and in fact functioned as an all-purpose school of the Party. Except for its high-ranking officials, the CYL's members, fifteen to twenty-five years of age, were indoctrinated, trained and prepared as future party regulars. The league was organized on the party pattern, and its leader was termed First Secretary (usually a member of the Central Committee). Its 50 million members (as of 1979) were required to carry out CCP policies, abide by law and order, defend state and collective interests, and unite the youths of all nationalities. The CYL was responsible also for guiding the activities of another organization, the Young Pioneers of China (for children below the age of fifteen). During the Cultural Revolution the CYL was suspended, as was the case with other mass organizations, and was supplanted by Red Guard (see Glossary) groups. Like most other mass organizations, the league was revived in 1978; its tenth national congress came after fourteen years of dormancy.

The All-China Women's Federation mobilized women in the Party's effort to raise idological, educational, and technical levels, protected women's rights and promoted their welfare, and assisted them in family planning. The All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles was guided, according to an official account, by the principle of "let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend." The federation was intended to unite literary and art circles and to create a "socialist literature and art in China." Its members were guided by the dictum of making "the past serve the present and foreign things serve China" or stated another way, by weeding through "the old to bring forth the new." The All-China Federation of Youth had the CYL as its "nucleus" and embraces many youth organizations, including the All-China Students' Federation (university and college students). The All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce was supported mainly by "national bourgeois industrialists and merchants." The Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries was responsible for the promotion of mutual understanding and friendship on nongovernmental levels by establishing contacts with "friendly popular organizations and personages" in foreign countries and by sponsoring cultural exchanges. In 1978 the association had connections with more than 100 foreign countries. In addition there were several politically active groups among Chinese adherents of Buddhism, Islam, Taoism, and Christianity.

The Government

Constitutional Framework

The formal structure of government was based in 1980 on the State Constitution of 1978, which was adopted on March 5, 1978, by the NPC, China's highest legislative body. This document replaced the State Constitution of 1975, which had in turn superseded the State Constitution of 1954. The latest version bore more similarities to the 1954 document than did the 1975 one. Nonetheless, changes in these constitutions dealt more with procedures than structural alterations. Generally the State Constitution of 1978 gave more power, at least in theory, to the NPC than previously. This was done, however, without diminishing the CCP's preemptive authority to control and supervise the state organs. It also underlined the critical importance of "struggle for production and scientific experiment." This emphasis on economic struggle as contrasted to the political and class struggles so prominent during the Cultural Revolution was directly linked to the current national plan for the "four modernizations" (see ch. 5, (Economic Context).

The Constitution defines China as "a socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat led by the working class," a state in which the CCP forms "the core of leadership of the whole Chinese people" and in which Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought remains "the guiding ideology" of the state. China is also "a unitary multinational state" in which all the "nationalities" (the country's various ethnic groups, including fifty-five minorities and the Han majority [see Glossary]) are to be equal and are entitled to freedom to use and develop their respective languages and to preserve or reform their varied customs. The power of the state is to emanate from the people and is to be exercised by the people through the NPC and its local counterparts. Autonomy is granted to those regions or areas having heavy concentration of ethnic minorities.

Two basic forms of ownership of the means of production "at the present stage" are identified as socialist ownership by the whole people, i.e., the state sector of the economy, and socialist collective ownership by the working people (see Planning and Organization, ch. 6). The strategy for economic development is to be guided among other things by the principle of self-reliance, taking "agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading factor." In an apparent attempt to spur popular involvement in public life, the Constitution provides under the heading of "general principles" that the state, in adhering to "the principle of socialist democracy," ensures to the people "the right to participate in the management of state affairs and of all economic and cultural undertakings, and the right to supervise the organs of state and their personnel." It does not specify, however, how these rights are to be exercised.

Sixteen out of sixty articles in the State Constitution of 1978 (compared to four out of thirty articles in the 1973 documents and nineteen out of 106 articles in the 1954 constitution) are concerned with "the fundamental rights and duties of citizens." The right to vote and stand for election begins at the age of eighteen except for those disfranchised by law. The 1978 document provides a number of constitutional safeguards familiar to Western democracies concerning the due process of law and civil liberties. The freedom of religious worship as well as the "freedom not to believe in religion and to propagate atheism" are guaranteed. Official effort to promote a more responsive and honest government is reflected in part in Article 55, which states: "Citizens have the right to lodge complaints with organs of state at any level against any person working in an organ of state, enterprise, or institution for transgression of law or neglect of duty. Citizens have the right to appeal to organs of state at any level against any infringement of their rights. No one shall suppress such complaints and appeals or retaliate against persons while making them." This provision was originally in the 1954 state constitution but not in the 1975 constitution. The 1978 document also proclaims that "Citizens enjoy freedom of speech, correspondence, the press, assembly, association, procession, demonstration and the freedom to strike, and have the right to 'speak out freely, air their views fully, hold great debates and write big-character posters.' "

In February 1980 the CCP Central Committee announced a decision that the people's right to speak out freely, air their views fully, hold great debates, and write wall posters should be abolished. This proposal was ratified by the third session of the NPC that met in August and September 1980 (see Controlling Social Change, ch. 11). Known as the "four big rights" since the 1950s when free and open

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expression of views and the antirightist struggle were encouraged, these rights fell into official disfavor evidently because of their potential for causing political destabilization. The official explanation is that the four rights have been abused in such a way as to beget chaos and instability, not to mention their dampening effect on the normal exercise of civil rights. It is maintained that these rights were twisted for the purpose of persecuting the innocent, suppressing dissenting views, and discrediting the accused.

National People's Congress (NPC)

The NPC is defined in the Constitution as "the highest organ of state power" without being identified, as it was in the 1975 state constitution, as "under the leadership of the Communist Party of China" (see fig. 16). It is empowered to enact laws and amend the constitution; to supervise the enforcement of the constitution and the law; to decide on the choice of premier (but only on the recommendation of the CCP Central Committee); to elect (and remove) the president of the Supreme People's Court and the chief procurator of the Supreme People's Procuratorate; to examine and approve the national economic plan, the state budget and the final state accounts; to decide on questions of war and peace; and to approve the provincial-level administrative boundaries. The NPC may also remove the members of the State Council, China's cabinet.

The NPC is to hold one session a year. Its deputies are elected by secret ballot for a term of five years by the people's congresses at the provincial-level administrative divisions as well as by the PLA; provincial-level delegates themselves are indirectly elected. There were 3,497 deputies at the session of the Fifth National People's Congress held on February 26 – March 5, 1978. Because of its infrequent meetings, the NPC functions through a permanent body, the Standing Committee, the members of which it elects (176 members in 1978), and a number of special committees appointed by the Standing Committee. Invariably the senior leaders of this committee are influential members of the CCP and leaders of major mass organizations. In addition to the NPC's formal functions, the Standing Committee is responsible for, among other things: conducting the election of NPC delegates; convening the NPC session; interpreting the Constitution and laws and enacting degrees; supervising the work of the executive and judicial organs; deciding on the appointment and removal of cabinet members on the recommendation of the premier; approving and removing senior judicial and diplomatic officials; deciding on the ratification and abrogation of treaties; and deciding on the proclamation of a state of war when the NPC is not in session. The Standing Committee is under a chairman, who is elected by the NPC and who, for all practical purposes, serves as the titular head of state, although he is not expressly so identified anywhere in the State Constitution of 1978. He receives foreign diplomatic envoys, promulgates laws and decrees, and ratifies treaties concluded with foreign states.


National People's Congress (NPC)
Standing Committee
Chinese Communist Party (CCP)*
State Council
Premier
Vice Premiers
Ministers
Secretary General
Others
People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Supreme People's Court
Supreme People's Procuratorate
Ministries
Commissions
Other Agencies
Various Subordinate Offices
Province-level People's Congresses
Standing Committees
Province-level People's Governments (in provinces, autonomous regions and three cities)
Higher People's Courts
Higher People's Procuratorates
Intermediate People's Courts
Divisional People's Procuratorates
Basic People's Courts
People's Procuratorates
County-level People's Congresses
Standing Committees
County-level People's Governments (in counties, autonomous prefectures, prefectures, autonomous counties, cities, and municipal districts)
For Rural Areas
For Urban Areas
Commune-level People's Congresses
Commune Administrative Committees (in People's Communes)
Neighborhood Committees
Brigades
Residents' Committees
Work Teams
Residents' Small Groups
Extragovernmental control and supervision
Formal accountability
Ex officio commander in chief of the PLA; the State Constitution of 1978 states that the chairman of the Central Committee of the CCP "commands the armed forces of the People's Republic of China."

*Article 2 of the State Constitution of 1978 states: "The Chinese Communist Party is the core of the leadership of the whole Chinese people. The working class exercises leadership over the state through the Chinese Communist Party."

Figure 16. The Structure of Government

In 1980 it was not clear how much power the NPC and its permanent body could actually assert independently of the CCP—this despite the intention of the party leadership to make the NPC more actively involved in the decisionmaking process of the state. Uncertainties arose from the fact that all important legislative initiatives and political decisions brought before the NPC for its formal deliberation were previously determined by the CCP Political Bureau and endorsed pro forma by the Central Committee in plenums.

The State Council

The top executive apparatus of the government is the State Council, the equivalent of the cabinet or the council of ministers in other countries. Although formally responsible to the NPC and its Standing Committee in conducting its wide range of government functions both at the national and local levels, the State Council is geared mainly to the CCP Central Secretariat under the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee. This orientation is dictated, if for no other reasons, by the fact that the senior members of the Council are concurrently influential party leaders. This linkage has sometimes facilitated the party's centralized control over the state apparatuses but at the same time tended to obliterate the distinction between the party and government, courting the risk of political excesses in the government bureaucracy. Apparently Deng Xiaoping's intention has been to bring about some degree of mutual checks and balances between the party and government sectors, but how this could be done effectively remained to be seen.

The functions and powers of the State Council are to ensure "unified leadership" over the activities of various ministries, commissions and other agencies; to formulate administrative measures, issue decisions and orders and monitor their implementation; to draft legislative bills for submission to the NPC or its Standing Committee for pro forma enactment; and to prepare the national economic plan and the state budget for deliberation and approval by the NPC. The membership of the State Council has varied over the years. As of September 1980 the council, chaired by Premier Zhao Ziyang, had thirteen vice premiers, a secretary general in charge of the State Council secretariat, thirty-eight ministers, eleven ministers in charge of commissions, the President of the People's Bank of China, and the Director of the All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives. The ministerial portfolios included: agricultural machinery; agriculture; building materials; chemical industry; civil affairs; coal industry; commerce; communications; culture; economic relations with foreign countries; education; electric power industry; finance; food; foreign affairs; foreign trade; forestry; geology; justice; light industry; machine building; metallurgical industry; national defense; petroleum industry; posts and telecommunications; public health; public security; railways; state farms and land reclamation; textile industry; and water conservancy. The commissions were: energy; foreign investment control; import and export; machine-building industry; nationalities affairs; physical culture and sports; state agriculture; state capital construction; state economy; state financial and economic; state planning; and state science and technology.

The State Council relied on other agencies for carrying out specialized functions. These agencies were placed directly under the State Council and included: Bureau of Religious Affairs; Central Broadcasting Administration; General Administration of Travel and

Tourism; Central Bureau of Meteorology; Foreign Languages Publishing and Distribution Administration; Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs; General Administration of Civil Aviation of China; State Bureau of Labor; State Administrative Bureau of Museums and Archaeological Data; State Geological Bureau; State General Administration of Foreign Exchange Control; State Oceanography Bureau; State Statistical Bureau; State Publication Administration Bureau; State Seismological Bureau; and Xinhua News Agency (New China News Agency—NCNA).

The Judiciary

The State Constitution of 1978 and the Organic Law of the People's Courts of the People's Republic of China that went into effect on January 1, 1980, provide for a four-level court system. At the top is the Supreme People's Court, the highest appellate forum of the land, which supervises the administration of justice by all subordinate "local" and "special" people's courts. Local people's courts—the courts of first instance—handle criminal and civil cases. They consist of "higher people's courts" at the level of the provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central government; "intermediate people's courts" at the level of prefectures, autonomous prefectures, and municipalities under the central government, provinces, or autonomous regions; and the "basic people's courts" at the level of autonomous counties, towns, and municipal districts. Special courts were established for adjudication of military, railway transport, water transport, forest, and economic cases.

The court system is complemented by a structure of people's procuratorates from the Supreme People's Procuratorate at the top to lower procuratorates established at the corresponding levels of the courts. The procuratorates represent the state in criminal proceedings and must also ensure that the judicial process of the courts and the execution of judgments and orders in criminal matters conform to the law.

In 1980 CCP leadership continued to intensify its effort to restore and strengthen the integrity of the judicial system, which had been extensively disrupted during the Cultural Revolution. The courts were being told to administer justice independently, subject only to the law, and allowing no special privileges to anyone regardless of "nationality, race, sex, occupation, social origin, religious belief, education, property status, or length of residence."

As practiced in China, the concept of judicial independence has not implied detachment from the CCP. On the contrary, it was premised on the notion that justice could be ensured only under party leadership. As one commentator put it, the CCP has merely "handed over the nation's judicial authority to the people's courts; in carrying out their judicial authority, the people's courts merely abide by the state laws, and no organ, body, or individual has the right to interfere. This means that the principle of independent justice exercised by the people's courts is independent justice under Party leadership. . . ." In short, "exercising the laws of the state and the policies of the Party are one and the same thing." Judicial adherence to the party line is ensured through the control and supervision exercised by party committees at the corresponding level of judicial organs. Interference by party committees with the work of judicial organs is officially prohibited, however. In the words of a sympathetic commentator, "no leading person may, under any pretext, order judicial organs to violate the legal bounds and judicial procedures of the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedures Law or to prosecute and judge at will."

Local Administration

Governmental institutions below the central level are regulated by the provisions of the State Constitution of 1978 and by the Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments of the People's Republic of China. The latter was adopted by the Fifth National People's Congress on July 1, 1979, when the NPC also passed a resolution amending the state constitution. The amendment was intended to streamline local institutions of the state and make them more efficient and more responsive to grass-roots needs, to stimulate local initiative and creativity, to restore prestige to the local authorities that had fallen into chaos during the Cultural Revolution, and to aid local officials in their efforts to mobilize and organize the masses. Reforms envisaged under the Organic Law passed in July 1979 and the constitutional amendment were potentially significant, but in 1980 it was still too early to ascertain whether these reform measures had any desired effect or not.

The state institutions below the national level are local people's congresses, the NPC's local counterparts, whose functions and powers are exercised by their standing committees at and above the county level when the congresses are not in session. The administrative arm of these congresses are the local people's governments (until 1967 called local people's councils). The local organs are established at three levels: the provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities under the central government; autonomous prefectures, counties, autonomous counties—called banners in Nei Monggol Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolia)—cities, and municipal districts; and people's communes and towns at the base of the administrative hierarchy. All local organs are essentially extensions of central government authorities and thus are responsible to the "unified leadership" of the central organs. In 1980 this was still the case despite the intent of the Organic Law of 1979 stipulating that the local organs should be more accountable to their supervisory bodies at the same level than to higher level authorities.

The functions and powers of the local apparatuses are to execute the Constitution and law; to implement the state policies and plans;

to examine and approve local economic plans and budgets; to maintain public order and protect public property; and to safeguard the rights of citizens of all nationalities. In discharging these functions the local organs are to be guided by certain new rules instituted under the constitutional amendment and the organic law on local government promulgated in 1979.

For example, the local revolutionary committees—the term used in the State Constitution of 1978—were renamed local people's governments; these committees had been formed in January 1967 as "temporary organs of power"—"a three-in-one" organization combining the powers of the local party committees, the local people's congresses, and the local people's councils—and had continued to exist through mid-1979 even though actually they underwent substantial changes after the Gang of Four was purged in October 1976. This change that was designed to restore administrative functions to the local people's governments was regarded as improving the efficiency of local authorities, if only because the local people's governments would no longer be concerned with party and legislative matters. Another change in 1979 also called for restoring the use of former official titles for the heads of local administrative divisions. This was considered necessary because the people were more accustomed to the old titles: specifically, governors and deputy governors for provinces; chairmen and vice chairmen for autonomous regions; mayors and deputy mayors for municipalities and cities; heads and deputy heads for prefectures, counties, districts, and towns; and directors and deputy directors for the people's communes.

Still another innovation concerned the establishment of standing committees for local people's congresses at and above the county level. Through the mid-1970s these committees had been considered superfluous inasmuch as the local congresses did not have a heavy workload and in any case could adequately serve as executive bodies for the local organs of power. The CCP's decision to embark on the "four modernizations" in 1978, however, entailed the critical need of broad mass support for and participation in the varied activities of both party and state organs—in short, the importance of responsive government. The CCP view was that the standing committees were better equipped than the local people's governments to address such functions as convening the people's congresses; keeping in touch with the grass roots and their deputies; the supervision, inspection, appointment, and removal of local administrative and judicial personnel; and preparing for the election of local deputies to the next higher people's congresses. The creation of the standing committees was seen as a more rational way to supervise the activities of the local people's governments, rather than these local administrative authorities having to check and balance themselves. The separate standing committee system would strengthen, in the words of a party organ, "people's control and supervision over the governments."

The establishment of the standing committees in effect meant restoring the formal division of responsibilities also between party and state authorities that had existed before 1966. The 1979 reform mandated that the Party should not interfere with the administrative conduct of local government organs and that its function be confined to "political leadership" to ensure that the party's line was correctly followed and implemented. In most cases provincial party chiefs, for instance, were no longer allowed to serve concurrently as provincial governors or deputy governors—as they had been allowed to do during the Cultural Revolution. In this connection many officials who had held positions in the former provincial revolutionary committees were excluded from the new local people's governments. Conversely, some provincial officials who were purged during the Cultural Revolution were rehabilitated and returned to power.

The local people's congresses and their standing committees were given the authority to enact laws and regulations under the Organic Law of 1979. This authority is only for the organs at the level of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities centrally administered. Its purpose is to allow these local congresses to accommodate the special circumstances and actual needs of their respective jurisdictions. The new measure is officially billed as "a major reform" inasmuch as "a unified constitution and a set of uniform laws for the whole country have proved increasingly inadequate" in coping with differing "local features or cultural and economic conditions." *Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)* on July 17, 1979 observed: "To better enforce the constitution and state laws, we must bring them more in line with the concrete realities in various areas and empower these areas to approve local laws and regulations so that they can decide certain major issues with local conditions in mind." The law is explicit, however, that the scope of legislation must be within the limits of the constitution and policies of the state and that locally enacted bills must be submitted "for the record" to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the State Council.

The notion of a wider local latitude extends also to the operation of the local people's governments. In the years after 1949 the local departments, bureaus, sections, divisions and so forth were subject to the control or direction of the people's congresses at the same level and to the departmental authorities at the next higher level. In actual practice, however, their activities were almost always dictated by higher authorities regardless of particular local circumstances. The new Organic Law of 1979 seeks to alter this pattern of control from above somewhat. Thus it states that all local departments should be under "the unified leadership of respective people's governments" at the same level—except for an unspecified number of departments accountable to the higher authorities. It stipulates in effect that henceforth the control from above would be changed to "work guidance."

In 1980 the CCP and the government appeared quite sincere about the need for a more effective way to bring about popular "supervision" over, for instance, the county-level administration. They continued to talk about the importance of having to maintain close ties with the masses, to listen to their opinions, to be concerned with their welfare, and to serve their interests. Such concern was reflected in part in a new electoral procedure instituted under the July 1979 reform package. Specifically the new procedure called for direct, rather than indirect as in the past, election of deputies to the local people's congresses at the county level by secret ballot. It also provided that the number of candidates nominated must exceed the number of deputies to be chosen. Under the old procedure the voters had no choice other than to vote for a slate of candidates equal in number to the number of deputies to be elected. This change is publicized as "a major step toward expanding democracy in the countryside and boosting the peasants' morale for agricultural production, the key to the success of the modernization plan." Officially these deputies not only would take part in "collective discussions" and decide "major political, economic, cultural and other problems"; they would also exercise, on behalf of the voters, supervision over their local administrative and judicial authorities.

Official efforts to improve governmental performance at the grass-roots level continued in 1980. In January of that year the Standing Committee of the NPC caused the republication of old regulations first enacted in 1952 and 1954. These regulations covered the activities of what are officially referred to as "basic-level mass autonomous organizations." These included: the urban neighborhood committees; subdistrict offices, people's mediation committees, and public security committees. They are described as playing "the role of a bridge in helping the government manage the social life in each area and in strengthening the ties between the government and the masses." The intent of republication was to strengthen the activities of these grass-roots bodies, concerned as they are with such matters as public welfare services of the residents, channeling local demands or needs to proper authorities, the maintenance of social order and public security, and the settlement of civil and minor criminal cases among residents (see ch. 3, The Social System; ch. 13, Public Order and Internal Security).

The Cadre System

In 1980 the party and government cadre (*ganbu*) system, the rough equivalent of the civil service system in other countries, was in a state of flux—the object of a major reformist campaign under way after 1978. The outcome of this test of change was far from clear, but there was little question about the sense of urgency with which the party leadership was addressing the reform, the purpose of which was to transform the massive bureaucratic system into an effective instrument of national policy. Uncertainties surrounding the test of reform and adaptations stemmed from the fact that the Chinese cadre system had had its sources in a mixture of rules and behavior sanctioned by both the society's time-honored customs and the presumed universality of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. CCP leadership had come to realize that tradition and the supposed sanctity of doctrine needed a sweeping reevaluation.

In the first few years after the communist seizure of power, the bureaucracy expanded rapidly in response to the massive requirement for reconstruction, rehabilitation, and stabilization. Loyalists were rewarded with responsible positions; most were peasants and workers who had little or no professional skill other than their proven party allegiance and their reliability as soldiers in the communist guerrilla wars against the Japanese and the Nationalist Chinese forces of Chiang. Indiscriminate recruitment quickly swelled the ranks of public employees from 720,000 in October 1949 to 3.3 million by September 1952 and to almost 8 million by 1958. In 1980 the number of "cadres" was officially placed at 18 million without further elaboration. Of this total the number of "leading cadres" at and above the county level within the CCP organization alone was said to be "several hundred thousand." The number of total party cadres would be much higher because the party's "ordinary cadres" were not included in that figure.

The term "cadre" refers to a public official holding a responsible or managerial position in various institutions of the society, including the Party and the government. A cadre may or may not be a member of the CCP, although a person in a sensitive position would almost certainly be a party member. The types of cadres, both leading and ordinary, are many and varied in function. Some are party cadres and government work cadres; others are broadly identified as technical cadres. Evidently the number of "leading cadres" in the technical category is far fewer than those engaged in party and government work. Among the technical cadres are engineers, agronomists, animal husbandry specialists, economic or enterprise managers, scientists, theorists, professors, schoolteachers, medical doctors, judges, lawyers, editors, reporters, artists, and athletes.

As a rule all cadres are required, especially since the late 1970s, to be both "red and expert"—well versed in the CCP's political line and guiding ideology and at the same time expert in professional knowledge and skill. In practice this requirement has been less than rigid and not uniformly enforced. Party and government cadres are expected to achieve "relatively high standards in Marxism-Leninism" and do well in ideological and political work. Science and technology cadres, on the other hand, may be considered "red" so long as they support the CCP, love the motherland, and contribute toward the "four modernizations." As *People's Daily* (April 21, 1980) put it, "We must not demand that they participate in a lot of political activities and read many Marxist-Leninist works, nor must we force them to participate in physical labor and mass work . . . Their major efforts and over five-sixths of their time" should be spent on learning and solving professional problems.

In 1980 the CCP leadership's evaluation of the cadre system was alarmist—at best, guardedly optimistic. It was acknowledged that the problem of transforming the massive system into a responsive vehicle for sociopolitical change would be difficult, to say the least. A commentator article in *Guangming Ribao* (June 18, 1980) was blunt:

> Achieving the four modernizations is an unusually arduous, complicated task, and we require a large number of well-trained, farsighted, intelligent, and capable men of action to charge forward. However, the present state of our force of cadres does not very well meet this demand . . . there are too few cadres who have professional knowledge and ability . . . Therefore, it is an extremely urgent, important task of the whole party and a pressing matter of the moment to select for leadership posts at all levels young and energetic cadres . . . The key to firmly grasping this lies in emancipating the mind, breaking with conventions and throwing off the trammels of the old force of habits. What incorrect ideology is now hindering us?

The "ideological obstacles" cited by this article include among other things: the seniority system and its inhibiting effect on promoting able young cadres—for fear of "hurting old comrades' feelings"; the mistrust of intellectuals as politically unreliable; the doctrinaire obsession of favoring cadres of politically "correct" class origin; the bureaucratic sin of disapproving of cadres who have "original ideas and ability and dare to put forward critical suggestions"; the pattern of demanding blind obedience and perfection from cadres; and the practice of promoting cadres in light of "factional viewpoint."

Aside from these obstacles, commentators continue to point out bureaucratic habits that they say would undermine China's march toward the "four modernizations." For example, the tendency of "some people" to ignore "the central authorities and take their orders only from their immediate bosses" is singled out as a major problem; such a tendency is said to be based on the prevailing view that "my boss's boss is not my boss." Among other undesirable habits are: "dilatoriness" that in extreme cases means using "collective leadership" as an excuse for one's failure to solve problems that can be solved easily; "aloofness"—the habit of standing "high above the masses and acting like bureaucratic overlords"; "looseness"—lack of discipline and factionalist behavior; "inertia"—satisfaction with the status quo and the consequent inattentiveness to new conditions and new problems; "favoritism"—using "one's position for personal advantage"; and "extravagance"—the habit of lavish entertaining and gift-giving, not to mention indulgence in "extravagant eating and drinking, squandering and wasting money and even cheating and violating financial and economic discipline."

The two problems that seem to trouble the CCP leadership most center on the seniority system and the admittedly low cultural, scientific, and technical standards of cadres. *Red Flag* pointed out in its June 1980 issue that many of the cadres are "weak and too old

Left, Deng Xiaoping, Chinese Communist Party chairman (and concurrently vice premier until the National People's Congress meeting in August-September 1980).
Right, Premier Zhao Ziyang, Deng protégé.

中华人民共和国第五届全国人民代表大会第二次会议

National People's Congress in session
Courtesy China Pictorial

and often are ill" from top to bottom in the party hierarchy—a pervasive problem that may well have reached, admittedly, the proportion of "senility." This situation, popularly derided as "uniform thickness from top to bottom," is blamed for the inability, if not unwillingness, of some prefectural and county party committee leaders to keep in touch with the grass roots. In stressing the need for replacing the seniority system with a merit-based system, *Red Flag* has called on "veteran cadres" to retreat step by step "to the second and third lines," to serve as advisers to "middle-aged and young cadres." In this connection it has noted that China has a pool of some 4 million fairly competent cadres aged forty to fifty who had twenty to thirty years of work experiences after finishing college in the 1950s and 1960s.

The idea of promoting "experts" as leading cadres was not without some resistance. There were still social prejudices against "specialists and professors" who were regarded as "bookworms" and hence unfit for leadership positions. Also the Marxist-Leninist doctrine that cadres or leaders should be chosen from among workers and peasants had to be reckoned with in light of the party's commitment to class struggle. Party leaders were in 1980 quite realistic about the dimensions of challenge they were facing in their attempt to reform the cadre system. In June 1980 *Red Flag* commented: "This change goes against many hard and fast rules of the past and encroaches on the interests of some people and therefore will meet with obstacles, interference, and reproaches."

This sobering prognostication relates to the CCP's decision in February 1980 to overhaul "the existing system of lifetime jobs for cadres" within the Party. Written into the draft of the CCP's revised constitution at that time, this decision was being hailed in official media as an answer to the problem of replacing "our large and aging contingent of cadres." Technically the Party and government have had no statutory provisions for a system of tenure for any category of cadre or noncadre officials. As practices have evolved, public officials were expected to stay on the job indefinitely so long as they did not commit egregious errors. In the view of the party leadership, the problem of "lifetime tenure" can be solved by adopting elections as the means of choosing leading cadres, especially for those at the highest echelons of the party and government organizations. In any case the election process was being viewed in a very positive light not only as the most effective means of selecting "the best" talent; it was also advertised as a tangible way of lending substance to the party's call for a responsive government and a democratic participation of the masses in public affairs. In the first half of 1980 elections were in fact being held on an experimental basis in selected localities to choose county-level cadres for local people's governments. As noted earlier the deputies to the local people's congresses at the county level would also be popularly elected by secret ballot.

The Mass Media

The mass media continued to play its assigned role as a vehicle through which to inform, educate, indoctrinate, control, and mobilize the masses. The way in which this role was performed after 1978 differed somewhat, however, from the pattern observable during the ten-year period starting in 1966, the inaugural year of the Cultural Revolution. This emphasis was of course part of the CCP's effort to modernize every key sector of the society—convinced as it was that a responsible and honest mass media would facilitate the party's attempt to narrow the distance between elite and masses and thereby to enlist mass support for its nation-building program.

As in other communist-controlled countries, the mass media in China for the past three decades followed a pattern that was rigidly supervised and directed by the Party. Until the late 1970s communications media were not considered vehicles for popular entertainment; nor were they a means of bringing popular pressures to bear on the governing process or devices for promoting the interest of any particular group or groups outside the party-controlled political framework. They were, rather, used as a tool to "serve the interest of proletarian politics" or the party's "class struggle" and "mass line." Characteristically the communications processes were not geared to openness, the official rationale being that "we cannot expose our weakness to the enemy." Thus what constituted information to the CCP was more often than not the "correct" interpretation of the events or data that would aid the fulfillment of the government's political, social, and economic programs. Moreover, timeliness of content was considered far less important than correctness or the utility of information from the party's political and ideological viewpoint. The result was that the output of reporting and commentary made information and propaganda all but synonymous.

To carry out its information policy, the CCP maintained total control over the media of mass communications, the substance they imparted, and the sources of information as well. In 1980 as in the past, this monopoly excluded foreign sources of information. On the output and dissemination side, materials were delivered (as of 1979) through a system of 50,000 post offices that permeated all levels and sectors of society, reaching the grass roots of the remotest parts of the country. Substance was continually repeated in all media in every possible thematic variation to ensure that whatever was being said was correctly understood and remembered, resulting in generally monotonous programming. The most attentive audience of the information media reportedly consisted of persons with political ambitions. Such people scanned the media to learn of the sometimes unpredictable shifts in official policies and attitudes since such changes could affect careers. This was because the information media always served as a tool in the intraparty political rivalry and conflict at the highest level of power.

With the ascendency of "pragmatists" to power virtually assured in 1978, the mass media began to play a significant part in the CCP drive to popularize, first within the Party, the notion of "practice being the only criterion of truth" and of seeking truth from facts rather than petrified formulations. The Chinese communist press no longer printed Mao's quotations in bold type after March 1978. Moreover, it began to report more shortcomings and expose more criticisms of central authorities. Although far from independent of the Party, the new pattern was a sharp contrast to the pre-1976 decade during which no dissenting view was allowed to appear in print. Another innovation in 1978 was the appearance of a "Letters to the Editor" column in the Party's daily organ *People's Daily*, opening the paper to the public and providing, as Qi Xin put it, "a forum for readers to express their grievances about various injustices."

After 1978 it became clear that journalists, evidently with the party's blessing, strove to recapture their "fine traditions" of telling the truth and writing about facts without falsification. These traditions were said to have been built during the long and lean years of revolutionary struggle before 1949 and to have been carried forward through the mid-1950s—until the antirightist campaign was launched in 1957. Party sources maintain that false, fabricated, and exaggerated reporting gradually became common practice after 1957, peaking during the Cultural Revolution and the transitional period thereafter, which lasted until 1976. The situation began to improve after the Gang of Four was arrested in 1976—so said a group of Beijing area journalists who met in October 1979 to reflect on the state of their profession. This group asserted that the newspapers at that time were in better and more vigorous shape than at any time in the past thirty years. Earlier, however, an authoritative commentator's article in *People's Daily* (July 24, 1979) struck a more candid, sober note by saying that, although the situation had improved, "false or partially false reports still occasionally appear in newspapers." Among the bad practices cited in this article were: fabrication, cheating, generalization from particularity, a tendency to report only good news and present failures as achievements, exaggerating the importance of models out of all proporations, and factionalist tendencies in news reporting and propaganda work.

China maintains an extensive communication system that includes both formal and informal channels. The former consists of newspapers, periodicals, books and other publications; radio and television; and drama, art, and motion picture production and exhibition facilities. The latter covers handwritten wall newspapers, handbills, posters, and street corner skits. Of all these channels, the newspapers and periodicals as well as the electronic media continue to play the most important part in the communications processes.

The principal national newspapers in 1980 were: *Renmin Ribao*

(People's Daily), the official daily organ of the CCP; *Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily)*, the organ of the PLA, which in 1977 took the lead in launching the drive for lively, factual, readable reporting in newspapers; and *Guangming Ribao*, a newspaper devoted mainly to science, culture, and education. There were numerous other newspapers published provincially and by the mass organizations, but none of these had the prestige and authoritativeness associated with the three newspapers listed above, or for that matter, with *Hongqi (Red Flag)*, the theoretical organ of the CCP Central Committee. A monthly until December 1979, *Red Flag* is now published twice a month. Another important organ of information is *Reference News*, which has a circulation of 11 million to cadres and their families and friends and which also carries foreign news in Chinese translations, much of this news critical of China.

The principal source of domestic news and the sole source of international news for the mass domestic newspapers and radio is the New China News Agency (NCNA). The agency has departments dealing with domestic news, international news, domestic news for foreign news services, and foreign affairs. It maintains an extensive network of correspondents in foreign countries. NCNA also releases *News Bulletin* in Chinese, English, French, Spanish, Arabic, and Russian, and *News from Foreign Agencies and Press* in Chinese, English, and French.

Electronic media are fully exploited and are regarded as second only to newspapers in linking the Party to the people. An extensive system of government mediumwave and shortwave facilities provides domestic service to every area of the country, and a number of powerful transmitters are engaged in transmitting information and propaganda to audiences all over the world. Television service is available in the major urban areas and is beginning to reach areas outside urban centers.

Radiobroadcasting is under a single system known as the Central People's Broadcasting Station, which has its headquarters and key station in Beijing. In addition, there are ninety-three local radio stations run by provinces, municipalities, autonomous regions, and cities (see Telecommunications, ch. 8). Nearly all counties and towns are said to be wired to these broadcasting stations so that by the end of 1978 they could reach 94 percent of the rural production brigades. Although once important as a tool for party propaganda, the system appeared to decline considerably in popularity after 1978. Domestic service is broadcast on five separate channels, overseas radio service is transmitted in thirty-nine foreign languages and in standard Chinese as well as four Chinese dialects for the benefit of Overseas Chinese.

Because television sets are expensive, television broadcasting was not as widespread as radio; however, it is growing very rapidly. This service is under the control of China Central Television (CCTV). There are thirty-two stations that transmit CCTV's programs in addition to their own locally prepared ones. Color transmission started in May 1973. In 1979 the network began an "open university" program.

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Given the highly fluid state of political transition in China, the structure and process of the CCP and government in 1980 were tentative at best. This factor introduces the predictable problem of ascertaining reality from policy intention and rhetoric. Unfortunately, aside from official Chinese releases and other fragmentary accounts of the transition under way, there is no single comprehensive, independent study of the Chinese political system as it had been unfolding since 1978, the year in which the CCP leadership had begun to initiate a series of political and administrative reforms. For introduction to the backdrop against which the current change is taking place, the following works may be useful sources of information as well as offering comparative perspective: Joyce K. Kallgren's "The Chinese Communist Party: Structure, Membership, and Mass Organization" and Franklin W. Houn's "Constitution and Government"—both in *China: A Handbook* (1973), edited by Yuan-li Wu; Harald W. Jacobson's "The Political System" in *The People's Republic of China: A Handbook*, edited by Harold C. Hinton; and *China's New Democracy*, a somewhat sympathetic account of the current politics of transition, by Qi Xin and others. A brief legalistic-institutional description of the party and government organs is available in Qi Wen's *China: A General Survey*, a 1979 publication of China's Foreign Languages Press. For insights into the general context in which the current official drive for "four modernizations" is taking place, the following two sources may be quite useful: Ross Terrill's "China in the 1980s" in the Spring 1980 issue of *Foreign Affairs;* and *China: The Continuing Search for a Modernization Strategy*, a research paper released in 1980 by the United States Central Intelligence Agency. (For further information see Bibliography.)

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Chapter 11. The Political Process

Artist's rendition of Song (Sung) Dynasty (960–1279) stoneware vase with celadon glaze, representative of the finest of its type, to which the Japanese gave the name "kinuta" for its especially remarkable blue-green color.

UNDERSTANDING MODERN CHINA'S political system requires patience, resolve, and the love of a good mystery. There are no handy referents to ease the task. Although initially patterned somewhat after the political system of the Soviet Union, China's decision to break with Soviet practice has led to a distinctly different polity. Neither does a knowledge of China's imperial past provide much more than a few scattered insights into how the People's Republic of China was being governed at the start of the 1980s.

The chief problem for the prospective China-watcher has always been a lack of reliable data on politically significant events. This is a result both of the nature of the political system itself—in which key decisions are made by a small group of leaders—and of a conscious decision to withhold meaningful information from the outside world. In such circumstances, political scientists have relied upon models and theories to fill in the gaps left by the data. There has been no lack of models of varying complexity to explain Chinese political behavior. None has ever won unanimous acceptance, however, in part because the Chinese political system was in such a continual state of change that models could seldom keep up with events, much less predict them.

Since well before the founding of the People's Republic, the chief impetus and proponent of change in China has been the personality of Mao Zedong. Given his dominant role in the political system, his political skills, and the development of his values, change was often sudden, imperfectly controlled, and occasionally violent.

This chapter begins with Mao's death but in a sense is much concerned with his continued impact on politics in China. For in late 1980 the Chinese political process was still very much in the grip of the forces of change. The difference was that change now was directed away from Mao's values and the capricious political process it engendered and toward a more orderly, bureaucratic, and pragmatic system. Mao's successors, while struggling for power among themselves, have also wrestled with his political legacy: a political system wracked by factionalism and dissension, incapable of formulating and implementing coherent economic policies, out of touch with a confused and frustrated populace, and hovering on the brink of serious breakdown. To change that situation has been a immense undertaking and a difficult one. But its urgency was witnessed by the parlous state of affairs in the final year of Mao's rule.

The year 1976 was one of the most traumatic in the twenty-seven year history of the People's Republic (see China in Transition [1969–76], ch. 1). It began on a note of gloom with the passing of China's beloved and talented premier, Zhou Enlai. Although Zhou Enlai had been ill for several years, his death cast a pall of uncertainty over the political system, for he left no secure successor. Deng Xiaoping, the feisty vice premier who had filled in for Zhou Enlai, had come under attack in late 1975 and disappeared after delivering the eulogy at Zhou Enlai's funeral. The world was taken by surprise when in early February an unknown figure, former Minister of Public Security Hua Guofeng was appointed acting premier.

In April, crowds in Beijing used the occasion of the Qingming festival to fill historic Tiananmen Square with wreaths and poems to the memory of Zhou Enlai, and many also expressed their disapproval of the increasing domination of the government by the left wing of the Party. Government efforts to remove the wreaths and break up the demonstrations backfired, and violent riots broke out in the capital for the first time since 1949. Public security and militia units eventually brought the mobs under control, but a shocked Politburo "unanimously" approved Mao's recommendation that Deng Xiaoping—blamed for the demonstrations—be stripped of all his party and government positions.

Mao's physical condition deterioriated during the spring, and the government announced on June 10 that he would no longer meet foreign visitors. The sense of a government drifting aimlessly increased during the summer, with only tepid response to the party's anti-Deng campaign. Longtime army commander Zhu De died in July. The massive earthquake that rocked the city of Tangshan, some 150 kilometers east of Beijing, killing hundreds of thousands and seriously damaging one of China's main industrial bases, was seen as an omen, a sign of the passing of the "mandate of heaven," as much as a natural disaster (see Physical Environment, ch. 2). The regime stumbled along, waiting for Mao to die. Mao finally succumbed to his illnesses on September 9, 1976. A nation numbed by a year of tragedy mourned him respectfully but reservedly, watching to see what his successors would do.

The Political Impact of Mao's Death

In the last years of his life, Mao's participation in the political life of China was sporadic and shallow, yet still crucial. While his mind remained keen up until the last year, he seemed to lack the energy to play an active role in the political struggle, contenting himself with control over China's foreign policy line and behind-the-scenes manipulation of the issues of domestic politics. Although he continued his interest in the issues of contention, it is an open question whether in 1976 he was a prime mover, or whether his subordinates manipulated him into attacking their enemies. Even when his illness had clearly begun to affect his mental faculties, Mao's influence was such that his order for the dismissal of Deng Xiaoping and his recommendation that Hua Guofeng be appointed as premier and first vice chairman of the Party were accepted immediately by the Politburo.

While Mao had secluded himself in his book-lined study, the political system had polarized into increasingly bitter and irreconcilable factions. Most analysts, while recognizing the limited descriptive value of the terminology, placed China's leaders on the left-to-right continuum. On the far left were the beneficiaries and remaining activists of the Cultural Revolution of 1966–68 (see Glossary), led by Mao's wife, Jiang Qing. They appeared to stand for the subordination of all political issues to ideological purity (as defined by Mao through them) and the perpetuation of the politics of struggle. Their views found some resonance among representatives of the "masses" on the Politburo, who owed their prominence to Mao, but who had little real power. On the right was a loose coalition of old soldiers, economic specialists, and veteran bureaucrats, led by Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping. Concerned that the constant ideological squabbling was sapping China's ability to solve its economic problems or to preserve its security against hostile neighbors, they favored more flexible policies designed to improve the living standards of the Chinese people. In between, as "swing" figures, were public security specialists Hua Guofeng and Wang Dongxing, four regional military leaders, and a number of others.

In his declining years Mao had tried to remain above the fray, playing factions off against each other to suit his purposes, never committing all his political capital to one side or the other. The purge of Deng indicated clearly that Mao was leaning toward the left, but the right rallied around Defense Minister Ye Jianying. Jiang Qing's and later Hua Guofeng's claims notwithstanding, Mao did not clearly designate a successor, and his death not only removed the commanding figure who had kept the contending forces in check but seemed to set those forces on a collision course.

Not surprisingly, it was Mao's legacy over which the controversy erupted after his death. Despite attempts to maintain a facade of unity during the mourning period, the Politburo began to fragment even before the September 18 memorial service. The leftists staked their claim to be the interpreters of Mao's word through the official party media, publishing an editorial on September 16 purporting to contain Mao's final instructions: "Act according to principles laid down." Hua Guofeng evidently disputed the accuracy of this phrase at a Politburo meeting and refused to include it in his memorial speech, preferring to stress themes of unity and loyalty. The maneuvering continued through September, with the left's media blitz escalating by October 4 into vague threats against "capitalist chieftains" in the Party who refused to accept Mao's directions.

Aside from its dominance of the official media, the left had remarkably little institutional strength. Its firmest support lay in those ministries and departments that were of least use in an outright power struggle. They may have felt they had neutralized the rest of the bureaucracy and had sufficient strength in the militia and public security forces to prevent successful coup plotting.

Their most glaring weakness was in the People's Liberation Army (PLA). From 1973 to 1975 many of the veteran military leaders purged in the Cultural Revolution by the left had returned to the ranks. In 1976 the central military leadership was dominated by conservative old soldiers, dead set against permitting the forces of anarchy, as they saw the left, to gain control of China. While the left may have had a few supporters in key units, their plight was best described by party Vice Chairman Wang Hongwen, who reportedly said, "We control the pen, but not the gun."

In the developing power struggle, control of the military forces in the Beijing area became of critical importance. Units of the Beijing Military Region and municipal garrison are stationed in and around the city, capable of carrying out or foiling a coup. But the unit best suited to interfere in the political system in 1976 was the "central bodyguards unit," also known by its code designation, the 8341 unit. Established by Mao in the 1950s, this elite unit was responsible for the physical security of the Central Committee. Made up of specially chosen soldiers but subordinate to the party's General Office, it was commanded by Politburo member Wang Dongxing. longtime personal bodyguard for Mao.

The Purge of the Left

Ye Jianying played the key role in the final resolution of the leadership crisis. Having convinced Hua that the left sought his downfall, and that political neutrality was no longer feasible, Ye Jianying organized a coup in utmost secrecy. Later official explanations insisted that the plans were made only after it became clear that the left was organizing a coup of its own, but the evidence for this assertion is not convincing. It seems reasonable to assume that the decisions were made, with Hua Guofeng's approval, before Mao's death. The key element was Ye Jianying's persuasion of Wang Dongxing to assist in the coup.

On the evening of October 6, carefully selected 8341 units arrested Politburo members Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, along with a few dozen of their closest supporters in the capital. That same evening, local PLA troops took over the party media and closed down the offices of leftist sympathizers at Beijing and Qinghua universities. The operation was carried out with great precision and little bloodshed. Expecting trouble in Shanghai, home base for three of the four leftist leaders, Hua Guofeng summoned several of Shanghai's leaders to Beijing and dispatched a loyal general and member of the Politburo to take command of troops in the area and head off a possible militia rebellion. Whatever resistance might have developed in China's largest city collapsed immediately, and the coup was complete.

On October 7, only hours after the arrests, Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, and Wang Dongxing delivered reports to the Politburo on the evidence of leftist plotting and actions taken to preempt it. At that same meeting the Politburo, without making the actions public, elected Hua Guofeng as chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and of its Military Commission which exercised control over the PLA. On October 8 it was announced that Hua Guofeng would take charge of editing a fifth volume of Mao's works. Within a week, posters, streamers, and cartoons began to appear in all major cities attacking the Gang of Four (see Glossary) with increasing vehemence and confidence. Finally on October 21, Beijing publicly announced what the world already knew, that the post-Mao era had arrived with a vengeance. On October 24 Hua Guofeng, dressed in a PLA uniform, made a ritual appearance on Beijing's Tiananmen Gate, smilingly acknowledging the massive demonstrations organized to celebrate his "election" to the party chairmanship. He was accompanied on the occasion by the remaining fourteen members of the Politburo.

Chinese crowds, so easily and often mobilized in the past for shows of "popular support," are always difficult to gauge, but most Western and Chinese press observers were struck by the genuineness of the mass enthusiasm for the purge. People from all walks of life, who had maintained a stolid reserve in the face of the chaotic politics of the post-Cultural Revolution period, gave vent to spontaneous jubilation and relief at the downfall of the Gang of Four. The tremendous unpopularity of the left, already foreshadowed in the April riots, must have made a profound impression on China's "new" leaders as they looked out across Tiananmen Square. A coup d'etat, most dreaded by all of them, had brought them a level of popularity and goodwill not enjoyed by the Party for many years.

The Shaping of the Post-Mao Leadership

The immediate post-Gang of Four leadership was an oddly mismatched set of party bureaucrats and soldiers, largely unused to wielding the kind of power with which they had invested themselves and unified only by their opposition to the fallen leftists and some of their policies. They faced a bewildering array of problems, some only dimly perceived. The economy was in serious straits, significant segments of the population were alienated from the regime, and even the loyalty of the party rank and file could not be assumed (see ch. 5, Economic Context).

The most prominent feature of China's new leadership was its loyalty to bureaucratic procedures. The top three leaders had risen through different bureaucracies but shared a preference for orderly procedure that outweighed personal animosities and rivalries. As products of the bureaucracy, they rejected the predilection for "struggle politics" that had characterized the behavior of the Gang of Four. Determined to maintain internal unity at all costs, the Politburo informally set its priorities: to restore order and normalcy to society; to purge the Party, government and army of the "poisonous influence of the Gang of Four"; to establish their own legitimacy; and to improve economic performance.

The restoration of order was the easiest task, as the initial purge of the left was accomplished before any mass action could be carried out in their defense. The most urgent problems were ones that had existed before the October purge. As in the past, the PLA played the key role. Military supervisors were sent into those bureaucracies most seriously disrupted by leftist or factional problems, such as the press, propaganda, education, and culture. Military units were dispatched to local trouble spots in Shanghai, Fujian, Zhejiang, Sichuan, Henan, and Hebei provinces, where they quickly brought disorders to a halt.

The second stage of the purge of the left proceeded at two levels. The vilification of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan dominated the mass media. Party investigations of their plots, their checkered pasts, their families, and their sumptuous lifestyles were widely publicized. Other local units blamed them for virtually everything that had gone wrong in China for the past several years. Mao's "criticism" of their behavior was discussed in great detail, although few Chinese appeared to accept the inference that Mao would have favored their purge. Not without a sense of irony, the four were now branded with the very epithets they had once hurled at their ideological opponents: "rightists, capitalist roaders, counterrevolutionaries, renegades and traitors."

At lower levels the investigation and removal of Gang of Four sympathizers proceeded at a languid pace. Only the most obvious of their high-level supporters fell victim, along with a few handfuls of the most obstreperous radicals left over from the Cultural Revolution. Among the most prominent victims were five State Council ministers, two Military Region commanders (whose dismissals were not confirmed for several months), and a larger number of provincial party first secretaries and secretaries. Generally speaking the number of high-level leftists eliminated in late 1976 and early 1977 were quite low. This reflected the thorough nature of the investigations, as well as the Politburo's concern that "stability and unity" not be disrupted. While there were some voices heard calling for a deeper purge of the party apparatus, they remained in the minority.

The consolidation of the new leadership's legitimacy proved to be more difficult than it had anticipated. This was due primarily to two related problems: the elevation to great power of a man with little influence—Hua Guofeng; and the exclusion from power of one of China's most influential leaders—Deng Xiaoping. Like so many other problems facing the new regime, its legitimacy dilemma traced back to Mao. When Mao ordered Deng to be removed from his posts and criticized, he appointed Hua Guofeng first vice chairman of the Party. Although the politicking surrounding those decisions is unknown, most observers suggested that the purge of Deng was in response to pressure from the left, while Hua's appointment

Opening of the National People's Congress meeting in August–September 1980 in Beijing. Several leaders are here helped to their seats as then Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping (near center) gestures and then Premier Hua Guofeng looks on (rear left).
Courtesy United Press International photo

was intended to placate more moderate elements on the Politiburo. Contradictory to the last, Mao's choices presented his successors with a serious problem: how could the Party respond to growing pressure for Deng's exoneration without undercutting Hua's legitimacy? Or conversely, how could the Party praise Mao's decision on Hua without continuing to criticize Deng?

The party's response to this dilemma was to delay action on the Deng question while building up Hua's image and reputation through propaganda. In this the PLA again played a key role. On the one hand, the army newspaper, *Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily)*, was the first to publicize Hua, his background, talents, and qualifications. Other party papers soon followed suit. The army articles not only projected an image of a man possessing great leadership qualities but also pledged strong PLA support. This campaign was probably fostered by Ye Jianying, who as defense minister oversaw the military newspaper. Ye Jianying, now the party's most respected elder and chief spokesperson for the military, lent his considerable prestige and authority to support Hua's chairmanship. He appeared publicly with Hua often in the first months after the purge and praised him publicly on several occasions. This support was crucial to Hua, for he lacked not only public recognition but also the bureaucratic experience and network of personal ties that effective party leadership required.

A native of Shanxi province, Hua was only fifty-six when he became party chairman. Prior to 1971 he had spent nearly his entire career in the party and government bureaucracies of Mao's home province, Hunan. An adept and talented politician, Hua rose swiftly, both in periods of relative stability and during mass campaigns. He accumulated experience in a variety of functional areas during his Hunan days and developed his skills as a modest, thoughtful, and prudent man with a flair for conciliating divergent opinions. It was probably Mao's influence, however, that accounted for Hua's being called to Beijing in 1971 and joining the Politburo in 1973. Hua served under Zhou Enlai on the State Council, acting as Politburo supervisor for both agricultural and scientific work, and was named minister of public security in 1975.

Politically, Hua is difficult to categorize. Although he was a member of the party "establishment" in Hunan, he nonetheless prospered during the Cultural Revolution, when the party apparatus was subjected to extreme attack. Although a loyal Maoist in his policy orientations and ideology, he was no favorite of the left. The evidence is quite clear that the Gang of Four saw him as an opponent and sought his downfall. Hua's flexibility and skill at conciliation, while it enhanced his survival prospects in a perilous political climate, also left the impression of a weak-willed figure and an unprincipled opportunist not to be trusted. At the top, Hua tended to be a cautious politician, waiting to see how the political winds would blow before committing himself, then moving boldly to the center of the political action. Hua's caution served him well in 1977, for the Party was still badly divided and uncertain of its future direction. On the other hand, he did not seem to provide the ideological or political guidance that was needed.

In late 1976 and early 1977 Hua sought to build up a personality cult around himself, largely by wrapping himself in Mao's mantle. His portrait was hung alongside Mao's in most public places and in private homes. Newspapers referred to him as "our wise leader, good commander, and worthy successor to Chairman Mao." Books were published about his exploits during the war against Japan and later in Hunan. The media also gave prominence to his personal selection by Chairman Mao. The key piece of evidence was a message from Mao to Hua, written (at Hua's request) after one of Mao's last meetings with a foreign visitor in the spring of 1976. After being briefed by Hua on the campaign against Deng, Mao supposedly said, then wrote: "With you in charge, I'm at ease." Oddly, Hua did not report these words to the Politburo, although he did relate the rest of his conversation with Mao. In consolidating his position, however, Hua made great use of the incident, treating it almost as a religious rite—the laying on of hands. A painting was done to commemorate the event, showing a healthy-looking Mao with his hand over Hua's, seemingly conferring his blessing. The painting was reproduced on large tapestries, which were hung in railroad stations

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and airports all over China. In one last attempt to "Maoify" himself, Hua changed his hairstyle from a proletarian crew cut to a combed-back look, reminiscent of the younger Mao.

Despite attempts to portray Hua as the best qualified leader, pressure grew for the rehabilitation (see Glossary) of Deng Xiaoping, who was seen as a victim of a frame-up by the Gang of Four. Support for Deng's return came from party and government officials, who respected his administrative talents and felt that his tough-minded pragmatism would help restore order and purpose to China's inefficient bureaucracy. Deng was also popular among ordinary citizens, who felt that the policies he pursued during his brief tenure in power in 1974–75 were designed to improve their living standards. Most importantly, however, Deng had the support of the central PLA hierarchy, who shared his strong anti-Soviet convictions and his desire for a more effective and modern national defense.

There was, of course, opposition to Deng's return. Several members of the Politburo, having opposed Deng in the past, feared that his return would bring about their own fall. Chief among these were security boss Wang Dongxing, Beijing municipal party First Secretary Wu De, Beijing Military Region Commander Chen Xilian, and First Political Commissar Ji Dengkui. These four and others based their arguments against Deng's return on the correctness of his earlier purge, insisting that he had made serious political and ideological mistakes, including that of opposing Mao, and should admit them before being returned to power. Hua at first remained noncommittal on this question, although he may have had doubts about his own status once Deng returned.

Ye Jianying played a crucial role in brokering Deng's rehabilitation. His task was complicated by Deng's unwillingness to admit previous "errors" and his demand to be restored fully to all his positions. In March 1977 the Central Committee of the CCP held a work conference, at which the Deng question was discussed. Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying both made speeches favoring Deng's restoration and urged the meeting to undertake a resolution absolving Deng from responsibility for the Tiananmen riots. Such a resolution was adopted, but it appeared there were still unanswered questions, including that of Deng's self-criticism. In April 1977, probably at Ye Jianying's urging, Deng wrote a letter to Hua, thanking the Central Committee for the resolution on Tiananmen, expressing his firm support for Hua's selection as party chairman, and leaving it up to the Central Committee to decide what work he should be assigned. Deng assessed his own performance during 1975 as basically good but admitted some mistakes and shortcomings and accepted Chairman Mao's criticism. This letter, which was circulated as a central directive along with another letter Deng wrote in 1976 congratulating Hua on the purge of the Gang of Four, was apparently the "evidence of repentance" the party leadership needed to restore Deng to his full powers. It was decided, however, that such a restoration could only be done properly at a full Central Committee meeting, and that had to wait until preparations for the Eleventh National Party Congress were completed. The intervening period was used by the Party to explain publicly how the Gang of Four had distorted Mao's words to "viciously attack and slander Comrade Deng Xiaoping."

On July 21, 1977, the CCP issued a lengthy communiqué of the Third Plenum of the Tenth Central Committee. Among its decisions were: a resolution confirming Hua as party chairman, a resolution condemning the Gang of Four and expelling them from the Party, and a resolution restoring Deng to his positions as member of the Politburo and its Standing Committee, vice chairman of the Party, vice premier of the State Council, vice chairman of the Military Commission, and chief of the general staff of the PLA. Nine months after the purge of the Gang of Four, Deng was finally exonerated.

Deng's rehabilitation marked another milestone in the career of one of the party's most remarkable leaders. Born in Sichuan Province in 1904, Deng was the son of a wealthy Hakka landlord named Gan. A bright student, he was sent off to France on a work-study program in 1920. There Deng, like many other Chinese students (including Zhou Enlai), was radicalized and joined the nascent CCP. Once home, Deng became involved in guerrilla activities after the Party was forced underground in 1927. Eventually he ended up with the main body of the Party and Red Army in Jiangxi Province. Deng participated in the Long March and rose through the ranks of the Red Army to become a senior political commissar. In 1949 he was stationed in his home province of Sichuan, where he was made first secretary of the Southwest Regional Party Bureau. Like many other talented leaders, however, Deng was brought to Beijing in 1952 and given national responsibilities. Deng soon was appointed secretary general of the Party and a vice premier, remarkable promotions that he probably owed to Mao's favor.

In 1956 Deng was promoted over the heads of several other party leaders to the Standing Committee of the Politburo and became general secretary of the Party, head of the Secretariat. As general secretary, Deng involved himself in the day-to-day business of implementing party policies. With immediate access to the entire party bureaucracy, his power grew immensely. Because he perceived Mao's policies to have been harmful to China's development after 1958, Deng began to go his own way and worked more closely with State Chairman Liu Shaoqi. Deng's behavior irritated Mao, and his stress on results over ideological orthodoxy struck Mao as "revisionist." During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1968), Deng was branded the "number two capitalist roader in the Party" (after Liu Shaoqi) and purged.

After the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and the shock of an attempted military coup by Lin Biao, Premier Zhou Enlai apparently recommended that Deng be brought back to aid the regime in

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dealing with increasingly complex domestic and international issues. Mao agreed, and Deng returned in April 1973, as a vice premier. He rejoined the Politburo in December, becoming more active in national affairs as Zhou Enlai's health worsened. By early 1975, he was "in charge of the work of the Central Committee." Deng wasted no time in carrying the political battle to the left, organizing a political program to restore normalcy to the country by eliminating leftist influence. Heeding Jiang Qing's alarms, Mao again began to distrust Deng, and after Zhou's death, agreed that he should be suspended from work.

Deng is often described as having an aggressive, brash, impatient, and self-confident personality. He inspires respect among Chinese officials for his capabilities as an administrator and as a brilliant intellect. He does not, however, inspire loyalty and devotion and admits that his hard-driving personality has often alienated him from others. Deng is basically a nonideoloque, often called a "pragmatist" by Western analysts. That word, however, has a negative connotation in China as one lacking in principles, and Deng rightfully rejects it. Deng is an ardent patriot, dedicated to China's taking its place among the world's great powers. Although committed to the general ideals of socialism, Deng is flexible in his approach to problem solving.

Like others in the post-Mao leadership, Deng is a strong believer in effective bureaucracy. He has great faith in the CCP and its ability to lead China to the goals of modernization. He is determined, however, to reform the Party, believing that the Cultural Revolution weakened it by bringing in a large number of unqualified leaders. He also believes that unless a bureaucracy is well provided with educated specialists and experts, it cannot carry out effective policies.

The Eleventh National Party Congress, held in August 1977, was no doubt a graphic illustration for Deng of the amount of work that had to be done. In essence, the congress was an exercise in compromise and continuity. To be sure, with Deng not yet fully active in pointing out the flaws in party performance, divisions within the Party were not as clear-cut as they were to become. But Hua Guofeng's political report contained numerous contradictions and papered over known disagreements. For example, on the nature of the Gang of Four: most observers considered them "leftist," while Hua Guofeng insisted they were "ultrarightists." Hua Guofeng also praised Mao extravagantly, brought out more unconvincing evidence of his opposition to the Gang of Four, and promised that more Cultural Revolutions might be necessary in the future.

The new party leadership elected at the congress gave the impression of being carefully balanced. Central Committee membership increased from 319 to 333 (201 full members, 132 alternates), with 110 members of the Tenth National Party Congress being dropped, and 145 new members added. Most of the newcomers were party, government, and military officials at the provincial level and above, while many of those dropped were "masses" representatives. Overall military representation on the Central Committee dropped slightly, while provincial party leaders grew in representation.

At the Politburo level, the First Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, convened August 19, reelected all but one of the members who survived the purge of the Gang of Four. Ten full members and two alternates were added to the Politburo, and two alternates were promoted to full membership. Generally, the new members were either highly respected old cadres or functional specialists chosen for their expertise. The impression sought was that the political divisions and factionalism of the recent past were to be left behind in favor of an effective, working Politburo capable of making sound decisions. The Standing Committee also seemed in balance, with Deng and Ye Jianying representing cadres who suffered during the Cultural Revolution, Li Xiannian being a survivor with needed expertise, and Hua Guofeng and newly elected party Vice Chairman Wang Dongxing (whose elevation was a surprise) representing officials who had benefited from the Cultural Revolution.

The Struggle for Power

Deng Xiaoping evidently found this political balance unsatisfactory and quickly set about to fashion a political system more to his liking. His goal of party reform became inextricably linked with his desire for greater personal power. Deng took the initiative on two fronts: reorganizing the bureaucracy and redirecting policies. Changes in the top military leadership, including the transfer of the Beijing garrison commander, seemed to strengthen Deng's hand in the PLA. Within the Party, Hu Yaobang—a longtime Deng protégé—was appointed to head the Organization Department, replacing a subordinate of Wang Dongxing. This office, responsible for party personnel matters, played an important role in subsequent changes.

To the degree that other leaders were unwilling to propose needed changes in Cultural Revolution policies, Deng was able to seize the initiative in a number of important areas. The first was education, one of the issues over which he had clashed with the Gang of Four in 1975 and one involving great controversy. In October 1977 changes were proposed in the education system, reestablishing competitive examinations for university entrance (in place of work unit recommendations based on political activism) and emphasizing science and technology over politics and ideology as the main course of study (see Education Policy, ch. 4). The judgment that education had been incorrectly handled prior to the Cultural Revolution was refuted. Deng also chose to overturn Cultural Revolution verdicts on literature and art and on the training of scientists (see Winds of Political Change, ch. 9). On the latter issue, Deng differed publicly with Hua for the first time at a conference in April 1978, leading

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foreign journalists to speculate on the power struggle between the two men.

Although some observers had expected that Deng would gain significantly at the Fifth National People's Congress (NPC) held in February–March 1978, it again reflected a careful balancing act among competing party interests. Hua Guofeng retained the premiership, despite the unprecedented concentration of titular authority in the hands of one man. Ye Jianying was elected chairman of the NPC Standing Committee (China's protocol head of state), relinquishing his Defense Ministry portfolio to another old marshal, Xu Xiangqian. Deng was made chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, a "united front" organ—disbanded during the Cultural Revolution—made up of representatives of noncommunist parties and other social groups. While the post held no substantive powers, it was another symbol of Deng's commitment to China's intellectuals and their desire for change.

Deng began a concerted drive for power with all the tools at his command in the spring of 1978. Party, military, and academic media, all of which were responsive to Deng, began to publish articles proposing changes in ideology and attacking unnamed leaders who had "bent with the wind" when the leftists were in power. Wall posters commemorating the 1976 Tiananmen incident also attacked some of Deng's opponents by name. Deng himself, however, initiated the major action at an All-Army Political Work Conference, held in May and June.

In a sharply combative speech, different in tone from those delivered earlier by Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying, Deng defended his brand of pragmatic philosophy and attacked those in the Chinese leadership who considered departures from dogma to be a "heinous crime." Authoritative "contributing commentator" articles in party and army newspapers took up this issue in late June, not only criticizing "dogmatists" who resisted this approach to political problem solving, but even questioning some of the tenents of orthodox Maoism. Wang Dongxing apparently tried to prevent publication of such articles but had only limited success.

Opposition to Deng from remaining leftist elements on the Politburo increased during the summer. Adherents themselves of the later, more radical phase of Mao's thinking, they held fast to the policies and methods of the Maoist era, such as mass campaigns "learning from Dazhai in agriculture," suppressing "bourgeois tendencies" among the peasants, and taking "class struggle as the key link" in running the country (see "Agriculture First," ch. 6). In the face of increasing challenges to these and other ideas by intellectuals within the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and in the party press, these individuals, supported by thousands of Cultural Revolution beneficiaries at lower levels, became the "conservative" opposition. The Chinese political scene in late 1978 was characterized by the rather unusual situation of young "leftist conservatives" confronting elderly "radicals," who were calling for sweeping changes in the political system. Hua, although he belonged to the "Cultural Revolution generation," tried to steer a neutral course to preserve unity, supporting some of Deng's political initiatives, while at the same time defending leftists from Deng-inspired attacks.

By autumn Deng was able to draw upon his support within the military, State Council, and provincial bureaucracies to begin the process of removing his opponents from their bases of power. In October Wu De was replaced as party first secretary of Beijing amid considerable criticism over the way work had been done there. About the same time, Ji Dengkui was removed from his position as first political commissar of the Beijing Military Region. Somewhat later Wang Dongxing lost control of both the party's General office and the 8341 bodyguard unit, which was apparently returned to the official military chain of command.

Deng also profited at this time from the increased level of political activism demonstrated by young workers and students in the capital (see Controlling Social Change, this ch.). Wall-poster writers began to demand reforms in the political system, supporting Deng's programs and attacking his opponents by name. They also, however, directly attacked Mao, blaming him for many of China's problems. Deng would later disavow their actions.

Another initiative by Deng which brought him considerable support was the increased pace of political rehabilitations evident during this period. Unlike earlier restorations of officials purged during the Cultural Revolution, these rehabilitations were accompanied by strong implications that the purged officials were in the right, while the movements that brought them down—such as the antirightist campaign of 1957, the attack on Peng Dehuai in 1959, and the Cultural Revolution—were misguided and wrong (see The People's Republic of China [1949–   ], ch. 1).

All these questions and many others were discussed at the Central Committee work conference and the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, held during November-December 1978. The significance of these two meetings can hardly be overstated, as they involved a shift in the party's entire outlook and direction. Starting off with a recognition that the campaign against the Gang of Four had basically ended, the plenum communiqué called for the termination of mass class struggle altogether. Instead, it proposed that the focus of all party and government work be shifted to the achievement of the "four modernizations" (see Glossary)—agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. This redefinition of the political line of the Party meant that, as far as the central leadership was concerned, the attainment of economic goals would now be the yardstick by which the success or failure of policies and individual leaders would be measured. Mao had

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rejected this approach in the late 1950s, preferring "politics in command" and socialist indoctrination to promote economic work. The decision to return to the goals and work style of the early 1950s was a conscious, if unspoken, repudiation of Mao's methods.

Other decisions reached by the Third Plenum were equally momentous. Among its personnel actions was the addition of four members to the Politburo: Chen Yun, architect of China's post-1949 economic recovery; Deng Yingchao, widow of Zhou Enlai; Hu Yaobang, an energetic protégé of Deng Xiaoping; and Wang Zhen. Chen Yun was further elevated to a party vice chairmanship and was appointed head of the newly established Discipline Inspection Commission. Following the plenum, Hu Yaobang was appointed secretary-general of the Party and head of the Propaganda Department.

The plenum also took up several "historical questions left over from an earlier period," including the Tiananmen Incident, the 1959 Peng Dehuai case, and others. It left for a more "appropriate" time, however, the assessment of the Cultural Revolution. While that in itself was a major change from the Eleventh National Party Congress, the decision to "shelve" this issue was probably unsatisfactory to many older cadres. The plenum also "highly evaluated," but did not officially endorse, the ideological discussion that had been generated by Deng's remarks to the All-Army Political Work Conference (see Rethinking Mao Zedong Thought, this ch.). Finally, the plenum approved two documents on agricultural policy and organization that were intended to loosen political restrictions on peasants and allow them to produce more on their own initiative.

Although there were many elements of compromise in the Third Plenum decisions, it was a major achievement for Deng, whose ideas and priorities dominated the discussions and whose associates benefited from the personnel decisions. In the ensuing months the Third Plenum was to take on increasing symbolic importance, becoming for Deng and his party reformers a touchstone of political loyalty and a shield against opposition attacks.

Rapid political change always brings confusion and China in 1979 was no exception. By spring a number of serious problems had developed: the February war with Vietnam had brought only marginal success, considerable international criticism, and a high rate of casualties; normalization of relations with the United States, while initially gratifying, had run into difficulties over trade negotiations and the Taiwan Relations Act; economic imbalances and ineffective planning had led to doubts about modernization goals; lower level cadres were unsure of the staying power of new agricultural policies and delayed implementing them; and the fledgling "democracy movement," buoyed by foreign interest, stepped up its attacks on the Party (see ch. 5, Economic Context; Relations with the United States, ch. 12). Because Deng had been integrally involved in all these decisions, his opponents took the opportunity provided by these setbacks to attack his leadership. This time the detractors included not only residual elements of the Politburo left wing but also some party elders, who saw the political problems as evidence that the pace of change fostered by Deng was too fast.

As a result Deng was forced to alter his political strategy. In a major speech in March 1979 Deng took a conservative position on how much dissent was permissible and agreed to a crackdown on the "democracy movement." Having co-opted part of his opposition, Deng broadened the attack on that element he saw as most threatening to the long-term survival of his policies—the Cultural Revolution-nurtured left wing. Chinese media opened up a strong attack on the persistence of "ultraleftist" thinking among some bureaucrats, accusing them of trying to delay implementation of Third Plenum decisions.

Furthermore, despite the Third Plenum decision to shelve consideration of the Cultural Revolution, Deng was able to keep the issue very much alive, largely through publicity for posthumously rehabilitated cadres. Articles describing the humiliation, persecution, and sometimes cruel deaths suffered by some of China's foremost leaders during the Cultural Revolution greatly increased public revulsion for that period. The media stressed that there were thousands of such tragic stories from the Cultural Revolution, that ordinary people as well as party leaders suffered, and that those responsible were in many cases still in positions of authority.

Yet another means by which Deng sought to keep pressure on his opposition was by raising the issues of incompetency and corruption among party cadres. Media articles sharply attacked cadres who abused their offices and sought special privileges for themselves and their families. During the second session of the Fifth NPC in late June 1979, wall-poster writers attacked Wang Dongxing for spending millions of yuan in public funds to renovate a house for his own use.

Hua Guofeng sensing a turn toward the right in the party's political outlook, tried to move toward the political center, lending support to modernization, party reform and some other of Deng's ideas. He also began to disengage himself from the beleagured Politburo leftists. As a consensus-seeking leader, a man with his own prestige to protect, and an apparently firm believer in Mao's ideals, however, Hua Guofeng could not bring himself to throw his full support to Deng's programs and ideology and continued to try to remain aloof from the political struggle.

Ye Jianying whose support Hua Guofeng had relied upon so much in the early phase of his chairmanship, was fading as a political force. At eighty-two and in failing health, Ye Jianying simply lacked the stamina to engage in the complex business of politics and seemed to spend much of his time out of the capital, touring and recuperating. As the party's most respected elder, however, Ye Jianying still played an important, if occasional role. He was called upon to deliver the key address to the Fourth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, which met September 25–28, 1979.

Ye Jianying's speech—delivered on the eve of the 30th anniversary of the People's Republic—was billed as a "preliminary" assessment of the entire period of CCP rule and much of it was taken up with a recitation of the regime's achievements. To the degree that Ye Jianying also addressed the CCP's errors, however, his speech broke new ground. For the first time the Party accepted the fact that its leadership had made serious political (not simply ideological) errors that had brought great misery to the Chinese people and to the Party itself. Breaking the silence about the Cultural Revolution, Ye Jianying called it "an appalling catastrophe" and "the most severe setback to our socialist cause since the founding of the People's Republic." Although Ye Jianying did not blame Mao for these errors, he left no doubt that Mao bore much of the responsibility.

Beyond a recognition of past errors, however, Ye Jianying's speech marked the party's official acceptance of a new ideological line, based upon "seeking truth from facts" and other elements of Deng's thinking. This not only constituted a further setback for the remaining Maoists on the Politburo but also placed other party members on notice that passive resistance to party policies, on the pretext that they were inconsistent with Mao Zedong Thought, would no longer be tolerated. To drive that point home many party and military units were forced to "make up the missed lesson" in studying the new ideology.

Deng Xiaoping Consolidates His Gains

With the political and ideological lines of the Party now changed to their satisfaction, Deng Xiaoping and his party reformers moved to the knottier problem of cleansing the party's organizational structure. Although significant changes had been made through the middle reaches of the bureaucracy, there remained at the top levels those who directly opposed some of the new economic policies and the ideological line, as well as a number of elderly politicians too weak or ignorant to pay attention to the complex details of pragmatic decisionmaking. This problem was much worse at lower levels, where central guidance gets translated into action. The magnitude of the problem was attested to by the party's admission that nearly half of its 38 million members joined during or after the Cultural Revolution, and many were unfit to act as "models for the masses." In late 1979 the Party initiated a "rectification" campaign to reeducate, screen and, if necessary, purge substandard party members. It made slow progress, however, in part because of continued resistance at the Politburo level.

Deng's desire for an organizational shakeup of the Party bore fruit in early 1980. It began in the PLA, whose rectification record was apparently considered unsatisfactory. The first victim was Politburo member Chen Xilian, who was finally stripped of his title as commander of the Beijing Military Region and replaced by a Deng associate. Several other central and regional personnel changes were announced about the same time, the end result being the largest military shakeup since the purge of Lin Biao in 1971. Although the political influence of several generals was reduced, the overall effect was an attempt to improve the efficiency and quality of the PLA by promoting younger, professionally qualified officers to high positions.

Deng capped his organizational drive at the Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, held February 23–29, 1980. That meeting approved several resolutions crucial to Deng's organizational control of the Party. Most important, from the symbolic perspective, was the decision to accept the "resignations" of Politburo members Wang Dongxing, Wu De, Ji Dengkui, and Chen Xilian. These four, long the backbone of Politburo opposition to Deng, lost all their party and government positions but were allowed to retain their Central Committee membership. They were charged in *Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)* with "grave errors" in the struggle against the Gang of Four and afterwards, but the errors were not specified, nor did they become the subject of party study.

Equally important, from the standpoint of political power, was the elevation of two Deng protégés, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, to the Standing Committee of the Politburo. With the removal of Wang Dongxing, there were now seven members of the Standing Committee, four of whom were strongly committed to party and economic reform.

Hu Yaobang's rapid rise through the party hierarchy closely paralleled Deng's 1954–56 emergence from relative obscurity to the top levels of party leadership. A Deng associate since the 1940s, Hu Yaobang came to Beijing with Deng in the early 1950s and headed the Communist Youth League (CYL) until his purge in the Cultural Revolution. After Deng's rehabilitation in 1973, Hu Yaobang was given a post at the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), where he gained notoriety as a fearless challenger of leftist policies in education, science, and the treatment of intellectuals. In 1975 Hu Yaobang helped draft a controversial document that Deng used as a program for his planned reform of the political system. When Deng drew heavy fire from the left for that program, Hu Yaobang was also attacked, and he fell with Deng in 1976. In 1977 Hu Yaobang returned to power and was placed in charge of party organizational work. His active investigations of Cultural Revolution cases and bold rehabilitation of its victims involved him deeply in controversy but won him much admiration from cadres at all levels. As head of the Propaganda Department in 1978, Hu Yaobang kept the media spotlight on party controversies and granted access to the media to many nonparty intellectuals. His promotion to the Standing Committee marked the sixty-five-year old Hu Yaobang as one of the "succession" leaders of China.

Although not as closely tied to Deng Xiaoping as was Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang shared their concern for improving the performance of the political system, particularly with regard to economic policies, and demonstrated his willingness to drop unworkable Maoist policies. At sixty-one, Zhao Ziyang was a contemporary of Hua Guofeng and shared his background as a rapidly promoted provincial party official; Zhao Ziyang spent his early career in Guangdong Province, where he gained expertise in managing agricultural affairs. Unlike Hua Guofeng, who benefited from the Cultural Revolution, Zhao Ziyang was purged for supporting the policies of Mao's opponents. After his rehabilitation in 1972, Zhao Ziyang worked briefly in Nei Monggol Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolia), then returned to Guangdong. In 1975 during a peak period in Deng's influence, Zhao Ziyang was sent to troubled Sichuan Province as party first secretary, and under his leadership, Sichuan returned to political and economic health. A firm believer in material incentives, Zhao Ziyang also promoted experiments in returning decisionmaking authority to the production units themselves, rather than centralizing it exclusively in provincial or central administrative bureaus. Appointed an alternate to the Politburo at the Eleventh National Party Congress in 1977, Zhao Ziyang was made a full member at the Fourth Plenum in 1979, and his 1980 promotion to the Standing Committee marked him clearly as a Deng favorite. Although his central bureaucratic experience was limited, Zhao Ziyang was Deng's choice to replace Hua Guofeng as premier, a move officially approved at the third session of the Fifth NPC (August 30–September 10, 1980).

Another major decision taken at the Fifth Plenum was the restoration of Central Committee Secretariat under the leadership of General Secretary Hu Yaobang. According to the plenum resolution, the Secretariat was to take charge of the day-to-day management of party affairs, leaving the Politburo free to consider "major" domestic and foreign policy issues. The new Secretariat (the old one was abolished in the Cultural Revolution) bore the stamp of Deng. Aside from Yu Yaobang, a majority of the ten secretaries elected at the plenum had long career associations with Deng or seemed to have gained Deng's favor. While it was not completely Deng's work team, as other political forces were also represented, Deng's influence among its members and his long experience as head of the Secretariat gave him an important tool for remolding the Party.

The August–September 1980 NPC session consolidated Deng's preeminence in the government bureaucracy, much as the Fifth Plenum had confirmed his control of the Party. The new State Council leadership emplaced at the NPC was strongly committed to reform and to Deng's brand of no-nonsense policymaking. Deng himself gained no new institutional powers and in fact resigned from his vice premiership, as he had earlier turned over his duties as chief of staff. Nor was Deng now able to dictate policies to the Politburo, as Mao had once done. Deng worked more through consensus and shifted course when he encountered stiff opposition from his peers on the Politburo. Nonetheless, it was clear by late 1980 that he was the key leader in the Chinese political system, and its future development would depend in large part on how he chose to exercise his power.

The political system on the eve of the Twelfth National Party Congress (scheduled for early 1981) was radically different from the immediate post Mao Gang of Four system. While much of its transformation was the result of a familiar struggle for personal power, certain structural alterations seem likely to have a more lasting effect. The most significant appears to be the institutional weakening of the party chairmanship. Hua Guofeng, a cautious, conservative, somewhat dogmatic and inexperienced leader, lost power continually to Deng Xiaoping and his supporters. Hua Guofeng's staying power as party chairman derived from a number of factors, including Deng's unwillingness to risk political instability and press for his removal, continued support from several party elders, and the lack of immediately apparent alternatives. While these factors slowed the diminution of Hua Guofeng's power, they did not halt it. Hua's resignation from the premiership in September 1980, while logical from an institutional standpoint, was viewed as one more step in his march toward obscurity.

The weakening of the chairmanship went well beyond a personal attack on Hua Guofeng, however; it was also part of a plan to insure that another figure like Mao could not dominate the CCP in the future. The institutional measures taken to limit the powers of the party chairman included: limitation of the term of office of any individual to three five-year terms; the strengthening of the general secretary and Secretariat; and the enactment of legal strictures against the creation of a personality cult. Although these steps weakened Hua Guofeng, they were motivated by a desire to correct what Mao had done to the political system.

To avoid the dangers of one-man rule, the Party attempted to institutionalize "collective leadership," long the ideal but seldom the reality of the CCP. The Secretariat was highly touted as a step in this direction. Although clearly led by the general secretary, its members—each an acknowledged functional expert—were expected to make decisions collectively on important policies. And since they were elected by a full party plenum, rather than chosen by a particular leader, it was reasoned that theirs was a more "democratic" mandate.

Another alteration intended to improve collective leadership was the creation of a corps of party elders to act as "advisers" to the decisionmakers, but removed from line authority over the bureaucracy. These advisory groups were set up in many party, government, and military organs, giving old veterans the opportunity to retain prestige and influence befitting their long service but leaving the more

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demanding and difficult work of actually administering the bureaucracy to younger, more active, and competent individuals.

What was ironic about these restrictions on the powers of potential party "strongmen" was that they were largely the creation of the post-Mao "strongman," Deng Xiaoping. Although the measures had broad support in the Party, it was Deng's influence that counted most in having them officially adopted, proving the tenacity of Chinese leadership habits—Deng first had to grasp power before he could arrange to let it go. With an eye to the future, Deng promoted changes to improve leadership performance, guarantee policy continuity, dampen power struggles, and avoid the "succession crisis" that has so often plagued communist party regimes.

Pragmatism and the Politics of Modernization

Policy issues have historically had a transient quality in the Chinese political process, serving more often as weapons for interpersonal and interfactional conflict than as rallying points around which coalitions formed. The post-Mao leadership, however, has raised one issue so much above all others that it actually has begun to shape the political process itself. That issue is economic modernization, and it is the wellspring from which Deng's pragmatism and reformism have flowed (see ch. 5, Economic Context).

Continuous development of the means of production is, of course, a major goal of all Marxist governments. Under Mao, however, that goal was pursued in a manner that subordinated economic policy to the dictates of mass class struggle and, in the end, to political struggle at the Politburo level. Mao, who admitted his own ignorance of economics, resented efforts to correct the problems caused by hasty agricultural collectivization and the "Great Leap Forward" and initiated political and ideological struggle against the reformers. Emphasis on struggle reached massive proportions during the Cultural Revolution, which did tremendous damage to the economic, political, and social fabric of Chinese society.

In 1975 Deng and Zhou Enlai tried to get the promotion of economic progress elevated to a higher status in the party's goal structure. In his speech to the fourth NPC in January, Zhou Enlai called for the "comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology before the end of the century." Deng stated that economic work was one of the "key links" of party work, a position that was anathema to Mao and the radicals and led in no small part to Deng's second disgrace in 1976.

After the death of Mao and the purge of the radicals, the modernization issue emerged again, and this time there was little disagreement with the proposition that the improvement of China's backward economic condition was one of the regime's most critical tasks (see Economic Policies 1949–80, ch. 5). All Politburo members recognized that to continue to neglect economic development and the well-being of the people in favor of confusing and disruptive political campaigns was to court disaster. Despite this consensus, however, there was little agreement on what modernization entailed or how fast to achieve it. Because of his early association with the issue, Deng's name was most frequently linked with modernization plans, even though they were the result of a collective Politburo effort.

In his work report to the Fifth NPC on February 25, 1978, Hua Guofeng unveiled a new ten-year economic plan, a detailed and ambitious scheme to set China on the course for modernization by the year 2000. Although the goals were set remarkably high, e.g., a 5-percent annual increase in agricultural production and a 10 percent per annum rise in industrial output from 1978 to 1985 and doubling China's steel output to 60 million tons by 1985, the means by which they were to be achieved were consistent with past economic practices. These included simplistic campaigns to learn from national models of self-reliance and struggle, striking hard at "capitalist" tendencies in the countryside, and using mass campaigns to promote enthusiasm for production. Implicit in this plan was the assumption that, with obstructionist radicals out of the administrative structure, previously established policies could successfully generate large-scale economic growth. That view soon proved to be unrealistic.

The commitment to economic modernization became official party policy at the Third Plenum in 1978. In the communiqué the Party admitted the need for changes in policy and procedures "to meet the needs of socialist modernization." These changes included, in the political sphere, strengthening of "democracy in party life," eliminating the "overconcentration of authority," and better distinguishing the difference between party and government work. The communiqué also called for a new approach to economic decisionmaking, which included respect for "economic laws," simplified administrative procedures, and the adoption of material incentives to promote production.

The combination of tepid economic performance in 1978 and the growing awareness of serious shortcomings in economic policymaking brought on a new phase in the modernization process: readjustment. Party Vice Chairman and Vice Premier Chen Yun appeared to play the key role in this development. A longtime opponent of Maoist economic policy, Chen Yun shared Deng's hardheaded realism about China's problems and also his recognition that more than cosmetic changes were needed to bring about improvement. Bolstered by statistics on bottlenecks and imbalances and by a growing chorus of economists critical of economic decisionmaking, Chen Yun pressed for a thorough reconsideration of the economic assumptions and policies of the past and reform of the decisionmaking structure of which they were a product. At a Central Committee work conference in the spring of 1979, it was decided that the ten-year plan approved at the 1978 NPC had to be delayed (it was eventually scrapped) and that a three-year period of "readjustment, restructuring, consolidation, and improvement" was needed to restore order to the economic bureaucracy.

Readjustment had several political implications. It cast doubt upon the qualifications of Politburo members responsible for economic policy. At first, criticism was aimed at Deng for his overenthusiasm for modernization, but by mid-1980 the blame had shifted to veteran economic planners such as Yu Qiuli, and China's planning bureaucracy underwent a thorough shake-up. Although embarrassed at the failure, the Party pointed to readjustment decisions as proof of their commitment to correcting mistakes quickly. Readjustment was also a spur to long-silent economists to air their theories and criticisms. In a more open and fearless fashion, controversial issues such as decentralization, wage bonuses, price policy, and the distribution of agricultural land to individuals and families in sections of the countryside unsuited to collective agriculture were debated freely in the party media. New economic administrators like Zhao Ziyang eagerly sought new concepts for trial implementation and encouraged China's economists to make further recommendations for economic reform.

Readjustment also created institutional splits within the government. Heavy industrial ministries, whose development funds were to be cut back, tried to delay or avoid implementing readjustment policies, and local governments dodged central directions on cutting back capital construction. The shake-up of the economic planning organs hampered the formulation of a new ten-year economic plan, badly needed to give direction to the modernization effort. Politicking with economic issues also increased, and various leaders used economic policy criteria to question the fitness of other leaders. Hua Guofeng was under attack in mid-1980 for his Maoist economic beliefs. The overall impression was one of ferment and confusion, leading to a growth of cynicism and disillusionment among party cadres and intellectuals alike.

Compounding these difficulties at the top was a widespread unwillingness among middle and lower level cadres to implement economic policies that were agreed upon, much less to participate in experimental programs with uncertain futures. It was on this issue that Deng and his reformist colleagues staked their party rectification campaign. While Hua Guofeng and others may have faulted incorrect ideology and poor policymaking for the continuing problems in China's economy, Deng placed the blame squarely on the cadre system left over from the Cultural Revolution. In his mind, the success of economic modernization programs was inseparable from the progress of political reform and party rectification.

Political Readjustment Under Deng Xiaoping

There was widespread consensus within the post-Mao leadership that unless the Party was restored to a condition of stability, policy coherence, discipline, and competence, all other goals would be unrealizable. Plans for party reform, however, generated intense controversy among various factions and generations of CCP leaders. For Mao, too, had intended to reform the Party, to cure it of its bureaucratic habits so that it could more genuinely "serve the people." This goal eventually led him to undertake the Cultural Revolution, which nearly destroyed the CCP. Those post-Mao leaders who fell in the Cultural Revolution wanted a return to old forms and values. Younger leaders who benefited from the upheavals considered that the party apparatus against which Mao had fought was indeed flawed and in need of new blood. Reinforcing conflict on this issue was the veterans' desire for revenge against their tormentors, and younger cadres' determination to hold on to power.

Party reform was, from the very beginning, a slow process. One of Deng's first priorities was to expand his base of support by bringing back to power trusted older leaders, many of whom were languishing in jails and labor reform camps in 1977. Under Hu Yaobang, the party Organization Department took the lead in this effort, reinvestigating old cases, reversing verdicts from the Cultural Revolution and before, restoring veterans to their official positions, and rehabilitating the reputations of those who had died of persecution or of natural causes while in disgrace.

The political rehabilitation process was not the invention of the post-Mao leadership. It had begun shortly after the most intense phase of the Cultural Revolution ended in 1969 and continued off and on despite radical opposition. After the Gang of Four fell, it remained a controversial issue throughout the Party. At the top, some cases—such as that of Liu Shaoqi—encountered bureaucratic resistance because they involved the reputation and judgment of Mao or because they had become part of the official party record. At lower levels, factional interests often were at play, and local officials refused to reopen cases of individuals they had purged, trying to cover up criminal behavior and protect their subordinates. Problems were easier to solve at the higher levels, in one sense, because they could be handled by administrative fiat. Other cases needed more time, more thorough reinvestigation of the original evidence, and often the addition of high-level pressure before verdicts could be reversed.

Another reform Deng sought was the restoration of party procedures prevalent in the early 1950s, particularly the idea of inner-party "democracy." In a Marxist-Leninist party, "democracy" means "democratic centralism," a procedure that guarantees party members the right to voice their opinions, criticisms, and dissent during the policy formulation process. Once an issue is decided by the collective leadership, however, all party members are obligated to support it and implement it to the letter, even if they believe it to be wrong. Dissent is not to be suppressed by force, however.

By late 1978 articles in the party media discussed the degree to which this "tradition" had been damaged in the CCP. Mao was indirectly criticized for contributing to the "abnormal" state of democracy within the party, in which disagreement was equated with apostasy, meriting serious punishment. The purge of former Defense Minister Peng Dehuai in 1959 was a case in point and began the downward slide toward the "fascist dictatorship" of the Cultural Revolution. "One-man rule" became the norm, and not only at the top. Mao's personality cult was taken to absurd extremes, eliminating all possibility of directly disagreeing with his views. Rather, leadership interaction was carried out through conspiracy and cabal. In many cases factionalism between opposing groups became so serious as to paralyze entire party committees and prevent the accomplishment of all but inconsequential work.

By 1979 the Party had made considerable progress in eliminating the excesses of one-man rule. Many of the reforms were codified, as in the "Guiding Principles for Inner Party Life," adopted by the Fifth Plenum. The new guidelines set cadres' terms of office, established strict decisionmaking procedures, dispersed responsibilities, and prohibited factional activity. The Party also established grievance channels, such as the Discipline Inspection Commission and to a lesser degree through the party media so that "whistleblowers" would not fear retaliation (see The Mass Media, ch. 10).

The post-Mao leadership also undertook institutional reform by clarifying the distinctions between Party and government. As a result of the destruction of party committees and governmental organs during the Cultural Revolution, so-called "revolutionary committees" were formed to carry out their combined duties. After party committees were reestablished in the provinces in the early 1970s, revolutionary committees faded in importance, acting much like the earlier people's governments. In 1978 the Fifth NPC agreed that revolutionary committees should be phased out in certain administrative units. At its June 1979 session, governmental reorganization laws were adopted, requiring the establishment of people's governments and people's congresses and the abolition of revolutionary committees at all levels. These laws clearly set out the relationship between government and legislature, but left vague the party's role and did not specify how the revolutionary committees were to be dismantled. That process was completed in all provinces by the summer of 1980, apparently without major difficulties.

Probably the most urgent reform pressed by Deng and his allies was cadre reform, or party rectification; this was the most important problem but also the most intractable. Without a disciplined, loyal, and reliable cadre force, central policies could not be effectively implemented, and future policy continuity could not be assured. However, harsh purges of the cadre ranks would produce further discontent, having negative effects on popular support for government reforms.

As a result of years of chaos, confusion, and neglect by central authorities, China's 18-million member cadre force was in bad shape by 1977. Some officials were corrupt, lacking in ideals and using their offices to benefit their families and friends. Many were leftist holdovers from the Cultural Revolution, opposed to post-Third Plenum policies and unwilling to implement them. Many were part of entrenched factional networks that led to important Politburo leaders, making it virtually impossible to remove them. Many were sheer incompetents, promoted for "redness" rather than expertise, and unable to handle the challenge of new responsibilities. Many were overaged rehabilitees from earlier disgrace, eager to make a contribution and restore their reputations but too ill to devote full attention to their duties. Many were simply weak-willed, avoiding commitment to controversial policies for fear of future retaliation. Nearly all were confused by the rapid pace of change, dismayed at having to "criticize what we once practiced and practice what we once criticized."

Deng's rectification plans were intended to solve massive problems in the cadre corps with minimal work disruption. The process, officially begun in October 1979, was expected to take as long as three years, with the stress on reeducation and persuasion rather than on coercive methods. Die-hard Gang of Four followers and those who had proved totally opposed to new policy guidelines were to be removed from office, as were those who fomented factionalism or violated state laws.

Political education courses on a rotational basis, i.e. party schools, were to be provided for those who had "committed errors" during the Cultural Revolution or during the struggle against the Gang of Four and suitable employment was to be given them. As an example, the four leftists removed from the Politburo at the Fifth Plenum retained their Central Committee membership and were eventually to be given work. Overaged cadres were encouraged to resign their posts in favor of younger officials and were rewarded for doing so. For the first time since the establishment of the People's Republic, the Party undertook in late 1980 to provide a viable and honorable exit pattern from the political system. Deng set the example by retiring from the State Council, and the media publicized numerous examples of other retirees.

To upgrade the overall quality of cadre ranks, the Party provided technical training courses and vigorously stepped up recruitment and promotion of college graduates, scientists, and intellectuals. Those who lacked the educational or technical skills to perform their tasks were encouraged to seek reassignment or were involuntarily transferred.

Party leaders had few illusions about the difficulty of their tasks in the rectification process. Party media frequently spoke of opposition to the cadre reform process, especially to policies of hiring intellectuals, eliminating factionalism, and encouraging retirement. By late

1980 the process was still moving quite slowly, generating political pressure and discontent but not seriously upsetting the system.

Party-Army Relations

The relationship between the CCP and its military arm has always been of crucial importance in understanding political dynamics in China. Prior to 1949 most of China's leaders were engaged in military affairs, with the result that party and army functions were virtually inseparable. After "liberation," many of the Red Army's most talented leaders went into civilian administration. For its own part, the PLA—having fought in Korea with mixed success and heavy losses—began to conduct itself as a professionalized military organization, rather than as a revolutionary band. This tendency was rejected by Mao and others, and after the purge of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai in 1959, the Party fostered campaigns to politicize the PLA and to portray it as a model of socialist loyalty and morality. This movement, enthusiastically carried out by the new defense minister, Lin Biao, reached its apogee just prior to the Cultural Revolution (see Military Modernization: The Unfolding Story, ch. 14).

The PLA's role in the Cultural Revolution was extremely complex, but generally speaking, it was used by Mao and Lin Biao, after its own purge, as a key instrument in the political struggle against the Party. PLA units were ordered to support "seizures of power" by youthful extremists in 1967, and many local officers served in leading positions on revolutionary committees. When factional violence threatened to get out of control, main force units were sent into troubled provinces to restore order. After 1969 China appeared to be on the verge of military dictatorship. Lin Biao was officially anointed as Mao's successor, and PLA officers dominated most provincial administrations, government ministries, and party departments.

A concerned Mao turned to Zhou Enlai and other veteran party leaders to help regain control of the military. Lin Biao, impatient and frightened, plotted against Mao, failed, and was killed attempting to flee to the Soviet Union. A shocked Party undertook a sweeping purge of Lin Biao's supporters in the military hierarchy, replacing them in many cases with victims of Lin Biao's Cultural Revolution purge of the PLA leadership.

After the Lin Biao purges, the struggle for ascendancy in the Party continued, and leaders of all factions turned to elements of the PLA for support, resulting in army leaders maintaining a high political profile and considerable influence within the Party. Although the role of the PLA in the actual purge of the Gang of Four should not be overestimated, its support for the coup, and for Hua Guofeng's leadership, was crucial to the new regime. PLA support for Deng Xiaoping was also a major factor in his rehabilitation and consolidation of power.

The reconstruction and reform of the Party in the post-Third Plenum period, however, saw a significant diminution of PLA influence in Chinese politics. Regional military figures were brought into line by strengthening the central chain of command and the political commissar system. Most were also removed from provincial party posts and given strictly military responsibilities. In Beijing few military men remained on the State Council by late 1978. On the Politburo, military influence was limited by the poor health of several of its representatives and by the proportionally greater number of civilians added in 1977–78. Two career soldiers were expelled from the Politburo in 1980, and another was politically neutralized. Generally, senior military leaders trusted the leadership of Deng and Ye Jianying and were firm believers in Mao's dictum that "the party controls the gun," and thus did not resist this "back to the barracks" program. Some resentments were built up, however.

Modernization of national defense was given last priority of the "four modernizations" for the sound reason that, to develop effectively, a modern military establishment needs industrial and technological sectors that are healthy and productive, and China had neither. Military modernization was perceived as a slow process, requiring training, education, and "professionalization." While most military men accepted the logic of this situation, there was great concern that the Party did not fully recognize the danger of China's inadequate defense against the Soviet threat and of the growing technological gap between China and its adversaries. Also disturbing to many was a cut in the PLA budget in 1980.

Differences in perception of the overall modernization process also led to some disharmony between civilians and soldiers. PLA officers appeared to view modernization in a narrow sense—as the acquisition and absorption of technologically advanced weapons, accompanied by limited organizational and doctrinal changes. Party leaders, on the other hand, faced much more complex problems, requiring major changes in thought process and social relations, some of which—such as "liberalization"—veteran soldiers were reluctant to accept. Neither were military leaders very enthusiastic about the growing criticism of Mao, whose doctrinal concepts were still considered valid for the PLA.

Thus, while party-army relations were restored to their pre-Cultural Revolution norms by 1980, there was a noticeable coolness developing. Deng, who had relied on the PLA's support during his comeback, had now forged a new party coalition, seemingly turning his back on erstwhile allies. Economic readjustment was hitting hardest at those sectors most important to the PLA, such as metallurgical and machine-building industries. These problems, while worrisome to the Party and army alike, were nowhere near a crisis level. The PLA, loyal and dedicated to its task of defending

China's security, was not motivated, inclined, or positioned to interfere in China's political process.

Rethinking Mao Zedong Thought

Ideology has always played a major role in the political life of China. A major component of Mao's power was his preeminence in the realm of ideology, adapting Marxism-Leninism to a Chinese context. As early as the mid-1940s the CCP officially recognized the importance of Mao Zedong Thought as China's guiding ideology. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, Mao's thinking, under attack from within the Party as well as by the Soviet Union, hardened into rigid dogmatism. During the Cultural Revolution, the accusation that an official was not "upholding Mao Zedong Thought" was grounds for dismissal—or worse. Massive battles were fought in the provinces between student factions all claiming to be the correct interpreters of Mao's thought. As contained in the "little red book" (*Quotations from Chairman Mao*), ideology was considered to have almost mystical power.

After the Cultural Revolution Mao made few speeches and wrote no major theoretical tracts. Yet his "thought," contained in short sentences usually highlighted on the front page of *People's Daily*, was still considered absolute truth and could start off a major political campaign.

Such was the identification of Mao with ideological rectitude that the Party felt obligated to search his writings for quotes to justify policies adopted after his death. Mao was extensively quoted criticizing the Gang of Four, implying that he himself was distrustful of them and would have approved the purge. The immediate postpurge decision to publish a fifth volume of his *Selected Works* provided Hua Guofeng with the opportunity not only to gain control of the holy writ but also to shape Mao to suit post-Mao purposes. Most of the works included in the 1977 edition were taken from the period prior to the Great Leap Forward, when Mao was first among equals but still committed to collective leadership and more importantly to traditional socialist economic principles. But the later Mao attacked and undermined those principles, and few post-Mao leaders were comfortable with the prospect of having new policies attacked with Maoist canons. No one, however, wanted to take on the enormous and politically perilous task of "revising" the chairman's thought.

Deng Xiaoping clearly understood the importance of ideology in the political struggle and realized that unless the destructive aspects of Mao's thought were discredited or refuted, his own pragmatic political principles would be continually jeopardized. In mid-1978 he began the task of recasting the regime's ideology. At the All-Army Political Work Conference Deng delivered a ringing defense of realistic politics, based not upon rigid dogma, but upon flexible and creative application of basic Marxist principles. Deng warned that serious problems lay ahead on the road to modernization, for which Mao's and Lenin's writings provided no answers, and that unless a problem-solving ideology was adopted, progress toward modernization would cease. Although he admitted considerable opposition to this approach existed, Deng boldly asserted that "seeking truth from facts" was the real essence of Mao Zedong Thought. "Some comrades talk about Mao Zedong Thought every day, but forget, abandon or even oppose Chairman Mao's fundamental Marxist view and method of seeking truth from facts, proceeding from reality in doing everything, and integrating theory with practice."

Deng's position touched off a major debate within the Party. The slogan "practice is the sole criterion for judging truth" became the rallying point for all those cadres who had been blocked by obscurantist ideology in the hands of youthful radicals from considering or implementing policies designed to solve real economic and political problems. The opposition, led by Wang Dongxing, saw any shift in ideology as an effort to besmirch Mao's reputation. He accused Deng and his intellectual supporters of "chopping down Chairman Mao's banner." From his stronger position in control of the party media, Deng began to attack what became known as the "whatever faction," those who insisted on blind adherence to "whatever Chairman Mao said and wrote." Wang Dongxing consistently overplayed his hand and lost the support of other leaders. As a result, he was greatly weakened and soon began to lose important components of his political power. Hua Guofeng, seeking to remain neutral, got caught in a cross fire and was indirectly attacked by Deng's zealots. He subsequently made a self-criticism at a party meeting for supporting "whateverism."

The Third Plenum decision to shift the focus of the party's work from criticism of the Gang of Four to the promotion of modernization was a major victory in Deng's ideological readjustment campaign. With modernization so enshrined, ideas which could be proved to be inconsistent with the need for econmic progress could be abandoned. Deng wasted little time in refuting one of the central tenets of Mao's ideology, namely the need for continuing class struggle to promote progress in a socialist country (see Inequality, Stratification, and Social Mobility, ch. 3). In his June 1979 work report to the NPC, Hua Guofeng stated the party's official position: capitalists, landlords, and others no longer exist objectively "as a class" in China, and although the CCP still must combat "bourgeois and feudal ideology" and a few remaining "class enemies," "class struggle is no longer the principal contradiction in our society." This statement refuted Mao's justification for the Cultural Revolution.

Mao's preference for subjective assessments of what should be done rather than objective analysis of what was possible under prevailing circumstances also came under attack. In Marxist terminology the tendency to overestimate potential and disregard limitations is called "leftism." In February 1979 party media refuted Hua

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

Portrait of Mao being removed from public building, August 1980, as part of the leadership effort to downgrade his legend.
Courtesy United Press International photo

Guofeng's earlier depiction of the Gang of Four as "rightists" and described their ideology (and by implication, Mao's) as "ultraleftist." Party writers then undertook a discussion of the damage done to China's efforts at economic progress by "leftist" ideology and accused those who opposed Third Plenum policies of similar ideological deviation.

Underlying all these controversies was the need for a reassessment of Mao and his contributions to the revolution. Pressure for a negative judgment grew as more and more of his former opponents returned to power and as the party leadership better recognized the damage Mao had done to the political system in his waning years. The process of "demythologizing" Mao began in earnest in the summer of 1978 with the publication of the text of Mao's own self-criticism, made before an enlarged party work conference in early 1962. The communiqué of the Third Plenum took the process a step further, recognizing that "it would not be Marxist to demand that a revolutionary leader be free from all shortcomings and errors." In contrast to the communique's caution, wall-poster writers in Beijing and elsewhere were bitterly attacking Mao for all sorts of problems.

Opponents of "de-Maoification" were able to use the vehemence of wall-poster criticism and the antiparty strains of "dissident" rhetoric as an excuse to slow down the reassessment process. In late March Deng, on the defensive over other issues, defined the tolerable limits of political and ideological criticism. All commentary had to uphold four things: socialism, the CCP, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the sanctity of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. Having dissociated himself from the extremist critics of Mao, Deng continued his drive against the left and for a more balanced appreciation of Mao.

The Fourth Plenum furthered the process of altering China's guiding ideology. In his speech Ye Jianying denounced the Cultural Revolution as a "calamity," based upon an inaccurate perception (Mao's) of the danger of "revisionism" and an "erroneous" emphasis on class struggle. Ye Jianying also redefined Mao Zedong Thought as the collective wisdom of several of China's revolutionary leaders—"not the product of Mao Zedong's wisdom alone."

Even though the Fifth Plenum removed the four leading "whateverists" from the Politburo and rehabilitated Liu Shaoqi—Mao's chief ideological rival—there was still a great reluctance to criticize Mao directly. Hu Yaobang broke the ice in June 1980, telling Yugoslav reporters that Mao was directly responsible for the "disaster" of the Cultural Revolution. Deng went even further in an interview with an Italian reporter, accusing Mao of "ultraleftist" thinking and being out of touch with reality in the last years of his life. Even Hua Guofeng admitted to Yugoslav reporters that Mao was "a man, not a god" and bore responsibility for certain mistakes. All three insisted that Mao had made great contributions to the socialist cause and that his place in history would never be forgotten by the Party.

By late 1980 the Party had not adopted an official position on Mao, but it appeared likely that a final resolution of the problem would precede the Twelfth National Party Congress. It would probably recognize Mao's achievements prior to 1956 and the continued relevance of some of his ideas but would point out the errors in his thought which brought on the Cultural Revolution. Public opinion for such a reassessment was being prepared in the summer of 1980, when portraits, statues, and quotations of Mao began disappearing from public display.

To a certain degree the movement to de-emphasize Mao Zedong Thought cut China adrift without a guiding ideology. Deng's "seeking truth from facts," while a useful prescription for flexible policymaking, lacked a goal structure or a set of noninstrumental values. By late 1980 party writers had begun to deal with the confusion and disillusionment this entailed. Hua, among others, expressed concern that China had lost its ideological compass and called for increased political and ideological work to "promote proletarian ideology and destroy bourgeois ideology." That position was rejected, however, by those in Deng's camp who felt that modernization was more hampered by the vestiges of "feudal ideology," such as patriarchal leadership, the cult of personality, and so forth.

Beyond the aspects of political struggle in the ideological debate, China had begun an almost unprecedented experiment in dealing with ideas on their own merits by late 1980. As a result of the party's policy of "emancipating the mind," debates were joined on several subjects once considered "forbidden zones." China's scholars argued publicly—and without forced party adjudication—over issues such as the value of the commune system, the need for market concepts in a socialist economy, the historical impact of humanism, and even the current relevance of Lenin's writings. There was evidently some dissatisfaction with this climate of tolerance on the part of some older cadres, who felt it contributed to doubts about the Party and socialism. As of late 1980, however, the leadership's emphasis was still upon "emancipating the mind, starting up the [brain's] machinery, and proceeding toward the four modernizations."

Controlling Social Change

With the CCP in such a state of flux, it would have been impossible to prevent the spread of heterodox ideas to the society even if the Party had been inclined to do so. And it is clear that party reformers were committed to channeling the increased political awareness and discontent of heretofore silent members of society into a strengthened movement for change.

Mass political participation had always been a goal of the CCP leadership, the "mass line" being enshrined as one of the main principles of the Party since the 1940s. Mao used mass mobilization campaigns on several occasions, the most notable being the Great Leap

Bleached out sign above door reading "Uninterrupted Revolution" (Mao's dictum) attests to shift in political environment
Courtesy Rinn-Sup Shinn

Forward—to achieve economic goals—and the Cultural Revolution—when millions of youths roamed the countryside in response to Mao's political goals. Most of these mass campaigns ended in bitterness and confusion, with large sectors of society being repressed in the name of guidance and education from the masses. Moreover, the Party, while proclaiming its loyalty to the masses, gradually became a privileged elite in society. Over time, the political education process that accompanied mobilization politics, and the grievances that accumulated as party policies and cadres disregarded the needs of the populace combined to create mass opposition.

In 1976 pressures had built up to such a degree that only a slight spark was needed to touch off the trouble. The party's decision to remove wreaths and other materials commemorating Zhou Enlai proved to be the spark, and mobs in Beijing's Tiananmen Square and in other cities rioted for two days in April. Although the militia and public security units were able to bring the crowds under control and to punish some of the activists as "counterrevolutioneries," the event became a cause celebre. After the purge of the Gang of Four, pressure was generated inside and outside the Party to "reverse the verdict" on the Tiananmen incident and acclaim it as a genuine reflection of the revolutionary will of the masses. This was done by the Beijing party committee in late 1978. Activists were released from jails, and the Third Plenum granted official approval.

The euphoria created by that decision and the tacit approval of Deng Xiaoping—who may have wished to manipulate public opinion to influence important party decisions then under consideration—led to the development of a "democracy movement" in Beijing, and to a lesser degree in other cities. Young workers and students used wall posters to call for increased democratization of society and to criticize the Party. Small groups began to publish mimeographed political journals, which they sold openly. Politically sophisticated and daring in their criticisms and demands, the posters and journals attracted considerable attention from Western reporters and diplomats, who began comparing the movement with the underground in the Soviet Union.

Party policy toward this movement vacillated. At first, when its apparent goals coincided with party reform efforts, party leaders were tolerant, if not supportive. However, as the intensity of poster attacks on Mao and the socialist system escalated in early 1979, Deng and others began to see the movement as a liability. Furthermore, the movement began to be associated with foreign influence. Open admiration for the United States, appeals to President Jimmy Carter on human rights, daily contacts with Western reporters and diplomats, and other "dissident" activities aroused popular as well as party antipathy. The crackdown came after Deng's "four upholds" speech in late March. Subsequently, wall posters were ordered confined to "Democracy Wall" in Beijing, contact with foreigners was officially discouraged, and several activists were arrested.

After a quiet summer, "dissident" activity began again in early autumn, this time with a new element. Large numbers of impoverished peasants descended upon the capital to present their unresolved grievances to the government. These "petitioners," as they were called, were proof that policies on correcting the mistakes of the past had not been carried out and were an embarrassment to the Party. Ragged, dirty, and destitute, they even began to picket the leadership residence area of Zhongnanhai. The government set up reception areas for them, assigned over a thousand cadres to deal with their problems, and chastised local officials for not handling cases better, but not before "democratic" activists gained renewed publicity and support for their criticisms of the Party.

Party leaders subsequently decided to silence the noisy "democracy movement." Several methods short of outright suppression were chosen. Two well-known "dissident" leaders were placed on public trial, and one received a stiff jail sentence. Beijing municipality, with NPC blessing, closed "Democracy Wall" but allowed approved posters to be hung up in a remote park. The "underground" journals were shut down, and several more activists were arrested. The party press carried denunciations of the movement and its leaders, not only from party leaders but from selected "ordinary citizens" as well. In January 1980 Deng Xiaoping proposed that the right to put up wall posters, along with some other "rights" emerging from the Cultural Revolution, be deleted from the state constitution. Both the Fifth Plenum and the 1980 NPC session approved that proposal. The party's unofficial verdict on the entire episode was that some of the activists were "anarchists" poisoned by the ultraleftist ideology of the Gang of Four, while others were simply misguided youths whose ideals were shattered during the Cultural Revolution. In September 1980 leaders closed down the last public wall-poster area in Beijing.

While it had reacted harshly against a nonparty movement for more democracy, the party's own efforts to promote greater freedom, tolerance, and popular participation advanced considerably. These efforts culminated at the second session of the Fifth NPC, held in June–July 1979, at which questions of democratic rights for the populace were actively debated. Hua Guofeng was one of the most ardent speakers for the expansion of democracy, declaring in his work report that "without a high degree of political democracy, . . . there can be . . . no four modernizations." In the party's definition, of course, democracy had to be combined with "centralism," and "freedom" with "discipline" in order for these rights to be insured, but there is no gainsaying the party's genuine commitment to undertaking reforms.

That commitment was manifested in the work of the NPC's Legal Commission, which presented several legal statutes to both the 1979 and 1980 sessions of the NPC for discussion and approval. These new laws included criminal laws, revised tax and marriage statutes, laws on reorganizing people's governments, congresses and courts at local levels, and laws facilitating direct foreign investment in China's economy. A law was also adopted requiring direct election of people's congress representatives at the county (*xian*) level and stipulating for the first time that the number of candidates placed on ballots had to exceed the number of available offices. This system was highly touted as a guarantee of democratic rights for the masses, and it was suggested that the idea would eventually be expanded to encompass selection of delegates at the provincial level. More than 500 counties held trial elections under the new code in the first half of 1980, and although national officials admitted to "resistance" and other problems, it was decided to implement the system throughout China in the latter half of the year.

Implicit in all the attention to legal procedures and statutes was the recognition that, in the past, the Party had trampled upon the rights of its citizens, who needed some guarantee that these abuses would not be repeated. "All are equal before the law," a slogan publicized in 1979, was a pledge from the CCP that, not only would cadres be bound by the law, they would not be allowed to manipulate it capriciously (see The Return to Socialist Legality, ch. 13). Despite the weakness of China's legal system, the Party claimed it was sufficient to guarantee "socialist democracy."

Another aspect of legal work, however, soon came to dominate the party press. In late 1979 there was an increase in the number of serious crimes reported in China's urban areas. As a means of giving publicity to the operation of the new legal system, public trials were held in great numbers for petty thieves, embezzlers, rapists, and murderers. Harsh sentences were meted out in many cases (including a number of executions that probably violated new criminal procedure laws). Party conservatives seized on the need to curb social disorder and "counterrevolutionary" activity (often confused) and began to speak of the legal system as a "weapon" rather than a guarantor of citizens' rights. Although this situation appeared to be correcting itself by late 1980, in part because of lower reported crime rates, the underlying issue was not resolved. That issue was the reluctance of many party leaders to allow even the law, much less independent activity by nonparty members, to limit their political prerogatives. Party hard-liners on this question appeared to outnumber the reformers, although the latter pressed their case for a more equitable and independent legal system without hindrance.

Youth and the Party

No group felt the changes and confusion of the last two decades of the Maoist era more than China's youth (arbitrarily defined here as those under thirty-five), particularly urban youth. With no recollection of the pre-"liberation" past, this group had grown up entirely within the socialist era, imbued with the values taught by the CCP. Mobilized to revolt against their elders in the Cultural Revolution, they participated in the destruction not only of the heritage of their past and the oppression of their present, but also of their futures. Dismayed with their excesses, Mao ordered the PLA to pack radical students off to the countryside for "reeducation." The "down to the countryside youth" (DCYs) quickly lost their idealism and came to view themselves as China's "lost generation" in exile: abandoned by their beloved chairman, distrusted by their peasant hosts, unused to arduous agricultural work, and separated from their families and friends. Their numbers grew even after schools reopened in the early 1970s—as the regime continued to send students to the rural areas to relieve pressure for urban industrial jobs, to introduce peasants to scientific methods, and to "purify" youth. By 1978 fewer than 1 million of some 17 million youth sent to the countryside had actually made the commitment to settle there permanently. The rest sought any available means to return to the cities (see Social Problems, ch. 3; Secondary Education and The Fate of Educated Youth, ch. 4).

After the fall of the Gang of Four, there was considerable ferment among China's youth. Those who had received cadre posts during the Cultural Revolution found themselves under attack, and many were removed from office and jailed as "beaters, smashers and looters." Others formed part of the "opposition" to Deng that by late

1980 still posed a challenge to his leadership. Those who had been sent down to rural areas to labor in the fields saw the system moving off in a positive direction, but leaving them behind. Although age restrictions for college examinations were stretched to allow DCYs to compete, many failed because of poor middle-school preparation or because of long absences from their areas of interest.

Finally, in December 1978, the government announced that, while the political goals of the program had perhaps been misguided, pressure on urban job markets required that the DCY program be continued, although on a smaller scale. Cities were encouraged to experiment with small-scale collective enterprises, such as service industries, rather than send large numbers of unemployed youth to the rural communes. Those that were to be sent down would go not to ordinary agricultural brigades (see Glossary) but to state farms.

Government programs, however, were too little and too late. Caught by excitement of the "democracy movement," youths in Shanghai (home for spring festival vacations) staged a sit-down strike in February 1979, blocked transportation, and marched on party committee headquarters. DCYs from southern Yunnan Province went on strike and sent a delegation to Beijing with their grievances. Although these two incidents were settled with little difficulty, the unauthorized movement of DCYs from countryside to city continued, and provincial orders to return to work units went unheeded. Government leaders estimated that about 5 million had returned to the cities by the spring of 1979. There they contributed to the growing unemployment problem.

The Party had begun to be plagued by other aspects of the youth problem as well. An upsurge in urban crime was attributed in no small part to "misguided" youth. The prevalence of educated youth within the "democracy movement," many of the children of party cadres, was also disturbing to the leadership. By late 1979, after economic readjustment had somewhat embarrassed the government, party media took note of a "crisis of faith" among China's youth. Many no longer accepted the party's ideals, nor did they have any confidence in its ability to successfully achieve modernization.

This loss of idealism on the part of educated youth was deeply disturbing to the party leadership, but by late 1980 no satisfactory solution to the problem had been found. Party conservatives, including leaders of the PLA, seemed content with reiterating the old values—patriotism, devotion to the masses, love of socialism—despite the fact that the Party itself had debased those values by practicing then puncturing the fallacies of Maoism. They preferred tried and true methods for instilling idealism in China's youth, such as singing "revolutionary songs" and emulating model youth like Lei Feng. Other party leaders urged greater sensitivity to the needs and interests of young people, not forcing sterile ideals on them but giving them a genuine sense of participation in political life; not shouting slogans at them, but proving that the system deserved their trust by making modernization a reality. In late 1980 the Party still seemed caught between these two positions.

Modernization is by its very nature a social disruptive process, creating strains, inequities, and dislocation in any country. With only a dim perception of what kind of modernization they sought and an imprecise understanding of how to minimize the social costs of the process, the CCP in 1980 was indeed on a "Long March." While great progress had been made in wrestling the political system out of the Maoist straitjacket, China's leaders still faced an awesome task of planning and implementing changes for a nation of 1 billion, a nation still weighed down with traditions and still scarred by its immediate past. The success of that task was by no means assured.

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Relatively few book-length studies of post-Mao politics are yet available. Among the most noteworthy are Parris H. Chang's *Power and Policy in China*, Lucian W. Pye's *The Dynamics of Factions and Consensus in Chinese Politics*, and Ross Terrill's *The Future of China*. Political change has occurred so rapidly, however, that the best sources of analytical insight are periodicals dealing with Asia, such as the *China Quarterly* and *Asian Survey*, among others.

Some older works are valuable in setting the stage for understanding contemporary politics. A. Doak Barnett's books, especially *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China*; Richard H. Solomon's interesting but controversial *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture*; Kenneth Lieberthal's short paper, *Central Documents and Politburo Politics in China;* and biographies of Mao Zedong by Stuart R. Schram, Jerome Chen, and others are but a few examples of excellent work done on China under Mao. Dick Wilson's *Mao Tse-tung in the Scales of History* is a collection of essays written after Mao's death, assessing his career from different perspectives. Lowell Dittmer's thoughtful article "The legacy of Mao Zedong" in *Asian Survey* attempts to come to grips with Mao's continued impact on the current political scene. None of these works, it should be noted, are as critical of Mao as are recent articles and speeches coming out of China itself.

The fall of the Gang of Four is best described in Andres D. Onate's "Hua Kuo-feng and the Arrest of the 'Gang of Four' " and Jürgen Domes' "The 'Gang of Four' and Hua Kuo-feng," both in *China Quarterly*. Good political biographies of Hua Guofeng can be found in Michel Oksenberg's and Sai-chang Yeung's *China Quarterly* article, "Hua Kuo-feng's Pre-Cultural Revolution Hunan Years, 1949–66," and Ting Wang's "A Concise Biography of Hua Kuo-feng" in *Chinese Law and Government*. Unfortunately, no good biographic volume has been done in Deng Xiaoping. Chi Hsin (a Hong Kong-based writing group) has published *Teng Hsiao-ping: A Political Biography*, but it leaves much to be desired.

A growing literature exists on economic modernization and its impact on Chinese politics, including a book by Richard Baum, *China's Four Modernizations: The New Technological Revolution*, and excellent articles by Victor C. Falkenheim ("Administrative Reform and Modernization in Post-Mao China") in *Pacific Affairs*, Robert F. Dernberger ("Prospects for the Chinese Economy"), and Kenneth Lieberthal ("The Politics of Modernization") in *Problems of Communism*. A study by the National Foreign Assessment Center of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, *China: The Continuing Search for a Modernization Strategy*, provides lucid coverage of this complex tropic.

Frederick C. Teiwes' *Politics and Purges in China* is a good historical study of cadre politics in China, with an epilogue for the post-Mao period. Military politics is covered well in Harvey Nelsen's *The Chinese Military System* and in William W. Whitson's and Cheng-Hsia Huang's *The Chinese High Command*. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 12. Foreign Relations

Artist's representation of the one of the images from the Nine-Dragon Wall in Beihai Park, Beijing, built in 1756 during the Qing Dynasty.

IN LATE 1980 Chinese foreign relations were being carried out, as they had been since the early 1970s, in a pragmatic and flexible manner, sensitively tuned to the demands of both the external environment and domestic priorities. Diplomatic, economic, and trade relations were maintained in varying degrees of cordiality and reciprocity with more than 120 nations. These were based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence that stressed "mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence." These principles were first enunciated by China and India in the mid-1950s.

The People's Republic of China has regarded itself as a socialist country but not a member of "the socialist camp," which it asserted as early as 1974 was no longer in existence. In 1980 it continued to refrain from involvement in any military alliance or bloc of countries affiliated by common ties of ideology, religion, or cultural background. China did not see itself obligated to act on concert with other communist countries, least of all the Soviet Union, with which it had both historical and contemporary disputes over several issues.

China was conscious of its status as a major power but repeatedly disavowed any intention of behaving like one, and certainly not like what it called the superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union. Its perception of its external role was modest to the point of being self-effacing. Given the limitation of resources, this was readily understandable. China apparently has felt more at home in the role of what it called "a developing nation" and as a self-appointed member of the Third World.

A low profile on the international front does not mean passivity, however. China, like any other sovereign state, has been sensitive to the possibility of losing national prestige. Equally clear has been Chinese sensitivity to superpower intrusions, real and imagined, in Asia. Such intrusions, direct or through the use of one or more surrogates, were usually regarded as undermining China's regional influence. Through much of the 1960s, ideology played an important part in the Chinese perception of foreign enemies. In the 1970s, however, the ideologically conditioned view of the world as the arena of confrontation between capitalism and socialism steadily gave way to a new perception. In the Chinese view the principal antagonistic contradictions were between the two superpowers for control of the world, on the one hand, and between these superpowers and the rest of the world, on the other. In these circumstances friends and foes could no longer be defined according to the Marxist terms. What mattered to China now was whether other countries were prepared to coexist on reciprocal and mutually beneficial terms—and without one offending the honor of the other.

China continued in earnest to cultivate its image as a responsible international actor. It placed a high premium on the development of state-to-state relationships. Realism was a conspicuous aspect of this effort, and practical benefits that could be translated into the substance of modernization were given top priority. China had no compunction about maintaining or establishing relations with regimes that it would have excoriated in the 1960s as reactionary and revisionist. From available evidence, China in 1980 was no longer providing significant aid to insurgent movements in foreign lands. Radicalism and subterfuge were definitely shelved, at least for the time being, in favor of the conventional norms of international diplomacy.

As the 1980s opened, China had two major reasons to be realistic and accommodating in its external behavior. The first concerned the strategy of the "four modernizations" (see Glossary) being implemented by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Success in this undertaking was believed to be crucial if China was to become economically advanced and militarily secure within this century. This depended to a substantial degree on foreign goodwill and the Chinese ability to acquire capital, plants, production processes, and technical assistance from the advanced Western nations. Necessarily China needed a peaceful and stable international and regional environment. It could ill afford to become involved in any costly foreign conflicts—barring a situation where the Chinese leadership believed its sovereignty or honor was compromised or was about to be compromised.

The second reason concerned the Soviet Union, the rival communist neighbor with whom China shares a long stretch of disputed land borders. In Chinese diplomatic parlance, the Soviet Union and the United States are "hegemonists," sometimes also referred to as "great power chauvinists," but more often than not the term "hegemonist" has been applied only to the Soviet Union. These superpowers have been roundly condemned as the initiators of aggression, war, plundering, and exploitation. In China's view they are contending for control of the world. Since the late 1960s, however, the Soviet Union has come to be seen as more adventurist and dangerous than the United States. This perspective has gained currency as a result of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969, and a series of other Soviet ventures in the 1970s—the most recent of which being the military occupation of Afghanistan. The alarmist Chinese perception stemmed from the view that since 1975 the United States has been declining militarily. The United States, unlike the Soviets, was therefore perceived in Beijing as being more concerned with the preservation of the status quo than with aggressive and expansionist ventures.

It can be said safely that China's foreign relations continued in 1980 to be a function of its relationship with the Soviet Union. The Chinese distrusted Soviet intentions and perceived a Soviet policy of encirclement. This prompted them to seek to check Soviet influences by diplomatic and other nonmilitary means.

In their efforts, the Chinese have relied mainly on the strategy of a worldwide united front against hegemonism. Such a front included, in China's conception, not only the Third World and socialist countries but also the industrialized nations—including the United States and Japan. These countries are said to share the common interest of deterring a third world war, which China asserted would be started only by the expansionist Soviet Union.

The worldwide united front in question was, however, more rhetorical than real. By 1980 no potential leader acceptable to all parties had emerged, nor had any common program of action been developed that was universally appealing and self-justifying. Different nations had different priorities in their external relations. Even China, the principal proponent of the front, expressed its readiness to *join* the struggle against hegemonism but not lead it. Apparently China wanted other nations, the United States in particular, to provide the leadership for the united front coalition against the Soviet Union.

In any case China emerged as the foremost advocate of vigilance against the Soviet Union. In China's view, a third world war could be delayed but was inevitable because of Soviet intentions to gain control of Europe, by first moving against targets of opportunity in the Middle East and North Africa. Accordingly the Chinese asserted that appeasement in dealing with the Soviet Union would have disastrous consequences. The only effective way to cope with the growing danger of war in the 1980s was for all nations to unite, bolster their defense capabilities, and maintain vigilance against the Soviet threat.

Evolution of Foreign Policy

Despite the appearance of unpredictability and despite internal changes, Chinese foreign policy has shown striking continuity. Its objectives have been relatively constant but have had different emphases depending on shifting domestic and external situations. These have been to preserve territorial integrity, enhance its international stature, establish China as the preeminent Asian power, obtain access to foreign science and technology, and gain the friendship of and influence with, as many nations as practicable. The last of these objectives was designed to enhance China's credibility as an advocate of world peace and stability; since the early 1970s its real purpose has been to create a foreign policy environment in which China could alert the world to the danger of a war that it believes will be started by the Soviet Union sometime in the 1980s.

Since 1949 China has gone through several foreign policy phases; each has evidenced certain salient themes. From 1949 to 1953 its foreign policy was subordinated to the central concern of defending the country's borders (the concern that prompted participation in

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the Korean War), strengthening its ties with other socialist countries, and learning from the experiences of the Soviet Union. The world view of the Chinese leadership was understandably that of bipolarity—division of the world into the socialist and imperialist camps. There was no question as to where China stood in the East-West conflict, popularly known as the Cold War; as Mao Zedong put it in 1949, China was "to lean to one side"—toward the fraternal camp headed by the Soviet Union.

Between 1954 and 1956 peaceful coexistence was the dominant concern. Before 1954 China's identification had been for the most part with the socialist bloc. The People's Republic emerged from the Korean War with considerable international respect—but its Asian neighbors were fearful and suspicious of it. In April 1955 China participated in an Afro-Asian conference held at Bandung, Indonesia and agreed with other Asian states that relations among nations should be guided by the principle of peaceful coexistence. The concept of an Afro-Asian bloc began to emerge as a factor in Chinese foreign policy but the principal geographical focus was still on countries in east, southeast, and south Asia. Peaceful coexistence was meant to be selective. It was not to be applied in relations with the United States, which as leader of the imperialist camp in the Cold War, was seen as China's principal enemy, or with other countries allied with the United States.

The period from 1957 to 1965 was marked by a mixture of optimism, assertiveness, frustration, and caution. In the latter half of 1957 China was highly optimistic about the international situation. Two events lent strength to such a mood: the Soviet Union's successful testing of an intercontinental ballistic missile in August 1957 and its successful orbiting of an earth satellite (sputnik) two months later. Because the Soviet Union was the first to accomplish these feats of great strategic potential, Mao believed that these developments would decisively tip the balance of power in favor of the socialist camp. Given such a presumption, Mao tried—unsuccessfully—to persuade the Soviet Union to forsake its policy of peaceful coexistence with the United States and to take a more militant offensive against the latter, especially in the context of the Taiwan crisis of 1958.

Their contrasting positions on the issue of peaceful coexistence were soon to loom large in the acrimonious though muted exchanges between Beijing and Moscow. In both foreign and domestic policies China became increasingly assertive vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Other differences over doctrinal and policy-related issues gradually hardened into what came to be known as the Sino-Soviet dispute (see The Soviet Union, this ch.).

The 1957–65 phase was notable also for China's emergence as the major Asian power, especially after 1962 when China humiliated India in border fighting and, in doing so, undermined India's claim to be the principal voice of the Afro-Asian world. Nevertheless, China's presumption about the "anti-imperialist" nature of the Afro-Asian world proved to be too simplistic. In 1963 China called on anti-imperialist nations to join a struggle against the United States and to isolate the "revisionist" Soviet Union. Response was hardly encouraging. In 1965 China suffered disappointment when many Afro-Asian nations refused to back its attempt to exclude the Soviet Union from an Afro-Asian people's solidarity conference scheduled for June of that year. Perhaps an even more disheartening setback came in September 1965 when Indonesian President Sukarno—Mao's most reliable anti-American foreign policy partner—was toppled from power shortly after the Indonesian communists failed in their bid to seize power and were brutally suppressed by the Indonesian army. This period also witnessed China's increased involvement in revolutionary ferment in foreign countries. Despite its menancing posture, however, China was cautious because the United States military involvement in Vietnam that began in the early 1960s was perceived in Beijing to be aimed primarily against China. This was in part the reason for Lin Biao's speech in early September 1965 in which he stated, among other points, that the Vietnamese struggle for national salvation should be conducted principally by the Vietnamese themselves (see Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, ch. 14).

The period of the Cultural Revolution (see Glossary) was an aberration. Although the main concern of the Chinese leadership was domestic, excesses of the Red Guards (see Glossary) had disruptive effects on China's relations with more than thirty countries. During this period (1966–68) the country was virtually isolated from the outside world. The disruption peaked in 1967 when the Chinese attempted to export "the great red banner of the invincible thought of Mao Zedong." Moreover, China lashed out at any country, communist and noncommunist alike, alleged to have committed real or imaginary slights against the Cultural Revolution.

Isolation ended gradually after 1969 as order was restored and the machinery of government stabilized under the moderate and pragmatic influence of Premier Zhou Enlai (see China in Transition, ch. 1). Mao's efforts to rekindle revolutionary fervor under the slogan of "politics in command" proved too chaotic in most areas of governmental activity. Moreover, the Sino-Soviet border fighting in March 1969 brought home a sense of urgency about the external situation.

In April 1969 the CCP held its Ninth National Party Congress and adopted a report, delivered by then Party Vice Chairman and Minister of Defense, Lin Biao, which contained two significant foreign policy points. One was the mention for the first time in years of the Chinese readiness to conduct foreign relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence. The other was, apparently for the first time, explicit reference to the Soviet Union (along with the United States) as "common enemies" of all countries and people subjected to "aggression, control, intervention or bullying by the United States and Soviet revisionism." With this assertion, Lin Biao initiated what may be called a strategy of simultaneous confrontation against both superpowers. The report stated that these common enemies must be "overthrown" by "the broadest possible united front." A notable aspect of this united front was that China no longer insisted on "revolutionary" posture or "oppressed" status as the minimal condition for participation in the front. The door was thus opened to almost all nations that had a common stake in resisting great power expansionism.

Rhetorically Chinese pronouncements on foreign policy became less vitriolic and were accompanied by major efforts to restore or establish normal diplomatic relations. The spirit of the post-Cultural Revolution foreign policy was aptly expressed in *Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)* in January 1970: "It has always been our persistent policy that our relations with other countries are to be developed on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence." The principles were applied, however, selectively, depending on circumstances in various countries.

The first credible clue to a new policy direction came in August 1970 when China resumed ambassadorial-level relations with Yugoslavia after twelve years of hostility over ideological issues. In the years after 1958, China had denounced that country for its support of peaceful coexistence, nonalignment, reconciliation and cooperation with the West in general and the United States in particular, and for its domestic policies of "revisionism." Policy implications of the 1970 shift were far-reaching. China appeared to signify its readiness to be realistic about the need for political truce with the United States. In addition China needed a positive identification with, and the goodwill of Yugoslavia in its efforts to gain the confidence of the Third World countries, this because President Tito was a dominant figure in the nonaligned Third World.

In August and September 1970 China decided to feel out the United States, and in December Mao indicated in an interview with Edgar Snow, an American journalist, that President Richard M. Nixon would be welcome in Beijing. In October 1970 diplomatic relations were established with Canada. In the spring of 1971 China initiated a step toward reconciliation with the United States by inviting an American table tennis team to visit. In July 1971 Henry Kissinger, then special assistant to the president on national security affairs, paid a secret visit to Beijing to confer with Premier Zhou Enlai concerning Nixon's visit to China in early 1972.

China's practical approach bore fruit in October 1971 when the People's Republic was finally seated in the United Nations (UN) and Nationalist China was expelled from the world organization. Three other developments during 1972 further bolstered the Chinese position internationally: President Nixon's historic visit to China in February, the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations in

September, and the agreement to establish diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) in the following month. There was no doubt that China needed the friendship of the United States, West Germany, and Japan as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism.

Chinese pragmatism was not without cost, however, especially in relations with the then Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam). From the Vietnamese perspective, as John Gittings noted in *Manchester Guardian Weekly* (February 25, 1979), "China's open courtship of the U.S. has gone from bad to worse since President Nixon first visited Peking [Beijing] in 1972 while American bombs were still falling in Vietnam and it has helped pushed them [the Vietnamese] towards Moscow." By 1973 it had become clear that the policy of practical cooperation with the United States was irreversible, despite the insistence of the radical wing of the CCP leadership that the struggle against both superpowers should be continued relentlessly. Zhou Enlai and his moderate associates were firm in their belief about the futility of such a strategy—and about the desirability of compromises with the United States and its allies so that China could concentrate on Soviet expansionism. By 1973 it had also become evident that Chinese support of the communist movements in Southeast Asia and Somalia was cut back in the interest of a higher national interest: China's quest for credibility as a responsible and moderate international actor.

From the ideological point of view, Chinese antipathy toward United States "imperialism" and the Soviet "social imperialism" continued unchanged. This was evident in Mao's so-called "three worlds" line, which was made public in February 1974. Mao's theory held that the international arena divided itself into the "three worlds." The Soviet Union and the United States formed the "first world"; the developed European nations, Japan, and Canada comprised the "second world"; and China and other developing nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin American constituted the "third world." Mao's contention was that, because the second and third world nations were all victims of superpower interference, they were natural partners in the united front against the first world. The three-worlds theory was formally proclaimed by Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping in his April 1974 address to the UN General Assembly. Deng drew special attention to the fact that the emergence of "social imperialism" had become the "most dangerous source of war" at that time and that the socialist camp could be considered, for all practical purposes, as having been dissolved. He also called for a broad coalition of the second and third world nations.

Chinese foreign policy in 1980 was a product of three decades of trial and error. The thrust of realpolitik in that policy remained undisturbed despite the deaths of both Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong in 1976. China under Deng was determined to reach out to all corners of the world in its search for practical and material benefits. Foreign policy had taken on critical importance as a vehicle for ensuring the success of the "four modernizations" policy.

The United Nations

In the evolution of Chinese foreign relations the United Nations has had negative as well as positive influences. For more than two decades the People's Republic was thwarted in its attempt to join the family of nations because of its intervention in the Korean War and the resultant hostility of the United States and its supporters. The situation was complicated further by the Nationalist Chinese presence on the island of Taiwan, to which Chiang Kai-shek and a few hundred thousand of his troops had fled in December 1949.

China's effort to participate in the UN began in November 1949 when it sent a note to the UN General Assembly to reject the authority of Taiwan to speak for the Chinese people. In this effort it received firm support from the Soviet Union but to no avail. The first direct political encounter with the UN came in November 1950 on the heels of Chinese military intervention in the Korean conflict. In presenting its case for the military intervention in Korea, China not only blamed the Korean War on the United States but also demanded that the UN Security Council condemn United States "aggression" in Korea and apply appropriate sanctions against the United States. Not persuaded, the UN General Assembly in February 1951 declared that China "has itself engaged in aggression in Korea" by means of "giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against the United Nations Forces there." Three months later the General Assembly called upon all UN members to impose an embargo on the export of such strategic materials to China as "arms, ammunition and implements of war, atomic energy, materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war."

Beijing's interest in joining the world body declined in the 1960s. In 1963 its foreign minister said that China had no intention of seeking a UN seat because the UN, allegedly "manipulated" by the United States, was useless from China's standpoint. In January 1965 Zhou Enlai publicly expressed the need for a new rival united nations that could satisfy the aspirations of the Afro-Asian countries. Late in the year China hardened its position by announcing several conditions to be met before it could join the world body. These were: the expulsion of Nationalist China; the cancellation of the 1951 UN resolution against the People's Republic and the adoption of a resolution condemning the United States as an aggressor; review and revision of the UN Charter; the admission of "all independent states" in the UN; and ouster of all "imperialist puppets."

Nonetheless by the mid-1960s sentiment favoring China's participatory role in the world body had gained some momentum, especially among the newly independent former colonial territories. This trend was halted understandably during the Cultural Revolution but regained momentum after the Ninth National Party Conress of the CCP in April 1969.

Under Zhou Enlai's moderate influence, China's UN policy became conciliatory and flexible. It won many new friends in the community of nations. In the fall of 1970 for the first time a majority in the UN General Assembly supported a motion to seat China in the UN, but the support fell short of the two-thirds majority required for formal adoption. In October 1971, however, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution sponsored by Albania and others to admit the People's Republic and to expel Taiwan. China thus was able to "restore" all its "lawful rights" in the world organization. This development formally confirmed China's prestigious major power status as one of the elite five permanent members of the UN Security Council (United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China). Equally significant was the fact that it marked an important milestone toward the UN's effort to evolve as a universal organization.

Chinese behavior has been modest in the UN. As far as is known, Beijing's representatives have not sought to exploit the UN as a forum for revolutionary propaganda or subversive purposes. They have been generally friendly toward the delegates from most nations, especially those of the Third World. In fact from the beginning of their UN participation the Chinese have skillfully articulated the view that their place in the UN would be on the side of the oppressed, the poor, and the weak. Also evident was their disposition not to align with any military, ideological, or geographic bloc.

One notable aspect of Chinese participation has been the effect it had on Sino-Soviet competition for advantage in the international organizations. More often than not Beijing and Moscow found themselves on opposing sides during the multilateral voting process of the UN on a number of issues. A good example of the tenor of these disagreements can be found in the Security Council debate on the Indo-Pakistan War of December, 1971. Referring to Soviet support of India during this conflict, the Chinese envoy accused the Soviet Union of seeking to gain control over the subcontinent, encircle China, and promote its hegemonistic ambitions at the expense of the other superpower. In rebuttal the Soviet representative charged that China, of "the socialist betrayal camp," was scheming to gain control of the Third World. The two communist powers also clashed verbally on such issues as arms control and disarmament, nuclear-free zones and nuclear testing and proliferation, strategic arms limitation talks, Indochina, the Middle East, Soviet-American détente, the law of the sea and sea-bed control, and aid and economic development involving the less developed countries. In light of this situation, political scientist William R. Feeney observed in 1977: "In fact, antagonism between Moscow and Peking [Beijing] has become so pronounced and predictable that it has largely supplanted the earlier East-West Cold War contention in the world organization."

Relations with the Superpowers

The Soviet Union

In 1949 China and the Soviet Union became the closest of allies, inspiring fears on the part of Western nations that the two communist powers in control of the Eurasian heartland might seek to rule the entire world. In February 1950 they concluded a thirty-year treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance (effective April 11, 1950). The treaty provided a framework for cooperation, consultation, and mutual respect but was actually aimed mainly at mutual defense against Japan and its principal supporter, the United States. China and the Soviet Union cooperated closely in foreign relations, even if not as equal partners. The Soviet Union provided technical assistance, plans, and capital equipment for China's industrialization. The Soviet assistance was not free; China had to repay in the form of raw materials and foodstuffs.

In the mid-1950s relations began to cool gradually. The CCP leadership was also disturbed by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's declaration in 1956 that war between socialism and capitalism was no longer inevitable and that the two adversary systems could coexist, if only temporarily. Communist victories could be achieved also by political warfare and parliamentary means. Communism could spread to the Afro-Asian countries by drawing them away from the Western imperialist bloc. Neutrality or nonalignment was to be encouraged for these countries as a means of containing and opposing imperialist influences.

Foreign policy implications of Khrushchev's pronouncements were not lost on the Chinese, who favored a militant, anti-imperialist struggle and who were skeptical about the value of neutralist or nonaligned countries. The Chinese continued to call for bloc unity and argued that the military and economic strength of the Soviet Union should be used to put the imperialist camp on the defensive. They expected fraternal support from Moscow in 1958 when they renewed heavy bombardment of the Nationalist-held offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu and deployed armed forces on the coast opposite Taiwan. The Soviet Union failed to support the Chinese efforts to blockade the islands. Furthermore its decision to remain on the sidelines during the Sino-Indian border clashes in 1959 (and again, more importantly, in 1962) was resented by the Chinese. Sino-Soviet differences also widened because of Mao's decision to accelerate the pace of socialist transformation through his Great Leap Forward (see Glossary), a measure that diverged from the Soviet model and hence was viewed in Moscow as a challenge to the applicability of Soviet experiences to other socialist countries and other noncommunist, emerging countries.

In the late 1950s the Chinese kept their criticism to a minimum because of their dependence on Moscow for economic and military assistance. But the situation changed rapidly after 1960 when the Sino-Soviet dispute surfaced and recriminations intensified. China publicly accused the Soviet Union of being "revisionist," and the Soviet Union called China "dogmatic" and "reckless," especially in the latter's view on war—nuclear and conventional. In these exchanges neither named the other directly, China calling Yugoslavia "revisionist" and Moscow referring to China's then ally, Albania, as "dogmatic." In 1960 the Soviet leadership unilaterally canceled economic, technical, and military aid to China, thereby causing setbacks to the latter's economic development. The dispute quickly evolved into an actual split in the communist movement. Not only did the various communist parties within the bloc take sides, but in many cases individual parties in other countries split into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions.

The intensity of Sino-Soviet discord was evident in relations Moscow and Beijing had with other countries. This was especially the case in their relations with India and Pakistan. Chinese support of Pakistan in the latter's confrontation with India was no secret. Shortly after the Sino-Indian border clashes in late 1962 the Soviet Union supplied India with MiG-21 jet fighters.

China and the Soviet Union share some 6,452 kilometers of frontier, and this has been the source of intermittent friction since the seventeenth century. The border issue entered the Sino-Soviet dispute in 1963 and has since become perhaps the most intractable—and explosive—issue between Beijing and Moscow. In 1963 the Soviet government indignantly drew attention to a map published by China in 1954, which showed considerable portions of Soviet Siberian territory as part of China. After that year both sides encouraged their people to settle near disputed boundaries, and each side also massed troops along the disputed borders. In the mid-1960s the two sides exchanged allegations of border provocation (see fig. 3, ch. 2).

After the mid-1960s both government-to-government and party-to-party relations went from bad to worse. In 1965, for example, the Chinese and Soviet leaderships failed to agree on measures to pool their resources and jointly aid North Vietnam against the United States intervention in Vietnam. In 1966 the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) used Mao's name for the first time in condemning his "dogmatic" policies. At the height of the Cultural Revolution in 1967 the two countries withdrew their respective ambassadors.

Nevertheless it was not until 1968 that, from the Chinese standpoint, the Soviet Union came to be seen as a military threat. This was prompted by the Soviet suppression by force of arms of the reformist government of Alexander Dubcek in Czechoslovakia. The Chinese government decried the Soviet action as a crime of aggression. For its part, the Soviets defended their action under the so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine," also known as "the theory of limited sovereignty of socialist states." This doctrine, proclaimed by General Secretary of the Communist party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, held that in case of a grave threat to a socialist country and "the Socialist Commonwealth" as a whole, other socialist states had the common obligation to intervene against the forces of disruption.

The Sino-Soviet border conflict of March 1969 proved to be a major turning point in Chinese foreign relations. For one thing, to the Chinese, the border incident was ample vindication of their distrust of hostile Soviet intentions (each side blamed the other for provoking the fighting). For another, the border issue has become more complex as a main obstacle to the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations and in fact has overshadowed other points of contention.

In September 1969 premier Zhou Enlai and his Soviet counterpart Aleksey Kosygin met at the Beijing airport to discuss means of resolving the border question. But if they reached an understanding on basic principles (as evidenced in the Chinese disclosure in 1974) it has not been confirmed by the Soviets. The Soviet government had denied there was any agreement in September. In any case, despite the divergent interpretations each side has since given, apparently the Zhou-Kosygin talks were focused on the need for settlement of the border question through peaceful negotiations, nonuse of force, maintenance of the status quo on the border, the withdrawal of border troops by both sides from disputed areas, and cessation of hostile propaganda.

As talks on the border issue continued intermittently thereafter, it became clear that there was a fundamental Sino-Soviet disagreement, the resolution of which would require a compromise by both sides. Basically the Soviet Union contended that the territorial question was unilaterally placed in dispute by the Chinese and that any Soviet withdrawal of frontier forces from the so-called "disputed" areas would have the effect of conceding legitimacy to the Chinese claims, actual or potential. Military buildups on the Soviet side have been stepped up in recent years, accompanied by the ever-present danger of hostile exchanges. In May 1978, for example, Soviet troops crossed the border south of Khabarovsk on the Ussuri River, not too far from the site of clash in 1969. In apologizing for the incident, the Soviet government described the trespassing as "inadvertent" but denied the Chinese charges that a number of its citizens had been wounded by Soviet fire.

Symptomatic of the strained relations was China's decision in April 1979 to abrogate the treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance of 1950. Its explanation was that, in view of "great changes" in the international situation—especially the normalizing of relations with Japan—and as a result of violations for which the Chinese side was not responsible, the treaty had for a long time existed in name only. For these reasons the treaty would not be extended beyond its expiration date of April 1980 (see Relations with Other Countries, this ch.). At the time the Soviet side was notified of this decision, the Chinese government stated that "the difference of principle between China and the Soviet Union should not hamper the maintenance and development of their normal state relations on the basis of the five principles" of peaceful coexistence. Then it formally proposed that "negotiations be held . . . for the solution of outstanding issues and the improvement of relations between the two countries." The Soviet government charged menacingly that the Chinese decision was a "hostile act."

On October 17, 1979, the Chinese-proposed talks on redefining the terms of future Sino-Soviet relations opened in Moscow. The talks focused on three main areas: the settlement of pending problems, the removal of obstacles to the normalization of relations, and the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations generally. At the close of the first round of talks that ended on November 30, 1979, the Chinese government stated that "the two sides expounded their respective stands on the relations between the two countries," providing no further details.

The Chinese leadership had no illusions about the hegemonistic ambitions of the Soviet Union toward China and other strategically placed countries of the world. In a "commentator" article, *Hongqi (Red Flag)*, the CCP's semimonthly theoretical journal, declared in December 1979 that if the Soviet Union really wanted to refrain from hegemonism, then it could "at least do the following": immediately withdraw all of the Soviet occupation troops from certain East European countries and Mongolia; immediately withdraw from certain African countries the Cuban mercenaries kept by the Soviet Union and let African countries settle their domestic disputes or disputes among themselves; immediately withdraw from certain Asian countries the military "advisers," "experts," and other personnel under civilian cover engaged in subversion and seeking to control their host countries; stop supporting all the aggressive activities carried out by the Vietnamese regional hegemonists against other countries, take concrete actions to prevent the Vietnamese authorities from implementing their plans to annex foreign territories and establish a so-called "Indochinese federation," urge the Vietnamese authorities to immediately withdraw their army of aggression from Kampuchea (formerly Cambodia) and their occupation army from Laos and restore the sovereignty and independence of these two countries and bring peace back to the Indochinese region; halt all Soviet military intimidation, intervention, subversion, and other activities aimed at controlling foreign countries in any part of the world; and stop arms expansion and war preparations and comprehensively disarm all offensive military forces in excess of the number needed for defensive purposes.

The *Red Flag* article was followed within days by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Chinese response was predictable. It declared in effect that the failure of the international community to punish the Soviet Union's "previous acts of aggression and expansion in Czechoslovakia, Angola, Zaire, the Horn of Africa, and the Red Sea area" emboldened the Soviet leadership to confront the world with "a fait accompli" in Afghanistan. On Janaury 29, 1980, China announced the suspension of second-round Sino-Soviet talks on the grounds that the Soviet action in Afghanistan menaced world peace as well as the security of China.

The United States

Relations with the United States have undergone a dramatic change since the early 1970s. In late 1980 China and the United States maintained friendly and cooperative relations in the economic, technological, commercial, cultural, and other areas. Only a decade ago this would have seemed too farfetched to imagine.

In its early years the People's Republic viewed its external environment in terms of the Leninist framework of antagonism between socialism and imperialism. The United States was regarded by the Chinese as the most villainous country on earth and the archenemy of China and other progressive countries. The Chinese perception was reinforced by a series of developments. China fought the United States in Korea. Its plans to take over Taiwan by one means or another were thwarted by United States naval intervention on behalf of Nationalist China. Its bitter feelings were exacerbated further by the United States support of Nationalist China against efforts by the People's Republic to gain entry into the United Nations; by the United States policy of forming a military alliance (the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization—SEATO) in the mid-1950s—seen as directed against China; and by the United States military involvement in Vietnam in part to contain perceived Chinese expansionism.

The axiom that in foreign policy there can be no permanent enemy or friend has been borne out since the late 1960s by China's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. Against the backdrop of already strained Sino-Soviet relations, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969 convinced the Chinese of the need for a change in its relations with the superpowers (see The Soviet Union, this ch.). China's low-keyed effort to sound out the United States in 1970 was followed by a succession of dramatic events in 1971–72: the Chinese invitation to an American table tennis team, Kissinger's secret mission to China, and the unilateral action by the United States to remove the twenty-year-old embargo on trade with China (actually the process of relaxation had begun in stages since July 1969), and President Nixon's visit to China in February 1972. These developments helped to reinforce the Chinese perception of the United States as a potential benefactor in their effort to counter Soviet threat and modernize the economy.

Sino-American relations after 1972 were guided by the principles set forth in a joint communiqué issued at Shanghai at the end of the Nixon visit on February 28, 1972 (see Appendix B). In the Shanghai Communiqué the two sides recognized "essential differences" in their social systems and foreign policies but agreed nevertheless to conduct their relations on the basis of five principles of coexistence. Specifically they agreed that: normalization of Sino-American relations is in the interests of all countries; both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict; neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings directed at other states. Beyond these principles both sides pledged to develop contacts and exchanges in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports, and journalism; to facilitate the progressive development of bilateral trade; and to stay in contact through various channels for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations.

The two sides also reviewed long-standing disputes, focused especially on the thorny issue of Taiwan. China reaffirmed its position that Taiwan is a province of China, that the "liberation" of the island is China's internal affair, and that all United States forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. At the same time it opposed any activities that aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two Governments," "two Chinas," and an "independent Taiwan" or that advocate "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined." For its part the United States acknowledged that all Chinese on either side of the Formosa Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. It did not challenge that position. In doing so it reaffirmed its interest in a peaceful settlement of the "Taiwan question" and affirmed the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all American forces and military installations from Taiwan. The United States also pledged that it would progressively reduce its military presence in Taiwan as the tension in the area diminished.

In May 1973 liaison offices were established in Beijing and Washington to perform many of the functions of regular embassies. Sino-American contacts increased by leaps and bounds. Trade increased from US$95 million in 1972 to a level of US$934 million in 1974. By 1975 several hundred Chinese and some 10,000 Americans had exchanged visits as part of people-to-people contacts and exchanges.

By the mid-1970s progress was less evident, however, on the touchy question of Taiwan. The Republican administration of President Gerald Ford was cautious on this issue for at least two reasons. First, in anticipation of presidential election year politics in 1976, the Ford administration proceeded slowly for fear of a political backlash from the conservative wing of the Republican Party headed by Ronald Reagan. Second, the circumstances under which the United States managed to extricate itself from its disastrous Vietnam venture left the future United States role in Asia uncertain.

The pace of normalization quickened appreciably after Jimmy Carter assumed the presidency in 1977. A more "serious effort" to discuss issues of mutual concern got underway in July 1978. China insisted on the severance of United States diplomatic relations with Nationalist China; the abrogation of the mutual defense agreement with Taiwan; and the withdrawal of all American military personnel from the island. The negotiations culminated in the announcement of a joint communiqué on December 15, 1978, on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two nations as from January 1, 1979 (see Appendix B).

The communiqué stated, inter alia that: "The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China"; the two sides reaffirm the principles agreed on by them in the Shanghai Communiqué; and the two governments would exchange ambassadors and establish embassies on March 1, 1979. In addition, the United States issued a separate statement noting that on January 1, 1979, it would notify "Taiwan that it is terminating diplomatic relations and that the mutual defense treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China is being terminated in accordance with the provisions of the treaty." It also stated that it would be withdrawing its remaining military personnel from Taiwan within four months" and that "in the future, the American people and the people of Taiwan would maintain commercial, cultural, and other relations without official government representation and without diplomatic relations." It was also noted that the United States "continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue."

In its own separate statement, China declared that "the prolonged abnormal relationship" between the two countries had finally ended now that the question of Taiwan had been resolved "in the spirit of the Shanghai Communiqué and through their joint efforts." It also added: "As for the way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland and reunifying the country, it is entirely China's internal affair."

Soviet reaction was skeptical and apprehensive. In response to the Carter administration's assurance that the United States had no intention to use its new relationship with China to the disadvantage of the Soviets or anyone else, the Soviet government stated that "time will show if these words accord with practical deeds." Also expressed was the Soviet concern that "the Chinese great-power chauvinists," the United States imperialists, and "the Japanese revanchists" were scheming to form an anti-Soviet military bloc.

In late January 1979 Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping was welcomed in Washington by President Carter. The two leaders signed several

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agreements covering cooperation in science and technology, cultural exchange, commercial activities, and consular affairs. Deng also used his American visit to level charges against the Soviet Union, a source of apparent embarrassment to the Carter administration. In an interview with *Time*, published on January 29, 1979, to coincide with his visit, Deng asserted that what was needed in countering the Soviet Union, or "a hotbed of war," as he put it, were "more realistic steps, tactical steps—for instance, unity between the United States, China, Japan, Western Europe, and other countries of the Third World, unity among these to deal with Soviet hegemonism." On the issue of Taiwan, he stated that China would no longer use the term "liberation of Taiwan" and that China would respect "the present realities of Taiwan" so long as Taiwan is returned to the motherland and there is only one China.

The Soviets were evidently upset by the fact that the United States allegedly provided "a broad forum . . . for the Chinese visitor in the United States capital and other cities for slander" against the Soviet Union. At a press conference in February 1979 President Carter dissociated himself from Deng's statements, observing at the same time, however, that Deng's statements on Vietnam were no more noteworthy than the statements that Deng had made in Beijing and in other countries.

Bilateral relations expanded steadily in 1979 and 1980. In July 1979 a trade agreement granting China most-favored-nation treatment for its exports on a reciprocal basis was signed in Beijing. Submitted to the United States Congress on October 23, 1979, the agreement went into force on February 1, 1980. Two-way trade increased from the equivalent of US$2.3 billion in 1979 to nearly US$4 billion in 1980. A series of trade and commercial agreements signed in Washington in mid-September 1980 were expected to increase bilateral trade perhaps to the level of US$10 billion by 1985. In addition as many as 100 Chinese delegations were arriving in the United States each month in 1980, and more than 60,000 Americans visited China in the same year.

China and the United States have also developed a pattern of frequent consultations at the highest political and diplomatic levels on international security affairs. The importance of mutual consultation was underlined especially after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. In January 1980 United States Secretary of Defense Harold Brown visited China and informed the Chinese government that the United States was prepared to sell it some items of high technology and military support equipment (but not weapons). In September 1980 a United States team of technical and scientific experts flew to China to investigate the state of Chinese military technology. It was disclosed at that time that China would be willing to sell the United States three metals needed for aircraft production—the lightweight, heat-resistant titanium, vanadium, and tantalum.

In late 1980 Sino-American relations were conducted, as far as the United States was concerned, in accordance with a set of principles reaffirmed by the United States in June 1980. These principles were that the United States would develop its relations with China "on their own merits" rather than "as a function of [its] relations with the Soviet Union" and that America's "new friendship with China need not and will not be pursued at the expense of [its] relationships with others." It was also reaffirmed that the United States would continue to recognize its national interest in a friendly and successfully modernizing China, and that its "policies on technology transfer are evolving to reflect this interest."

On the security issue affecting the two nations, the United States made it clear that its interest was in "a strong, peaceful, and secure China" and that a China confident in its ability "to defend its borders against foreign aggression enhances stability in the Pacific and on the Eurasian landmass" and therefore would contribute to the United States security and that of its allies. Furthermore, the United States stated that it could and would assist China's drive to improve its security by permitting the transfer of appropriate technology, including the sale of carefully selected items of dual-use technology and military support equipment. Such transactions were to be considered "on their merits as they arose, taking into account the security interests of the United States and those of others in the region."

Relations with Other Countries

In his report on the state of the Chinese domestic and external situation in June 1979, the then Premier Hua Guofeng stated:

> We are pleased that the unity between China and other socialist countries has become closer and our cooperation with them in various spheres has developed further. Our friendship with many third world countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and other regions has been strengthened. Our good-neighborly ties with many south and southeast Asian countries have become stronger. Our relations with countries of Western Europe, North America, and Oceania have also made marked progress.

In late 1980 Chinese relations with the countries of what China sometimes called the "second" and "third worlds" continued to improve. More often than not old disputes were markedly downplayed, but there were also new frictions as well. As the Chinese leadership saw it, much of international turbulence and tension was precipitated by the aggressive and expansionist Soviet actions in many parts of the world, most recently in the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and its support of Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. In September 1980 Hua Guofeng declared that the Soviet actions posed "not only a menace to the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia but also a threat to world peace and security." Chinese foreign policy toward the second and third worlds continued to be influenced by its perception of the Soviet Union.

A significant aspect of China's relations with Asian neighbors has been its friendly and cooperative ties with Japan in recent years. China and Japan had close historical ties, but Japanese aggression against China in the 1930s and 1940s left a legacy of bitter feelings and distrust. Such a legacy was the stated reason for the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950, which was directed against the so-called "resurgence of Japanese militarism." In the 1950s and 1960s Chinese fear of Japan remained latent as Japan became the foremost economic power in Asia, bolstered its defense capabilities, and most of all deepened ties with the United States.

Nevertheless, despite its manifest distrust of Japanese intentions, China sought to foster a friendly political climate in Japan through trade and intensified "people's diplomacy," especially after the late 1960s. This effort soon bore fruit as reflected partly in the Japanese media and partly in growing pressure within the ruling Liberal Democratic party in Japan for a more conciliatory China policy. But, more importantly, it was the beginning of the thaw in Sino-American relations in the spring of 1971 that led to Sino-Japanese rapprochement. In September 1972 China and Japan established diplomatic relations and agreed also to hold negotiations aimed at the conclusion of a treaty of peace and friendship and accords on trade, navigation, aviation, fishing, and so forth. The two sides also agreed that the normalization of relations was not directed against third countries, that neither side should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and that "each country is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony."

This development meant that the seventy-five years of enmity between China and Japan, dating back to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, was formally ended. Its actual significance was much greater, however, given Japan's strategic role as an economic superpower. China's interest in Japan had at least three dimensions: to dissuade Japan from aiding the Soviet effort to develop the vast untapped resources of eastern Siberia; to seek Japan's more active contribution toward China's own industrialization; and to encourage the Japanese government to bolster its defense capabilities and participate actively in a united front against Soviet hegemonism.

Sino-Japanese negotiations for a peace treaty began in late 1974. The talks continued inconclusively until 1978 because of Japanese reluctance to accept the Chinese demand that a peace treaty should include an "antihegemony" clause aimed at the Soviet Union. The final round of negotiations in July 1978 led to the signing of the treaty of peace and friendship on August 12, 1978. Article II of that treaty stipulates that "the contracting parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony."

The Soviet response was predictably hostile. TASS, the official Soviet news agency, asserted that Japan took the risk of being drawn into China's "hegemonistic policy," inasmuch as the treaty was alleged to conflict with "the interests of peace and détente" and was fraught with "tremendous danger" to the peoples of East Asia. The Japanese government maintained that the treaty was not directed against the Soviet Union and therefore should have no adverse bearing on Japanese-Soviet relations.

China has had a close relationship with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) except for a period of strain during the Cultural Revolution. By intervening in the Korean War it saved North Korea from possible extinction. It also contributed substantially toward the latter's postwar reconstruction. The two neighbors shared strong anti-imperialist beliefs as reflected in their sometime similar if not identical views on ideological and other points of contention between China and the Soviet Union. Friendly ties were strained from 1966 to 1968 as a result of the invectives hurled by the Red Guards against North Korea during the Cultural Revolution (see The People's Republic of China [1949–], ch. 1). Apparently, however, the Chinese government took the initiative toward restoring a good neighbor relationship. The Chinese intention was to counteract Soviet influence in P'yŏngyang, which was rising in the 1965–68 period and also to ensure North Korea's noninvolvement in the Soviet scheme for an Asian collective security system that Moscow had first publicized in mid-1969. The Soviet scheme was viewed in Beijing as a step toward the encirclement of China. In April 1970 Premier Zhou Enlai visited P'yŏngyang, his first state visit since the mid-1960s.

Chinese initiatives toward détente with the United States in the early 1970s had a disquieting effect on North Korea, but the latter's concern was eased by the Chinese assurance of military support in case of overt attack by the forces of the United States and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Since the mid-1970s China has consistently backed North Korea's position on Korean reunification, and in this connection it has pointedly stressed the importance of a "peaceful" method of unification. One significant difference between Beijing and P'yŏngyang concerned the United States military presence in South Korea. Publicly the Chinese government continued to support the North Korean demand for the withdrawal of American troops from the south; privately, however, it tended to soft-pedal the issue, realizing that the continued United States military involvement in South Korea would serve as deterrence against any Soviet military ventures in East Asia.

Relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (the name adopted in 1976 for reunified north and south Vietnam) exemplify Chinese hostility to any country, especially in Asia, that courts the friendship or allows itself to become a willing ally of the Soviet Union at the expense of China. Through the spring of 1975, up until

Saigon fell to the communist Vietnamese forces, China maintained friendly ties with North Vietnam, assisting the latter's war against the United States. The fall of Saigon marked a turning point, however. With the power and prestige of victory, the Vietnamese leadership came to believe that a careful balancing of relations between Moscow and Beijing was no longer necessary. Given the enormous task of postwar reconstruction, the Vietnamese felt compelled to seek foreign aid wherever they could get it. After sending delegations to Beijing in August and September 1975 and to Moscow in October 1975, they found the aid package offered by the Soviets to be much more appealing. Hanoi's ties with Moscow became steadily closer thereafter.

The foreign policy implications of the Soviet aid quickly became evident. In June 1978 China terminated its twenty-year-old aid program to Vietnam. Hanoi responded in June by joining the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation, whose members include, in addition to the Soviet Union, most of the East European countries, Cuba, and Mongolia. Politically and economically, Vietnam became a de facto ally of the Soviet Union. From the Chinese perspective the situation went from bad to worse in November 1978 when Vietnam and the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation, valid for twenty-five years. Separate agreements were also signed to promote economic, scientific, and technological cooperation. On mutual security, Article VI stated that, "In the event of one of the parties becoming the object of attack or of threats of attack, the high contracting parties will immediately begin mutual consultations for the purpose of removing that threat and taking appropriate effective measures to ensure the peace and security of their countries." The treaty obliged both parties to consult, but the concrete steps aimed at removing the "threat" were left undefined. In any case the treaty was viewed in Beijing as another link in the Soviet effort to encircle China.

Two other factors further complicated Sino-Vietnamese relations: the de facto, if not explicit, Chinese support of Kampuchea in its 1977–78 border skirmishes with Vietnam and the Vietnamese mistreatment and expulsion of ethnic Chinese residing in Vietnam. Within eight weeks after the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty, Vietnam launched a massive invasion of Kampuchea and installed a pro-Hanoi regime in Phnom Penh, headed by Heng Samrin. In Beijing the invasion was seen as a Vietnamese challenge to China's credibility as a major regional power. China had been the only country that extended a full range of diplomatic, economic, and military support to the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea, despite the latter's notorious reputation as one of the most hated and revolting regimes of the twentieth century.

On February 17, 1979, China launched a limited "defensive counterattack" into Vietnam along the 774-kilometer Sino-Vietnamese border (see Perceptions of Threat, ch. 14). Two weeks later in announcing its readiness to withdraw troops that had penetrated as far as forty kilometers into Vietnam, China called on Hanoi to negotiate. The Chinese action was probably motivated by three considerations: alleged Vitnamese border "provocations"; Vietnamese efforts to overthrow the Chinese-backed Pol Pot regime; and mistreatment of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam. Bilateral talks got under way in April 1979, but little was accomplished. Recriminations continued, with China warning that it would have to teach Vietnam "another lesson" if border provocations continued. In March 1980 China proposed that the talks on normalizing relations be called off until later in the year, claiming that negotiations were pointless at a time when Vietnamese troops were pursuing their "war of aggression" in Kampuchea and "threatening" Thailand and other countries in Southeast Asia.

Since the mid-1970s China and the Soviet Union have actively courted the friendship of the countries of Southeast Asia. For China, the critical event was the fall of Saigon in 1975, and the uncertain global and regional implications involving it and the two superpowers. The principal Chinese concern has been that Soviet-backed Vietnam would act as a "Trojan horse," projecting Soviet influence into the region. Another concern has been that the United States military setback in Vietnam and its military disengagement from the region, notably, from Thailand, would create a dangerous power vacuum—a tempting target for Soviet expansionism. In the Chinese perception, Soviet control of Southeast Asia and the Pacific and Indian oceans would affect China's own security.

Chinese efforts to gain the confidence of Southeast Asian countries and at the same time to exclude Soviet influence from the region were facilitated, ironically, by the United States military setbacks in Vietnam. Southeast Asian countries began to initiate steps in earnest to improve their traditionally cool relations with China; and the Chinese government in turn began to stress bilateral state-to-state relations, deemphasizing and, in fact, greatly reducing its previous support of local insurgent rebels. Whenever and wherever deemed advisable, China also harped on the danger of Soviet expansionism, both direct and indirect, through Vietnam, which China labeled a "regional hegemonist."

Also conspicuous was the Chinese effort to allay the traditional suspicion of the Southeast Asian countries toward the Overseas Chinese (see Glossary), who were sometimes mistrusted as a potential source of subversion. The Chinese government repeatedly renounced political connections with the ethnic Chinese in foreign lands. It also reaffirmed its policy of encouraging the Overseas Chinese to show loyalty toward the governments of the individual host-countries—a policy enunciated in the mid-1950s and codified in 1980 but given little credence by other countries.

By 1980 China had established diplomatic relations with all Southeast Asian countries; except Indonesia, where anti-Chinese sentiments lingered, and Singapore. Singapore and China have agreed, however, to the setting up of official trade offices. The Chinese government also strongly encouraged the countries of the region to strengthen their regional collective efforts through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines). Such cooperation was seen as essential to the exclusion of Soviet influence from the region.

India and Pakistan figured importantly in Chinese foreign relation in the 1950s and 1960s. Factors influencing China's relations with India included border disputes, regional rivalry, and in the 1970s India's growing friendship with the Soviet Union. Pakistan, India's arch rival, was significant from the Chinese standpoint as a counterpoint not only to India but also the Soviet Union. Despite its hostility toward the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, China did not attack Pakistan's membership in both the United States-dominated SEATO and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), both of which are now defunct. Efforts by both China and India to normalize their relations, strained since the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962, bore some fruit in recent years. From all indications China appeared to downplay differences and focus on what it perceived to be in the common interest of both countries: to keep the Indian Ocean free of superpower intrusions.

Relations with the countries of Western Europe have been cordial in recent years. Initially trade was China's main interest in those countries. In the 1970s, however, the Chinese view of Western Europe changed substantially in response to what it perceived as Soviet expansionism. As late as 1971 China, which had pursued a policy of trade, even without diplomatic relations, denigrated the European Economic Community (EEC — Benelux, Britain, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, and West Germany) as a center of imperialist contradictions backed by the United States. In 1974, however, the Chinese leadership redefined its posture toward Western Europe under the so-called three worlds line. Though once colonialist, the European countries were now regarded as potential allies in a worldwide effort to resist Soviet encroachment (see Evolution of Foreign Policy, this ch.). In the spring of 1975 Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, during his visit to France, expressed a positive view of the EEC, or the Common Market, as it is more popularly called.

In May 1975 China formally recognized the EEC in an attempt to solidify its political and economic relations. A five-year trade agreement granting China most-favored-nation status was signed in April 1978. Its interest in Western Europe, of course, went far beyond trade and advanced technology. After the early 1970s China looked with favor on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), publicly stressing the importance of a stronger Western alliance and at the same time pointing to the risk of détente with the Soviet Union. In the Chinese view, a weak Europe would have disastrous consequences for the rest of the world if this industrialized region fell into the hands of a hostile, "hegemonist" power—the Chinese code word for the Soviet Union. This perspective was amplified by then Premier Hua Guofeng during his tour of France, West Germany, Britain, and Italy in October and November 1979. Hua Guofeng made several references to the ever-present danger of Soviet global expansionism, warning his hosts to be wary of the Soviet quest for strategic advantage in Europe, the focal point of the Soviet strategy for world conquest. The European hosts expressed much interest in cooperation with the Chinese government but were reserved in their response to Hua Guofeng's anti-Soviet polemics.

China maintained correct-to-friendly ties with East European countries, the exception being the strained relationship with Albania. Especially courted were Romania and Yugoslavia, as evidenced in Hua Guofeng's visit to the two independent-minded states in April 1978. Chinese efforts to befriend the socialist countries of the region were predictably resisted by the Soviet Union, which viewed Eastern Europe as being within its sphere of influence. Typical Soviet themes against China were that it had been consorting with "reactionaries of all stripes and all sorts of opportunists," that the socialist countries should be wary of Chinese attempts to seduce them with tempting trade offers, and that the socialist countries should take joint action against the Chinese effort to broaden its global influence at their expense.

Through the early 1970s Albania had been China's only ally within the socialist bloc, both sharing an antipathy toward "revisionism." But apparently Albania became troubled by China's warming relations with the United States and by its theory of three worlds that was enunciated in 1974, and its displeasure surfaced in September 1977 when Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito—Albania's ideological enemy—visited China. Albania publicly declared that "embracing Tito" would inevitably lead to "embracing United States imperialism" and that the "three worlds" line was a deviation from the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the class struggle, inasmuch as it allegedly ignored the fundamental contradiction between socialism and capitalism. In July 1978 the Chinese government, which had been the principal donor of aid to Albania since the early 1960s, announced the termination of economic aid to that country.

Chinese relations with countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America have been motivated by an assortment of factors. In the 1950s and 1960s opposition to colonialism, racism, imperialism, and Zionism was the principal thrust of Chinese foreign policy, but ideological imperatives gradually lost their importance as China became confronted with the more pressing problems relating to economic development at home and what it perceived as the threat from the Soviet Union. The competition with the Soviet Union for influence in the less developed countries of the world became a major policy goal.

In its efforts to gain recognition and the friendship of the new nations, China tried to capitalize on the anticolonial and antiracist sentiments of African states and peoples. Also evident was an attempt to portray the Soviet Union as a neocolonial and "social imperialist" power pursuing a policy of plunder and exploitation, directly and by proxy, in the Third World. China supplemented its propaganda with a substantial aid program. Perhaps the best known of the aid programs was the Chinese-built railroad connecting the Tanzanian port of Dar-es-Salaam with Zambia. The 1,860-kilometer railroad project, begun in 1970, was completed with an interest-free Chinese loan equaling about US$415 million. It was officially handed over to Tanzania and Zambia in 1976.

The Middle East and North Africa are seen by China as an integral part of a broadly defined "Europe," thus a critical strategic point in the hegemonic rivalry of the superpowers. Given its limited military and economic capabilities, China has played only a marginal role in the countries rimming the Mediterranean Sea. Its activity has been confined mainly to support of the Palestinian liberation movement. In 1965 China became the first major power to back the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) by permitting it to open a permanent mission in Beijing. Of course, it had long been a staunch supporter of the Arab cause in the Middle East, identifying itself with Egypt and other Arab states against Israel. Meanwhile in March 1976 when Egypt abrogated its treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, China applauded the Egyptian action and supplied Egypt with thirty engines for Soviet-supplied MiG fighters. In the following month, China signed a protocol to supply spare parts for Egypt's Soviet-equipped industry.

On the Arab-Israeli confrontation over the fate of the Palestinians, the Chinese position was that occupied Arab territories must be recovered and that the national rights of the Palestinians, including their right to establish their own state, must be restored. In recent years China has dissociated itself from the hardline rhetoric of radical Arab states that had in effect denied the right of Israel to exist and denounced terrorism as a political tool. More emphasis was placed instead on a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East question through negotiations—and without the superpowers' intervention.

Chinese interest in Latin America was at first marginal but in the 1960s was broadened to compete with the Soviet Union for influence in the region. The Chinese also intensified efforts to organize a broad united front of Latin America "peoples" against United States "imperialism." Anti-Soviet factions were set up in the communist parties operating in about ten countries in order to accentuate "revolutionary violence." Pro-Maoist groups failed, however, in their insurgent activities in the rural and urban areas. At the same time, through the pro-Maoist elements, China sought to capitalize on what it believed was the surging tide of anti-American economic nationalism in many Latin American countries. In the 1970s the Chinese considerably toned down their doctrinaire stand on revolutionary violence and class struggle because of the need to draw attention to the "hegemonistic" ambitions of the Soviet Union.

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In the 1970s Chinese foreign policy was a subject of countless books and articles reflecting diverse perspectives and disciplinary approaches. Generally the following periodicals contain informative and analytic articles on the subject: *Asia Pacific Community*, *Asian Survey*, *China News Analysis*, *China Quarterly*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Pacific Affairs*, *Problems of Communism*, and *World Today*. Of numerous books the following may be useful for both introductory and professional purposes: Michael B. Yahuda's *China's Role in World Affairs*; Robert G. Sutter's *Chinese Foreign Policy After the Cultural Revolution, 1966–1977*; *China and the Three Worlds: A Foreign Policy Reader*, edited by King C. Chen; Wang Gungwu's *China and the World Since 1949*; and Samuel S. Kim's *China, the United Nations, and World Order*. These five books are given a critical review by Jonathan D. Pollack in the July–August 1980 issue of *Problems of Communism*. United States-China relations are a topic of insightful studies in *Dragon and Eagle: United States-China Relations, Past and Future*, edited by Michel Oksenberg and Robert B. Oxnam. *China: US Policy Since 1945*, edited by Patricia Ann O'Connor, provides a handy reference to the history of American-Chinese relations, which has moved from the mutual distrust of the 1950s to the rapprochement of the 1970s. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 13. Public Order and Internal Security

Ink and sponge drawing of a ceremonial axe, its blade heavily inlaid with turquoise, dating from the late Shang Dynasty (ca. sixteenth century–eleventh century B.C.).

DURING THE SECOND plenary session of the Fifth National People's Congress (NPC) held in mid-1979, sweeping reforms in the legal system were announced. A series of new laws on courts, procuratorates, crime, and criminal procedure was promulgated, effective January 1, 1980. The changes reflected the leadership's pragmatic conviction that if economic modernization was to succeed, the population—which had suffered through the humiliations, arbitrary arrests, and massive civil disorders of the Cultural Revolution decade—had to be assured that it no longer would be abused or incarcerated on the basis of hearsay or arbitrary political pronouncements. For intellectuals who often had been subject to political detraction and persecution, this was especially important.

From the perspective of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), moreover, a strengthened legal system was seen as the single most important means of preventing a possible return of the radicals and a repetition of the era when they and the Gang of Four ruled by decrees and party regulations that they readily modified to suit their advantage. Codified laws, responsibly enforced, would be more difficult to manipulate.

Speaking at the August–September 1980 session of the Fifth NPC, the then Premier Hua Guofeng called on all cadres to further the cause of developing socialist democracy by setting an example in observing discipline and the law. "Our cadres," Hua Guofeng said, "must fight resolutely against the evil practice of tailoring the law to suit one's selfish ends and against bureaucrats protecting one another in wrongdoing." Hua Guofeng reminded this audience that in China in 1980 "all are equal before the law" and there must "never be any special citizens who can violate laws with impunity."

Aside from establishing a legal code that could not be manipulated by corrupt officials, the new laws were designed to reduce the inflated powers of the police and make the courts responsible for applying all but minor sanctions. The laws intended that the police once again become the servants of the court, subservient to the procuratorate. Ensuring a greater role for the courts and stressing independent investigations would make it harder to introduce politically colored testimony into the courtrooms.

Officials said the new laws were sufficiently simple in language, structure, and method for the people to understand, yet forceful enough to be trusted. They urged people to use them to bring reports of wrongdoing directly to the judiciary instead of having to rely on "back door" methods such as letters to newspapers. Although the new laws appeared straightforward, they were designed to be administered by legal specialists. Ideally the people would understand the law but allow the specialists to administer it for them—under the guidance of an independent and responsive judiciary.

As of mid-1980 the process of building a sound legal foundation—in relation to which people could feel sufficiently secure to discuss, read, and criticize, or otherwise participate in public life—had clearly begun. Among the many problems conneted with this process was a shortage of trained personnel, and it would be years before the required number of people would be available. The press in 1980 was sprinkled with stories about court cases that had been pending for years because of the shortage of judges and procurators. Additionally confusion and arbitrary enforcement were possible in late 1980 because the updated series of laws on the courts, crime, and criminal procedure did not completely replace codes of the early 1950s—many of which remained in effect. Moreover persons detained before January 1980 were not entitled to the protection of the new codes.

Grass-roots organizations continued to play a role in the pervasive public security network that extended across the country and into virtually every facet of daily life. These grass-roots committees used criticism, collective responsibility, and other enforcement procedures to influence both thought and behavior (see Urban Social Organization; Socialization and Social Control, ch. 3).

The most common form of punishment in China in late 1980 was a form of hard labor. The system stressed reform rather than penal retribution and expected productive labor to reduce the penal institutions' cost to society. Even the death penalty usually was stayed by a two-year reprieve in which a prisoner could demonstrate reform and thus have his or her sentence commuted to life or a fixed term at labor.

Historial Background

The Imperial Era

Aspects of contemporary social control are rooted in the Confucian past (see Social Values, ch. 3). The teachings of Confucius had an enduring effect on Chinese life and provided the basis for the social order through much of the country's history (see The Hundred Schools of Thought, ch. 1). In the early centuries China was not ruled by a written code of law but by moral persuasion in accordance with the *li*, a Confucian-based set of generally accepted social values or norms of behavior. The *li* was enforced by society rather than by a court. Criminal codes, however, were promulgated to deal with the most unruly elements in society.

Confucians believed that man was fundamentally good. With the proper amount of education he would live harmoniously in society as long as his position in that society was clearly defined. The Confucian social order recognized and bowed to the privileged scholar-official classes. Confucian law regulated an individual's way of life according to social status. The *li* ranked people accordingly and the *yi* defined relations among the ranks.

Education was the key ingredient for maintaining order in traditional China, for Confucius believed that all men were educable and that punishment did not necessarily make people learn or induce them to be good. Ideally, codes of law only supplemented the *li* and never replaced it.

Another ancient school of thought—legalism—was diametrically opposed to this Confucian interpretation. Legalism maintained that man was by nature evil and that he had to be controlled by strict rules of law and uniform justice that applied equally to upper and lower classes. To the legalists, the wise had no more right to evade the law than did the ignorant. Legalist philosophy, however, lacked the enduring impact of Confucianism and prevailed over the latter only during the first imperial dynasty, the Qin (221–207 B.C.).

Confucianism flowered under the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–A.D. 220) with social control based on ethical and moral persuasion backed by a state penal code. Most legal professionals were not lawyers but generalists trained in philosophy and literature. The local, classically trained gentry played a crucial role as arbiters and handled all but the most serious local disputes.

With Confucianism as its prevailing philosophy, China in succeeding centuries formed no tradition or codified law in the modern, Western sense. While law in the West in recent centuries was beginning to protect the common man from arbitrary government, in China a collectively sanctioned set of social values, or rules of behavior, saved the ordinary Chinese from arbitrary rule by any individual. The concept of individual rights as against those of society at large, however, was totally alien and unaccepted.

Confucians believed that codified law was inadequate to provide meaningful guidance for the entire panorama of human activity, but they were not against using law to control the most unruly elements in the society. The first criminal code was promulgated sometime between 455 and 395 B.C. There were also civil statutes, mostly concerned with land transactions. Religion played no part in the formulation of Chinese law.

The traditional criminal process dealt harshly with the impecunious and the uninfluential. The criminal code was not comprehensive and often not written down, which left magistrates great leeway during trials. The accused had no rights and relied on the mercy of the court; defendants were tortured to obtain confessions and often served long jail terms awaiting trial. A court appearance, at a minimum, resulted in loss of face, and the people were reluctant and afraid to use the courts. Rulers did little to make the courts more appealing, for if they stressed rule by law they weakened their own moral influence. The education system relied upon by Confucianism to show people how they should behave clearly had failed.

Law in Republican China

In the transitional period between the last days of the imperial era and the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, China's leaders

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reacted to western intervention and with some success tried to modify the country's legal system. The faltering Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) borrowed and tried to implement the legal system of Japan under the Meijis—itself originally based on German judicial precedents. The Nationalist government which later rose to power after 1911 accepted most of the Qing code, excepting only provisions that were contrary to the newly established republican system of rules. For example, it did away with holding families collectively responsible and punishable for the misbehavior of one of their members.

Few of the Nationalist codes, however, ever were implemented fully nationwide. While government leaders were striving for a Western-inspired system of codified law, the historical Chinese preference for collective social sanctions over impersonal legalism hindered constitutional and legal development. The spirit of the new laws never penetrated to the grass roots or provided hoped-for stability. Ideally, individuals were to be equal before the law, but this premise proved to be more rhetorical than substantive. In the end, the new laws were discarded as the Nationalists became preoccupied with fighting the Communists, the invading Japanese, or both.

Developments Under Mao

Mao Zedong taught that the CCP controlled the state and created and used the law to regulate the masses, realize socialism, and suppress counterrevolutionaries. Since it was Mao's view that the law and legal institutions existed to enhance party and state power, law not surprisingly often took the form of general principles or shifting policies rather than detailed and constant rules.

Moreover, Mao maintained that revolution should never end, and he opposed any legal system that could constrain it. While Western law stressed stability, Mao wanted constant change, "contradictions," and class struggle. The courts were government instruments for achieving political ends, and criminal law was a weapon to be used by the Party to conduct class struggle. Since emphasis constantly was shifting and new enemies often were identified, Mao believed it unwise to codify a criminal law that later might restrain him.

Mao wanted the administration of justice to be as decentralized as possible in order to be consistent with the "mass line" (see Glossary). Peer groups handled most legal problems, using administrative sanctions supervised by local officials in tune with current central policies. Therefore, public security organs and courts handled only the most serious cases. In both traditional and contemporary China, political and legal theory tended to support decisions and actions by groups, and Mao was unconcerned that a person contesting the result of a group decision had nowhere to go for redress.

Mao wanted the law to be written so simply that every individual could understand and abide by it. Technical language and strict procedures were to be dispensed with so as to encourage greater popular appreciation of the working of the legal system.

After 1949 the CCP greatly altered the character of the legal profession. A number of law schools were closed, and most of the teachers were retired. Legal work was continued by a handful of Western-trained specialists and a large number of cadres (see Glossary) hastily trained in China. From the beginning these two groups disagreed over legal policy, and the development of the legal system reflected their continuous debate over both form and substance.

The specialists were ex-Nationalist lawyers who chose to cooperate with the Communists. These men were considered politically unrealiable, so Mao initially ignored most of their arguments for a modern legal system. In the 1950s, however, they were instrumental in the country's adoption of a Soviet-style legal system.

In general the specialists wanted codified law, enforced by a strict Soviet-style legal bureaucracy. Without such procedures there would be too much arbitrariness, and eventually the law would cease to exist. Many of them passed from the scene later when the Soviet-style system was scrapped, but some gained influential positions or became party members.

Throughout most of the history of the People's Republic the new cadres—chosen more for their idological convictions than legal training or experience—have conducted the day-to-day legal work. The cadres favored the Maoist system of social and political control, regarding themselves as supervisors of the masses who subscribed to a common set of Maoist values. The new cadres saw this common ideology as giving better overall direction than strict legal controls.

The new cadres believed that China was too large for any single set of fixed rules or for a legal bureaucracy to supervise completely. They preferred to administer justice by simplified directives tailored to the situational needs of local communities so that the people (and the new cadres) could participate fully in their implementation. The cadres organized "study groups" to familiarize every citizen with current directives and circulars.

The universal purpose of criminal law is to control deviancy, but the Chinese traditionally have sought to do so through peer groups rather than by utilizing the courts. Ideally peers helped the deviant through criticism or *shuifu*, meaning "to persuade by talking" or "to talk until the other is persuaded." The stress is on education and rehabilitation (see Glossary), a policy linked to the Confucian and Maoist beliefs that with patience and persuasion man can be reformed.

Years of "Legalized" Terror: 1949-53

In 1949 the Communists abolished all Nationalist laws but did not replace them. Instead they began to rule through party regulations and circulars. By early 1950 the CCP had set in motion several mass movements, triggering considerable violence. It denied all individual rights that did not conform with state interests. Land reform began in mid-1950, and "people's tribunals" settled many disputes between peasants and landlords. These kangaroo courts often resulted in mass executions of "criminals"—in this case landlords—supervised by police or local People's Liberation Army (PLA) officers.

During the "thought reform campaign" the Party defined "good" and "bad" judicial work. This gave the new cadres a chance to attack the holdover Nationalist specialists and remove about half of the judges still on the bench after 1949.

Also in 1951 a People's Procurator-General was established to supervise all legal work. A network of procuratorial offices sprang up nationwide, free to function within broad guidelines. The procurator was a combination public prosecutor and ombudsman who reviewed police findings, sometimes made a separate investigation, approved the arrest of suspects, and presented the state's case in court.

During this period party leaders began a serious study of the Soviet legal system, and by the mid-1950s a number of Soviet-style codes had been adopted. In general, Mao was reluctant, however, to have any legal bureaucracy that might obstruct radical campaigns like land and thought reform.

The so-called "three anti" movement to eradicate official corruption and inefficiency began in early 1952 and was followed later that year by the "five anti" campaign against illegal activities in business (see ch. 1, Historical Setting). The new cadres used these rectification drives to launch a judicial reform and purge the courts of more holdover Nationalist judges. Those who remained, having been tacitly cleared of charges of flagrant counterrevolution and sworn to uphold the "mass line" in judicial work, continued to press for a more regularized Soviet-style legal system. These specialists grew confident that the mass movements shortly would burn themselves out and that the communist government eventually would see that it required a more formal judicial structure. Indeed, nudged by the specialists, China in 1953 began to promulgate various separate criminal laws.

The State Constitution of 1954 and Beyond

The state constitution promulgated in September 1954 attempted to set down in legal form the central tasks of the country in that period of transition and to use Soviet-style methods to regulate the means to realize socialism. The constitution provided the framework of a legal system much like that in effect in the Soviet Union from 1921–28. Many Soviet legal codes were translated into Chinese, and Soviet legal experts helped rewrite them to suit Chinese conditions. The Standing Committee of the NPC became the source of legal guidance with the power to appoint and dismiss judicial personnel and enact legal codes.

The constitution spelled out many so-called people's rights. It protected individuals from arrest and detention unless approved by the people's procuratorate, which had been organized in 1951. The citizens were granted freedom of speech, correspondence, demonstration, and religious belief. They could vote and stand for election. They also acquired the right to an education, work, rest, material assistance in old age, and to lodge complaints with state organs. Each citizen was granted the right to a public trial and the right to offer a defense aided by a "people's lawyer." Citizens were granted equality before the law, and women were guaranteed equal rights (but not equal pay for equal work).

According to the constitution, the procurator became the state prosecutor with the power to supervise all legal agencies including the police. The judiciary became "independent" and the Supreme People's Court became the highest judicial organ of the state.

Additionally, a law codification commission was set up to draft the nation's first criminal code and spell out criminal liability. Judicial and police rules were defined, and it became the "political task" of the courts to determine what was or was not an offense. A criminal law, a code of criminal procedure, and a civil code actually were drafted, but none of these laws were enacted until twenty-five years later.

To cope with the anticipated need for more legal workers, law schools expanded and revamped their curricula. Legal books and journals reappeared in quantity to train people's lawyers. Although all lawyers were supposed to be steeped in the current ideology, many developed a specialist viewpoint. This would cause trouble later, but in 1954 it appeared that China had taken a first step toward an orderly administration of justice.

Between 1954 and 1957 a good deal was done to make these institutions work, but the underlying conflict between the specialists and the new cadres remained. By 1957 the situation had polarized. The specialists argued that the period of intense class struggle was over, so all the people allowed to keep their political rights had to be considered "good" and were therefore equal before the law and the constitution. The new cadres, on the other hand, contended that class struggle would never end; they saw the specialist as obstructing the revolution—trying to subvert the new state and restore old class enemies.

It was at this time that Mao personally launched a popular movement under the classical slogan "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend." In early 1957 he published an essay entitled "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People" in which he encouraged people to vent their criticisms as long as they were constructive ("among the people") rather than hateful and destructive ("between the enemy and ourselves"). Mao was anxious to defuse the potential for a backlash against communist rule such as had occurred in Hungary and Poland.

The legal specialists were among the most vociferous critics. They complained that there were too few laws, and progress was slow on enacting laws already drafted. They felt that legal institutions were maturing too slowly and were obstructed by the technically unqualified cadres because it suited their immediate political ends. The specialists also spoke out against people who thought themselves above the law, especially party members.

By August 1957 the criticisms were too broad and abusive to be ignored, and Mao launched an antirightist campaign against the critics. Among the first victims were the specialists and their legal system to which Mao objected for several reasons—among them, his views that the Soviet model was too Westernized for China and that the judicial system was too constraining.

Whatever the specialists criticized was praised and whatever they favored was ridiculed. For example, the notion of a judiciary free from party and political interference was denounced. The principle of "favor the defendant" was spurned as was the notion that the law always should act "in the interest of the state and the people" rather than the Party. In short, Mao did not want a judiciary that stood as a fair and impartial arbiter between the Party and anyone else.

Many specialists were transferred to nonjudicial jobs. The shrinking legal bureaucracy was padded with new cadres. All codification commissions stopped working, and no new laws were drafted. The number of operating law schools dropped sharply as most shifted their courses of study to more acceptable subjects. Almost all the remaining law schools were closed during the Cultural Revolution.

Courts received low priority, and many of their functions were turned over to local nonlegal administrators; few qualified people chose to stay with the still-operating courts. The number of public trials fell, and by the 1960s the court system had become mostly inactive.

One interesting by-product of the shift from formal legal organs to local administrative control was that criminal sentences became milder. Persons found guilty of grand theft, rape, or manslaughter were sentenced to only three to five years imprisonment, and the death penalty rarely was imposed.

The 1957 "antirightist campaign" put an end to efforts that would have brought about some degree of judicial autonomy with safeguards for the accused. Instead the country evolved toward a police-dominated state; by 1958 the police were empowered to impose sanctions as they saw fit.

During the Great Leap Forward (1958–60) the number of arrests, prosecutions, and convictions increased as the police dispensed justice "on the spot" for even minor offenses. Still, the Great Leap Forward (see Glossary) was milder than the excesses of the 1948–52 period when many of those arrested had been summarily executed; persons found guilty during the Great Leap Forward were regarded as educable. When the moderates resumed control of the economy after 1960, there was some emphasis on rebuilding the judicial sector, but the Cultural Revolution nullified most of that progress.

The State Constitution of 1975

The state constitution adopted in January 1975 drew its inspiration overwhelmingly from Mao Zedong Thought. It stressed party leadership and reduced the NPC's power. The streamlined document (thirty articles compared to 106 in 1954) reduced even further the constitutional restraints on the Maoists. The single article in the new constitution that pertained to judicial organs eliminated the procuracy and gave its functions and powers to the police. This marked increase in police power suited the radicals high in the party leadership who wanted public security forces to have the power to arrest without having to go through other judicial organs.

The NPC still theoretically was empowered to enact laws, select and reject state officials, and direct the judiciary. The Party, however, would be the ultimate arbiter, and the Supreme People's Court was no longer designated the highest judicial organ in the land.

Equality before the law, a provision of the earlier constitution, was deleted. Moreover, people no longer had the right to engage in scientific research or literary or artistic creation, or had the freedom to change residences.

Some new rights were added, including the freedom to propagate atheism and practice religion. Citizens also gained the right to "speak out freely, air views fully, hold great debates, and write big character posters" (see Constitutional Framework, ch. 10). These "new" forms of socialist revolution along wih the right to strike were examples of radical political activism popularized during the Cultural Revolution; they were revoked in 1980 (see ch. 11, The Political Process).

The "socialist legality" that resulted from the 1975 document was characterized by instant, arbitrary arrest and impromptu trial, either by a police officer on the spot, by a revolutionary committee—the local government body during the heyday of the Cultural Revolution—or by a mob. Spur of the moment circulars and party regulations continued to take the place of code of criminal law or judicial procedure. For example, during demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in early 1976, three demonstrators were seized by police and accused of being counterrevolutionaries singing the praises of Deng Xiaoping. The three were "tried" by the "masses" during a two-hour "struggle meeting," a session where hundreds or thousands of onlookers shouted their accusations. After this "trial," during which the accused were forbidden to offer a defense (even if they had wished to), the three were sentenced to an unknown number of years in a labor camp. In contrast to the mild sentences of the 1957 period, sentencing under the State Constitution of 1975 was more severe. Death sentences were handed down frequently for "creating mass panic," burglary, rape, and for looting after the July 1976 earthquakes.

Given the poor lot of most judicial workers prior to the arrest of the Gang of Four, it was no surprise that they supported Hua Guofeng who was sworn in as party chairman and premier in October 1976. Legal workers hailed his rise to power and foresaw an era of better quality judicial work.

In January 1977 Hua Guofeng signaled the death knell for the 1975 constitution by issuing several directives calling upon legal workers to begin stabilizing judicial institutions in the spirit of the State Constitution of 1954. From that point on the Chinese press carried many stories about the virtues of the 1954 document and about the Gang of Four's abuse of it. In August Hua Guofeng announced that China had eight important tasks to fulfill, including the reconstruction of "people's state apparatuses" such as the formal legal organs.

Within a month the press reported that the PLA and militia were turning over the responsibility for public security to the reorganized local courts. Also during September judicial and public security workers held several provincial meetings to seek ways "to strengthen the building of the legal forces . . . and socialist legal systems." Hua Guofeng announced that legal institutions had to be strengthened to protect people from arbitrary abuse by renegades like the Gang of Four.

In October and November 1977 a theoretical study group from the Supreme People's Court affirmed that the courts, with the public security organs as their tools, were solely responsible for maintaining public order. The study group told people to cease "going against the tide" by refusing to accept the views of superior authorities.

The press carried stories describing well-run police stations cooperating fully with the courts and called upon all police to emulate these models. The national press urged the government to completely reorganize all judicial procedures and insisted that codes of criminal law and judicial procedure be enacted as quickly as possible. Finally, the articles called for improving legal education and reopening the law schools, rehiring the teachers, and printing legal books and journals. By the end of 1977 the courts reportedly had more power than at any time since the 1954–56 period.

Return to Socialist Legality

In March 1978 the Fifth NPC adopted a new constitution intended to provide a structural basis for the return to socialist legality. Legal reform was deemed essential not only to prevent future radical takeovers but to achieve the "four modernizations" prescribed by the party leadership.

The NPC called for new criminal, procedural, civil, and economic codes as quickly as possible, using the State Constitution of 1978 as a guide. The delegates quoted Mao as having said in 1962 that "we not only need a criminal code but also a civil code." Whether he actually said this or not, the NPC invoked Mao's authority as a weapon against those who viewed regularizing the legal system as counterrevolutionary.

In November 1978 the Law Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) called for strengthening the socialist legal system which, it explained, was based on democracy, socialist principles, and the worker-peasant alliance. The academy added that the system should be formulated, enforced, and used by the people for economic development and against groups like the Gang of Four. The Constitution gave the NPC sole authority to interpret, promulgate,and change laws and reestablished the people's procuratorates, which were empowered to prevent unlawful arrests and detentions. The procuratorates were also expected to curb the police, some of whom had acted improperly during the brief heyday of the radicals and the Gang of Four in 1976 (see The Judiciary, ch. 10).

The Constitution reaffirmed the principle—deleted in the 1975 state constitution—of the equality of all citizens before the law. It guaranteed the citizen's right to a public trial (with some qualifications) and reaffirmed his right to offer a defense—also omitted in 1975.

In mid-1979 China announced a series of new laws that included the country's first criminal and court procedural laws and an updated law for procuratorates. Extensive preparations preceded the announcements. Beginning in early 1979, for example, the media hosted debates on relevant subjects, some previously forbidden. In March there was debate about whether the country should adopt "assumption of innocence" in place of the usual "assumption of guilt." A high party official addressed a national conference of procuratorates in January 1979, stressing the need for thorough investigations in all cases and respect for evidence—again "seeking truth from facts." He warned that henceforth no extorted confessions would be accepted and no policeman could arrest anyone without procuratorate approval. There were, of course, some qualifications with respect to that provision, and in any case it could not be ascertained in late 1980 whether in general the new restrictions actually were observed.

Numerous judicial work conferences also were held in the provinces, the majority calling for judicial independence. As of late 1980 indications were that this would be the rule. Future Chinese courts would be allowed "to reject instructions and orders from any organization or individual other than the law," as long as they "work under unified leadership of the local party committees." In short, party policy no longer would be the equivalent of the law, but judicial independence in China still would be modified by party guidance.

Peng Zhen, director of the NPC Commission for Legal Affairs and formerly active in the abortive reform efforts of the mid-1960s, announced the new laws in June 1979 and published them shortly thereafter. According to his announcement, the laws were based on 1954 and 1963 drafts and would provide a foundation for the socialist legal system and, ultimately, social democracy. Peng Zhen had been the mayor of Beijing from 1951–66 and was the first major victim of the Cultural Revolution. He subsequently was rehabilitated and served as a drafter of the 1979 laws. (He reportedly had helped write the 1963 drafts—probably under Liu Shaoqi's orders.) In November 1979 he was appointed secretary general of the Standing Committee of the Fifth NPC, a position from which he could control the reconstruction of the legal system.

Peng Zhen affirmed that the judiciary would be independent and subject only to the law; all individuals, no matter how senior, would be equal before the law; and party members and cadres must forego special treatment and set an example to the people. He said that Mao back in 1977 had stressed the importance of observing the law, and Peng Zhen added that existing statutes were merely the foundations on which many more laws would be built.

The major problem in implementing the new laws was a critical lack of properly trained personnel. No legal research had been done for at least a decade. A newspaper article mentioned a shortage of 200,000 legal workers, including 10,000 lawyers, and the prospects of quickly training this many specialists were not good because of the damage the Cultural Revolution had done to the educational system, especially the law schools.

As of December 1979 all Chinese police and judicial workers were required to attend a three- to six-month course to familiarize themselves with the new laws. Every legal worker had to complete the course before 1982. In addition China enrolled about 2,000 undergraduate and 100 postgraduate lawyers in 1980 and planned long-term specialized training for an additional 5,000 legal workers. Four universities and four other legal institutes offered training for lawyers.

Among the laws taking effect January 1, 1980, was the Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and the Local People's Governments. The revolutionary committees, which had usurped judicial authority in the 1967–76 period, were eliminated; their authority was to be assumed by local people's governments, and judicial responsibility was transferred back to the appropriate courts.

The Electoral Law for the National People's Congress and People's Congresses reestablished congresses at and above the county level and provided for the direct election of deputies as well as some procurators and judges. The law prescribed—for the first time in People's Republic history—that there would be a choice of candidates. It stipulated that the number of candidates could exceed vacancies to be filled by 50 to 100 percent in county elections and by 20 to 50 percent in elections to higher office.

The Organic Law of People's Courts was designed to create a more orderly environment and to assure the people that the years of turmoil, terror, and massive arrests with no courts and no legal guarantees were over. The law was a revised version of 1954 drafts, supplemented where necessary. The law guaranteed the accused equality before the law regardless of race, nationality, sex, social background, or religious beliefs and gave him or her the right to a lawyer, court-appointed if necessary.

The law upheld the "independence" of the judiciary from political interference. The courts were free to establish judicial committees to assist them in difficult cases, and there were provisions for lay personnel called assessors to help judges. Court proceedings were to be conducted and court decisions to be written in the local language. Cases involving the death penalty were to be reviewed by the Supreme People's Court, and all defendants were entitled to appeal to the next higher court.

The Organic Law for People's Procuratorates, an amended version of a 1954 law, made procurators responsible for supervising law enforcement by the police, courts, and administrative agencies. The procuratorates in 1980 still were in transition and short of quality manpower; most procurators were undertrained, and a few were corrupt. The procurators were elected by local people's congresses and approved by the next higher procuratorial level to handle only criminal cases. Breaches of party or government discipline were to be handled by the Party or an appropriate governmental organ.

According to the new law, procuratorates at all levels had to establish procuratorial committees, practice democratic centralism, and make decisions through discussion. Ideally a procuratorate at a lower level would be led, rather than dictated to, by one at the next higher level; each was responsible to the standing committee of the people's congress at the corresponding level.

The procuratorial system was linked to China's past in that it functioned like the censorate of Imperial China. It served as the eyes and ears of the government just as the censorate was the watchdog of the emperor. The independence of the procuratorates was constitutionally guaranteed. Still their responsibilities were taxing, and especially difficult in any case involving a high party official.

The Criminal Law was intended to protect the personal and property rights of citizens against unlawful infringement by any person or institution. It safeguarded the fundamental rights stipulated in the State Constitution of 1978 and prescribed penalties for counterrevolutionary and other criminal offenses. Prevention of crime and rehabilitation through education, taking into account actual conditions in China in 1979, were stressed. Illegal incarcerations, fabrications, prosecutions, and intimidations were forbidden, but the provisions of the law did not apply retroactively.

The law contained a provision prohibiting the criminal liability of a person with "reactionary" ideas but who had committed no reactionary actions. As Peng Zhen pointed out in late 1979, "Most contradictions were among the people," that is, nonantagonistic to the Party or state, so punishment was inappropriate. As in some other areas of the law, the actual judicial disposition appeared at times to be at variance with this particular principle.

The law defined other criminal acts and distinguished between real crimes and accidents. It also established a statute of limitations to demonstrate both the "humanitarian spirit" of the penal code and to permit law enforcement officials to concentrate on crimes for which evidence was still available. The law was vague on the important principle of analogy, according to which acts not specifically defined in the law might be considered crimes.

Criminal charges could not be brought unless there was evidence that a crime had been committed; the sole basis for prosecution was verifiable evidence. The law also made a good start at defining understandable rules of evidence.

The death penalty could be imposed for flagrant counterrevolutionary acts and for homicide, arson, criminal intent in causing explosions, and other offenses of this nature.

The Law on Criminal Procedure was promulgated to reform judicial procedures in enforcing the criminal law. It described the relationship between public security organs (investigations, provisional apprehensions), the procuratorates (arrest approvals, possible procuratorial investigations, prosecutions, supervision of the police and penal institutions), and the courts (trials, sentencing). It also guaranteed the accused the right to make a defense at a public trial and with an advocate present.

The public security organs, procuratorates, and courts had to base their judgments on verified evidence using the law as a yardstick. There were strict time limits on court and police actions to prevent overly lengthy detentions. The longest time allowable between arrest and trial was five and one-half months. Finally, the law was designed to educate citizens, establish judicial jurisdictions, and streamline judicial appeal and review.

As of late 1980 and despite some problems, the new laws were being accepted and gradually implemented. A chronic shortage of trained personnel ensured, however, that the laws probably would not be completely enforced throughout the country until at least the late 1980s. One of the most serious problems was the time limit on detention before trial; because of the shortage of procurators and judges, many detainees still were imprisoned beyond the period stipulated by law. An official explanation noted that persons arrested before January 1980 were not entitled to the protection of the new codes. Still, the leaders were fully committed to fostering a responsive government structure and prospects were good for the continuation of reform.

Court Structure and Process

Between the "antirightist" campaign in 1957 and the legal reforms of mid-1979, the courts—viewed by the Maoists as troublesome and unreliable—played only a small role. Most of their functions were handled by other party or government organs.

By 1980, however, there were four levels of courts in the general administrative structure, and judges were elected or appointed for a period of years by people's congresses at the corresponding levels. Judges needed no formal training and presided over an inquisitorial form of trial in which they played an active part in questioning all witnesses. (This contrasts with the Western adversarial system in which the judge is meant to be an impartial referee between two contending attorneys.) After the judge and assessors ruled on the case, they passed sentences which were often milder than those imposed for similar crimes in the West. An aggrieved party then could appeal to the next higher court.

The Supreme People's Court stands at the apex of the judiciary structure (see fig. 17). Located in Beijing, it has jurisdiction over all lower and "special" courts, for which it serves as the ultimate appellate court. It is directly responsible to the Standing Committee of the NPC, which elects the court president.

In late 1980 there were about thirty higher people's courts at the province level interacting with about 200 intermediate people's courts at the next lower level. Serving as courts of first instance for specified offenses, they also heard appeals from the basic courts. The approximately 3,000 basic people's courts were at the county level, their presidents elected by local citizens.

There were five types of special courts to hear cases of counterrevolutionary activity, plundering, bribery, sabotage, or indifference to duty that resulted in severe damage to production or government property or threatened the safety of soldiers or other special workers.

The military courts were the largest group of this category and tried all treason and espionage cases. Although they were independent of the civilian courts and directly responsible to the Ministry of National Defense, they were supervised by the Supreme People's Court.

The military courts were revived in October 1978 when the military procuratorate was reinstituted. Open military trials resumed in December of that year, and since mid-1979 military judicial personnel have been studying the new laws to determine how they apply to military tribunals. Special military courts were first established in September 1954 to protect the special interests of all commanders, commissars, and soldiers, but these courts ceased to function during the Cultural Revolution.

In addition, China operated railway transport, water transport, forestry and other special courts that tried cases involving these workers.


PEOPLE'S COURT SYSTEM¹
PEOPLE'S PROCURATORATES²
Central Government Level
Province Level
County Level
Commune Level
Supreme People's Court
Criminal Bench
Civil Bench
Economic Bench
Other
Special People's Courts
Higher People's Courts
Criminal Bench
Civil Bench
Economic Bench
Other
Intermediate People's Courts
Criminal Bench
Civil Bench
Economic Bench
Other
Basic People's Courts
Criminal Bench
Civil Bench
People's Mediation Committees
Railway Transport
Water Transport
Forestry
Other
Military
Supreme People's Procuratorate
Special Procuratorates
People's Procuratorates
Divisional People's Procuratorates
People's Procuratorates
Military
Railway Transport
Water Transport
Other

[1] Organization of a people's court:
President, vice presidents, presiding judges, deputy presiding judges, judges, judicial committees, people's assessors, marshals, legal-medical experts, interpreters, bailiffs.
Components of a people's court in session:
Collegial bench of judges and assessors, public prosecutor, defense lawyer or publicly appointed defender, defendant.

[2] Organization of a people's procuratorate:
Chief procurator, procurators, departments for economic cases and for criminal cases, and others as needed.

Source: Based on information from "Seven PRC Laws Adopted At Fifth NPC Second Session," part 1, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: People's Republic of China*, I, No. 146, July 27, 1979, p. 20.

Figure 17. Organization of the People's Courts and People's Procuratorates

Enforcement

An extensive public security system and a variety of enforcement procedures maintained order in China in late 1980. Along with the courts and procuratorates, the country's judicial and public security organs included the Ministry of Public Security and its descending hierarchy of departments, bureaus, subbureaus, and stations, assisted by the PLA and the militia (see ch. 14, National Defense).

Historical Background

However much the system may have been influenced by the Maoists, it was rooted directly in the traditional Chinese concept of governmental control through imposed collective responsibility. Even before the start of the first imperial period in 221 B.C., a system was proposed to organize the people into "groups of families which would be mutually responsible for each other's good behavior and share each other's punishments." The Qin and Han dynasties made some use of the concept, and the Song Dynasty (A.D. 960–1279) institutionalized it on a nationwide basis referred to as the *bao jia* system. Eventually, each group of families also was required to furnish men to serve in the peasants' militia. *Bao jia* alternately flourished or languished under later rulers but was reinstituted by the Qing Dynasty in 1644.

Under the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911), the people's aversion to legalistic procedures and the rulers' preferences for socially and collectively imposed sanctions continued. Technically, the magistrate was to hear even minor criminal cases; but local elders and village leaders were allowed to handle most disputes, freeing the magistrate for more important work and saving the government expense. The people preferred to handle matters in this way, outside the intimidating courts.

Other practices for maintaining public order in China during the imperial era included the formation of *she*, mutual assistance groups of farm households, which over time came to assume police functions. In a move that was a precursor to contemporary notions of ideological control, rulers of the Qing Dynasty organized popular lectures that stressed the Confucian principle of obedience. Still another traditional form of policing was the appointment of censors to investigate corruption and misconduct up to the highest levels of government. Doing that job too well cost many censors their lives.

In 1932 the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek reinstituted the *bao jia* system. It entailed the organization of family households into groups of ten, each such unit itself being organized successively into a larger unit leading up to the county level of administration. Each family sent a representative to the monthly meeting of its unit, and each unit elected a leader to represent it at the next higher level. Since the head of each element was responsible to the next higher level for the conduct of all members of his unit, the system served as an extension of the central government.

Besides the chief, there were two officers of importance within each 100-family unit. The population officer maintained records and reported to the district office on all births, deaths, marriages, movements, and unlawful activities. The *bao* troop commander organized a self-defense unit and was responsible for maintaining

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law and order. In rural China, however, the local village was generally a self-contained world, and the peasants remained aloof from more remote and higher ranking centers of authority.

The Japanese, introduced to the *bao jia* system on Taiwan when they assumed control of the island after the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), found the system highly suitable for administering occupied areas. They instituted modified versions of it—renamed *hoko*—on the mainland in China after 1937. In North China the Japanese imposed severe restrictions on the population, and the *hoko* system aided in taking the census, restricting movement, and conducting spot checks. Each household was made to affix a wooden tablet on the front door with the names of all inhabitants inscribed. Anyone discovered missing or not on the list during an inspection by Japanese troops was presumed to be a guerrilla. Farther south in China, the Japanese did not have enough troops to be as demanding as they were in the north. Thus they allowed the local *hoko* leaders to participate in administering the areas, disseminated propaganda at the *hoko* meetings, and established self-defense and youth corps. The Chinese peasants, who in some sense feared both the Japanese and the guerrillas, responded favorably to this lenient treatment and to genuine Japanese protection against the guerrillas. Only the increasingly obvious fact that Japan was losing the war prevented greater success in pacifying Chinese territory.

Aspects of Chinese society have also contributed to shaping the contemporary structure for maintaining public order. Urban and rural dwellers in China rarely change their residences. Amid the sprawling cities, neighborhoods remain closely knit communities. For the 80 percent of the population that lives in the countryside, home and place of work are the same. With little physical mobility, most villagers stay put for generations and know each other intimately. In such environments, where everyone is likely to know everyone else and notice most of what happens, mutual surveillance and peer pressure can be extremely effective.

The Communists were themselves products of Chinese society and liberally borrowed from these historical examples. They extensively organized the people and maintained the principles of mutual surveillance and mutual responsibility. They also retained the concept of self-defense forces. Communist control, however, exceeded that achieved under *bao jia* or any other traditional system and extended into virtually every household in the country. Under the Communists, the family was deemed unsuitable as a basis for control. To achieve near total control, a large number of administrative agencies and social organizations were created or adopted. Among the governmental organizations were the police, organized until about 1957 with the aid of Soviet specialists and resembling the Soviet police in organization, power, and activities.

During the Civil War and the years immediately after the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, disorder was so severe that the PLA, militia, police, and people all became heavily involved in public security work. Remnants of the Nationalist forces remained on the mainland and communist efforts to enforce tax laws and agricultural rules provoked disturbances and riots. Extending responsibility for public order to include the police, military, and the people proved to be a highly effective arrangement, and the concept was written into the Common Program, a document that before the promulgation of the first constitution in 1954 served as a fundamental statement of CCP philosophy and goals.

Police Forces

In late 1980 the Ministry of Public Security within the State Council was the central police authority (see ch. 10, Party and Government). The ministry consisted of an administrative office and functionally separate departments for political security, economic security, communications security, intelligence, police operations, prisons, and other ministerial business. Subordinate to the ministry were public security departments at the provincial level, which included the three special municipalities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin; public security bureaus and subbureaus at the county level (the bureaus being in the prefectures and large cities, the subbureaus in counties and municipal districts); and stations at the commune, village, or town levels (see fig. 18). While public security considerations significantly affected official decisions at all levels of administration, the police appeared to wield progressively greater influence at each lower level of government.

Organization of the public security offices could be inferred from the tasks with which the police were charged. Generally, each office had sections for population control, pretrial investigations, welfare, fire fighting, traffic control, a detention center, and other activities. Sections enjoyed varying degrees of autonomy; for example, criminal investigation and population control went hand-in-hand, while fire fighters were all but technically independent.

None of the laws enacted in mid-1979 pertaining to the courts, procuratorates, or other government structures dealt with the public security apparatus. Its enabling legislation remained the Act for the Organization of Public Security Stations (December 1954) and the People's Police Act (June 1957).

The public security station—the police element in closest contact with the people—was supervised by the public security subbureau as well as by the local people's government and procuratorate. The procuratorate could assume direct responsibility for handling any case it chose, and it supervised investigations in those cases it allowed the public security station to conduct. A great deal of "coordination" occurred among the public security organs, the procuratorates, and the courts, so that a trial was unlikely to produce a surprise outcome.

The station was generally smaller than a police station in the West but had considerably broader responsibilities. In a rural area it had


Central Government Level
Ministry of Public Security[1]
People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Province Level
Public Security Department
Internal Defense Units
County Level[2]
Public Security Bureau
Militia Units
Commune Level
Public Security Station
Militia Units
People's Mediation Committee
Security Defense Committee
Other Committees
Coordination

[1] Other ministries within the State Council have limited public security responsibilities.

[2] Includes prefectures, autonomous prefectures, counties, autonomous counties, municipalities.

Figure 18. Organization of the Public Security System

a chief, deputy chief, a small administrative staff, and a small police force. In urban areas the station was larger. It had more administrative personnel and seven to eighteen patrolmen. Criminal law activities included investigation, apprehension, interrogation, and temporary detention. The arch criminal was the "counterrevolutionary," a vague term that could be applied to any troublemaker, giving the police considerable latitude beyond the restrictions on their powers. The station's household section maintained a registry of all persons living in the area. Births, deaths, marriages, and divorces were recorded and confirmed through random household checks. The station regulated all hotels and required visitors who remained beyond a certain number of days to register with it. It also controlled all theaters, cinemas, radio equipment, and printing presses to effectively regulate gatherings and censor information reaching the people. It regulated all explosives, guns, ammunition, and poisons. The police were in charge of traffic control, fire fighting and prevention, public health and sanitation, and protection of foreign diplomatic installations and important Chinese military and economic facilities.

Controlling changes of residence was another important police function. Were it not regulated, large numbers of rural residents undoubtedly would move to the cities in search of better living standards, work, or education. But China's cities are already overcrowded. During and after the Cultural Revolution, large numbers of urban youths completing their education were forced by the PLA and the police to go "down to the countryside." Many of them were assigned to the paramilitary Production and Construction Corps (see ch. 14, National Defense). As of 1980 the police continued to enforce government orders for urban youths to go to the country and restrained the movement of rural dwellers to the cities.

The public security official had the authority to impose administrative sanctions. According to the Regulations on Sanctions of Breaches of Public Order of 1957—which *Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)* republished in 1980 as still valid—offenders might be "vagabonds, people who have no proper occupation, and people who repeatedly breach public order." The police could apprehend such individuals and sentence them to "reeducation through labor" with the approval of local labor training administration committees. The 1957 regulation placed no limit on the length of sentence to labor training, but since the early 1960s three or four years have been the norm. An amendment issued simultaneously with the reissue of the 1957 regulation in 1980, however, limited the length of "reeducation through labor" to two years with extension possible in extraordinary cases. The same regulation empowered the police to apply admonitions, fines, and detention up to fifteen days. Beyond these sanctions, an offender could be coerced into "volunteering" for extra work or study under the supervision of a public security official or local activist. Goods illegally in the possession of an offender were to be confiscated, and payment was imposed for damages or hospital fees in the event he had caused injury.

The Criminal Law and the Law on Criminal Procedure being implemented in 1980 did place certain restrictions on police powers regarding arrests, investigations, and searches. A public security official or a citizen could apprehend a suspect under emergency conditions, but a court or procuratorate was required to approve the arrest. Within 24 hours the accused had to be questioned and his or her family or work unit notified of the detention. Any premeditated arrest required a warrant from a court or procuratorate. The time that an accused could be held pending investigation was limited, and incarceration without due process was illegal.

Two officials were necessary to conduct an investigation. They were required to produce identification and apparently to inform the accused of the crime involved before questioning. The accused could refuse to answer only those questions irrelevant to the case. Torture was illegal.

Finally, the laws provided that in conjunction with an arrest the police could conduct an emergency search; otherwise, a warrant was required. They had the right to search the person, property, and residence of an accused and the person of any injured party. They could intercept mail belonging to the accused and order an autopsy whenever cause of death was unclear.

In July 1980 the State Council approved new regulations governing police use of weapons and force. A patrolman could fire his pistol in self-defense or when shooting was the only means available to subdue or prevent the escape of a violent criminal. He could use his baton only in self-defense or when necessary to subdue violent criminals or rioters. Other weapons could be used if necessary to stop violent riots, lessen the overall loss of life, or crush surrounded but still resisting criminals. The regulations even governed use of sirens, police lights, and whistles.

The armed people's police force was a specialized branch of the public security forces that was armed with heavier weapons. Operating in the countryside, they were known as public security troops prior to 1957. The units were controlled jointly by the Party, the Ministry of Public Security, and the local government and were trained by the PLA. As of late 1978 there were an unknown number of provincial armed people's police "forces," with squadrons at the county level. They were armed with rifles, grenades, and possibly other infantry weapons.

Secret police operations employed agents, informers, and "roving spies." Restrictions on police surveillance apparently applied to probation and parole and did not hinder monitoring suspected "counterrevolutionaries." Agents in plain clothes were posted at bus and railway stations and other public places. Police informers denounced "bad elements" and assisted in surveilling suspected political criminals. "Roving spies" were a special category of informant in the factories and work places and were ever watchful for dissidence or sabotage. Youths aspiring to be Communist Youth League (CYL) members or CYL members aspiring to be party members commonly cooperated as informants and agents for the police.

The relationship between the patrolman on his "beat" and the people was close. He lived in the neighborhood and was assigned to that area for a long time. He was expected to know everyone who lived there and understand their problems. His task was not only to prevent and punish crime but to promote desirable behavior as might a social worker or teacher. This positive side of the policeman's duties was a year-round responsibility, but the bond between the public security units and the people was strengthened annually by means of "cherish-the-people" month. During the 1980 spring festival, for instance, the police again were enjoined to restudy the "eight main rules of discipline and ten points for attention for public security personnel." Their instructions were to

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continue "holding various types of discussion meetings; making work reports to the masses; visiting, comforting, and commending activists in serving public security; (and) adopting various ways to modestly solicit and listen to the masses' criticisms and opinions."

Personnel for the police apparently were drawn from every segment of the population without restriction as to sex or ethnic origin. Selection probably was based on political loyalty, intelligence, and health, as it was for the armed forces. Most recruits had CYL backgrounds or were former PLA soldiers.

Police schools were operated by some municipalities, and there was at least one in every province. Usually those designated for leadership positions attended the schools, and patrolmen were trained at the unit and on the job.

With the announcement of the new laws in mid-1979, there began a propaganda campaign to admit past legal abuses and generate support for the reforms of the "new socialist legal system." Once more, Lin Biao and the Gang of Four were blamed for the excesses. Official pronouncements reported they had "fanatically instigated people to smash the public safety, procuratorial, and legal organs," after which they had attacked the loyal cadres and masses "to confiscate their family possessions, arrest them, imprison them, and force them to confess their supposed crimes under cruel punishment." Blame also was placed on public security officials still on the job. A Xinhua News Agency (New China News Agency—NCNA) article in July 1980 concluded that some public security cadres had "a dull sense of the legal system." They were "unaccustomed to doing things according to law," and some of them believed the law was "restrictive" and something that "only helps the accused." The article said the police had a responsibility to "completely eradicate extorting a confession by torture, . . . a chronic and stubborn disease."

The legal and public security organs were instructed to lead the masses toward the new rule by law. They were to set an example in observance of the law and not misuse power, practice favoritism, or seek personal gain. The new laws could not be implemented fully on January 1, 1980, as intended because of shortages of experienced manpower, so public security units were to recruit additional cadres, allow former officials to return, and step up training. The top leadership spoke out to get the drive going—including the president of the Supreme People's Court, the chief procurator of the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and the director of the Legal Commission of the NPC Standing Committee. To propagandize the masses a slogan was created: "Everything must be based on facts and the law must be taken as a yardstick." The slogan's similarity to Deng Xiaoping's "seek truth from facts" suggested the vice premier's support of the program.

Commune-level Organizations

The structure of the public security system was extensive, and the authority of its forces exceeded that of most police forces in the

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West. Nevertheless, the public security agencies required and received the assistance of a wide-ranging network of grass-roots organizations in efforts that included mobilizing residents' responses to the government's call for observance of laws; leading the masses in maintaining social order and public security and settling disputes among residents; and in constraining "traitors, spies and thieves" and eliminating "counterrevolutionaries."

The lowest level of government having a police station was that of the rural people's commune and the town; in urban areas, this meant that an average of eleven patrolmen were to control an area containing some 15,000 people, perhaps more. The patrolman clearly could not know personally all the people and their particular problems along his beat; he needed help. The local people's governments and congresses shared responsibility for public order, but they had no specialist personnel for the task. The armed forces were available, but they had other primary concerns. They could put down a disturbance but had limited utility for the day-to-day process of discovering unrest and preventing disorder.

To close this gap and to extend the government's control, a system of neighborhoods or streets was established on a nationwide basis in 1954. The broad charter for these neighborhood committees included responsibility "to manage those affairs relating to the work of residents that are turned over to them by the people's councils of cities and city-administered districts." Such a committee usually controlled from 10,000 to 20,000 people and consisted of three to seven full-time cadres. After the Cultural Revolution, the neighborhood committee was expanded in size and functions. It was specifically responsible for maintaining public order, and it was accountable to the people's congress at the same level.

Beneath neighborhood committees were residents' committees and residents' small groups, also established in 1954. These were true grass-roots organizations, staffed by unpaid local residents elected by the masses. They extended the government, involved the people in controlling their neighborhoods, and reduced the demands upon the formal state institutions. A residents' committee supervised 100 to 600 families with a staff of seven to seventeen members, one from each subordinate residents' group. A residents' small group controlled fifteen to forty households (see Urban Social Organization, ch. 3).

In the countryside, organization was just as pervasive but structured along military lines. The commune was the lowest level of government organization, with its administrative committee equaling the local people's government in the urban areas. Communes were subdivided into production brigades of about 1,000 persons or 200–300 households and production teams of about twenty–fifty households or 100–250 persons (see Rural Social Organization, ch. 3). Each team elected a people's committee, which sent a representative to the committee at brigade level. Physical control was mostly the responsibility of the militia units organized at the team, brigade, and commune. Fisherman too were well organized and controlled. Their families remained behind when they put to sea, and secret policemen were present in each group of five to fifteen boats.

With the antirightist movement of mid-1957 and the Great Leap Forward, the "mass line" emerged. The antirightist campaign halted the trend toward legal professionalism, which was seen as threatening to party control. The party leadership resolutely declared its power was absolute in legal matters. The Great Leap Forward sought to rekindle revolutionary spirit among the people. The "mass line," as it affected public order, advocated turning an increasing amount of the judicial and control work load over to the masses. This meant greater involvement and authority for the neighborhood committees and grass-roots mass organizations.

The residents' committees and small groups were staffed originally by housewives and retired personnel but grew to involve others as their functions expanded. The members were well-intended but largely uneducated and unskilled. Gradually, they set up child-care centers and cooperatives for marketing, cooking, laundry, and housecleaning services. They became involved in road and building maintenance, volunteer fire fighting, sanitation, and health clinics. They operated a variety of small factories and workshops. Their pervasive presence made them a primary vehicle for disseminating propaganda, and their grass-roots nature allowed for effective use of peer pressure in mediating disputes and controlling troublemakers. Perhaps 4 or 5 percent of the adult population exercised some authority in what Victor Li, one of the leading students in the West of the Chinese legal system, described as "participatory democracy in an extended form."

Particularly important in controlling the people were the functional subunits, the residents' committees and residents' small groups. The people's mediation committees settled minor disputes and disagreements using conciliation and peer pressure. The security defense committees assisted the police in the routine aspects of maintaining public order, particularly in the countryside. There were from time to time other committees, but generally they were not concerned with public order.

The mediation committee was guided and supervised jointly by the basic people's court and the public security station. A natural outgrowth of traditional preferences for local mediation of disputes, mediation committees were established originally in communist areas during the Civil War. Upon taking over the major cities of China in 1949, the Communists were confronted with a tremendous backlog of judicial cases. Mediation committees provided a means of clearing up these disputes while actively propagandizing and involving the people in the new communist government.

After 1954 a mediation committee consisted of three to eleven members drawn from the residents' groups. Mediation committees were set up in neighborhoods, stores, schools, enterprises, factories, and workshops in the cities, and in the production brigades and teams in the countryside. Their task was to settle disputes, strengthen popular unity, promote production and order, and conduct propaganda. Parties in dispute came voluntarily to the committee, and the people seemed to feel they at least must try mediation before proceeding to a lawsuit. According to Jerome Alan Cohen, author of numerous works on the Chinese legal system: "The Chinese mediator may merely perform the function of an errand boy who maintains contact between parties who refuse to talk to one another. At the other end of the spectrum, he may not only establish communication between parties, but may also define the issues, decide questions of fact, specifically recommend the terms of a reasonable settlement—perhaps even give a tentative or advisory decision—and mobilize such strong political, economic, social and moral pressures upon one or both parties as to leave little option but that of 'voluntary' acquiescence." In addition to the committees, other officials, policemen, party members, and work supervisors were expected to serve as mediators. Members of the residents' committees and groups who were not part of the mediation committees likewise were involved in the process.

The lay mediators inevitably made mistakes and exceeded their authority. They resolved disputes by a show of hands, subjecting disputants to criticism and "struggle meetings." Gradually the committees assumed a quasi-official status so that the courts would not consider cases unless mediation had been tried first. In 1954 the government passed rules designed to curb the abuses and to make it clear that mediation was not compulsory.

Separate adjudication committees were established in the factories and mines and under the supervision of party, government, and public security officials. They dealt with industrial accidents, negligence, theft, and breaches of discipline at the work place. Their authority included asking the management to impose reprimands, demotion, or dismissal upon the offenders. They also conducted propaganda among the workers.

In the rural areas the wide dispersion of production brigades and teams strained the capabilities of the public security stations and necessitated the formation in 1952 of security defense committees. They too were grass-roots, volunteer organizations under the supervision of a public security cadre and the administration of the commune. Their relative isolation, however, gave them considerable authority. Apparently they were successful because a national conference of cadres in Beijing in November 1979 concluded that public security was generally better in the countryside than in the cities. Security defense committees also were established in the cities, but closer police supervision there reduced their influence. In relatively small, well-administered areas, a security defense member of the residents' committee was designated in lieu of another committee.

The proliferation of committees with public order responsibilities in late 1980 was considerably wider than can be detailed here. At the top of the organizational maze was the Party itself. Along with its auxiliary, the CYL, it permeated every government office, work place, and community (see ch. 10, Party and Government). Other mass organizations specialized in the concerns of workers, peasants, youths, women, students, soldiers, and so on. In common among all these organizations from national to grass-roots levels were the procedures used for control.

The principle of mutual surveillance capitalized on a Chinese tradition of social and political conformity and developed to a fine degree after 1949. Cadres at all levels used forms of public criticism to control the people. "Struggle sessions" were held to persuade, educate, and criticize an offender, who was under tremendous pressure to admit guilt and criticize himself or herself. The accused understood that confession was rewarded with leniency, while failure to confess was evidence of a "bad attitude" deserving severe punishment. Denouncing family and friends was a meritorious way to get ahead. Those suspected of criminal activity or harboring counterrevolutionary thoughts were watched constantly. The social ostracism was severe, and frequently those under suspicion for some minor infraction buckled under the pressure and committed or were judged to commit a serious offense. Treatment was unequal; those with influence were able to flaunt the system while others less fortunate received harsh punishment.

Propaganda aimed at supplementing rules and enforcement with willing compliance. While the new laws defined crimes and other punishable offenses, "communist morality" dictated further norms of behavior. It was to be invoked whenever the law proved ineffective to censure and to discredit offenders, thus striking "relentless blows" on the enemy. Grass-roots organizations used full-time propaganda cadres, lecturers, teachers, announcers, and storytellers to get the message across (see *The Mass media*, ch. 10).

The Armed Forces

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the militia shared in the responsibility for internal security and public order. In late 1980 the PLA was intent on professionalizing and modernizing to meet external threats, and consequently its involvement in public security was at the lowest point since before the Cultural Revolution. Nevertheless, large PLA garrison commands were present in the major cities and, along with the internal security divisions, were guarding primarily against internal threats. An internal security division was roughly half the size of a main-force infantry division and armed with weapons that included antitank guns and howitzers. It routinely conducted foot and mounted patrols and was available to suppress riots or disorder.

The PLA's involvement in internal affairs reached a zenith during the massive civil disorder of the Cultural Revolution. At that time the Mao-Lin Biao group within the CCP resolved to purge the Party of "capitalist-roaders" and unleashed millions of Red Guard (see Glossary) students to bombard party headquarters and engage in a rekindling of revolutionary enthusiasm (see the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–68), ch. 1). The military tried to remain uninvolved, but there was chaos throughout China. The PLA was ordered to support the Red Guards with transportation and even arms. Perceiving that the public security cadres were protecting precisely the party leaders he wished to purge, Mao soon directed the Red Guards to crush the police, courts, and procuratorates as well. The Minister of Public Security was purged, soon followed by the ministers for the courts and procuratorates. It was estimated later that 400,000 people died during the mayhem.

The PLA was ordered to intervene and restore order in late January 1967 (although Mao's directives to the military equivocated in later months), and it gradually took over the public security forces by establishing military control committees within the bureaus. New people's revolutionary committees were set up to run the provinces and municipalities, usually with a PLA cadre in charge. In April the military was told to cease making arbitrary arrests and firing on the mass demonstrations and virtually was ordered not to defend itself or its installations. With the armed forces in check, the Red Guard zealots again ran rampant. In September the restrictions on the PLA were relaxed, and order gradually returned. By the summer of 1968 nineteen of the twenty-nine provincial-level people's revolutionary committees were headed by PLA cadres. The Red Guards were being disbanded, and mass trials were used to punish and intimidate rioters.

At this point the PLA was running the country, but it badly needed help from experienced police officers. A policy of leniency toward most former officials evolved, and some public security cadres returned to work. The PLA also recruited inexperienced people to form auxiliary police units. These units were mass organizations with a variety of names reflecting their factional orientation. Perhaps best known was the "Attack with Reason, Defend with Force Corps" named for the militant slogan of Mao's wife, Jiang Qing. The public security forces were composed largely of amateurs and lacked the disciplined informant networks and personnel dossiers previously used to maintain order.

Beginning in 1968 the PLA helped to send millions of urban dwellers from the overcrowded cities down to the countryside and to transport cashiered officials to special cadre schools for indoctrination and labor. The migration to the country mostly involved students and other youths for whom there simply were not enough jobs or places in the school system within the cities. Yet despite the discontent these campaigns caused, reported crime declined after

1970. Increased concern over the threat from the Soviet Union forced the PLA gradually to return to the barracks, and control of the country reverted to the civilian leadership.

The Central Security Regiment, or "unit 8341," was the Beijing-based, PLA element that over the years was responsible for the physical security of Mao Zedong. More than a bodyguard force, it also operated a nationwide intelligence network to root out plots against Mao or any incipient threat to the regime. The unit reportedly was deep in intrigues over the years, discovering electronic "bugs" in Mao's office and surveilling his rivals. Reported to number 10,000 troops, it was "8341" that arrested the Gang of Four in late 1976. Little is known of its activities today.

Together with the PLA, the militia also was involved in late 1980 in maintaining public order. The urban militia had been expanded since 1973 and was controlled primarily by the municipal leadership. It was the urban militia, along with the public security forces, that broke up the demonstrators around Zhou Enlai's memorial in April 1976—the event that served as the pretext for the second purge of Deng Xiaoping (see China in Transition, ch. 1). In rural areas the militia was more under the control of the PLA.

Punishment

China retained the death penalty in 1980. Certain crimes resulted in prompt execution. On most occasions, however, the convicted criminal would be sentenced to death with a stay of execution for two years during which he or she might demonstrate reform and thus have the sentence reduced. Not demonstrating adequate repentance and reform during the two years of hard labor could result in the execution being carried out. Mao was credited with the idea, which some observers found cruel. The procedure appeared to be a humane one, however, which obviated many executions.

The overwhelming majority of those imprisoned were sentenced to a form of hard labor. There were two categories: the criminal sanction "reform through labor" and the administrative penalty of "reeducation through labor." The former could be any fixed number of years, while the latter might be indeterminate but usually lasted three or four years. In fact, both categories ended up at the same camps, which were usually state farms or mines, but occasionally were factory prisons in the city.

The original regulations on "reeducation through labor" were introduced in August 1957 and supplemented in November 1979. The supplement created labor training administration committees consisting of members of the local government, public security office, and labor department. The police, government, or a work place could recommend that an individual be assigned to "reeducation through labor," and, if the labor training administration committee agreed, it was imposed without further process. The police reportedly made heavy use of the procedure, especially with urban youths, and probably used it to move unemployed, youthful, potential troublemakers out of the cities.

The people's procuratorates supervised the prisons, ensuring compliance with the law. Prisoners worked eight hours a day, six days a week, and had their food and clothing provided. They studied politics, law, state policies, and current events two hours daily, half of that in group discussion. They were forbidden to read anything not provided by the prison, to speak dialects not understood by the guards, or to keep cash, gold, jewelry, or other goods useful in an escape. Mail was censored, and generally only one visitor allowed each month. Prison authorities determined whether prisoners who had completed their sentences would be allowed to return to their place of origin, and upon deciding to do so, could keep prisoners on as free laborers.

Prisoners were told that their sentences could be reduced if they showed signs of repentance and rendered meritorious service. Any number of reductions could be earned totaling up to one-half the original sentence, but at least ten years of a life sentence had to be served. Probation or parole involved surveillance by the public security office or a grass-roots organization to which the convict periodically reported.

Prospects

Under China's new rule by law in late 1980, counterrevolutionary crimes were the most grave, and the authorities retained wide latitude in dealing with them. Discrimination continued intermittently on the basis of class background and against persons referred to as "capped" (individuals deprived of their political rights.) Such a person would receive 10 to 20 percent lower wages for the same work as others getting full pay and would be denied free medical service others enjoyed; he was disenfranchised and barred from political meetings; he generally would get the lowliest jobs in the commune or work place; he was discriminated against on applying for advanced education; and his children were socially ostracized from an early age. Of course, he was continually anxious lest another repressive campaign sweep across China.

Prospects in 1980 were that the situation for personal freedom would not improve soon. The party Central Committee recommended that the "four bigs"—"speaking out, airing views, debating in a big way, and writing big-character posters"—be abolished. The NPC agreed, and it was announced that the new state constitution to be produced in 1981 would delete them.

By the same token, however, a dramatic loosening of controls at all levels had already occurred in the preceding two to three years. As a single example, minority peoples were being accorded some new considerations. Tibetans were finding the government more benign to their religion, monasteries, and monks, and the government went out of its way to avoid appearing to repress religion.

Uygurs, Kirgiz, and Tajik people in southern Xinjiang Autonomous Region, beset by poverty and low levels of agricultural productivity, were extended tax and interest relief, incentives, and some welfare.

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Readers with continuing interest in law in traditional China should see *Law and Society in Traditional China*, by T'ung-tsu Ch'ii; "The Role of Law in Traditional China," by Franz Michael in *Chinese Society under Communism*, edited by William T. Liu; and *Law in Imperial China*, by Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris. Readers more interested in studying traditional legal practices still in use in China should see *Law and Justice: The Legal System in China, 2400 B.C. to 1960 A.D.*, by Phillip M. Chen, and *Chinese Law Past and Present*, by Fu-shun Lin.

There are surprisingly few recent books devoted exclusively to the Chinese communist legal system, and many of these suffer from either cultural or political bias. The following books appear to be the most straightforward: *Justice in Communist China*, by Leng Shao-chuan; *The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China, 1949–1963*, by Jerome Alan Cohen; and *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, by Franz Schurmann.

The best scholarly works on enforcement in China are: *Law Without Lawyers*, by Victor H. Li; "The Public Security Bureau and Political-Legal Work," also by Li in *The City in Communist China*, edited by John Wilson Lewis; and "Crime and Punishment: China and the U.S.," by Richard M. Pheffer in *Contemporary Chinese Law*, edited by Jerome Alan Cohen. *Fanshen*, by William Hinton, is an outstanding account of the methods of social control used by the Communists in one village shortly after liberation. *Prisoners of Liberation*, by Allyn and Adele Rickett, is likewise a firsthand account of life in a communist prison related by two Americans.

The reader interested in studying the Chinese legal system can find considerably more information in primary sources and should consult *The Sample Index to Daily Report: People's Republic of China, Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, edited by Sylvia S. Tarasoff, Elsie Lim, and Susan S. Stacey. A wealth of secondary literature can be found each month in the *China Quarterly's* "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation" section (contained in each issue) as well as in the indexes of the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *China News Analysis*. There are also numerous articles listed in the *Journal of Asian Studies* annual bibliography issue where references are cited for such periodicals as: *American Journal of Comparative Law*, *Chinese Law and Government*, *Contemporary China*, *Studies in Comparative Communism*, *Chinese Business Review*, *Columbia Law Review*, *China Forum*, *Problems of Communism*, and *Asian Thought and Society*. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 14. National Defense

Artist's rendition of the terra-cotta figure of a warrior unearthed near Xi'an at the tomb of China's first emperor. Qin Dynasty (221–207 B.C.).

THE PRIMARY MISSION of the People's Liberation Army (PLA)—the collective name for the armed forces—is the defense of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), but over the years the PLA has assumed additional roles as well. It is charged with the deterrence and defeat of an attack upon Chinese territory and with supporting the foreign policy objectives of the People's Republic of China. It also trains the militia, aids in the maintenance of internal security, and participates in agriculture, industry, construction, and other areas of national development.

At the start of the 1980s the PLA provided the country with a credible, conventional defense-in-depth on the land, at sea, and in the air, but it lacked offensive capability more than a short distance beyond the external borders and was vulnerable to nuclear, biological, and chemical attack. The nation's small but effective nuclear deterrent was based upon a policy of "no first use," and efforts were made to ensure that some missiles would survive an enemy attack to retaliate in kind.

Beyond this, the country relied on numerical superiority—with the world's largest standing army and the third largest air and naval forces—and on a defensive strategy of trading space for time. Deterrence was enhanced by a huge and well-organized population that could be mobilized to support the regular forces as militia units; an army invading overland would face increasingly stronger regular defenses and the "aroused and mobilized masses." Coastal defense involved successive rings of submarines; missile destroyers and frigates supported by shore-based naval air forces; and smaller missile and torpedo boats. Naval shore batteries of missiles and guns were backed by ground forces deployed in depth. The air force emphasized air defense with superior numbers, but like the other services relied on obsolescent equipment.

In the leadership's evaluation, the country's "enemy number one" in 1980 was the Soviet Union, a superpower seeking "global hegemonism" and intent upon encircling China with Soviet client states. As the United States withdrew its forces from Indochina in the early 1970s, China's perception of an American threat diminished radically; by 1980 the United States in fact was viewed as a necessary counterweight to the Soviet Union. On its borders with the Soviet Union, China faced 25 percent of that country's ground and tactical air forces, and the formidable Soviet Pacific Fleet was expanding. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Vietnam) dependent upon Soviet economic and military aid and was less able to refuse the Soviets the naval and air bases they sought. Official Chinese commentators viewed Vietnam as Moscow's "Cuba of the East," a "regional hegemonist" challenging Chinese influence in Southeast

Asia. Beijing perceived the Soviets and their Vietnamese allies as determined aggressors, the former most recently in Afghanistan and the latter in Laos, Kampuchea (formerly Cambodia), and Thailand. China deployed 50 percent of its forces along the Soviet and Mongolian borders, and a much reinforced southern frontier was the scene of repeated clashes with the Vietnamese.

Conscious of the Soviet threat, the party leadership in 1980 was committed to a policy of military modernization. Although national defense officially ranked fourth behind agriculture, industry, and science and technology among the "four modernizations" (see Glossary), it still was seen as crucial. The National Defense Science and Technology Commission stressed: "If anyone still thinks it's possible to use broadswords against guided missiles and other nuclear weapons . . . this is a foolish and even criminal attitude." The PLA, of course, stood to gain from technological advances made by all sectors of the economy.

Modernization of the PLA has been controversial among the top leadership for more than twenty years, opponents arguing that if it did not take place hand in hand with political indoctrination, party control of the armed forces could be undermined. By 1980, however, such fears appeared to have been overidden by concern over possible Soviet encroachment. The party leadership reached a fragile consensus and seemed confident of its ability to ensure a harmonious relationship among itself, the PLA, and the people. It wanted a modernized army responsive to its orders, one it could control readily and which was at once "red" and "expert." The military anxiously wanted to modernize—partly to correct deficiencies revealed in its invasion of Vietnam in 1979—but was resigned first to improving China's industrial production and technology. As for the Chinese people, they saw the PLA as their own—a people's army—belonging to the country and to the whole society. In late 1980, however, latent signs of possible difficulty in civil/military relations could be discerned in the context of China's inadequate defense against the Soviet threat and a military budget cut.

The Armed Forces

General Development

The PLA was organized as the armed forces of the Party and remains under CCP control today. The Common Program, a precursor of the first constitution, placed control of the armed forces in the hands of a twenty-two member People's Revolutionary Military Council, headed by Party Chairman Mao Zedong. Later constitutions conformed to this precedent: the State Constitution of 1978 designated the party chairman commander in chief of the armed forces and head of the party's Military Commission, which oversees the PLA (see fig. 16, ch. 10).

China traces the official founding of the PLA to the Nanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927. Until early that year, the CCP and the

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nationalists had cooperated in a United Front against the warlords, but in the spring Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek turned on his communist allies, massacring many in Shanghai and launching a series of crackdowns. The CCP revolted in turn, led in the unsuccessful Nanchang fighting by Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Lin Biao, all of whom later figured prominently in the Chinese leadership, and by Mao himself in the equally ill-fated Autumn Harvest Insurrection (see Nationalism and Communism, ch. 1). The survivors of these and other incidents came together in the spring of 1928 and formed the First Workers' and Peasants' Army, a ragged collection of dedicated Communists, bandits, and deserters from Chiang's army that was the real beginning of the PLA.

When the PLA became a national armed force in 1949, it was a swollen, unwieldy mass of over 5 million men, still battling pockets of Nationalist resistance and increasingly involved in administration and reconstruction tasks. By Mao's estimate, there were still some 400,000 enemies at large on the mainland, and the Nationalists held numerous offshore islands. In October 1949 some 20,000 communist soldiers were lost in an unsuccessful attempt to take the island of Quemoy. The islands of Hainan and Zhoushan were taken, and in June 1950 the Third Field Army completed its training for an attempt against Taiwan. Meanwhile, the other four field armies were extending communist control into the western reaches of China and reconstructing the roads and rail network in the densely populated eastern segment of the country.

In 1950 massive demobilization of ill-trained or politically unreliable troops, mostly defectors from Chiang's army, reduced the regular ground forces to about 3 million men. The Chinese claimed the militia had an additional 5.5 million men, and the fledgling air force and navy numbered about 10,000 and 60,000 respectively.

Despite the monumental tasks of consolidation and reconstruction, Mao ordered the seizure of Tibet, known today as Xizang Autonomous Region, which began in October 1950. Better suited to the army's capabilities than amphibious assaults, the campaign was characterized by a quick routing of the vastly outnumbered Tibetan army, but attacks by fierce tribesmen and the need to build roads through the mountains delayed the operation. More than a year passed before PLA units reached the Tibetan capital, and their control over what Beijing regarded as traditional Chinese territory was tenuous at best. The Tibetans later revolted again (1956–59) but were crushed with the aid of newly acquired Soviet aircraft and artillery.

The Korean War (1950–53) was a watershed in the development of the People's Republic and its armed forces. It presented the People's Republic with its first external enemy and an opportunity quickly to unify the torn country against the "western imperialists." In the aftermath, the Chinese leadership and people enjoyed the confidence of having fought the United States and its allies to a standstill. At the same time, however, deficiencies in PLA equipment and tactics were demonstrated painfully. Initially, the PLA was successful with its incomparable skills at infiltration and stealth, but the lightly equipped Chinese troops were slaughtered in "human wave attacks" against the UN's modern firepower, and the PLA soon realized that the narrow Korean peninsula lacked the space needed to use People's War tactics (see Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, this ch.). The Chinese practice of supplying the army with captured weapons did not work in Korea. Troops were often short of food, medical supplies, and ammunition. The obvious need for heavier weapons, air power, and a more efficient logistical system provided the impetus to modernize the PLA with Soviet advice, weapons and production technology.

A thirty-year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union, signed in February 1950, made possible the transformation of the PLA from a massive guerrilla army to a national armed force with heavy weapons, aircraft, and a navy. With Soviet aid, the PLA and China's national defense structure were reorganized completely. A National Defense Council and a Ministry of National Defense were established in 1954, and conscription and military ranks and titles along the Soviet model were introduced the next year. By 1956 China was producing small arms and artillery and had MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighters and IL-28 light jet bombers—some of them assembled in China.

In the late 1950s Mao's dramatic break with the Soviet Union and "antirightist" drives for economic development coalescing in the Great Leap Forward Campaign of 1958–60 (see Glossary) resulted in the abandonment of the military modernization effort and the shunting aside of its advocates. Gradual regrouping of those favoring modernization of the armed forces occurred in fits and starts during the next two decades in accordance with the pendulum swings in China's internal politics. By late 1980, however, there appeared to be virtual unanimity in China on the need for military modernization with debate only about how best to accomplish it (see Military Modernization: The Unfolding Story, this ch.).

Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics

Mao's military doctrine known as "People's War" was developed in the 1930s and 1940s to compensate for the inferiority—at least initially—of his forces compared with those of the Nationalists. Mao perceived that China's abundant manpower, vast space, and rough terrain could be used to military advantage. He freely borrowed from the fourth century B.C. Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, Lenin, and others, and incorporated his military doctrine within a formula for protracted psychological, economic, and military struggle. Political and economic grievances were incorporated into the revolution in order to win the cooperation of the people as a source of military manpower, food and intelligence.

"People's War" reversed Lenin's model of urban revolution and stressed securing rural areas before attacking cities. It called for establishing base areas to rest and train the troops but rejected defending them or other territory in favor of an "active" defense in depth with incessant counterattacks. China's vastness permitted "luring the enemy in deep" to extend and disperse his forces and annihilate them piecemeal.

The doctrine prescribed three phases of protracted warfare—the strategic defensive, stalemate, and offensive—and mobilization of the entire population. The initially weak guerrilla units expanded until they could seize the initiative and employ conventional warfare decisively. Mao organized his troops into main and regional forces, backed by militia units. This accorded with his belief that "this army is powerful because of its division into two parts, the main forces and the regional forces, with the former available for operations in any region whenever necessary and the latter concentrating on defending its own localities and attacking the enemy there in cooperation with the local militia and the self-defense corps." He strengthened morale by stressing man's dominance over weapons, and he distributed equipment collected on the battlefield to all units, giving priority to the main forces. Tactics emphasized deception, surprise, psychological warfare, close combat, and night fighting in order to preserve the guerrilla forces and negate the enemy's advantage in weapons. The troops remained dispersed except shortly before an attack, when they concentrated to achieve a local advantage as high as six-to-one.

In the early 1950s Mao's doctrine was modified to accommodate the shift from revolution to national defense and changed again in the 1960s to reflect global advances in technology requiring a defense against nuclear as well as conventional attack. The official doctrine of the 1980s—"People's War under Modern Conditions"—was a marriage of old and new, the indispensable aspects of Mao's original principles modified in the more permissive post-Mao period to fit the circumstances of modern warfare. It was doctrine in the broad sense, encompassing grand strategy, small unit tactics, and the enduring factors of force size, structure, composition, and mission.

The doctrine included at least four basic concepts: defense of the homeland, nuclear deterrence, limited warfare beyond China's borders, and revolutionary war—or "Wars of National Liberation." China's limited industrial base and continuing requirements for the PLA to engage in militia training would not allow China to discard the basic principles of People's War until at least the twenty-first century.

Military doctrine remained based upon the realities of China's population, geography, and the relative inferiority of its armed

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forces. It postulated that long-range, nuclear weapons could not defeat China without a ground invasion utilizing conventional and possibly tactical nuclear weapons, and that in any case the country's vast area, huge population, and dispersed industry made it less vulnerable to nuclear attack than is a highly developed country such as the United States. Deterrence rested on the proposition that much of China's war-fighting capabilities would survive a nuclear attack, and an invader would have to defeat the PLA and pacify the "aroused and mobilized" populace of overrun areas.

China's nuclear deterrent doctrine rested on two premises: one, Beijing vowed that it would not use nuclear weapons first—thus an enemy did not need to feel compelled to use them; two, China's nuclear forces emphasized dispersion and partial mobility to convince an enemy that it could not be certain of destroying them all with one strike. Given the country's marked nuclear inferiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union—its likely adversary in a nuclear war—China would be unwise to initiate nuclear conflict and probably would not do so.

Although China's missiles were liquid fueled and required lengthy preparations before launch, they were deployed secretly and many could be moved from their garrisons during crisis periods. The missiles were relatively inaccurate, thus the Chinese could retaliate only against cities and other large area targets. Nuclear bombs could be dropped on troop concentrations in a tactical nuclear role. China had been dispersing, hardening, and camouflaging military installations and military industrial sites since at least 1961 and building civilian shelters since at least 1969.

"People's War under Modern Conditions" was not simply People's War plus advanced weapons. The PLA continued to rely on large numbers of troops and obsolescent but still effective, 1950s-vintage equipment, as it selectively modernized its matériel. The military sought to become more professional by streamlining organization and improving training. A modern PLA should be able to fight farther forward than "luring in deep" implies. Positional or "passive" defense was acceptable where rough terrain could multiply the PLA's effectiveness, as in the mountainous Northeast.

Although China since the late 1970s has reduced its support to "Wars of National Liberation," there still was an "export" version of People's War. Designed to include all Mao's original principles, it included these four key ingredients for success: there had to be an organized communist party of dedicated revolutionaries to lead the struggle; that party had to gain the support of other groups through the formation of united fronts; the party had to have an army that was loyal, mostly self-sufficient, and capable; and finally, the army needed secure base areas, usually in rough terrain and often along borders. Lin Biao's glorification of Mao's doctrine in the mid-1960s—"Long Live the Victory of People's War"—offered this formula for revolution to the undeveloped countries of the Third

World. It also seemed to tell North Vietnam to practice self-reliance, that a revolution could be fought successfully only by the people of the country involved. Thus China would provide limited aid, but it probably would not commit its own troops. China sidelined its support to wars of national liberation in an effort to establish government-to-government relations with a larger number of countries (see ch. 12, Foreign Relations).

Paradoxically the PLA is known as a defensive armed force, but in all conflicts since 1949 it has never practiced "luring in deep" or fought well inside China's borders. Generally, China's conflicts have been brief and shallow offensives and limited in the forces employed. For example, the Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the invasion of Vietnam in 1979 were shallow, ground-forces incursions of thirty-three and twenty-seven days respectively. They were described as "counterattacks," and they resulted at least partly from perceived threats to Chinese territory. They were limited to reduce costs and risks and also because the PLA has so little offensive capability.

Organization and Equipment

At the apex of Chinese military organization was the Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee headed by the party chairman (see fig. 19). In addition to the chairman, the commission in late 1980 included ten members of the Politburo, among them its five vice chairmen and its secretary general. The commission decided both policy and operational questions. Responsible to it were: the General Staff Department (GSD—operations), the General Political Department (GPD—indoctrination), and the General Logistics Department (GLD—logistics). Below the department level ran parallel chains of command for operational, political, and logistical matters, each with its own separate communications facilities. This was the basis of the checks and balances system in the PLA.

The Ministry of National Defense provided administrative support. It had responsibility for planning, manpower, budget, foreign liaison, and providing training materials but was outside the policy-making or implementation spheres.

Military policy originated in the Politburo or the Military Commission, became an operational order at the GSD level, flowed through the military region (MR)—time permitting—to avoid confusion, and arrived at a main-force unit. Orders to regional forces also passed through the military district level.

The GSD, which is headed by the Chief of Staff, contained directorates for eight service arms: the air force, navy, Second Artillery Corps (the strategic missile forces), as well as the Armored Corps, Artillery Corps, Engineer Corps, Capital Construction Engineer Corps, and the Railway Engineer Corps. The GSD included offices functionally organized for operations, training, intelligence, mobilization, unit organization, surveying, communications and


Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee
Ministry of National Defense
Military Industrial Complex
National Defense Science and Technology Commission
Military Training Schools
(Coordination)
PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY
General Logistics Department
General Staff Department
General Political Department
SERVICE ARMS
Air Force
Armored Corps
Artillery Corps
Capital Construction Engineer Corps
Engineer Corps
Navy
Railway Engineer Corps
Second Artillery Corps
East Sea Fleet
North Sea Fleet
South Sea Fleet
MILITARY REGIONS
Beijing
Chengdu
Fuzhou
Guangzhou
Jinan
Kunming
Lanzhou
Nanjing
Shenyang
Urumqi
Wuhan
MILITARY DISTRICTS
Hebei
Nei Monggol
Shanxi
Sichuan
Xizang
Fujian
Jiangxi
Guangdong
Guangxi
Hainan
Hunan
Shandong
Guizhou
Yunnan
Gansu
Ningxia
Qinghai
Shaanxi
Anhui
Jiangsu
Zhejiang
Heilongjiang
Jilin
Liaoning
East Xinjiang
North Xinjiang
South Xinjiang
Henan
Hubei

Figure 19. Military Organization

military schools. The GSD itself, rather than a subordinate office, served as headquarters for the army, which seemed to indicate the supremacy of the ground forces. The directorate for the navy controlled the North, East and South Sea Fleets, while the other directorates generally exercised control through the commanders of the eleven military regions.

The GPD was headed by the PLA's top commissar (see The Officer Corps, this ch.). It was responsible for political loyalty, indoctrination, and the administration of justice in the military. The GPD carried out these responsibilities through the widespread presence of party members and the formal chain of commissars equal in authority to the commanders at each echelon in the PLA. Virtually anyone in a position of authority in the military was a party member. The effort was made to have a party or Communist Youth League (CYL) member in every unit down to the smallest maneuver element. One of the primary tasks of the officer was the supervision of the party organization in his unit. Party committees existed at all organizations of battalion level or higher, while companies had a party branch.

The GLD was charged with logistical functions that included production, supply, transportation, housing, pay, and medical support. Historically, much of this support came from the civilian populace, and prior to the establishment of the GLD, it was handled most often by commissars. PLA logistical resources in 1980 were far less than those found in Western or Soviet Forces, and the Chinese military was heavily dependent upon the militia and civilians in wartime.

Each of the eleven MRs in 1980 contained between one and four military districts, which appeared to be geographically identical to provinces. Nuclear forces were subordinate directly to Beijing. Conventional main, regional, and militia units were controlled administratively by the MR commanders, but the GSD in Beijing could contact directly and command any main-force unit at will. Thus, broadly speaking, the GSD exercised operational control of the main forces, and the MR commanders controlled the regional forces and, indirectly, the militia.

Military units were organized on a triangular basis, the largest tactical formation in peacetime being the army—roughly equivalent to a corps in the United States Army. (PLA organization and echelons were: squad, platoon, company, battalion, regiment, division, and army, organized triangularly.)

In 1980 combined strength of combat and combat support units was about 4.3 million. Ground forces numbered about 3.6 million—the world's largest standing army; the navy about 350,000—including those assigned to the naval air forces; and the air force about 400,000. No separate estimate of China's missile units was available. Another 3 or 4 million uniformed personnel served in administrative and service support units. The PLA was

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supported by an estimated 7 million armed militia and 100 million or more unarmed militia. Despite the PLA's size, China, with its huge population, had only half the ratio of regular armed forces to men of military age as did the United States.

Ground Forces

The ground forces consisted of conventionally armed main and regional units and in late 1980 made up over 80 percent of the PLA. They provided a good conventional defense but had only limited offensive potential and were ill suited to nuclear, biological, or chemical warfare. Main forces included about forty armies, including one airborne army. Independent divisions numbered eleven armored, about forty artillery and antiaircraft artillery (AA), and fifteen or more engineer, plus 150 independent regiments of mostly support troops. Regional forces included about eighty-five divisions of border defense, garrison, and internal security troops, plus 130 independent regiments.

A main-force army included 43,000 troops in three partially motorized infantry divisions and two regiments of artillery and AA. Each division had over 12,000 personnel in three infantry regiments, a regiment each of artillery and armor, and one battalion of AA. Organization was flexible,—higher echelons free to tailor forces for combat around any number of infantry divisions. Each division at least theoretically had its own armor and artillery—actual equipment levels were unknown and probably varied—and the assets at army level and within the independent units could be apportioned as needed.

The PLA's one airborne army was technically part of the air force and had three lightly equipped divisions of about 9,000 men each. Once delivered to the battle area, it was a foot-soldier force with few, if any, weapons heavier than mortars and recoilless guns.

Armor, artillery, and other units primarily supported the infantry. The eleven armored divisions each had up to 300 medium tanks but lacked adequate mechanized infantry support. There was little evidence of armored personnel carriers during the China-Vietnam border conflict in 1979, and tanks were used to support dismounted infantry and as mobile artillery. Artillery forces emphasized towed guns and howitzers, but truck-mounted multiple rocket launchers appeared in increasing numbers. Self-propelled (SP) artillery was virtually nonexistent, and the PLA appeared to be producing rocket launchers as a cheaper but not totally effective alternative to SP guns. There was a variety of construction equipment, mobile bridging, trucks, and prime movers. A new multiple rocket launcher for scattering antitank mines appeared in 1979, but mine-laying and clearing equipment remained scarce.

Regional forces were full-time PLA troops organized as independent divisions for border defense, garrison, and internal security missions. Border defense units were reconnaissance forces deployed along frontiers to give early warning of attack and offer initial resistance. Garrison divisions were static, artillery-heavy units deployed along the coastline and borders in areas of likely attack. Internal security divisions were lightly armed infantry whose main responsibility was maintaining law and order. Regional forces were armed less heavily than their main-force counterparts, and were involved deeply in training the militia. They were the PLA units commonly used to restore order during the Cultural Revolution (see Glossary).

The ground forces in 1980 relied upon obsolescent but serviceable equipment and were most anxious to improve defenses against armored vehicles and aircraft. Most equipment was produced from Soviet designs of the 1950s. There was no evidence of tactical nuclear weapons, but atomic demolition munitions probably were available and nuclear bombs and missiles could be used in a theater role. There was an acute scarcity of antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), tactical surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and electronics to improve communications, fire control, and sensors. China claimed to have mastered production of the Soviet Sagger antitank missile in 1979 but, if true, a more powerful, longer range, semiautomatic ATGM still was needed. China's only SAM, the CSA-1, a copy of the Soviet SA-2, was insufficiently mobile and ineffective against low-flying aircraft. The PLA required a mobile SAM and an infantry shoulder-fired missile for use against helicopters and some other aircraft.

Ground forces training progressed through an annual cycle that culminated in combined-arms and joint-service exercises but emphasized individual and small-unit skills throughout. Stamina and close fighting tactics are mainstays of this training. The cycle begins with recruit training in a special training division. After a few weeks the recruits join their units for the individual and small unit phases of the cycle. By autumn and winter, training expands to divisional, army, or occasional joint service exercises.

The Militia

The militia supported the PLA in three principal ways. It was the basis for the PLA's logistical support and wartime mobilization, thus enabling China to employ to considerable advantage its abundant manpower. Deterrence was enhanced because an invader not only would have to defeat the PLA, but also pacify the "aroused and mobilized masses." Finally, the militia involved people in national development tasks and improved the morale of an army and populace facing enemies with far more modern military forces. In peacetime the paramilitary militia fulfilled construction, production, and internal security functions.

In 1980 China's part-time militia was trained and led by the PLA and organized in three categories with different missions and levels of training and equipment. The best trained was the approximately 7-million-member "armed militia." The estimated 15–20 million "basic or backbone militia" included many ex-servicemen who



Defense against armored vehicles and enemy aircraft is a prime concern in ongoing efforts to augment and modernize People's Liberation Army equipment. Chinese-produced tanks of T-54

Soviet design on assembly line, top left. Fighter-bomber (above right) is A-5 design. Large surface vessel on left is navy's LUDA guided-missile equipped destroyer. Lower right - Troops use chemical decontamination equipment.

received some training but few arms. The least trained and capable were perhaps 60 to 200 million "ordinary militia," used primarily as a work force. Several million "urban militia" consisted of personnel of these three categories in the cities.

Organization was nominal at the national and regional levels; real control began with the provincial party committees and military district headquarters. Rural militia organization called for a division to be established at the county level, a regiment at each commune, a battalion at a production brigade (see Glossary), and a company at each production team. Urban militia units were organized at plants, schools, and so forth. For example, a plant employing 3,000 men reportedly had a militia division. Nevertheless, the militia probably never functioned as units larger than company or battalion size.

The militia would share in the fighting and support the regular PLA by providing replacement personnel, transporting supplies and casualties, constructing roads and defense works, and providng food. Its continuing importance in a modernizing China was clear; as one PLA spokesman said, "With a well-organized militia we can . . . maintain a small army in times of peace (while) mobilizing large numbers of troops in time of war. Army expenses thus saved can be used (for, among other goals) the modernization of armaments." Retired and discharged servicemen became militia cadre (see Glossary). As a fighting force, the militia defended localties and functioned as guerrillas behind enemy lines. It supported the regional forces in defending the cities and could tenaciously defend such built-up areas. Armed militia units had a full range of infantry weapons, light AA guns, and antitank artillery. Armed militia near the borders and coastline performed patrols and guard duty even in peacetime, and the urban militia had internal security responsibilities.

Primary control over the militia has shifted between the Party and the PLA over the years. During the civil war the militia served primarily as the army's support force. After 1949 the Party consolidated control over the country and gradually used the militia to maintain order and help the PLA with defense of the borders and coast. During and after the Great Leap Forward the Party expanded the militia, which then concentrated on production tasks and internal security rather than military training and defense. The militia fragmented during the Cultural Revolution, but since then has been rebuilt and redirected to support the armed forces. Its logistical support to the PLA was essential during the China-Vietnam border conflict of 1979.

In 1980 the Production and Construction Corps (PCC) appeared to have been abolished. Numbering about 3 to 4 million people and organized along military lines, the PCC earlier had been used in remote and unproductive areas to build roads; reclaim land; construct defense and water works; and operate mines, state farms, and industrial plants. A secondary mission was border defense, so some units were armed with light infantry weapons and all received basic military training. Unlike the militia, PCC personnel were full-time and uniformed. By late 1980 there was little mention of the PCC in China, and most units probably had been absorbed into the militia and the regional forces.

The Air Force

The primary mission of the air force was the defense of the mainland, and most aircraft were assigned to this role. A smaller number of ground attack and bomber units had interdiction and possibly close air support missions, and some bomber units could be used for nuclear delivery. The force had only limited military airlift and reconnaissance capabilities.

The air force in late 1980 reportedly had five branches: air defense, ground attack, bombing, reconnaissance, and the airborne troops. In peacetime the GSD controlled the air force via air army headquarters located with or in communication with each of the eleven MR headquarters. In war, control of the air force probably reverted to the regional commanders.

The PLA had thirty-two air defense and fighter bomber divisions and twelve bomber divisions, each with three regiments. A typical air defense regiment had three squadrons of about twelve aircraft each. The air force also controlled about 100 SAM sites and over 10,000 AAA guns. The PLA had a large number of early warning, ground control intercept, and air base radars manned by specialized troops organized into at least twenty-two independent regiments.

The Soviet Union established China's air force and began to provide aircraft in late 1951. Production technology came two years later. By 1956 China was assembling MiG-15s and eight years later could produce both the MiG-17 and the MiG-19 under license. Meanwhile, Soviet instructors were training the new pilots in Soviet tactics.

The Soviet aid withdrawal in 1960 crippled China's aircraft industry. It declined markedly through 1963, further aggravated by the high priority accorded to the competing missile and nuclear weapons program. It began to recover about 1965, however, when China began providing MiG-15s and MiG-17s to Vietnam.

Chinese pilots saw considerable action in the Korean War and, to a lesser extent, during the Formosa Strait crisis of 1958, which was the last time they were in combat. During the China-Vietnam border conflict, the Chinese probably avoided air battles at least partly because they lacked the confidence to challenge Vietnam's better armed and trained yet far smaller air force.

In 1980 annual flight hours were well below United States standards. Following three years of flight school, a new pilot was assigned to an operational unit for two more years of training before he was considered combat ready. The average fighter pilot flew no more than ten hours per month, about half the minimum requirement of the United States Air Force.

China's air force in 1980 had more needs than capabilities to meet them. It needed a low-altitude SAM, better controlled AA guns, and electronic countermeasures equipment. Most aircraft had unsophisticated avionics, so most navigation was visual. Chinese pilots rarely flew at night or in bad weather.

Still, there were a number of significant developments—for instance, the Chinese released photos in 1979 of missile-equipped fighters. This was the first evidence that they had deployed an air-to-air missile, which had probably just gone into series production. A new fighter, the F-8 (Xian-A), in development for at least ten years and rumored to be capable of Mach-two speeds, was expected to go into production soon. It would be the first serially produced, indigenously designed fighter aircraft in China. Additionally, there was evidence in 1980 that the Chinese would install the Rolls Royce Spey engine—which they were preparing to produce under license—in a new fighter aircraft probably to be used for multiple roles.

The Navy

Although the navy comprises less than 10 percent of the PLA as a whole, it ranks as the third largest navy in the world. Like the ground forces, it is organized into main forces (three fleets), regional forces (patrol gunboats) and militia (armed fishing trawlers). It also includes the naval air forces. Headquarters in Beijing controls operations with the assistance of the fleet headquarters.

China's 1,500-kilometer coastline is protected by a ring of about 100 diesel powered Romeo and Whiskey class submarines, which patrol silently but can remain at sea only a limited time. Next, and within protective range of shore-based aircraft, would be the destroyers and frigates mounting Styx antiship missiles, depth charge projectors, and guns up to 130mm. Penetrating this ring, an invader would be swarmed by up to 500 missile and torpedo patrol boats—about half of which are Chinese variants of the Soviet Osa and Komar class craft. Stormy weather could limit the range of these small boats, however, and curtail air support. Behind the inner ring are naval shore batteries of Styx missiles and guns, backed by the ground forces deployed in depth.

Controlled by the coastal MR commanders as regional coast guard forces are about 500 patrol gunboats, augmented by the armed fishermen of the naval militia. The militia assist in patrolling fisheries and surveilling the coast.

The Navy was established in September 1950 by consolidating regional naval forces under GSD command. It then consisted of the motley collection of ships and boats acquired from the Nationalists. The naval air force was added two years later. With Soviet assistance, the navy reorganized in 1954 and 1955 into the North,

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East, and South Sea Fleets, and a corps of admirals and other naval officers was established from the ranks of the ground forces.

In 1949 Mao asserted that "to oppose imperialist aggression, we must build a powerful navy," and two years later the deputy commander of the navy added the policy of Soviet emulation. The PLA naval academy was established at Lüda (Dalian) in March 1950, mostly with Soviet instructors. By 1954 an estimated 2,500 Soviet naval advisors were in China—possibly one advisor to every thirty Chinese naval personnel—and the Soviet Union began providing modern ships. In shipbuilding the Soviets first assisted the Chinese, then the Chinese copied Soviet designs without assistance, and finally they produced vessels of Chinese design. Eventually Soviet assistance progressed to the point that a joint Sino-Soviet Pacific Fleet was under discussion.

Through the upheavals of the late 1950s and 1960s the navy remained relatively undisturbed. Large investments were made in naval construction during the frugal years immediately after the Great Leap Forward. During the Cultural Revolution a number of top naval commissars and commanders were purged, and naval forces were used to suppress a revolt in Wuhan in July 1967, but the service largely avoided the turmoil. While paying lip service to Mao and assigning political commissars aboard ship, the navy continued to train, build, and maintain the fleets. Ship construction during and after 1967 reached high levels.

To date the Paracel Islands operation of 1974 has been China's only amphibious operation of any distance, and it involved only eleven ships, some 600 ground troops, and the naval militia rather than the regular navy. Far more difficult would be an opposed landing on the Spratly Islands, claimed by China and partially occupied by forces of Vietnam, the Philippines, and Taiwan. China is estimated to have a force of up to 38,000 naval infantry; more likely, ground forces are made available for amphibious training and sea duty as needed.

In 1980 China had no nuclear missile submarines, but one was reportedly under development. The navy had a diesel-powered missile submarine (with no missiles) and one or two nuclear-powered attack submarines. China was developing a nuclear-powered, ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), but the stumbling block appeared to be the solid-propellant and other technology needed for the missiles.

The navy's lack of shipborne SAMs, effective antisubmarine warfare (ASW) sensors and weapons, and—until recently—oceangoing auxiliaries has delayed its development into an open-ocean force. It had to operate within the range of shorebased aircraft or be vulnerable to attack and stay in the shallow waters of the continental shelf to reduce the threat from submarines. A Chinese publication in 1980 showed a new SAM mounted on a ship in port (presumably it was not a decoy), and ASW gear was undoubtedly high

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on the navy's list for force modernization. Eighteen ships—including six destroyers, space event support ships, two oilers, and other auxiliaries operated well at sea and demonstrated underway replenishment to support the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests in 1980. China reportedly is interested in acquiring modern marine gas turbines to power larger craft, along with helicopters and British Harrier VSTOL aircraft, suggesting that China ultimately may acquire a small helicopter or VSTOL carrier for ASW or fleet air defense.

The Missile Forces

China possesses a small but credible nuclear deterrent force. It claims it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons, a sensible policy because its missiles are vastly inferior in number and capabilities to those of either superpower. Although a small force, China's missile units use dispersion, concealment, hardening, and mobility to ensure that a portion of the missiles would survive a nuclear attack and be available for retaliation. The missiles are liquid-fueled, relatively inaccurate, and of limited range. They could be used only after lengthy preparations and against cities or other large area targets in a counter-value role. In May 1980 China successfully tested a long-range ICBM. When such missiles are deployed, China for the first time will be able to hit targets in the United States and the far western Soviet Union.

China's missiles are operated by the Second Artillery Corps, founded about 1964 as the equivalent of the Soviet strategic rocket forces. China's missile forces probably have more checks on their authority than any other units in the armed services, and no doubt receive instructions directly from the highest levels of Chinese government. Most of the men identified with the Second Artillery Corps at some time have been involved with public security work.

The leadership has developed nuclear forces at great cost because it believes both superpowers have considered the use of nuclear weapons against China. The Chinese believed the United States did so during the Korean War and the Taiwan crises of 1954–55 and 1958. The Soviet Union reportedly considered a "surgical strike" to eradicate China's few nuclear facilities after the border clashes of 1969. Possessing nuclear weapons also enhances China's prestige and establishes a position for Beijing in international negotiations. The Chinese would like to break the superpowers' virtual monopoly on nuclear weapons, but there is no evidence that they are working to match the number of missiles probably deployed against them.

During the 1950s the Soviets gave the Chinese considerable help in developing nuclear weapons technology. They did not, however, give the Chinese a sample nuclear bomb. However, the Chinese were able to copy and enlarge sample Soviet missiles and in 1964 exploded their first atomic device, far sooner than most analysts expected. By early 1978 China had conducted at least twenty-three nuclear tests, and at least six missile tests occurred the following year.

The Chinese have fielded three types of missiles with ranges from 600 to 5,000 nautical miles but have had difficulty developing a long range ICBM. They first deployed intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in 1972 and two limited range ICBMs in silos sometime later. A full range ICBM has been delayed by problems with propulsion or guidance, or both, but the results of the May 1980 test suggest they may be close to eliminating the problems. They also are working on submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), which when deployed will be their first solid-fueled strategic missile.

Early in 1980 there appeared what may have been the opening shot of a nuclear strategy debate, the first for many years. The authoritative *Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily)* observed that China's nuclear thinking was in need of revision. It pointed out the limits of Chinese deterrence, arguing that it might no longer be appropriate that China could strike only Soviet cities. The authors rhetorically asked if, in the event the Soviets used tactical but not strategic nuclear weapons, would China respond with a massive retaliation? They said this might be unwise and that China needed tactical nuclear weapons to be able to respond in kind. Time will tell if the Chinese go this route and alter the Sino-Soviet balance.

Recruitment and Conditions of Service

Because living standards and career opportunities were generally better in the military than in civilian life, the PLA in 1980 had an abundance of willing recruits. The attractiveness of the service to potential recruits was evidenced by regular attacks in the press on those who used high-level influence—"taking the back door"—to get accepted. Each year after the autumn harvest, conscription quotas were set for the individual provinces and military subdistricts, but the rigid medical, political, academic, and work standards served to eliminate candidates more than to induct conscripts. Some feared that significant increases in prosperity resulting from the modernization process could make the PLA less attractive to recruits, especially in urban areas. About 10 percent of the estimated 9 million men reaching age eighteen annually were accepted; only a few percent of the inductees were female volunteers.

In early 1978 the Military Commission revised the fixed terms of service to permit longer retention of technicians and competent servicemen. The initial obligations became three years for nonspecialists in the ground forces; four years in the air force, land-based naval units, and technical units of the ground forces; and five years for those serving aboard ship. The decision also authorized allowing competent conscripts to continue to serve voluntarily in accordance with the needs of the service.

Discipline in the PLA is strict, but the emphasis is on reform rather than punishment. Service personnel are required to give unquestioning obedience to military orders, but they may question

Since 1976 training has greatly expanded. Here, members of the militia (upper left) receive drill instruction while members of the regular forces practice combat skills.



superiors during political discussions. One criticism of the Gang of Four was that their followers disrupted discipline by openly challenging command authority on political grounds; under the new leadership, therefore, there may be less latitude. Most offenses are handled through self-criticism at unit discussion groups, but violators are subject to formal censure including courts-martial. Punishments include warnings, expulsion from the Party or the PLA, imprisonment, and execution.

Upon completing military service, most conscripts return to their homes and civilian employment, and all are assigned to the militia. Veterans' allocation offices handle demobilization, usually obtaining preferential employment and other benefits for ex-servicemen. Often this involves not returning home, but accepting a desirable post where skills learned in the military can be put to use. This practice, along with a soldier's greater opportunities to join the Party and gain the benefits of membership, made the PLA a ladder to success. Although some veterans recently have protested that they were denied the usual benefits, discontent does not appear to be widespread.

Cadres generally are selected from the ranks on the basis of political reliability, military competence, and leadership abilities. A few technicians are selected from senior-middle schools, but they must serve a short period among the enlisted troops before becoming cadres.

As there are no ranks in the PLA, promotion consists of transfer to a more responsible position. The PLA generally promotes cadres up the given unit's chain of command; for example, a company commander's next position would be on the staff of his parent battalion. Selection takes place two echelons above the vacancy to be filled and depends on party recommendations. Often a member of the selection committee will sponsor a particular candidate, a practice that greatly contributes to cliques in the PLA. Promotions are slow in the officer corps, largely because the mandatory retirement provisions of the 1955 conscription law were ignored. In 1978 the retirement system was reinstated, and senior officers were being pressured to step down to permit more rapid promotions and more youthful leadership. The same pressure was being exerted on aged cadres in the bureaucracy.

Uniforms and Insignia of Rank

Uniforms were notable for their distinctive Maoist cut and lack of insignia. The only service not wearing Maoist style uniforms was the navy, which returned to traditional dress in 1974; naval duty dress was dungarees and a striped tee shirt. The ground forces wore olive drab trousers and jacket, buttoned to the neck. Navy personnel wore blue. The air force uniform combined an olive drab tunic with blue trousers. Rank insignia was abolished in 1965, but red collar tabs and some awards—such as decorations for service in the Vietnam conflict—were worn. Westerners have noted the subtle variations that distinguish civilian cadre and officer uniforms from those of the fighters (enlisted men), and even rankings within the officer corps. An enlisted uniform has two jacket pockets while a cadre's or officer's has four. Ball-point pens worn prominently in the pockets, tailoring, and even several sweaters in cold weather are clues. Visiting China in 1973, journalist Derek Davies described one Chinese official only half jokingly as "a four-pocketed, three-ball-pointed, six-layered, Shanghai-tailored responsible."

Training

Since the arrest in 1976 of the Gang of Four, who favored party loyalty above professional expertise, military training in the PLA has greatly expanded and political indoctrination diminished. This was a significant departure from the radical or Maoist view of what military training ought to be. In the 1920s and 1930s Mao and the Red Army had opposed Guomindang (Kuomintang or KMT) officers, most of whom were military academy graduates who had been taught to see professionalism as an end in itself and to place duty to their calling over loyalty to any political party. Mao rejected this philosophy and stressed that the first purpose of military training was to teach a soldier to place party considerations above his profession. A 1976 press article, "Politics Must Command Military Training," echoed Mao's insistence that political training be the "backbone" of the army.

In the 1960s a typical soldier spent about 40 percent of his time in political study, causing legitimate concern for PLA readiness. Lo Ruiqing, Lin Biao's chief of staff, sought to rectify the problem by sponsoring a mass training program in 1964. But Lin Biao and Mao intervened to put a stop to it, and Lo Ruiqing became one of the first victims of the Cultural Revolution.

Professional training likewise was neglected during the Cultural Revolution, often ceasing entirely. Between 1966 and late 1976 there was little large-unit training. In 1977 China began exchanging visits of military delegations with a number of other countries. The Chinese took these opportunities to study foreign military organization and experience in order to acquire information to improve China's military schools.

The military, led by the perennial proponent of military training and preparedness, Ye Jianying, tried to launch a training drive in 1972. Ye Jianying argued that officers must be allowed to prepare for combat, but he lost the argument. Another movement was launched in 1975, but it stalled with the purge of Deng Xiaoping early the next year.

Within a month of the arrest of the Gang of Four, the Chinese press began to carry articles by high ranking military and civilian leaders calling upon the PLA to improve its training. The PLA was instructed to get the best use out of its existing weapons, for as Hua Guofeng stressed, it would take time to get many new ones.

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The most important aspect of the military training drive in progress in late 1980 was that it was remarkably depoliticized; troops were reportedly spending about 80 percent of their time doing strictly military work. There was also a refreshing pragmatism about the way political training was to support the "four modernizations." According to one analyst of Chinese military affairs, William Heaton, performance in combat skills, training, military bearing, and efficiency were seen as the best indicators of a soldier's correct ideological outlook.

In early 1978 Hua Guofeng said that the PLA must raise its educational standards in order to master warfare under modern conditions. The PLA raised the admission standards for military school applicants as well as the educational requirements for conscripts. In most cases, courses of study at military schools have been lengthened.

In an effort to shift from the theoretical to the practical, courses were rewritten. The emphasis in late 1980 was on how to conduct actual combat operations. Much of this work resulted from a series of Military Commission guidelines issued in mid-1978 that called upon the schools to study Soviet military tactics as well as the mid-East "October War" and the Sino-Vietnamese "counterattack."

Although there earlier was an informal Red Army College in the Jiangxi (Kiangsi) base area, the PLA's first real military academy was formed in 1936 in Yan'an (Yen-an). It was called the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College and featured a mixture of political indoctrination and military science. By 1949 the PLA ran at least three senior military academies, and each had a complement of staff colleges for commanders and commissars. As the need for advanced training rose during the Soviet-style modernization period, the number of schools and the size of their enrollments increased.

Closed in the mid-1960s, most of the military academies remained inoperative until the downfall of the Gang of Four. By 1978, however, most had been reopened. Late the next year, Minister of Defense Xu Xiangqian asserted that professional military education would be an important force for achieving modernization.

All military schools in 1980 were being reequipped as rapidly as the budget permitted and restaffed with professional instructors. In addition several military journals were issued for PLA members in the field. In late 1978 military training evaluation teams were reinstituted. Finally, the PLA once again began to sponsor youth training in military specialties; during the summer of 1978 the air force ran several aviation summer camps.

By 1980 there were three levels of professional military education. The top level was dominated by the military, logistics, and political academies. The Ministry of National Defense was believed to be in charge of these institutions. Below the academies were the service colleges such as the Beijing Air War College; there were many schools of this type in the MRs. The technical schools were just

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below the service colleges, and many new technical schools opened after 1976.

The PLA Military Academy seemed to share responsibility for the development of doctrine with the Academy of Military Science. Also presumably involved was the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies, which had been established sometime after 1976. The institute was to study "strategic questions in relation to national security and world peace and develop academic exchange with strategic research establishments, organizations, and academics abroad."

Individual and small-unit training was excellent, but combined arms experience was lacking. As a result, junior officers were less specialized than in the West; the typical Chinese infantry officer knew far less about employing armor or artillery than his United States counterpart. To make matters worse, Gang of Four supporters often played havoc with individual training, insisting at one point that the bayonet be replaced with a sword because it could be fought with more gracefully.

An important aspect of the 1964 mass training drive that had been revived in 1978 was unit competitions. Several ground and air force units reportedly have held marksmanship contests since 1978; late that year Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, and Ye Jianying attended the first air show conducted in over fourteen years.

Since 1977 a large number of Chinese military delegations have gone abroad, and an equally large number of foreign military delegations have visited China. The Chinese certainly have taken these opportunities to learn of foreign military experiences, to study such foreign weapon systems as they were permitted to see, and to collect information that would add to that already available in Chinese military schools.

The Place of the Military in National Life

Military Modernization: The Unfolding Story

That he and his supporters had survived the 1935–36 Long March was proof enough for Mao that human will and revolutionary consciousness were powerful tools for conquering great obstacles. Mao also learned that man needed another tool in order to guarantee victory: confidence.

By the mid-1970s the PLA had lost its confidence. Its senior commanders no longer felt the PLA could defend the nation against the superior forces of the Soviet Union and others. Key members of the military and civilian leadership set about to correct the problem. They set in motion the military modernization drive that was in progress in late 1980.

The modernizers had two particularly serious problems to overcome. First, modernization of any kind creates elite groups that inevitably become dissociated from the masses. This was unacceptable in China, where the PLA historically was close to the people. The modernizers promised that the military always would be responsive to the Party and would continue to bind itself to the masses with a common ideology. In contrast with the Soviet-style modernization experience of the 1950s, the drive of the 1980s stressed political work while increasing military preparedness.

There was also the problem of absorbing foreign technology and the impact that would have on self-reliance. During the late 1930s, Chiang and his Nationalist forces blockaded the Chinese Communists, and Moscow refused to provide significant help, so Mao's followers were forced to get by with what they could produce on their own or capture from the Japanese (see Republican China, ch. 1). The ultimate success of these self-reliant methods persuaded Mao that the unlimited energy and ingenuity of the people left little need to seek help from abroad. The Korean War (1950–53), however, proved that China could not produce everything it required and that outside help was needed to modernize. These things could come only from the Soviet Union.

Soviet-style modernization began in autumn 1951 and steadily increased until about 1954. The Soviets first provided supplies, then established defense plants where the Chinese produced a variety of weapons of Soviet design. As in the Soviet Union, defense modernization took clear precedence over languishing civil development.

In the mid-1950s Mao reasserted that whereas weapons were important, man was actually the decisive factor in determining the ultimate outcome of a war. He worried that by relying too heavily on the Soviet model the PLA already had lost its revolutionary ethic as it became more professional. Although the evidence is inconclusive, Mao seems to have embarked on the Great Leap Forward in part because of his uncertainty about relying on the Soviets for economic, financial and technical assistance. He also was concerned about China's need to give a higher priority to internal development.

The failure of the Great Leap Forward resulted in considerable criticism of Mao and his policies, including a sharp attack by Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai, the chief advocate of military modernization. Peng Dehuai asserted that "putting politics in command" was no substitute for economic laws and realistic economic policy (see the Great Leap Forward [1958–60], ch. 1). Mao responded by replacing Peng Dehuai with Lin Biao, who set about curtailing the Soviet-style modernization and restoring the PLA's revolutionary zeal. Throughout the 1960s, Lin Biao moved increasingly toward the center of China's political stage and urged the PLA to a peak of fervor for revolutionary undertakings based on a reemphasis of Mao Zedong Thought. His efforts reached a high point in 1964 with the "Learn from the PLA" campaign.

The chaos of the Cultural Revolution (1966–68) temporarily set modernization aside as the PLA struggled to define its role. In general commissars (whose function is political indoctrination) supported the Mao Zedong-Lin Biao faction's orders to "support the left" and the Red Guards whereas the regional military commanders did not. As events developed, the PLA's support of the Red Guards was qualified, and in many respects the army was actually a restraining influence. When Mao finally called on the PLA to curb the violence, the regional military commanders responded at least as much out of their interest in restoring public order and national stability as out of loyalty and support for Mao (see Enforcement, ch. 13).

At the end of the Cultural Revolution, the PLA had gained a new sense of its own importance, prompted by urgent concern over the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969. The radicals, however, still blocked the way to military preparedness. For the most part, the military hated the radicals for having goaded the Red Guards into attacking some PLA units during the upheavals. The disorder also had cost the PLA many old and revered officers and caused innumerable administrative headaches.

The role of the PLA in the period of reconstruction after the Cultural Revolution was vitally important, because PLA officers dominated the people's revolutionary committees that after 1967 had replaced the provincial and local party committees and administrative bodies.

The pervasiveness of factional tensions and cleavages in the still recovering institutions of Party and government made the process of reconstruction difficult (see China in Transition [1969–76], ch. 1). The PLA itself was not immune to factional infighting, reflecting the radical-moderate rivalry at the center of power. By 1971 two main factional alignments appeared. One adhered to Lin Biao with his call for "politics in command" and struggle against both superpowers. The other was an alliance between regional military commanders and Zhou Enlai with his moderate associates. Both distrusted Lin Biao's ambitions, which appeared to conflict with their own interest in military modernization and national reconstruction. Radical elements led by the Gang of Four pressed to increase political activities in the PLA at a time when military commanders increasingly were alarmed at the decline in PLA combat capability.

The bizarre death of Lin Biao in September 1971 proved to be a watershed for national development in general and for military modernization in particular. His supporters in the military hierarchy were replaced. Moreover, his death indirectly furthered the cause of military modernization, for it allowed Zhou Enlai to reestablish Chinese relations abroad, which later would help the PLA to acquire foreign technology. Zhou Enlai and the PLA began to plot out a long-range modernization strategy with an emphasis on rebuilding infrastructure. In 1972 the venerable Ye Jianying, a former PLA marshal and powerful advocate of military modernization, was made a member of the Military Commission. The odds favoring military modernization policies seemed to be increasing. Between 1973 and 1975 many PLA officers purged during the Cultural Revolution were rehabilitated. Nonetheless, as of 1976, the PLA remained dangerously inferior to its potential enemies in most areas except manpower.

In the struggle for succession following Mao's death in 1976, the central military leadership rallied behind Ye Jianying, who played a key role in the arrest of the radical Gang of Four. In the interest of transitional political stability, Ye Jianying actively supported the election of Hua Guofeng to the chairmanship of the CCP and of its Military Commission (see Party-Army Relations, ch. 11). Thereafter, the PLA worked through its propaganda organs to firm up Hua Guofeng's position.

The modernization policy in late 1980 was an attempt to mold the PLA into a modernized army capable of sophisticated defense, but also to retain sufficient revolutionary character to guarantee positive political control and popular support. The watchword was: "If we don't catch up we'll be left far behind."

The PLA in late 1980 was ten to twenty years out of date. It was woefully short of modern weapons and lacked the production technology to produce new weapons in quantity. Military leaders had agreed two years earlier that modernization should proceed along with civil economic development. As part of this plan, the nation's limited science and technology capability was placed in civilian hands and the educational system was revamped. These steps were needed to produce the high caliber scientists and technicians on whom modernization of the economy in general and military modernization in particular depended.

The central military leadership took a clear position on a number of policies related to military modernization. One of its fundamental objectives was the achievement of some degree of parity between the PLA and the Soviet forces; freedom to use the resources at its command without political interference and eventually to augment those resources was a corollary of that goal. Another objective was to acquire the right to discuss and modify military doctrine (see Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, this ch.). "People's War Under Modern Conditions" continued to incorporate basic elements of Mao's original "People's War"—in 1980 the PLA had nothing better—but the new doctrinal formula could be molded as necessary as the PLA was reequipped. (Even when the PLA became able to fight a modern war, however, it probably would continue to ascribe some value to the Maoist concepts because of their powerful political impact and because they so aptly described a condition in which the entire population contributed in an emergency.)

The leadership wanted to ensure that competence became the criterion for promotion. To this end the PLA in 1978 began to reform the officer promotion and reassignment system to achieve better internal management and dissolve many of the "sponsor-protégé" relationships fostered by the old system. With the old arrangement, supervisors pulled subordinates up and were responsible for them; however, if the sponsor fell from grace, his subordinates suffered as well. Reform would make it easier to transfer officers laterally and avoid concentrating too much power around a regional or functional elite. The new promotion and transfer devices were being tried in the Guangzhou Military Region beginning in 1978, with reported success.

The PLA high command made these requests openly in late 1980 and with a candor that would have been unthinkable four or five years earlier. The party leaders shared the PLA's general concern for China's safety as well as the concern that professional standards be maintained and improved as essential to successful military modernization.

The Military Roles

Fighters

The PLA soldier of the early 1980s was less technically proficient than his Western counterpart. He offset this disadvantage somewhat with physical toughness—the recruit had to be physically fit—and a readiness to fight long and hard with a minimum of supplies or amenities. He came of his own free will and had to be able to prove his good character; there was no compulsion in his recruitment, for the CCP understood that a discontented soldier was likely to desert. The PLA soldier was highly disciplined, superbly motivated, and well led; but he was also poorly equipped, inadequately serviced, and insufficiently trained. Knowing this, he probably favored military modernization even at some cost to his own privileges.

The PLA soldier of the 1980s—and his Red Army predecessor who had experienced the Long March, the Yan'an period, the Japanese aggression and the Civil War—was far superior to the Chinese soldier of the post-imperial era. Soldiers of the regional warlords had earned an unsavory reputation; most were vagrants, riffraff, or escaped criminals; many were alcoholics or opium addicts. The Nationalist soldiers of the Guomindang often had served unwillingly, conscripted at bayonet point. For the Red Army soldier, service was not just a personal affair. He had the support of his family and his village, and his behavior worked to their favor or detriment.

All PLA soldiers, from private to noncommissioned officer, are called "fighters." The code of conduct has not changed since the 1920s. The soldier must obey his superiors and hold the masses in esteem. He can elect many of his leaders beneath the officer ranks and may criticize any leader regardless of rank during political discussions. He is included in small unit planning and can offer advice on the execution of all unit plans.

Morale traditionally has been high. During a 1962 exodus to Hong Kong, when 125,000 persons from China fled to that city, not one serving soldier was found among the emigrants. Likewise, no

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communist soldiers deserted during the Sino-Indian border conflict that year, nor apparently did any do so during the China-Vietnam border conflict in 1979. Only three or four communist pilots have flown to exile since 1949 despite large sums of money reportedly being offered as inducement.

Modernization policies in effect in late 1980 were expected to change the soldier's life somewhat. The premium would be on knowledge and discipline; the old virtues of initiative and self-sacrifice would take second place. Just as many soldiers in the 1950s had found modernization to be in conflict with their revolutionary traditions, some soldiers in the 1980s probably would have trouble adapting. The new generation of soldiers was cognizant of tradition but probably starkly aware of the potential cost of failure to modernize. In all likelihood, the tradition would be modified to suit a different and more dangerous world.

The Officer Corps

The titles applied to the Chinese officers in the modern era require definition. The term commander refers to any PLA officer who commands at least a company; officers below that level are called leaders. The commissar does ideological work in units of regimental size and larger; the political officer does similar work in units at battalion level and below. (The terms commander and political commissar are used to differentiate officers who are militarily versus politically oriented respectively.)

The revolutionary origin and combat experience of the Red Army provided the PLA of the early 1950s with a firm concept of what an ideal commander should be. He came from the ranks, often by way of a military region service academy; he displayed few provincial or regional prejudices; he was a willing subordinate to the Party and the country as a whole; and more importantly he spoke in national terms when China's security was being discussed. Perhaps his most important attribute was versatility in the tradition of the heroes of the romantic classics Mao was fond of—*Water Margin* and *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms*. Mao valued the classics because they taught him new tactics, and he identified with the generalist leader struggling against evil and corruption in the pursuit of righteousness. Some commanders, feeling as Mao did, resisted modernization because it might cost them their flexibility.

The PLA commander in the early 1980s had more freedom to concentrate on military matters than did his earlier counterparts; he was able to separate his authority and responsibilities from the commissar's. Typically the commander had a professional outlook and expected to be promoted on the basis of how well he defended the country from external threats rather than on the basis of ideological fervor.

Since the mid-1970s the commander has been under orders to study modern warfare and to mold his command into a modern fighting unit, treating the troops with respect. It is the job of the man beside the commander—the commissar—to see that these rules are followed.

Mao said that "The Party commands the gun; the gun must never be allowed to command the Party." The commissar is the party's representative in the PLA and the link between the army and the civilian population with its social and political organizations. Mao was the Red Army's first commissar, and about 10 percent of the soldiers in the PLA today have some political function.

Commissars originated in 1918 in the Soviet Union when they were assigned to control ex-tsarist personnel in the Russian Red Army. Every order issued by about 48,000 ex-tsarist officers had to be countersigned by a commissar, who could countermand it and arrest the commander if necessary. Soviet advisers introduced the system to China at the Whamboa (Whampoa) Military Academy operated by the Nationalists in 1924–25 where Zhou Enlai was the school's first commissar.

Like the ideal PLA commander, the ideal commissar in the PLA of the 1980s is a paragon of virtues whose model behavior few men could hope to emulate fully. He is an uncomplaining, persuasive, courageous, and zealous officer who uses the promise of reward and only a hint of punishment to discipline his troops. He nurtures in the peasant soldier a deep sense of duty and confidence in himself, his comrades and his commander. Without this, the soldier could not sustain true courage himself. In battle, the commissar sets the example, and a study of casualty rolls suggests that he usually does. Both commissars and commanders generally strive to approximate the ideal and perform conscientiously.

The commissar expects to be treated as an equal by the commander in peacetime—he bows to the commander during wartime—and in exchange relieves the commander of many time-consuming chores such as personnel problems, relations with civilians, and troop entertainment. He expects to be promoted because he has a good political orientation, and he is prouder of his loyalty to the Party and people than his military prowess. In the 1960s a commissar was allowed up to 40 percent of the troops' time for political training. In the early 1980s he could utilize only 20 percent; his prime missions then were to look after his men, support the commanders, and aid in the "four modernizations." For this reason, he has taken a greater interest recently in the technology of military modernization.

PLA Relations with the Party

A recurrent theme since 1949 has been the importance of CCP control over the armed forces. The primacy of party leadership is maintained through a chain of command for political matters extending downward to the lowest organizational level (see Organization and Equipment, this ch.).

According to party theory, political control and political education or indoctrination ensure a harmonious relationship between the PLA, the Party, and the people. Political work, balanced against professional requirements, is to continue—military commanders and political commissars sharing their responsibilities. When dealing with subordinates, commanders are to abide by the "mass line" (see ch. 11, The Political Process).

The extent of CCP control over the PLA has varied over the years since 1949. At the beginning of the Korean War, 20 percent of the troops were party members, including 90 percent of the officers. Between the end of the war and the start of the Great Leap Forward, the degree of political indoctrination lessened considerably, but in 1959 the pendulum swung back. After his appointment as minister of defense, Lin Biao moved to restore absolute party control, increasing the number and authority of the commissars. Until the end of the Cultural Revolution, commissars, in the heyday of "politics in command," wielded greater power than commanders. By late 1969 the position of the PLA commanders relative to that of the commissars generally had improved; by that time many of the commissars had come under the influence of two emerging groups at the center of power: Zhou Enlai and his moderate associates in the civilian bureaucracies, and an assemblage of stability-oriented regional military commanders.

Deng Xiaoping was made chief of staff in 1975 to ensure that a revitalizing Party retained its control and to facilitate the removal of the PLA from involvement in civil matters through what were known as people's revolutionary committees (see China in Transition [1969–76], ch. 1; see Military Modernization: The Unfolding Story, this ch.). Two years later he was appointed a vice chairman of the Military Commission and chief of the general staff.

The PLA in 1980 continued to accept party control if only because that control was far less rigid than during the heyday of "politics-in-command" and did not impinge on legitimate professional matters. The Party was willing to let the center of gravity shift a good deal in favor of experts as a vital requirement for a modern, professional army. In late 1979 Deng Xiaoping said that a man could not qualify as a "red" unless he was already an "expert"; Mao Zedong Thought, he affirmed, no longer could be a substitute for advanced technology.

PLA Relations with the People

Since the PLA was founded in 1927, it has worked hard to maintain a good relationship with the Chinese people. There were times, such as during the Cultural Revolution, when these relations were strained. In late 1980, however, the PLA soldier occupied an honored place in society; the Red Army had had to work hard to become friend, producer, and protector to the Chinese people, but the modern forces were less committed to continuing that tradition.

The PLA was closely linked to the masses, but it was not—as many believe—much of a productive force in the civil society. Between liberation and the Korean War, it did large-scale production work in support of national reconstruction, mostly in water conservancy projects, engineering, factory work, and farming. This was the last time, however—except in Xizang and Xinjiang military regions—that the PLA made such a large contribution to the civil economy. Since 1949 it has harvested less than 1 percent of the farm products and produced no more than 5 percent of all manufactured goods for civil consumption. In late 1980 it helped the people best by providing free medical and veterinary skills and local disaster relief.

Instead of directly supporting the civil economy, the PLA has tried to be as self-sufficient as possible, running its own farms and small factories. It supplies much of the food and the manufactured goods it needs. Main forces do less of this work than regional units, but on a per capita basis the PLA is the least expensive standing army in the world and probably will remain so as it modernizes. As of late 1980 there were no published plans to change this policy.

The PLA probably will continue its policy of self-sufficiency for other than political or ideological reasons. It saves the civilian population an enormous amount of taxes and makes the best use of army reservations that normally would not be so productive. In the process, the PLA maintains an independent food supply and projects the useful image of a force willing to pick up its hoes when it is not required to carry rifles.

The civilian population will be one of the largest benefactors of the current military modernization drive—in an unexpected way. Defense industries are being encouraged to turn to civil production to sop up excess plant capacity, employ workers, and generate profits needed to buy modern equipment. The light industrial consumer goods produced by these defense plants will be in great demand by civilians recently granted their first pay raises in years (see ch. 5, Economic Context). As the PLA modernizes its defense industries, it will play a larger role than ever before in improving the quality of life and curbing inflation in China.

Military Expenditures

In 1979 China announced that defense spending that year would total 20.2 billion yuan (for value of the yuan—Y—see Glossary), but United States government officials estimated the full amount would be nearly twice that figure, or about Y40 billion (see fig. 20). China provided no definition or breakdown of its total, the first released since 1959, but United States officials estimated defense expenditures in 1978 absorbed 8 to 10 percent of China's GNP. Both United States and Chinese estimates are low for forces of the PLA's size, reflecting the fact that its soldiers are poorly paid and equipped.

Chinese defense spending has varied widely over the years. Arms production nearly stopped in the early 1960s as a result of the failure



Figure 20. Estimated Defense Expenditures, 1965–79



Figure 21. Defense Spending by Resource Category, 1965–79



NOTE–Figures reflect trends indexed to 1965=100 and do not indicate actual expenditures or production levels.

Figure 22. Defense Procurement and Industrial Production, 1965–79

Source for figures 20, 21, and 22: Based on information from U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, *Chinese Defense Spending: 1965–79*, Washington, July 1980, p. 3.

of the Great Leap Forward and the cutoff of Soviet assistance. It recovered in the middle of the decade, but personnel purges and disruptions to production and transportation during the early Cultural Revolution reduced defense production by about 20 percent. Defense expenditures from 1965 on grew about 10 percent annually but were cut back about 20 percent in 1972 in the aftermath of the Lin Biao affair (see Party-Army Relations, ch. 11). Thereafter, they again grew gradually but in 1978 still were below the 1971 level. The China-Vietnam border conflict in 1979 necessitated a sharp increase in defense spending, which probably exceeded the 1971 peak.

United States officials in 1980 estimated Chinese defense spending by resources and forces categories. Defense expenditures were roughly 50 percent for weapons, equipment, and new facilities; 35 percent for operating costs; and 15 percent for research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E). By service, these costs break down to 25 percent for the ground forces; 20 percent each for the navy and air defenses; 5 percent each for air attack and ballistic missile forces; and 25 percent for logistics, intelligence, medical care, administration, RDT&E, and other support. Defense spending was minimized by requiring the PLA to produce about half of its food (see fig. 21).

The Defense Industries

In 1980 China's leaders were committed to acquiring technical assistance from foreigners and developing the machine-building industries—the cornerstones of the defense industrial establishment (see Manufacturing, ch. 7). This was viewed as essential in light of the commitment to military modernization and the limited benefits of increased training without new equipment. In the late 1970s elements of the leadership had argued over priorities with respect to modernization, some asserting, as economic analyst David Shambaugh points out, that the defense industries should "lead" the national economy to modernization while others felt that it should follow on the heels of overall economic recovery (see fig. 22). The latter group won the debate, and to implement this policy and to bring the defense industries under closer government scrutiny, all of the heads of the machine-building industries were replaced. In most cases, civilian directors replaced career military officers. There were eight machine-building industries (see Technology and Organization, ch. 7).

The priorities of economic modernization stressing agriculture, followed by light and heavy industry, forced many defense industries to begin producing consumer goods. Because most defense plants already had excess capacity and manpower, they still were able to meet all weapons quotas. In the end, therefore, the shift to civil production was good for the defense industries, bringing increased funds for reinvestment, retraining for poor workers, and bonuses for especially productive workers.

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The acquisition of foreign military technology had been a contentious issue since the "self-strengthening" movements of the 1960s. According to statements by the leadership, China in the early 1980s never again wanted to become so dependent upon a foreign supplier that it would be vulnerable to that supplier's shifting policies or production limitations. Accordingly, the leadership insisted in late 1980 that foreigners agree to sell not only military end items but also production technology. China might buy some "quick fixes" for antitank and air defense, but certainly not without bargaining strenuously for eventual production rights in each case.

Two machine-building ministries were created in 1952, one to produce civilian goods and the other to build arms. These two ministries benefited from massive Soviet material and technological assistance, especially after Stalin's death in 1953. Over 100 of the 166 major Soviet industrial projects were machine building related and included technology and facilities for aircraft, naval vessels, electronic equipment, land armaments, and some know-how for nuclear weapons production. In each case, these plants were copies of vertically integrated Soviet factories; each plant produced all of the parts needed for a finished product.

Mao steadily became disenchanted with this model of militarized economic development and in 1956 declared that defense production should be reduced in favor of more balanced overall economic growth. At this time he introduced the policy—widely repeated by 1980 leaders—that defense production should be reduced until a firmer industrial base was created. Defense production lost ground during the Great Leap Forward when manufacturing priority was on chemical fertilizer and machinery for agriculture and petroleum production. The ultimate failure of the Great Leap was compounded by the Soviet aid withdrawal.

The machine-building ministries were reorganized and stabilized between 1961 and 1963, but defense construction was restrained. At about this time the National Defense Industries Offices and the National Defense Science and Technology Commission were formed, under the Military Commission, to coordinate military design, development and production.

The beginning of the Cultural Revolution upset much of this reform. Overall production dropped sharply as Red Guard activity disrupted raw material deliveries and plant routine (see ch. 9, Science and Technology). As scientists were purged, the quantity and quality of military related research and development declined.

In the last half of 1968, however, prospects began to improve owing to PLA-enforced stability in the country. The Ussuri River crisis the following year also helped. Defense production rose sharply and reached an all-time peak in 1971. At that time a debate surfaced between civilian and military planners about what should be the "leading factor" in military production—"steel," for improved land armaments to strengthen conventional deterrence, or

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"electronics," for higher technology weapons such as modern aircraft and missiles. Lin Biao favored "electronics" while Zhou Enlai (the ultimate victor) favored "steel." Zhou Enlai's victory signaled the opening to the United States (and thus the end of China's "dual adversary"—the United States and the Soviet Union—stance) as well as the party's commitment to reassert its control over the military. Finally, the "experts" would begin to receive more respect vis-à-vis the "reds."

The radicals lost another test of strength the following year with the decision to import foreign technology and equipment in exchange for Chinese raw materials. But the radicals continued to resist, obstructing military modernization efforts where they could until the Gang of Four was purged in late 1976.

In late 1980 the United States was just beginning to export "dual use" technology to China, and some analysts felt the United States might soon sell technology for defensive weapons. A team of technical experts visited China in September 1980 to assess and discuss China's military technology and other matters. Still, as Shambaugh asserts, the Chinese would have serious problems absorbing modern foreign technology into factories that had slipped ten to twenty years behind the state of the art. In addition, the educational policies of the Cultural Revolution had left China with few young scientists and engineers who were essential to the absorption process. Finally, only time would tell how successful the leadership would be in correcting managerial and bureaucratic problems that plagued the machine-building ministries and factories, and whether or not the new material incentives would increase labor productivity.

Perceptions of Threat

In the recent past, both the Soviet Union and the United States have been condemned as initiators of aggression, war, plundering, and exploitation. China saw the two countries as hostile to each other and contending for hegemony of the world. In the early years of the People's Republic, the United States was viewed as unmatched in its villainy and the arch enemy of other progressive countries. Since the 1970s, however, relations with the United States have undergone dramatic changes, and in 1980 the ties between the two countries were friendly and cooperative in many areas (see Relations with the Superpowers, ch. 12).

The Soviet Union

Despite a common ideology, and considerable Soviet assistance in the past, China in 1980 regarded the Soviet Union as "enemy number one." Tensions in relations between the two countries had escalated since the mid-1950s. After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia to enforce the "Brezhnev Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty" in 1968 China came to perceive the Soviet Union as a threat to its own national security (see The Soviet Union, ch. 12).

Sharp border clashes between Soviet and Chinese troops occurred in 1969, roughly a decade after relations between the two countries began to deteriorate and some four years after a buildup of Soviet forces along China's northern border had begun. Particularly significant incidents occurred along the Sino-Soviet border in the Northeast formed by the Amur and the Ussuri rivers and along which China claimed the right to navigate. Border provocations occasionally recurred in later years—such as in May 1978 when Soviet troops in boats and a helicopter intruded into Chinese territory—but a major armed clash was averted.

In April 1979 Beijing notified Moscow that the treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance—under which the Soviets aided the PLA in its 1950s modernization—would not be renewed. Negotiations on improving Sino-Soviet relations were begun in 1979, but China ended them when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan late that year.

In 1980 the Soviets maintained 25 percent of their ground and tactical air forces along their own and the Mongolian borders with China. These included an estimated six armored and thirty-eight mechanized infantry divisions supported by over 2,000 combat aircraft. On China's side, about 50 percent of the PLA main forces—some eighty-five divisions—were deployed in the north; additional divisions were positioned along rail lines to reinforce if needed (see fig. 23). Despite a numerical advantage of nearly two divisions to one, the Chinese forces were qualitatively weaker and numerically disadvantaged in all force categories except manpower and small arms.

China's strategy for defending against a Soviet invasion would vary along the border. Military inferiority and flat terrain in the Northwest would force the PLA to yield vast tracts of sparsely populated territory in order to stretch an invader's supply lines, disperse his units, and gain time to bring up PLA reinforcements. Mountainous terrain in the North and Northeast would permit a defense farther forward. In August 1945 the Soviet army invaded and quickly overran Japanese-occupied Manchuria—now Shenyang Military Region. That campaign served to illustrate how Moscow might use a limited attack in the 1980s to gain valuable territory, industry, rail lines, and a major port. Authoritative articles in Chinese military literature in the late 1970s addressed the need to protect population and industrial centers in these areas, although they recognized that the PLA still must defend in depth and that a determined Soviet attack inevitably would overrun considerable territory. The PLA's border defenses and other local forces would slow an invasion and obtain intelligence on its strength and direction. Beijing then could decide whether to risk reinforcing with main forces or consolidate defenses for a determined stand nearer the capital.

Chinese offensive capabilities against the Soviet Union are limited. The PLA might interdict temporarily the trans-Siberian


N
Shenyang
Ürümqi
Beijing
Beijing
Lanzhou
Jinan
Nanjing
Wuhan
Chengdu
Fuzhou
Kunming
Guangzhou
North Sea Fleet
East Sea Fleet
South Sea Fleet
Military region
Army
Fleet
National capital
There are 11 military regions and 3 fleets
0 200 400 Miles
0 200 400 Kilometers

Source: Based on information from Ray Bonds (ed.), *The Chinese War Machine*, New York, 1979, p. 39; Harvey Nelsen, *The Chinese Military System: An Organizational Study of the Chinese People's Liberation Army*, Boulder, 1977, p. 140; and Research Institute for Peace and Security, *Asian Security 1979*, Tokyo, 1979, p. iii.

Figure 23. Regional Deployment of PLA Forces

railroad where it closely parallels the border in the Northeast and could attempt attacks against troop concentrations or the cities of Khabarovsk and Vladivostok.

In late 1980 the military buildup continued on both sides. Brezhnev and Defense Minister Ustinov made an uprecedented inspection visit to the Soviet Far East in March 1978. According to testimony by the director of the United States Defense Intelligence Agency in July 1979, the Soviets had deployed widely T-62 tanks and BMP armored personnel carriers along the Chinese border, with increasing numbers of self-propelled guns. They had quantitatively improved tactical aviation, added Backfire long-range bombers, and deployed SS-20 missiles, which now provide target coverage of almost the entire Asian continent. China reportedly has placed some border units farther forward than previously and was believed to have established a new military command in the Turpan area of Xinjiang Military Region.

Vietnam

China's limited invasion of Vietnam in 1979 revealed serious deficiencies in the PLA with respect to mobility, logistics, and control. Conclusions drawn from the campaign are not all applicable to the balance of military power in the North, however.

China's relations with Vietnam began to deteriorate seriously in the mid-1970s (see Relations with Other Countries, ch. 12). After Vietnam joined the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (COMECON) in June 1978 and signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in November of the same year, China branded Vietnam the "Cuba of the East" and called the treaty a military alliance. Incidents along the Sino-Vietnamese border grew frequent and violent. On December 25, 1978, Vietnam invaded Kampuchea, quickly ousted the pro-Beijing Pol Pot regime, and overran the country.

On February 17, 1979, China attacked along virtually the entire Sino-Vietnamese border in a limited campaign carefully calculated to reduce risks and costs. The invasion was brief (twenty-seven days), shallow (the deepest penetration was some thirty-five kilometers near Cao Bang), and involved ground forces only. Air and naval forces were held in reserve.

The greatest risk was of a counterattack by the Soviets who stepped up reconnaissance flights along China's northern border, airlifted supplies to Vietnam, and dispatched a naval task force of warships and intelligence vessels to the South China Sea. China asserted, however, that its invasion would not threaten Hanoi or the populous Red River delta and that it did not want "a single inch of Vietnamese territory." The Soviets did not attack. Still, the costs of the war and strengthening China's border defenses to match the subsequent Vietnamese buildup necessitated a 20-percent increase in China's explicit defense budget. The human cost was at least 20,000 killed or wounded Chinese—extremely high for some sixteen days of combat.

The war pitted an estimated 500,000 Chinese troops drawn from several military regions against about 100,000 Vietnamese troops. China's widespread attacks demolished Vietnam's scattered border defense units before the PLA concentrated forces to seize provincial capitals. Of the six provinces bordering on China, at least five capitals were attacked and at least three were seized. The PLA mobilized civilian vehicles to supplement its inadequate motor transport, but vehicles for off-road movement of troops and supplies were not available. The haphazard coordination between infantry, artillery, and armor units was the result of inexperience, shortages of radios, and outmoded command relationships. Rates of advance were exceedingly slow due to Chinese restraint and inexperience, the rough and unfamiliar terrain, and the tenacious Vietnamese defense. On March 5, Beijing declared its "lesson" finished and began a measured withdrawal. The PLA's principal gain from the conflict was the extensive combat and related experience acquired by the many units involved.

In the aftermath of the war, China was reorganizing its southern border defenses. Defendable terrain and a lesser military threat would allow the PLA to deploy well forward. Hanoi instituted nationwide mobilization during the conflict, and there were in late 1980 many more Vietnamese troops stationed along the Chinese border than were there to oppose the invasion. Soviet arms poured into Vietnam by air and sea; in turn Soviet vessels enjoyed access to Danang and Cam Ranh harbors, and Soviet reconnaissance aircraft operated out of Vietnamese airfields. Prospects were that the Sino-Vietnamese border would remain tense, with Beijing waiting for a weakening of the Hanoi-Moscow alliance. China already is tying down large numbers of Vietnamese troops and has little to gain from another invasion.

Reserves, Logistics and Strategic Mobility

The main forces stationed in Wuhan in 1980 were available to reinforce anywhere in China and therefore constituted the PLA's central reserve. Of all the military regions, only Wuhan does not touch a national land border or the coast. Its forces are neither oriented toward a particular threat nor charged with defending a forward area. Rail lines cross through Wuhan Military Region north-south and east-west, including the double-tracked line north to Beijing and toward the Soviet border. The Wuhan units constituted 10 percent of the PLA's main forces and would increase by nearly 25 percent the main forces already garrisoned in the regions bordering on the Soviet Union. They included the PLA's only airborne army, as close to a quick-reaction force as exists in China.

Of secondary importance were the two armies and the independent units located in the Szechwan Basin of eastern Chengdu Military Region. They were positioned along roads and rail lines leading to India or Vietnam, leaving them in position to react to threats to southern as well as southwestern China. These troops could move toward the Soviet border days—if not weeks—sooner than if they were garrisoned on the Indian border. Having them in the heavily populated industrial basin meant they were closer to sources of supply, cheaper to sustain, and their vehicles and manpower were available to the civilian economy.

Because the PLA is dependent upon China's limited railroads for strategic mobility and supply, China relies heavily on local procurement and stockpiles of fuel, ammunition, and some spare parts at national, regional, and unit locations. At least food and clothing are procured locally.

* * *

Considering the gold mine of literature on China's martial tradition, there are few sources for non-Chinese readers. The best survey is

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Chinese Ways in Warfare, edited by Frank A. Kierman and John K. Fairbank. For further information on warlords, readers might start with James E. Sheridan's *China in Disintegration: The Republican Era in Chinese History: 1912–49. The Chinese High Command*, by William W. Whitson, is the most thorough discussion of 1921–47 Red Army development. For accounts of general Red Army exploits see *The Long March*, by Dick Wilson, and *Red Star Over China*, by Edgar Snow. Discussions of Mao's military theories are found in *Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare*, translated by Samuel B. Griffith, and *People's War*, by J. L. S. Girling. The best source for information on the PLA from 1947 to the Cultural Revolution is *The Role of the Chinese Army*, by John Gittings. Developments between the Cultural Revolution and the late 1970s are described in *The Chinese Military System*, by Harvey Nelsen. The United States Defense Intelligence Agency's 1976 *Handbook on the Chinese Armed Forces* is a source for information on PLA organization, tactics, equipment, and uniforms. *The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s*, edited by Whitson, is a collection of expert essays about the PLA's progress since the mid-1960s.

Allen S. Whiting's *China Crosses the Yalu* is both a discussion of Chinese crisis management and one of the most complete books concerning the PLA's role in Korea. Neville Maxwell's *India's China War* is the definitive source on that conflict. The most accurate discussion of the 1979 China-Vietnam conflict is the 1979 inaugural issue of *Asian Security*, by the Research Institute for Peace and Security. A general discussion of China's recent military modernization campaign is contained in *Peking's Evolving Concept of Military Security and Implications for the U.S.*, by Peter W. Colm.

By far the latest information on the PLA is contained in periodical literature. The interested reader should consult the *Air University Annual Bibliography of Military Publications*. The publications containing the most articles on the PLA are: *Military Review*, the *Royal United Service Institute Journal*, *Army*, *Air Force*, the *U.S. Armed Forces Journal International*, *Signal*, *International Defense Review*, *Nato's 15 Nations* and the *Soviet Military Review*.

The Journal of Asian Studies Annual Bibliography is a valuable source for articles in nonmilitary periodicals, including: *China Quarterly*, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, *Asian Survey*, *Contemporary China*, *Problems of Communism*, *Current History*, *China Report*, *Current Scene*, *Pacific Affairs*, and *Asian Affairs*. The general reader should also pay close attention to the "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation" feature of every *China Quarterly* issue.

The non-Chinese reader's access to the Chinese press is through the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and its parent publication, Joint Publications Research Service. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Appendix A

Table

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

2 Provincial-level Units and Selected Urban Centers—Pinyin and Wade-Giles Forms

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4 Chronology of Chinese Dynasties

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6 Population, 1953–80. United States Census Bureau Intermediate Model

7 Age Structure of the Population Estimated as of January 1, 1980

8 Distribution of the Population by Province-level Unit. Estimated as of December 31, 1978

9 Size and Distribution of Minority Nationalities, 1978

10 Municipalities of 1 Million or More

11 Production and Import of Major Commodities, Selected Years 1952–79

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

When you know	Multiply by	To find
Millimeters	0.04	inches
Centimeters	0.39	inches
Meters	3.3	feet
Kilometers	0.62	miles
Hectares (10,000 m^2)	2.47	acres
Square kilometers	0.39	square miles
Cubic meters	35.3	cubic feet
Liters	0.26	gallons
Kilograms	2.2	pounds
Metric tons	0.98	long tons
	1.1	short tons
	2,204	pounds
Degrees Celsius (Centigrade)	9 divide by 5 and add 32	degrees Fahrenheit

Table 2. Provincial-level Units and Selected Urban Centers—Pinyin and Wade-Giles Forms

Pinyin to	Wade-Giles	Wade-Giles to	Pinyin
	Provincial-level Units		
Anhui	Anhwei	Anhwei	Anhui
Beijing	Pei-ching	Chekiang	Zhejiang
Fujian	Fukien	Fukien	Fujian
Gansu	Kansu	Heilungkiang	Heilongjiang
Guangdong	Kwangtung	Honan	Henan
Guangxi-Zhuang	Kuang-hsi-chuang-tsu	Ho-pei	Hebei
Guizhou	Kweichow	Hsin-chiang-wei-wu-erh	Xinjiang-Uygur
Hebei	Ho-pei	Hsi-tsang	Xizang
Heilongjiang	Heilungkiang	Hunan	Hunan
Henan	Honan	Hupeh	Hubei
Hubei	Hupeh	Kansu	Gansu
Hunan	Hunan	Kiangsi	Jiangxi
Jiangsu	Kiangsu	Kiangsu	Jiangsu
Jiangxi	Kiangsi	Kirin	Jilin
Jilin	Kirin	Kuang-hsi-chuang-tsu	Guangxi-Zhuang
Liaoning	Liaoning	Kwangtung	Guangdong
Nei Monggol	Nei-meng-ku	Kweichow	Guizhou
Ningxia-Hui	Ning-hsia-hui-tsu	Liaoning	Liaoning
Qinghai	Tsinghai	Nei-meng-ku	Nei Monggol
Shaanxi	Shensi	Ning-hsia-hui-tsu	Ningxia-Hui
Shandong	Shantung	Pei-ching	Beijing
Shanghai	Shanghai	Shanghai	Shanghai
Shanxi	Shansi	Shansi	Shanxi
Sichuan	Szechwan	Shantung	Shandong
Tianjin	Tien-chin	Shensi	Shaanxi
Xinjiang-Uygur	Hsin-chiang-wei-wu-erh	Szechwan	Sichuan
Xizang	Hsi-tsang	Tien-chin	Tianjin
Yunnan	Yünnan	Tsinghai	Qinghai
Zhejiang	Chekiang	Yünnan	Yunnan
	Urban Centers		
Changchun	Ch'ang-ch'un	Ch'ang-ch'un	Changchun
Chengdu	Ch'eng-tu	Ch'eng-tu	Chengdu
Chongqing	Ch'ung-ch'ing	Ch'ung-ch'ing	Chongqing
Fushun	Fu-shun	Fu-shun	Fushun
Guangzhou	Kuang-chou	Ha-erh-pin	Harbin
Harbin	Ha-erh-pin	Hsi-an	Xi'an
Lüda	Lü-ta	Kuang-chou	Guangzhou
Nanjing	Nan-ching	Lü-ta	Lüda
Qingdao	Tsingtao	Nan-ching	Nanjing
Shenyang	Shen-yang	Shen-yang	Shenyang
Taiyuan	T'ai-yüan	T'ai-yüan	Taiyuan
Wuhan	Wu-han	Tsingtao	Qingdao
Xi'an	Hsi-an	Wu-han	Wuhan
Yan'an	Yenan	Yenan	Yan'an

Source: Based on information from U.S. Department of Interior, Board on *Geographic Names, Gazetteer of the People's Republic of China: Pinyin to Wade-Giles, Wade-Giles to Pinyin*, Washington, July 1979.

Table 3. Selected Place Names — Conventional and Pinyin Forms

Pinyin*	to Conventional Form of Reference
Beijing	Peking
Chang Jiang	Yangtze River
Da Hinggan Ling	Greater Khingan Range
Da Yunhe	Grand Canal
Dongbei Pingyuan	Manchurian Plain
Ergun He	Argun River
Gangdisê Shan	Kailas Range
Guangzhou	Canton
Guangxi-Zhuang Zizhiqu	Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region
Heilong Jiang	Amur River
Huang He	Yellow River
Junggar Pendi	Dzungarian Basin
Juyong Guan	Nankow Pass
Karakorum Shankou	Karakoram Pass
Kashi	Kashgar
Kunlun Shan	Kunlun Mountains
Lancang Jiang	Mekong River
Mu Us Shamo	Ordos Desert
Nei Monggol Zizhiqu	Inner Mongolia (short form) Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region
Ningxia-Hui Zizhiqu	Ningsia-Hui-Autonomous Region
Nu Jiang	Salween River
Qaidam Pendi	Tsaidam Basin
Qingdao	Tsingtao
Qinghai Hu	Koko Nor
Qing Zang Gaoyuan	Tibet, Plateau of
Qin Ling	Tsinling Shan
Qiongzhou Haixia	Hainan Strait
Shantou	Swatow
Sichuan Pendi	Szechwan Basin
Songhua Hu	Sungari Reservoir
Songhua Jiang	Sungari River
Taiwan Haixia	Formosa Strait
Taklimakan Shamo	Takla Makan Desert
Tarim He	Tarim River
Tarim Pendi	Tarim Basin
Tianjin	Tientsin
Tian Shan	Tien Shan
Tumen Jiang	Tumen River

Conventional Form of Reference	to Pinyin*
Amoy	Xiamen
Amur River	Heilong Jiang
Argun River	Ergun He
Brahmaputra River	Yarlung Zangbo Jiang
Canton	Guangzhou
China, People's Republic of	Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Dzungarian Basin	Junggar Pendi
Formosa Strait	Taiwan Haixia
Grand Canal	Da Yunhe
Greater Khingan Range	Da Hinggan Ling
Great Wall	Wanli Changcheng
Hainan Strait	Qiongzhou Haixia
Inner Mongolia (short form) Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region	Nei Monggol Zizhiqu
Kailas Range	Gangdisê Shan
Karakoram Pass	Karakorum Shankou
Kashgar	Kashi
Koko Nor	Qinghai Hu
Kunlun Mountains	Kunlun Shan
Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region	Guangxi-Zhuang Zizhiqu
Lesser Khingan Range	Xiao Hinggan Ling
Manchurian Plain	Dongbei Pingyuan
Mekong River	Lancang Jiang
Nankow Pass	Juyong Guan
Ningsia-Hui Autonomous Region	Ningxia-Hui Zizhiqu
Ordos Desert	Mu Us Shamo
Pearl River	Zhu Jiang
Peking	Beijing
Red River	Yuan Jiang
Salween River	Nu Jiang
Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region	Xinjiang-Uygur Zizhiqu
Suchow	Xuzhou

Table 3. Continued

Pinyin* to	Conventional Form of Reference	Conventional Form of Reference to	Pinyin*
Turpan Pendi	Turfan Depression	Sungari Reservoir	Songhua Hu
Wanli Changcheng	Great Wall	Sungari River	Songhua Jiang
Wusuli Jiang	Ussuri River	Swatow	Shantou
Xiamen	Amoy	Szechwan Basin	Sichuan Pendi
Xinjiang-Uygur Zizhiqu	Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region	Takla Makan Desert	Taklimakan Shamo
Xiao Hinggan Ling	Lesser Khingan Range	Tarim Basin	Tarim Pendi
Xizang Zizhiqu	Tibet (short form) Tibetan Autonomous Region	Tarim River	Tarim He
Xuzhou	Suchow	Tibet (short form) Tibetan Autonomous Region	Xizang Zizhiqu
Yalü Jiang	Yalu River	Tibet, Plateau of	Qing Zang Gaoyuan
Yarlung Zangbo Jiang	Brahmaputra River	Tien Shan	Tian Shan
Yuan Jiang	Red River	Tientsin	Tianjin
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo	China, People's Republic of	Tsaidam Basin	Qaidam Pendi
Zhu Jiang	Pearl River	Tsingtao	Qingdao
		Tsinling Shan	Qin Ling
		Tsingtao	Qingdao
		Tumen River	Tumen Jiang
		Turfan Depression	Turpan Pendi
		Ussuri River	Wusuli Jiang
		Yalu River	Yalü Jiang
		Yangtze River	Chang Jiang
		Yellow River	Huang He

*Including generic parts of Chinese place names.

Source: Based on information from U.S. Department of Interior, Board on Geographic Names, *Gazetteer of the People's Republic of China: Pinyin to Wade-Giles, Wade-Giles to Pinyin*, Washington, July 1979, pp. 915–16.

Table 4. Chronology of Chinese Dynasties

Dates	Dynasty
ca. 21st century–16th century B.C.	Xia (Hsia)
ca. 16th century–11th century B.C.	Shang (also called Yin)
ca. 11th century–770 B.C.	Western Zhou (Chou)
770–476 B.C.	Eastern Zhou (Chou)
	Spring and Autumn Period
475–221 B.C.	Warring States Period
221–207 B.C.	Qin (Ch'in)
206 B.C.–A.D. 24	Western Han
A.D. 25–220	Eastern Han
A.D. 221–280	Three Kingdoms
220–265	Wei
221–263	Shu
220–280	Wu
A.D. 265–316	Western Jin (Chin)
A.D. 317–420	Eastern Jin (Chin)
A.D. 420–589	Northern and Southern dynasties
A.D. 581–618	Sui
A.D. 618–907	Tang (T'ang)
A.D. 907–979	Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms
A.D. 960–1279	Song (Sung)
916–1125	Liao
1115–1234	Kin
1271–1368	Yuan
1368–1644	Ming
1644–1911	Qing (Ch'ing)

Note — Dynasty names in Pinyin; Wade-Giles, where indicated, is in parentheses.

Source: Based on information from Qi Wen, *China: A General Survey*, Beijing, 1979, pp. 251–52.

Table 5. Population, 1953–80. Reconstructed Official Data Model

Year	January 1 Population (in thousands)	Annual Average Population (in thousands)	Net Change (in thousands)	Births (in thousands)	Deaths (in thousands)
1953	575,853	582,643	13,580	22,728	9,148
1954	589,433	597,136	15,405	23,595	8,190
1955	604,838	611,302	12,928	20,740	7,812
1956	617,766	624,427	13,321	20,729	7,408
1957	631,087	638,809	15,433	22,623	7,180
1958	646,530	654,124	15,187	22,709	7,522
1959	661,717	668,364	13,293	21,271	7,978
1960	675,010	673,735	– 2,551	18,580	21,131
1961	672,459	665,864	– 13,190	11,871	25,061
1962	659,269	661,586	4,633	12,903	8,270
1963	663,902	671,820	15,835	23,225	7,390
1964	679,737	691,317	23,159	30,141	6,982
1965	702,896	713,450	21,108	27,886	6,778
1966	724,004	734,874	21,740	28,354	6,614
1967	745,744	755,019	18,550	25,874	7,324
1968	764,294	773,486	18,383	25,731	7,348
1969	782,677	793,014	20,673	27,572	6,899
1970	803,350	814,344	21,987	28,746	6,759
1971	825,337	836,208	21,741	28,264	6,523
1972	847,078	857,106	20,056	26,347	6,291
1973	867,134	876,541	18,813	25,475	6,662
1974	885,947	894,968	18,041	24,753	6,712
1975	903,988	911,844	15,712	22,551	6,839
1976	919,700	926,185	12,970	19,639	6,669
1977	932,670	938,950	12,560	19,048	6,488
1978	945,230	951,660	12,860	18,855	5,995
1979	958,090	964,505	12,830	18,617	5,787
1980*	970,920	-------	------	------	-----

*See Model A, table 7.

Table 5. (continued)

Natural Increase (per 1,000 population)	Birthrates (per 1,000 population)	Death Rates (per 1,000 population)	Life Expectancy		Year
			Male	Female	
23.3	39.0	15.7	50.32	53.37	1953
25.8	39.5	13.7	53.62	56.97	1954
21.1	33.9	12.8	54.72	58.15	1955
21.3	33.2	11.9	56.16	59.68	1956
24.2	35.4	11.2	57.54	61.14	1957
23.2	34.7	11.5	57.11	60.69	1958
19.9	31.8	11.9	56.05	59.57	1959
-3.8	27.6	31.4	29.85	32.27	1960
-19.8	17.8	37.6	22.23	24.35	1961
7.0	19.5	12.5	52.10	55.32	1962
23.6	34.6	11.0	57.23	60.82	1963
33.5	43.6	10.1	60.48	64.21	1964
29.6	39.1	9.5	61.69	65.48	1965
29.6	38.6	9.0	62.71	66.52	1966
24.6	34.3	9.7	61.07	64.83	1967
23.8	33.3	9.5	61.37	65.14	1968
26.1	34.8	8.7	63.16	66.98	1969
27.0	35.3	8.3	64.11	67.96	1970
26.0	33.8	7.8	65.14	69.01	1971
23.4	30.7	7.3	65.99	69.92	1972
21.5	29.1	7.6	65.31	69.19	1973
20.2	27.7	7.5	65.48	69.37	1974
17.2	24.7	7.5	65.34	69.22	1975
14.0	21.2	7.2	65.90	69.81	1976
13.4	20.3	6.9	66.66	70.59	1977
13.5	19.8	6.3	68.45	72.32	1978
13.3	19.3	6.0	69.48	73.29	1979
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Source: Based on information from John S. Aird, "Reconstruction of an Official Data Model of the Population of China," (Paper presented at China Population Analysis Conference, University of Hawaii, East-West Center, May 19–23, 1980), p. 32.

Table 6. Population, 1953–80. United States Census Bureau Intermediate Model

Year	January 1 Population (in thousands)	Annual Average Population (in thousands)	Net Change (in thousands)	Births (in thousands)	Deaths (in thousands)
1953	576,085	582,640	13,109	26,219	13,110
1954	589,194	596,709	15,030	27,200	12,170
1955	604,224	611,585	14,721	26,116	11,395
1956	618,945	626,339	14,787	25,910	11,123
1957	633,732	641,734	16,003	27,085	11,082
1958	649,735	657,523	15,575	27,062	11,487
1959	665,310	672,272	13,924	26,068	12,144
1960	679,234	681,559	4,650	24,470	19,820
1961	683,884	681,652	−4,464	20,526	24,990
1962	679,420	681,716	4,591	19,624	15,033
1963	684,011	692,126	16,229	27,435	11,206
1964	700,240	712,449	24,417	34,504	10,087
1965	724,657	736,054	22,794	31,889	9,095
1966	747,451	758,513	22,123	31,019	8,896
1967	769,574	780,176	21,203	30,529	9,326
1968	790,777	802,021	22,487	31,887	9,390
1969	813,264	825,032	23,536	32,779	9,243
1970	836,800	848,348	23,096	32,241	9,145
1971	859,896	870,699	21,605	30,543	8,938
1972	881,501	891,601	20,199	29,011	8,812
1973	901,700	911,544	19,687	28,238	8,551
1974	921,387	931,042	19,309	27,706	8,397
1975	940,696	949,711	18,030	26,355	8,325
1976	958,726	966,710	15,968	24,317	8,349
1977	974,694	982,185	14,981	23,156	8,175
1978	989,675	997,225	15,099	23,316	8,217
1979	1,004,774	1,012,197	14,846	23,105	8,259
1980*	1,019,620	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

n.a.—not available.

*See Model B; table 7.

Table 6. (continued)

Natural Increase (per 1,000 population)	Birthrates (per 1,000 population)	Death Rates (per 1,000 population)	Life Expectancy		Year
			Male	Female	
22.5	45.0	22.5	40.09	42.92	1953
25.2	45.6	20.4	42.82	45.76	1954
24.1	42.7	18.6	44.84	47.86	1955
23.6	41.4	17.8	45.83	48.88	1956
24.9	42.2	17.3	46.65	49.63	1957
23.7	41.2	17.5	46.27	49.29	1958
20.7	38.8	18.1	45.08	48.11	1959
6.8	35.9	29.1	31.96	34.46	1960
−6.5	30.1	36.7	24.17	26.36	1961
6.7	28.8	22.1	36.88	39.58	1962
23.4	39.6	16.2	46.64	49.62	1963
34.3	48.4	14.2	51.61	54.79	1964
31.0	43.3	12.4	54.52	57.94	1965
29.2	40.9	11.7	55.43	58.91	1966
27.2	39.1	12.0	54.93	58.38	1967
28.0	39.7	11.7	55.44	58.92	1968
28.5	39.7	11.2	56.38	59.92	1969
27.2	38.0	10.8	57.02	60.60	1970
24.8	35.1	10.3	57.68	61.29	1971
22.7	32.5	9.9	58.11	61.74	1972
21.6	31.0	9.4	58.91	62.58	1973
20.7	29.8	9.0	59.54	63.24	1974
19.0	27.8	8.8	59.92	63.63	1975
16.5	25.2	8.6	59.97	63.69	1976
15.3	23.6	8.3	60.56	64.30	1977
15.1	23.4	8.2	60.81	64.56	1978
14.7	22.8	8.2	61.08	64.84	1979
n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1980

Source: Based on information from John S. Aird, "Intermediate Model of the Population of China," (Paper presented at China Population Analysis Conference, University of Hawaii, East-West Center, May 19–23, 1980).

Table 7. Age Structure of the Population Estimated as of January 1, 1980

Age	Model A[1]		Model B[2]	
	Population (in thousands)	Percent of total	Population (in thousands)	Percent of total
0–4	95,394	9.83	112,155	11.00
5–9	126,832	13.06	133,249	13.07
10–14	125,680	12.94	138,250	13.56
15–19	80,311	8.27	95,976	9.41
20–24	86,316	8.89	95,098	9.33
25–29	89,309	9.20	88,680	8.70
30–34	68,710	7.08	67,238	6.59
35–39	51,130	5.27	55,071	5.40
40–44	47,857	4.93	50,670	4.97
45–49	43,595	4.49	45,757	4.49
50–54	38,784	3.99	38,186	3.75
55–59	33,685	3.47	31,155	3.06
60–64	28,314	2.92	24,620	2.41
65–69	22,589	2.33	18,844	1.85
70–74	16,168	1.67	13,047	1.28
75 and over	16,246	1.67	11,624	1.14
TOTAL[3]	970,920	100.01	1,019,620	100.01

[1] See 1980 figures, table 5.

[2] See 1980 figures, table 6.

[3] Totals may not add to 100 because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from John S. Aird, "Reconstruction of an Official Data Model of the Population of China," (Paper presented at China Population Analysis Conference, University of Hawaii, East-West Center, May 19–23, 1980), p. 45.

Table 8. Distribution of Population by Province-level Unit. Estimated as of December 31, 1978

Region* and Province-level Unit	Population (in millions)	Area (in square kilometers)	Density (people per square kilometer)
Northeast			
Heilongjiang	33.76	710,000	48
Jilin	24.74	290,000	85
Liaoning	37.43	230,000	163
North			
Beijing	8.50	17,800	478
Hebei	50.57	218,400	232
Nei Monggol	8.90	450,000	7
Shanxi	24.24	157,100	154
Tianjin	7.21	11,000	655
East			
Anhui	47.13	139,900	337
Fujian more than	24.50	123,100	199
Jiangsu	58.34	108,000	540
Shanghai	10.98	6,185	1,775
Shandong	71.60	153,300	467
Zhejiang	37.51	101,800	368
Central			
Henan	70.66	167,000	423
Hunan	51.66	210,500	245
Hubei	45.75	187,500	244
South			
Jiangxi	31.83	164,800	193
Guangdong	55.93	214,600	261
Guangxi	34.02	237,200	143
Southwest			
Guizhou	26.86	174,000	154
Sichuan	97.07	567,600	171
Yunnan	30.92	436,200	71
Xizang	1.79	1,223,000	1
Northwest			
Gansu	18.73	530,000	35
Ningxia	3.66	77,000	48
Qinghai	3.65	720,996	5
Shaanxi	27.79	195,800	142
Xinjiang	12.33	1,662,600	7

*Regional divisions are for descriptive purposes only and have no official administrative significance.

Source: Based on information from United Nations, Division of Population, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, *Population Headliners* [Bangkok], No. 63, June 1980, p. 5; Leo A. Orleans, *Every Fifth Child: The Population of China*, Stanford, 1972, p. 74; and P.J.M. Geelan and D.C. Twitchett (eds.), *Times Atlas of China*, London, 1974.

Table 9. Size and Distribution of Minority Nationalities, 1978

Minority Nationalities	Population	Major Areas of Distribution
Zhuang	12 million	Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region; Yunnan, Guangdong provinces
Hui	6.4 million	Ningxia-Hui Autonomous Region; Gansu, Henan, Hebei, Qinghai, Shandong, Yunnan provinces; Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region; Beijing, Tianjin
Uygur	5.4 million	Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region
Yi	4.3 million	Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou provinces; Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region
Miao	3.9 million	Guizhou, Hunan, Yunnan provinces; Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region; Sichuan, Guangdong provinces
Tibetan	3.4 million	Xizang Autonomous Region[1]; Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu, Yunnan provinces
Manchu	2.6 million	Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Hebei provinces; Beijing; Nei Monggol Autonomous Region[2]
Mongol	2.6 million	Nei Monggol Autonomous Region[2], Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region; Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Gansu, Qinghai provinces
Bouyei	1.7 million	Guizhou Province
Korean	1.6 million	Jilin, Liaoning, Heilongjiang provinces
Yao	1.2 million	Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region; Hunan, Yunnan, Guangdong, Guizhou provinces
Dong	1.1 million	Guizhou, Hunan provinces; Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region
Bai	1 million	Yunnan Province
Hani	960,000	Yunnan Province
Kazakh	800,000	Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region; Gansu, Qinghai provinces
Tujia	770,000	Hunan, Hubei provinces
Dai	760,000	Yunnan Province
Li	680,000	Guangdong Province
Lisu	470,000	Yunnan Province
She	330,000	Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Guangdong provinces
Gaoshan	300,000	Fujian Province
Loba	300,000	Xizang Autonomous Region[1]
Lahu	270,000	Yunnan Province
Va	260,000	Yunnan Province
Naxi	230,000	Yunnan Province
Shui	230,000	Guizhou Province
Dongxiang	190,000	Gansu Province
Tu	120,000	Qinghai Province
Khalkhas	90,000	Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region
Jingpo	80,000	Yunnan Province
Qiang	80,000	Sichuan Province
Daur	70,000	Nei Monggol Autonomous Region[2], Heilongjiang Province
Mulao	70,000	Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region
Bulang	50,000	Yunnan Province
Salar	50,000	Qinghai, Gansu provinces

Table 9. Continued

Minority Nationalities	Population	Major Areas of Distribution
Monba	40,000	Xizang Autonomous Region[1]
Xibe	40,000	Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region, Liaoning Province
Maonan	30,000	Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region
Gelao	20,000	Guizhou Province
Pumi	20,000	Yunnan Province
Tajik	20,000	Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region
Achang	10,000	Yunnan Province
Bengloog	10,000	Yunnan Province
Ewenki	10,000	Nei Monggol Autonomous Region[2], Heilongjiang Province
Jinuo	10,000	Yunnan Province
Nu	10,000	Yunnan Province
Yugur	8,000	Gansu Province
Uzbek	7,000	Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region
Baoan	6,000	Gansu Province
Jing	5,000	Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region
Drung	4,000	Yunnan Province
Oroqen	3,000	Nei Monggol Autonomous Region[2], Heilongjiang Province
Tartar	2,000	Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region
Hezhe	800	Heilongjiang Province
Russian	600	Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region

[1] Tibet

[2] Inner Mongolia

Source: Based on information from "Population and Major Areas of Distribution of Chinese Minority Nationalities," *Beijing Review* [Beijing], No. 9, March 3, 1980, p. 17.

Table 10. Municipalities of 1 Million or More

Municipality (Province, date of population estimate)	Approximate Population of Entire Municipality (in thousands)	Approximate Population of Urbanized Segment (in thousands)	Percent Urbanized Segment of Total Municipal Population
Shanghai[1] (----- 1978)	11,000	6,000	55
Beijing[1] (----- 1980)	8,750	4,900	56
Tianjin[1] (----- 1978)	7,210	3,250	45
Guangzhou[1] (Guangdong — 1978)	7,500	2,600	35
Shenyang[1] (Liaoning — 1978)	4,600	2,500	54
Wuhan[1] (Hubei — 1978)	3,750	2,500	67
Chongqing[1] (Sichuan — 1979)	6,250	2,500	40
Harbin[1] (Heilongjiang — 1978)	2,700	2,000	74
Nanjing[1] (Jiangsu — 1978)	4,000	1,750	44
Changchun (Jilin — 1978)	5,750	1,400	23
Xi'an (Shaanxi — 1978)	2,600	1,400	54
Chengdu (Sichuan — 1978)	3,970	1,300	33
Taiyuan (Shanxi — 1975)	1,800	1,000	56
Lüda (Dalian) (Liaoning — 1979)	4,500	900 - 1,000	20-22
Anshan (Liaoning — 1979)	2,750	900 - 1,000	33-36
Hangzhou (Zhejiang — 1977)	6,000	980	16
Baotou (Inner Mongolia — 1978)	2,100	950	45
Qiqihar (Heilongjiang — 1978)	1,450	750	52
Tangshan (Hebei — 1978)	1,100	730	67
Zhengzhou (Henan — 1976)	1,600	700	44
Jinan (Shangdong — 1978)	1,100	680	62
Guiyang (Guizhou — 1978)	1,600	650	41
Fuzhou (Fujian — 1978)	2,000	600	30

Table 10. Continued

Municipality (Province, date of population estimate)	Approximate Population of Entire Municipality (in thousands)	Approximate Population of Urbanized Segment (in thousands)	Percent Urbanized Segment of Total Municipal Population
Zibo[2] (Shandong — 1978)	2,100	500	24
Liaoyang (Liaoning — 1978)	2,750	275	10
Pingxiang (Jiangxi — 1975)	1,030	230	22
Zaozhuang (Shandong — 1978)	1,100	100	9
Lanzhou[3] (Gansu — 1978)	2,500	n.a.	n.a.
Kunming[4] (Yunnan — 1977)	1,500	n.a.	n.a.

n.a. — not available.

[1] Urban portion of the population exceeded 1 million in 1953.

[2] Zibo municipality contains ten small cities.

[3] The population of the urban portion of Lanzhou was reported as under 1 million in 1980 but was probably very close to the million mark.

[4] The population of Kunming city proper was reported as under 1 million in 1980.

Source: Based on information from Sen-dou Chang, "Trends in Internal Migration and Urbanization in China," (Paper presented at China Population Analysis Conference, University of Hawaii, East-West Center, May 19–23, 1980).

Table 11. Production and Import of Major Commodities, Selected Years 1952–79
(in millions of tons)

	Grain Output	Cotton Output	Chemical Fertilizer Use (nutrient)	Grain Imports
1952	161	1.3	.079	0
1957	191	1.6	.429	0
1965	194	1.6	2.120	5.9
1970	243	2.0	4.266	4.6
1975	284	2.4	6.935	3.5
1979	332	2.2	12.374	11.0

Appendix B

The formal rapproachement between China and the United States beginning in 1972 was expressed in the documents reprinted below. The first, the Shanghai Communiqué, was issued in Shanghai following talks between Premier Zhou Enlai and President Richard M. Nixon, and the conclusion of the latter's historic visit to China in February 1972. The second, the Joint Communiqué, was issued by the two governments on the occasion of the inauguration of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries on January 1, 1979. On February 6, 1981, the United States Department of State press spokeman announced that the new administration would honor the "solemn undertakings" agreed to in the 1979 communiqué, which among other points recognizes the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China.

EXCERPTS FROM THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUÉ

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai [Zhou Enlai] of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung [Mao Zedong] of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei [Ji Bengfei] held talks in the same spirit.

President Nixon and his party visited Peking [Beijing] and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow [Hangzhou] and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

—Progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;

—Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;

—Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and

—Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan", "one China, two governments", "two Chinas", an "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."

The U.S. side declared: the United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installation from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

February 28, 1972

JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

JANUARY 1, 1979

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979.

The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué and emphasize once again that:

- Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict.
- Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.
- Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.
- The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.
- Both believe that normalization of Sino-American relations is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the world.

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China will exchange Ambassadors and establish Embassies on March 1, 1979.

United States Statement

As of January 1, 1979, the United States of America recognizes the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. On the same date, the People's Republic of China accords similar recognition to the United States of America. The United States thereby establishes diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.

On that same date, January 1, 1979, the United States of America will notify Taiwan that it is terminating diplomatic relations and that the Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and the Republic of China is being terminated in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. The United States also states that it will be withdrawing its remaining military personnel from Taiwan within four months.

In the future, the American people and the people of Taiwan will maintain commercial, cultural, and other relations without official government representation and without diplomatic relations.

The Administration will seek adjustments to our laws and regulations to permit the maintenance of commercial, cultural, and other non-governmental relationships in the new circumstances that will exist after normalization.

The United States is confident that the people of Taiwan face a peaceful and prosperous future. The United States continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves.

The United States believes that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic will contribute to the welfare of the American people, to the stability of Asia where the United States has major security and economic interest, and to the peace of the entire world.

Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China
January 1, 1979

As of January 1, 1979, the People's Republic of China and the United States of America recognize each other and establish diplomatic relations, thereby ending the prolonged abnormal relationship between them. This is a historic event in Sino-U.S. relations.

As is known to all, the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China and Taiwan is a part of China. The question of Taiwan was the crucial issue obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United

States. It has now been resolved between the two countries in the spirit of the Shanghai Communique and through their joint efforts, thus enabling the normalization of relations so ardently desired by the people of the two countries. As for the way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland and reunifying the country, it is entirely China's internal affair.

At the invitation of the U.S. Government, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, [Deng Xiaoping] Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, will pay an official visit to the United States in January 1979, with a view to further promoting the friendship between the two peoples and good relations between the two countries.

Appendix C

The People's Liberation Army at a Glance

Ground Forces

Total strength: 3,600,000

Main Forces:

40 armies (3 airborne and 117 infantry divisions)
11 tank divisions
40 artillery and antiaircraft (AA) divisions
150 regiments (tank, artillery, AA, engineer, motor transport, signal)

Regional Forces:

85 divisions (border defense, garrison, internal security)
130 regiments

Militia:

7,000,000 armed militia (armed and trained)
15,000,000–20,000,000 backbone militia (partially armed, poorly trained)
60,000,000–200,000,000 ordinary militia (unarmed, untrained labor force)

Major Weapon Systems:

Armor

Type 59 medium tank — 100mm gun, 36 tons, copy of Soviet T-54
Type 62 light tank — 85mm gun, 21 tons, reconnaissance version of Type 59
Type 60/63 amphibious tank — 85mm gun, 18 tons, copy of Soviet PT-76
T-34 medium tank — 85mm gun, 32 tons, Soviet manufacture, obsolete
M 1967 armored personnel carrier (APC) — amphibious, crew 4, troops 10

Artillery

122mm howitzer — type 54, towed, copy of Soviet M 1938
122mm gun — type 60, towed, copy of Soviet D-74
130mm gun — type 59–1, towed, same chassis as 122mm gun
152mm gun/howitzer — type 66, towed, copy of Soviet D-20
122mm SP howitzer — type 54 howitzer mounted on APC
85mm antitank gun — type 55, towed, copy of Soviet D-44
100mm antitank gun, towed

- 107mm rocket launcher — type 63-1, 12-tube, towed
- 130mm rocket launcher — type 63, 19-tube, truck mounted
- 130mm armored rocket launcher, tube-pod mounted on APC

AA

- 14.5mm AA machine gun — type 58, optic, towed, twin-barrel copy of Soviet ZPU-2
- 14.5mm AA machine gun — type 56, optic, towed, 4-barrel copy of Soviet ZPU-4
- 37mm AA gun — type 55, optic, towed, copy of Soviet M-1939
- 57mm AA gun — type 59, optic or radar, towed, copy of Soviet S-60
- 85mm AA gun — radar, towed, copy of Soviet KS18
- 100mm AA gun — radar, towed, copy of Soviet KS19

* * * * *

Air Force

Strength: 400,000
32 air defense and fighter bomber divisions
12 bomber divisions
100 surface-to-air sites (6 launchers each)
10,000 AA guns

Aircraft

- 500 F-4 fighters - copy of Soviet MiG-15
- 4,000 F-5 and F-6 fighters - copies of Soviet MiG-17s and -19s respectively
- 100 F-7 fighters - copy of Soviet MiG-21
- 400 A-5 ground attack fighters - previously incorrectly designated F-9
- 100 TU-2 short-range piston bomber
- 400 IL-28 short-range jet bomber
- 100 TU-16 intermediate-range jet bomber
- 750 transports (AN-2, IL-14, AN-24, AN-26, AN-12, IL-18, Trident, etc.)
- 300 helicopters (MI-4, MI-6, MI-8, Super Frelon)

Airfields

400 operational, over 200 are jet capable and over 6,000 feet long

* * * * *

Navy

Strength: 350,000

Ships and boats

Submarines
- 1 Golf class ballistic missile (SSB)
- 1 or 2 Han class nuclear attack (SSN)
- 80 Romeo class diesel attack (SS)
- 20 Whiskey class diesel attack (SS)

Surface Combatants
- 7 Luda class destroyers
- 4 Gordy class destroyers
- 5 Riga class frigates
- 2 Jiangdong class frigates
- 5 Jiangnan class frigates
- 7 Jianghu class frigates
- 250 missile attack boats (OSA and Houku classes)
- 250 torpedo boats (majority Huchwan class)
- 70 lesser combatants (without missiles)
- 40 amphibious ships (majority left by the United States after World War II)

Naval Air Force
- 6 air defense and fighter bomber divisions
- 3 bomber divisions

Missile Forces

Strength: unknown

Ballistic Missiles

- 30-40 CSS–1 medium range 600-700nm range, IOC: 1966
- 50-70 CSS–2 intermediate range 1500-1700nm, IOC: 1972
- 2 CSS–3 limited range intercontinental (ICBM) 3,000-5,000nm, IOC: mid-1970s
  - Full range ICBM under development in 1980, expect initial deployment in early 1980s
- Several hundred nuclear warheads, both fission and fusion, 20 kilotons to 3 megatons yield

* * * * *

The Ten Major Principles of Military Operations
(according to Mao Zedong)

1. Attack weak points first (enemy forces).
2. Start small; start rural.
3. Be forces oriented.
4. Concentrate and achieve local superiority; annihilate the enemy.
5. Thoroughly plan and prepare.
6. Total commitment and effort.
7. Stay mobile, but attack enemy positions.
8. Attack weak points first, then stronger ones (cities).
9. The enemy is our source of supplies.
10. Rest between exertions, but allow enemy no respite.

Source: "The Ten Major Principles of Military Operation," *Peking Review* [Beijing], No. 12, March 24, 1978, p. 8.

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Glossary

brigade—The intermediate administrative level in the commune system; the organizational structure of the collective sector in agriculture. The highest level is the commune (*q.v.*); the lowest, the production team.

cadre—Person who holds any responsible position in either the party or the governmental apparatus of the nation. Usually denotes a person in administrative work. Term is often used, in a more restricted sense, to denote a person who has been fully indoctrinated in party ideology and methods and is employed in ways that make use of this training.

China Proper—Long used broadly to mean China within the Great Wall, with its eighteen historic provinces. Divisible into two major and sharply contrasting regions, North China and South China. The dependencies on the north and west—Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, and Sinkiang or Chinese Turkestan—were known as Outer China.

class struggle—In Marxist terms, the struggle waged by the masses of the toilers and the oppressed under the leadership of the vanguard of the working class—the communist party—against the privileged, oppressive, and property-owning ruling class.

commune—The highest of three administrative levels in rural areas. Communes, the largest collective units, are divided in turn into production brigades (*q.v.*) and production teams. The commune has both governmental and economic functions.

Cultural Revolution—Short term for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, a political campaign designed to rekindle revolutionary fervor through mass actions outside the formal party organizations. Begun in 1966 by Mao Zedong and his radical supporters, the Cultural Revolution began to wind down after 1968 after the violent excesses brought on by Red Guards (*q.v.*). Officially, however, the campaign was seen as having continued until October 1976 (although for all practical purposes, it was dormant) after the Gang of Four (*q.v.*) was purged.

democratic centralism—The basic organizational principle of China under which the representative organs of both state and Party are elected by lower bodies and in turn elect their executive arms at corresponding levels. Within both the representative and executive bodies, the minority must abide by the decisions of the majority, and lower bodies must obey the orders of the higher level organs. Derived from the organizing principles of the communist party of the Soviet Union.

"expert"—Term usually juxtaposed with "red" (*q.v.*) to denote special knowledge or skill, or both, relating to economic management, science, and technology.

fiscal year (FY)—January 1 to December 31.

"four modernizations"—The core of a development strategy aimed at turning the country into a relatively advanced industrialized nation by the year 2000. The modernizations are those of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and defense.

Gang of Four—Term used by the current party leadership to denote the four leading radical figures—Jiang Qing (Mao's widow), Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen—who played a dominant role during the Cultural Revolution (1966–68) and had continued to influence the political process until they were arrested in October 1976. Their negative deeds are often linked with Lin Biao, an early leader of the Cultural Revolution, who also has been discredited.

Great Leap Forward—Campaign beginning in 1958 and lasting through 1960 designated to accomplish at a greatly accelerated rate the economic modernization of the country, with an emphasis on national self-sufficiency and labor-intensive methods. Often referred to simply as the Great Leap.

Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution—*See* Cultural Revolution.

Gross national product (GNP)—The total value of final goods and services produced in the economy. The "estimated GNP" figures used in the text are estimates by United States government analysts of Chinese GNP according to the American definition, which includes personal consumption, gross investment, all government expenditures, and net exports. Through mid-1980, Chinese calculations of national income did not include government and personal services, passenger transportation, and depreciation investment. Statements by Chinese officials in late 1980 indicated that China might adopt the American concept of GNP.

Han—Also, Han Chinese. Term used to designate the ethnic majority, which constitutes 94 percent of the population. The more than fifty minority nationalities make up the remainder.

"hundred flowers" campaign—Government-sponsored initiative to permit greater intellectual and artistic freedom and variety. Introduced first into drama and other arts in mid-1956 under official slogan, "Let a hundred flowers bloom; let the hundred schools of thought contend," the movement spread to intellectual expression and, by early May 1957, was being interpreted as permission for intellectuals to criticize political institutions of the regime. Movement halted abruptly at end of May 1957, at which time antirightist campaign was launched.

Long March—Famous yearlong trek beginning in late 1934, carried out by The Red Army (predecessor of People's Liberation Army—PLA) to escape government forces sent to suppress them. Of the 100,000 to 190,000 people who began the arduous march from communist bases in Jiangxi Province and elsewhere in the south, some 20,000 survived to reach Shaanxi Province in northwest, communist headquarters for the next decade.

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Mao Zedong Thought—Sayings and writings of Mao that served as a major source of national ideology until his death in 1976 and since then have begun to undergo a cautious but critical reappraisal. By 1980 meaning of term had expanded to include the thoughts of all key party leaders.

"mass line"—Term for party policy aimed at broadening and cultivating contacts with the masses of the people so as to maximize the effect of propaganda, socialization, organizational work, mobilization, and leadership role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

mass struggle—Derived from the concept of "mass line" (*q.v.*). Party-directed campaign designed to mobilize the masses to take part in revolutionary activities, emphasizing the theme that the Party, on the basis of the reciprocal relationship between political leaders and the people, represents the interests of the working class.

National People's Congress (NPC)—Highest popular assembly of China, elected in accordance with principles of democratic centralism (*q.v.*).

neighborhood—Term in general use for the urban administrative unit usually found immediately below the district level, although an intermediate, subdistrict level exists in some cities. Also called streets (administrative terminology varies from city to city). Neighborhoods encompass 2,000 to 10,000 families. Within neighborhoods, families are grouped into smaller residential units of 100 to 600 families, supervised by a residents' committee, and these are finally subdivided into residents' small groups of fifteen to forty families.

Overseas Chinese—Term usually used to refer to any Chinese living abroad—without regard to his or her current citizenship status. Overseas Chinese minorities are concentrated principally in southeast Asia but are also found in other parts of Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and the Americas. Overseas Chinese are important to Beijing as a source of potential support abroad. Their remittances to relatives in China form a sizable portion of China's foreign exchange income. Also used in China to refer to persons living in China who have returned from abroad or who have relatives overseas.

putonghua—Common spoken language, used in its various forms by more than 70 percent of the population. Government promotes use of *putonghua* in schools, cultural arena, and daily life as means of bringing about the unification of the Han (*q.v.*) language. *Putonghua* is based on northern dialect, uses Beijing pronunciations as its standard.

Red Guards—Teenage students that were organized by Maoists in and out of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and first appeared in mid-1966 wearing armbands imprinted with words "Hong Wei Bing" (Red Guards) and carrying copies of the "little red book," *Quotations from Chairman Mao*. Acting under leadership of Mao and his radical adherents, Red Guards were the "soldiers" and the vanguard of Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (*q.v.*).

"red"—Politically and ideologically correct, according to Maoist criteria. Usually juxtaposed with "expert" (*q.v.*).

rehabilitation—Term used in official Chinese translations to denote the restoration, full or partial, of one's reputation or political standing.

revisionism—As used by Communists, term refers to political, economic, and social tendencies that stray rightward from orthodox Marxism-Leninism. The Chinese Communists have insisted that these tendencies are counterrevolutionary and that the Soviet Union is infected by this negative phenomenon.

team—The basic accounting unit. In the administrative hierarchy, it is the lowest level, the next higher levels being respectively production brigade and commune (*q.v.*). Typically the team owns most of the land and is responsible for income distribution.

Yuan—The monetary unit is the yuan (¥), which in mid-1980 had a rate of US$1 = ¥1.4575, or ¥1 = US$.686. The yuan is divided into 100 fen and 10 fen constitute 1 jiao. The currency is known as Renminbi (RMB) meaning the people's currency. The inscription Renminbi (or Renminbiao) appears on bank notes as well as yuan, and both terms are used synonymously in quoting exchange rates by different sources.

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